[Cite as State v. Hill,
2024-Ohio-3330.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
MONTGOMERY COUNTY
STATE OF OHIO :
:
Appellee : C.A. No. 30048
:
v. : Trial Court Case No. 2023 CR 1573
:
ANGELINA HILL : (Criminal Appeal from Common Pleas
: Court)
Appellant :
:
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OPINION
Rendered on August 30, 2024
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KRISTIN L. ARNOLD, Attorney for Appellant
MATHIAS H. HECK, JR., by SARAH H. CHANEY, Attorney for Appellee
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WELBAUM, J.
{¶ 1} Appellant Angelina Hill appeals from her conviction in the Montgomery
County Court of Common Pleas on two counts of aggravated vehicular homicide.
Specifically, Hill contends that the trial court erred by imposing consecutive sentences for
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her offenses. For the reasons outlined below, we disagree with Hill’s argument and will
affirm the judgment of the trial court.
Facts and Course of Proceedings
{¶ 2} On August 30, 2023, a Montgomery County grand jury returned an indictment
charging Hill with two third-degree-felony counts of aggravated vehicular homicide and
two second-degree-misdemeanor counts of vehicular homicide. The charges arose
after Hill ran a stop sign at a high rate of speed in Butler Township, Ohio, and caused a
collision with another vehicle that resulted in the deaths of 73-year-old John Parrish and
71-year-old Janet Mowen. Hill initially pled not guilty to the charges and was released
on bond with electronic home monitoring. The trial court later revoked Hill’s electronic
home monitoring and placed Hill in jail after she violated the terms of her electronic home
monitoring on several occasions.
{¶ 3} Following plea negotiations, Hill entered a plea agreement with the State
whereby she agreed to plead guilty to two counts of aggravated vehicular homicide in
violation of R.C. 2903.06(A)(2)(a). In exchange for Hill’s guilty pleas, the State agreed
to dismiss the remaining counts in the indictment. The trial court accepted Hill’s guilty
pleas and ordered a presentence investigation report (“PSI”). After considering the PSI,
the purposes and principles of felony sentencing, Hill’s conduct while on electronic home
monitoring, medical records submitted by Hill, and statements made by Hill, defense
counsel, and the victims’ family members, the trial court sentenced Hill to 60 months in
prison on each count of aggravated vehicular homicide and ordered those sentences to
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be served consecutively. Accordingly, Hill received a total term of 120 months in prison
for her offenses.
{¶ 4} Hill appeals from her conviction, raising a single assignment of error for
review.
Assignment of Error
{¶ 5} Under her sole assignment of error, Hill argues that the trial court’s imposition
of consecutive sentences was contrary to law and unsupported by the record. We
disagree.
{¶ 6} When reviewing felony sentences, we apply the standard of review set forth
in R.C. 2953.08(G). State v. Jones, 2020-Ohio-6729, ¶ 27, citing State v. Marcum, 2016-
Ohio-1002, ¶ 21. Under that statute, an appellate court may increase, reduce, or
otherwise modify a sentence, or it may vacate the sentence and remand the matter for
resentencing only if it clearly and convincingly finds either: (1) the record does not support
the sentencing court’s findings under certain listed statutes; or (2) the sentence is
otherwise contrary to law. Marcum at ¶ 9, citing R.C. 2953.08(G)(2).
{¶ 7} As previously discussed, Hill challenges the trial court’s imposition of
consecutive sentences, which is governed by R.C. 2929.14(C)(4). R.C. 2929.14(C)(4)
is one of the statutes listed under R.C. 2953.08(G)(2), and it provides that a trial court
may impose consecutive sentences if it finds that: (1) consecutive service is necessary
to protect the public from future crime or to punish the offender; (2) consecutive sentences
are not disproportionate to the seriousness of the offender’s conduct and to the danger
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the offender poses to the public; and (3) one or more of the following three findings is
made:
(a) The offender committed one or more of the multiple offenses while
the offender was awaiting trial or sentencing, was under a sanction
imposed pursuant to section 2929.16, 2929.17, or 2929.18 of the
Revised Code, or was under post-release control for a prior offense.
(b) At least two of the multiple offenses were committed as part of one
or more courses of conduct, and the harm caused by two or more of
the multiple offenses so committed was so great or unusual that no
single prison term for any of the offenses committed as part of any
of the courses of conduct adequately reflects the seriousness of the
offender’s conduct.
(c) The offender’s history of criminal conduct demonstrates that
consecutive sentences are necessary to protect the public from
future crime by the offender.
R.C. 2929.14(C)(4)(a)-(c).
{¶ 8} “[A] trial court is required to make the findings mandated by R.C.
2929.14(C)(4) at the sentencing hearing and incorporate its findings into its sentencing
entry, but it has no obligation to state reasons to support its findings.” State v. Bonnell,
2014-Ohio-3177, syllabus. “[W]here a trial court properly makes the findings mandated
by R.C. 2929.14(C)(4), an appellate court may not reverse the trial court’s imposition of
consecutive sentences unless it first clearly and convincingly finds that the record does
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not support the trial court’s findings.” State v. Withrow, 2016-Ohio-2884, ¶ 38 (2d Dist.).
“The plain language of R.C. 2953.08(G)(2) requires an appellate court to defer to a trial
court’s consecutive-sentence findings, and the trial court’s findings must be upheld unless
those findings are clearly and convincingly not supported by the record.” State v.
Gwynne,
2023-Ohio-3851, ¶ 5, accord State v. Williams,
2024-Ohio-1707, ¶ 19 (2d Dist.)
Therefore, “[o]ur authority is limited to detecting something in the record that supported
the trial court’s findings. As long as the findings were not clearly and convincingly
unsupported, we must affirm.” (Emphasis in original.) State v. Simpson, 2024-Ohio-
2378, ¶ 36 (2d Dist.).
{¶ 9} In this case, Hill does not dispute that the trial court made the required
consecutive-sentence findings at the sentencing hearing and that those findings were
incorporated into the judgment entry. Indeed, the record of the sentencing hearing and
the judgment entry indicate that the trial court found consecutive sentences were
necessary to protect the public from future crime or to punish Hill, and that consecutive
sentences were not disproportionate to the seriousness of Hill’s conduct and the danger
that Hill posed to the public. See Sentencing Tr., p. 45; Judgment Entry. In addition,
the trial court found that the two offenses in this case were committed as part of one
course of conduct and that the harm caused by the two offenses was so great or unusual
that no single prison term for any of the offenses adequately reflected the seriousness of
Hill’s conduct. Id. Because the trial court made the required consecutive-sentence
findings and incorporated them into the judgment entry, our review is limited to
determining whether the record clearly and convincingly does not support the trial court’s
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findings.
{¶ 10} Hill argues that the record does not support the trial court’s finding under
R.C. 2929.14(C)(4)(b), i.e., that her two offenses were committed as part of one course
of conduct and that the harm caused by those offenses was so great or unusual that no
single prison term for the offenses adequately reflected the seriousness of her conduct.
Hill claims that this finding was unsupported by the record because the only reason the
trial court gave for making it was that “two people lost their lives very unnecessarily as a
result of the actions that occurred on that day.” Sentencing Tr., p. 45. Hill argues that
in State v. Hacker, 2002 WL 1332289 (2d Dist. June 14, 2002), this court found that similar
reasoning did not support the great-and-unusual-harm finding under R.C.
2929.14(C)(4)(b) (then codified as R.C. 2929.14(E)(4)(b)).
{¶ 11} In Hacker, the trial court imposed consecutive sentences for two counts of
aggravated vehicular homicide after making consecutive-sentence findings that included
a great-and-unusual-harm finding under R.C. 2929.14(C)(4)(b). Hacker at *2. With
respect to that finding, the trial court in Hacker observed that the victims had suffered the
worst form of harm since they died as a result of their injuries. Id. at *4. On appeal, this
court found that the record did not support the trial court’s finding under R.C.
2929.14(C)(4)(b) because the deaths of the victims were “a necessary element” of the
defendant’s offenses. Id. In other words, the court found that because aggravated
vehicular homicide “necessarily involves the death of a victim,” the fact that Hacker
caused the death of his victims did not support finding that his aggravated vehicular
homicide offenses were “ ‘so great or unusual’ that no single prison term for either of the
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offenses . . . adequately reflects the seriousness of Hacker’s conduct.” Id.
{¶ 12} When determining whether the great-and-unusual-harm finding was
unsupported by the record, the court in Hacker did not consider facts in the record
establishing that Hacker drank excessively, took pills, and passed out just a few hours
before he caused the collision that led to his aggravated vehicular homicide charges. Id.
at *1. The court also did not consider facts in the record establishing that Hacker was
driving over 60 mph in a 35-mph zone when he lost control of his vehicle and collided with
a parked car that contained the victims, 63-year-old Kenneth Jones and 66-year-old
Glenn Wade. Id. Most importantly, the court did not consider facts in the record
establishing that Jones and Wade had been severely injured as a result of the collision
and did not die until several days later. In other words, the record indicated that the
victims suffered several days before succumbing to their injuries. Instead of considering
any of these facts, the court in Hacker focused solely on the reasoning the trial court gave
for the great-and-unusual-harm finding.
{¶ 13} We note that the court in Hacker also found that the record did not support
the trial court’s finding under R.C. 2929.14(C)(4)(c) (formerly R.C. 2929.14(E)(4)(c)), i.e.,
that Hacker’s history of criminal conduct demonstrated that consecutive sentences were
necessary to protect the public from future crime by him. Hacker, 2002 WL 1332289, at
*4-5. The court reached this conclusion even though the record established that Hacker
had a criminal history that included convictions for driving under the influence of alcohol
and an open container violation just two years before the collision in question. Id. at *4.
Although the court in Hacker recognized “that Hacker has demonstrated a propensity for
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getting into trouble as a result of the consumption of alcohol,” the court nevertheless
determined that the record did not support the criminal-history finding and instead focused
on the fact that Hacker had been seeking treatment for his alcoholism and was
remorseful. Id. at *4-5.
{¶ 14} Upon review, we find that the court in Hacker correctly recognized that the
clearly-and-convincingly-unsupported-by-the-record standard of review in R.C.
2953.08(G)(2) was the standard of review that applied to Hacker’s consecutive
sentences, see id. at *3, but that the court applied the standard incorrectly. We note that
the standard of review in R.C. 2953.08(G)(2) has not changed in any material respect
since Hacker was decided in 2002. See H.B. No. 331, 2000 Ohio Laws 222. As
previously discussed, “[t]he plain language of R.C. 2953.08(G)(2) requires an appellate
court to defer to a trial court’s consecutive-sentence findings, and the trial court’s findings
must be upheld unless those findings are clearly and convincingly not supported by the
record.” Gwynne,
2023-Ohio-3851, at ¶ 5. Therefore, “[a]ll we are given the authority
to do is to make sure there was something in the record that supported the trial court’s
findings.” (Emphasis in original.) Williams,
2024-Ohio-1707, at ¶ 21 (2d Dist.).
{¶ 15} Based on the aforementioned facts in Hacker, we find that there was
something in the record that supported the consecutive-sentence findings at issue.
However, instead of being deferential to the trial court’s consecutive-sentence findings
and simply reviewing the record for something that supported the findings, the court in
Hacker focused only on the facts it found to be important and modified Hacker’s sentence
in a way it deemed suitable. Such a review does not comply with R.C. 2953.08(G)(2).
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Accordingly, Hacker was not correctly decided and is hereby overruled.
{¶ 16} Having overruled Hacker, Hill’s argument with regard to the trial court’s
great-and-unusual-harm finding lacks merit. The fact that the trial court observed at the
sentencing hearing that the victims had died unnecessarily as a result of Hill’s conduct
did not mean that the trial court’s great-and-unusual-harm finding was clearly and
convincingly unsupported by the record. As previously discussed, a trial court is not
even required to state reasons supporting its consecutive-sentence findings. Bonnell,
2014-Ohio-3177, at syllabus. Any reason the trial court may have given for its
consecutive-sentence findings does not, by itself, determine whether those findings are
clearly and convincingly unsupported by the record. Again, that determination is made
by looking at the record and seeing if there is anything that fails to support the trial court’s
findings. We note that “the ‘record’ includes, among other things, any presentence or
other report submitted to the trial court, the trial record in the case, and any oral or written
statements made by or submitted to the trial court at the sentencing hearing.” State v.
McElrath,
2024-Ohio-2475, ¶ 10 (2d Dist.), citing R.C. 2953.08(F).
{¶ 17} In this case, the PSI indicated that, at the time of the collision, Hill was
uninsured and driving 82 mph in a 50-mph zone while making outgoing calls on her cell
phone. Although the PSI indicated that Hill’s blood test results for alcohol were
inconclusive due to an abnormality with the testing, it also indicated that a witness, who
stopped and spoke with Hill after the collision, smelled alcohol on Hill’s breath. The trial
court also indicated at the sentencing hearing that Hill had had an alcohol monitoring
device (Soberlink) while out on bond and noted that Hill had had past issues with alcohol.
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{¶ 18} The PSI further indicated that the collision in question caused a loud
explosion and resulted in Parrish and Mowen’s vehicle being knocked into the air and
landing in a cornfield. According to the PSI, Hill was treated at the hospital for non-life-
threatening injuries while Parrish and Mowen were both pronounced dead at the scene
of the collision. The statements given by Mowen’s daughters at the sentencing hearing
indicated that Parrish and Mowen had died violently and sustained broken necks, severed
brain stems, organ damage, and internal bleeding. Mowen’s oldest daughter stated that
she has nightmares about the collision and that she often thinks about how violently her
mother and Parrish died, the severity of their injuries, and the fear they must have felt
during the collision. She also stated that she has overwhelming stress and anxiety about
driving, has difficulty dealing with her grief and anger, and sobs during her lunch hour,
which she used to spend with Mowen.
{¶ 19} Mowen’s youngest daughter stated that she struggles with being angry
every day and gets sick to her stomach when she thinks of the fear her mother felt during
the collision. She also stated that she thinks about the collision all the time, which causes
her not to sleep well. She further indicated that she has had to miss work to get her
mother’s property in order, meet with the prosecutor, and attend court dates. To do so,
the youngest daughter stated that she drives 400 miles roundtrip even though it is a
financial struggle for her. The youngest daughter further indicated that her mother and
Parrish have grandchildren, great grandchildren, friends, and pets who loved them very
much and enjoyed spending time with them. In addition, Parrish’s sister provided a
written statement to the court stating that the loss of her brother has broken her heart and
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that she misses him and Mowen very much.
{¶ 20} Based on the information in the record regarding Hill’s conduct at the time
of the collision, the violent nature of Mowen and Parrish’s deaths, and the negative effects
the incident had on several of the victims’ family members, we cannot say that the trial
court’s finding under R.C. 2929.14(C)(4)(b) was clearly and convincingly unsupported by
the record. That is, we cannot say the record clearly and convincingly does not support
finding that the harm caused by Hill’s multiple offenses was so great or unusual that no
single prison term for any of the offenses adequately reflects the seriousness of Hill’s
conduct.
{¶ 21} We also do not find that the record fails to support the trial court’s other
consecutive-sentence findings, i.e., that consecutive sentences were necessary to
protect the public from future crime or to punish Hill, and that consecutive sentences were
not disproportionate to the seriousness of Hill’s conduct and the danger she posed to the
public. Although the PSI indicated that Hill had no prior felony convictions, it also showed
that she had seven out-of-state misdemeanor convictions between 2010 and 2022 for
violating a protection order, domestic violence, making false/misleading statements to a
public servant, attempted theft, resisting arrest, assault, and menacing. The PSI also
showed that in 2013 and 2016, Hill was arrested in Nevada for domestic battery, and that
Hill had a juvenile record in California for fighting when she was 13 years old.
{¶ 22} Most importantly though, at the sentencing hearing, the trial court stated
that Hill had a pending failure to yield charge out of Miami County, Ohio, that was based
on Hill’s causing a collision by once again failing to yield at a stop sign. The trial court
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stated that the Miami County collision occurred on March 7, 2023, just two months after
the collision in this case. The trial court noted that Hill had failed to pay the ticket in that
case and otherwise failed to appear at court. The trial court also discussed how Hill had
previously failed to appear at court in this case, violated the terms of her electronic home
monitoring on several occasions, made misrepresentations to the court about having
cancer, and completely disregarded the court’s orders for bond. The trial court stated
that Hill’s actions showed that the court’s orders meant nothing to her and that Hill was
not truly remorseful for her conduct.
{¶ 23} Based on the foregoing information and the previously discussed
information pertaining to Hill’s conduct during the collision, we cannot say that the record
clearly and convincingly fails to support the trial court’s findings that consecutive
sentences were necessary to protect the public from future crime or to punish Hill or that
consecutive sentences were not disproportionate to the seriousness of Hill’s conduct and
the danger she posed to the public. Because the trial court’s consecutive-sentence
findings were not clearly and convincingly unsupported by the record, there is no basis
for this court to modify Hill’s sentence.
{¶ 24} Hill’s sole assignment of error is overruled.
Conclusion
{¶ 25} Having overruled Hill’s assignment of error, the judgment of the trial court is
affirmed.
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TUCKER, J. and LEWIS, J., concur.
