[Cite as State v. Fields,
2024-Ohio-3328.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
MONTGOMERY COUNTY
STATE OF OHIO :
:
Appellee : C.A. No. 29620
:
v. : Trial Court Case No. 2021 CR 03837
:
TERRY FIELDS : (Criminal Appeal from Common Pleas
: Court)
Appellant :
:
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OPINION
Rendered on August 30, 2024
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RICHARD L. KAPLAN, Attorney for Appellant
MATHIAS H. HECK, JR., by NATHAN B. VANDERHORST, Attorney for Appellee
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HUFFMAN, J.
{¶ 1} Terry Fields appeals from his convictions, following guilty pleas, on three
counts of sexual battery and one count of illegal use of a minor in nudity-oriented material
or performance (“illegal use”). For the following reasons, the judgment of the trial court
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is affirmed.
Facts and Procedural History
{¶ 2} On November 29, 2021, Fields was indicted on six counts of sexual battery
and two counts of illegal use. Fields pled not guilty and filed a motion to suppress
statements he had made to law enforcement officers and other evidence. The court
found that Fields’s waiver of his rights during questioning was knowing, intelligent, and
voluntary, such that suppression of his statements to law enforcement officers was not
warranted, and that he had voluntarily consented to the search of his cell phone. The
court also found that two search warrants had been based on probable cause that
evidence of the offenses would be found in Fields’s residence and vehicle. The motion to
suppress was overruled.
{¶ 3} On July 14, 2022, Fields pled guilty to three counts of sexual battery and one
count of illegal use. In exchange for his pleas, the other counts were dismissed, and the
parties agreed that Fields’s sentence would not exceed five years. The trial court
designated Fields a Tier III sex offender for the sexual battery offenses and a Tier I sex
offender for the illegal use offense. Fields was sentenced to 36 months for each count
of sexual battery and to 12 months for illegal use, all to be served concurrently.
{¶ 4} Fields’s appellate counsel filed a brief pursuant to Anders v. California, 386
U.S. 738 (1967), stating that he was unable to identify any meritorious issues for review.
On August 9, 2023, we set aside the Anders brief after identifying at least one non-
frivolous issue, namely whether the trial court had properly advised Fields of his Tier I sex
offender classification for the illegal use offense. Different counsel was appointed for
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Fields, and Fields’s brief was filed on December 7, 2023.
{¶ 5} Fields asserts two assignments of error on appeal. His first assignment of
error states:
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT DESIGNATED MR. FIELDS
A TIER I SEX OFFENDER BECAUSE THE COURT FAILED TO NOTIFY
MR. FIELDS OF THE MANDATORY TIER I SEX OFFENDER STATUS
FOR THE CONVICTION OF ILLEGAL USE OF A MINOR IN A NUDITY-
ORIENTED MATERIAL OR PERFORMANCE PURSUANT TO R.C.
2907.232(A)(3).
{¶ 6} Fields asserts that, because the trial court did not inform him that he would
be classified as a Tier I sex offender as a result of his guilty plea to illegal use of a minor,
the court failed to comply with Crim.R. 11(C), which required that his plea be vacated.
{¶ 7} The State points out that the registration requirements for Tier III sex
offenders are more onerous than those for Tier I offenders and, therefore, Fields will
comply with his obligations under Tier I by virtue of complying with Tier III for the sexual
battery offenses. The State contends that the trial court partially complied with Crim.R.
11(C) by informing Fields of his obligations as a Tier III offender and that Fields cannot
show that he was prejudiced by the trial court’s failure to further advise him that he would
be classified as a Tier I sex offender and of his obligations under that tier. The State
argues that, because Fields indicated in his plea colloquy that he understood the more
stringent Tier III registration requirements (that he would be required to register as a sex
offender every 90 days for the rest of his life), he cannot successfully demonstrate that
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the trial court completely failed to inform him of the maximum penalty in accordance with
Crim.R. 11(C).
{¶ 8} “Due process requires that a defendant’s plea be made knowingly,
intelligently, and voluntarily; otherwise, the defendant’s plea is invalid.” State v. Bishop,
2018-Ohio-5132, ¶ 10, citing State v. Clark,
2008-Ohio-3748, ¶ 25. Crim.R. 11(C)
governs pleas of guilty in felony cases, and a “trial court’s compliance with Crim.R. 11(C)
ensures that a plea comports with due process.” State v. Perdue,
2022-Ohio-722, ¶ 10
(2d Dist.).
{¶ 9} “Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(c) requires that a defendant be advised of certain
constitutional rights, and strict compliance with this part of the rule is required.” State v.
Jackson, 2021-Ohio-4336, ¶ 7 (2d Dist.), citing State v. Thompson,
2020-Ohio-211, ¶ 5
(2d Dist.). “Where a trial court fails to strictly comply with Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(c), the
defendant’s plea should be deemed invalid on appeal.” (Citations omitted).
Id.
{¶ 10} Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(a) requires that a trial court ascertain whether a defendant
is “making the plea voluntarily,” and Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(b) requires that the court ascertain
that the defendant understands “the effect of the plea of guilty.” These parts of the rule
relate to nonconstitutional issues, and the “ ‘defendant must affirmatively show prejudice
to invalidate the plea where the trial court fails to comply fully with Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(a)-
(b).’ ” Jackson at ¶ 8, quoting State v. Dangler,
2020-Ohio-2765, ¶ 14. To demonstrate
prejudice resulting from partial noncompliance with Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(a)-(b), the defendant
must show that he “would [not] have otherwise entered the plea.”
Id., citing Thompson.
If, however, a trial court completely fails to comply with Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(a)-(b), the
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defendant’s plea should be invalidated on appeal, and a showing of prejudice is not
required. Id., citing
Dangler at ¶ 14.
{¶ 11} R.C. 2950.01(E)(1)(d) designates one who pleads guilty to illegal use as a
Tier I sex offender/child victim offender. R.C. 2950.01(G) designates one who pleads
guilty to sexual battery as a Tier III sex offender/child victim offender.
{¶ 12} In Dangler, the trial court advised the defendant that he would be required
to register as a Tier III sex offender, which meant he would have an obligation to register
for his lifetime. Id. at ¶ 4. Dangler argued that his plea had not been knowing,
intelligent, and voluntary because the court did not advise him of residency restrictions,
community notification requirements, and in-person verification every 90 days of where
he lived, worked, and went to school. Id. at ¶ 6. The Sixth District vacated the plea
without requiring a demonstration of prejudice on the basis that the trial court had
completely failed to comply with Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(a) by failing to review each “penalty”
associated with a Tier III classification. Id. at ¶ 8, 21.
{¶ 13} The Supreme Court of Ohio reversed and upheld the plea. Id. at ¶ 24, 26.
After noting the general rule requiring a showing of prejudice for vacating a plea, the court
noted the two exceptions, namely (1) the failure to explain the constitutional rights waived
by a guilty plea, and (2) the complete failure to comply with a non-constitutional part of
Crim.R. 11(C). Id. at 14-15. “Aside from these two exceptions, the traditional rule
continues to apply: a defendant is not entitled to have his plea vacated unless he
demonstrates he was prejudiced by a failure of the trial court to comply with the provisions
of Crim.R. 11(C).” Id. at ¶ 16. Dangler explained: “the questions to be answered are
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simply: (1) has the trial court complied with the relevant provision of the rule? (2) if the
court has not complied fully with the rule, is the purported failure of a type [constitutional
right/Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(c), or complete failure/Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(a)-(b)] that excuses a
defendant from the burden of demonstrating prejudice? and (3) if a showing of prejudice
is required, has the defendant met that burden?” Id. at ¶ 17.
{¶ 14} In State v. West, 2022-Ohio-1611, ¶ 19 (2d Dist.), the trial court erred in
advising West (both orally and in the plea form) that he was subject to a Tier II designation
for illegal use, when in fact he was subject to a Tier I designation for that offense. But
the court did inform West that he was subject to sex offender classification for that offense
as well as to Tier III classification for sexual batteries. We found that the record did not
reflect “a complete failure to comply with Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(a)” and noted that West had
“acknowledged that he was subject to a registration requirement ‘every 90 days for life.’ ”
(Emphasis in original.)
Id. We found it significant that West “failed to even argue that
he would not have entered his plea to illegal use of a minor in nudity oriented material if
he had been advised that he was in fact subject to the less onerous Tier I designation for
that count.” Id. at ¶ 20.
{¶ 15} West distinguished the matter therein from State v. Hawkins, 2013-Ohio-
2572 (2d Dist.), wherein the State incorrectly stated that the defendant would be required
to register as a Tier II offender when he was, in fact, required to register under the more
onerous Tier III. West at ¶ 21, citing Hawkins. In Hawkins, we found it significant that
the tier level had been misstated, concluding that the misinformation prejudiced Hawkins
because he was not advised about community notification and lifetime reporting
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requirements unique to a Tier III designation. Hawkins at ¶ 16; West at ¶ 21.
{¶ 16} In State v. Wroten, 2023-Ohio-966, ¶ 76-77 (2d Dist.), we noted:
In cases decided after Dangler, courts have even held that partial
compliance existed where there was “execution of a written plea agreement
advising [the defendant] he would be subject to Tier II and III sex-offender
requirements, combined with the prosecutor's statement at the plea
hearing.” State v. McFadden, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 20AP-179, 2021-
Ohio-2204, ¶ 35 (agreeing with State v. Dornoff, 6th Dist. Wood No. WD-
16-072, 2020-Ohio-3909, ¶ 17, that the defendant needed to show
prejudice). In Dornoff, the trial court did not inform the defendant of the
requirements; the only statement was from the prosecutor, who noted the
defendant would be subject to Tier III registration. In addition, while the plea
form the defendant signed indicated he would be subject to registration, it
did not outline the punitive consequences. Dornoff at ¶ 4. Nonetheless,
the defendant still had to show prejudice. Id. at ¶ 17.
Similarly, in McFadden, the trial court did not advise the defendant
at the plea hearing, but the prosecutor stated that the defendant would be
required to register as a Tier III offender. McFadden at ¶ 33. However,
the plea form did say that the defendant would be required to comply with
Tier III requirements, including residency conditions. Id.
{¶ 17} In Fields’s case, the court advised him as follows:
And I also need to tell you, sir, because this is a sexually-oriented
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offense, that as such, as a sexual offender or a child-victim offender, you
are going to be required not to reside within a 1,000 feet of any school
premises. Also, you may be required to register your residence, place of
employment, school attending, or place of obtaining higher education with
the sheriff of the county of which you establish residency. You are also
required to file a notice of intent to reside. After the date of the initial
registration, you will be required to periodically verify your residence in
person at the sheriff's office. If you change your address, school,
employment, or place of higher education, you will be required to notify the
sheriff and register the new information. You will be required to fulfill these
requirements for a period of time. A hearing will be held at which time the
Court will determine your sexual offender status, which will be at
sentencing.
Your failure to comply with these registration requirements is a crime
and will result in criminal prosecution.
The court further advised Fields, “it’ll be a Tier 3. I will make that determination formally
at sentencing. But a Tier 3, sir, means you’d have to register every 90 days for the rest
of your life.” Fields acknowledged his understanding.
{¶ 18} Fields’s plea form for the sexual battery offenses stated that he understood
he would be a Tier III sex offender and unable to reside within 1000 feet of a school,
preschool, or child daycare premises, and he would be subject to address verification
every 90 days for life and subject to community notification. His plea form for the illegal
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use offense stated that he understood that he would be a Tier I sex offender and unable
to reside within 1000 feet of a school, preschool, or child daycare premises, and subject
to address verification annually for 15 years. Immediately after Fields read and signed
the plea forms, he responded affirmatively when the court asked, “have you understood
everything that’s happened here so far today?” Fields’s signatures appeared below his
acknowledgment of the penalties for a Tier III and a Tier I offender designation on each
form.
{¶ 19} The best practice is for the trial court to always orally advise a defendant at
the plea hearing regarding each individual sex offender designation. The trial court failed
to do here. We cannot conclude, however, that the trial court completely failed to comply
with Crim.R. 11. The court orally advised Fields that he was subject to the penalties of
a Tier III sex offender designation, with the exception of community notification, which
was expressly included in the plea form and which Fields acknowledged he understood.
The court also advised Fields that the failure to comply with the registration requirements
was a crime and would result in criminal prosecution. Both plea forms contained all the
specific penalties for each of the offenses. Given the trial court’s partial compliance with
Crim.R. 11, Fields must show that he was prejudiced in order to vacate his plea.
{¶ 20} Fields does not argue that he would not have entered his plea to illegal use
if the court had orally advised him that he was subject to Tier I sex offender penalties in
addition to the specific advisement in the plea form. In fact, the word “prejudice” does
not appear in Fields’s brief under this assignment of error. As noted above, in exchange
for his guilty pleas, multiple charges were dismissed. We agree with the State that, in
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this case, the penalties of a Tier I designation, which were of shorter duration and less
onerous than those of a Tier III designation, were necessarily subsumed by the penalties
of Fields’s Tier III designation, such that the additional Tier I designation was of no
practical effect. Accordingly, in the absence of a showing of prejudice, Fields’s first
assignment of error is overruled.
{¶ 21} Fields’s second assignment of error is:
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED TO THE PREJUDICE OF MR. FIELDS
WHEN IT HELD HIS CONSENT TO THE SEARCH OF HIS CELL PHONE
WAS VOLUNTARY AND DID NOT VIOLATE HIS 4TH AMENDMENT
RIGHTS TO THE U.S. CONSTITUTION.
{¶ 22} “A plea of guilty is a complete admission of guilt. Consequently, a guilty
plea waives all appealable errors, including a ruling on a motion to suppress, except to
the extent that the errors precluded the defendant from knowingly, intelligently, and
voluntarily entering his or her guilty plea.” State v. Williams, 2018-Ohio-2972, ¶ 4 (2d
Dist.), citing State v. Harris,
2017-Ohio-9052, ¶ 7 (2d Dist.); State v. Frazier, 2016-Ohio-
727, ¶ 81 (2d Dist.); State v. Faulkner,
2015-Ohio-2059, ¶ 9.
{¶ 23} Fields does not claim that his plea was not entered knowingly, intelligently,
and voluntarily (beyond his argument about the court’s partial noncompliance with
Crim.R. 11, as discussed above). The transcript of the plea hearing reflects that the
court asked Fields if he understood that a guilty plea was a compete admission of guilt
and that by so pleading he gave up his right to appeal any pretrial rulings. Fields
answered affirmatively. On the record before us, Fields has waived his right to appeal
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from the trial court’s decision on his motion to suppress. Accordingly, Fields’s second
assignment of error is overruled.
Conclusion
{¶ 24} The trial court did not completely fail to comply with Crim.R. 11(C) in
designating Fields a Tier I sex offender, and prejudice is not demonstrated. Field’s guilty
pleas waived his right to challenge the trial court’s ruling on his motion to suppress.
Having overruled Fields’s two assignments of erros, the judgment of the trial court is
affirmed.
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TUCKER, J. and LEWIS, J., concur.
