[Cite as State v. Mills,
2024-Ohio-3359.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
TWELFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT OF OHIO
WARREN COUNTY
STATE OF OHIO, :
Appellee, : CASE NO. CA2023-12-110
: OPINION
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:
JOSHUA TAYLOR MILLS, :
Appellant. :
CRIMINAL APPEAL FROM WARREN COUNTY COURT OF COMMON PLEAS
Case No. 23CR40769
David P. Fornshell, Warren County Prosecuting Attorney, and Kirsten A. Brandt, Assistant
Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee.
Roger W. Kirk, for appellant.
BYRNE, J.
{¶ 1} Appellant, Joshua Taylor Mills, appeals his conviction in the Warren County
Court of Common Pleas following his guilty plea to one count of third-degree felony
aggravated possession of drugs. For the reasons outlined below, we affirm in part,
reverse in part, and remand to the trial court for the limited purpose of permitting the trial
court to employ the postrelease control correction procedures set forth in R.C. 2929.191.
Warren CA2023-12-110
I. Factual and Procedural Background
{¶ 2} On July 31, 2023, the Warren County Grand Jury returned an indictment
charging Mills with one count of aggravated possession of drugs, a third-degree felony.
The indictment also charged Mills with one count of theft and one count of possessing
drug abuse instruments, both first-degree misdemeanors. Mills was arraigned on August
2, 2023. He entered a not guilty plea to all three charges.
{¶ 3} On August 28, 2023, Mills entered a plea agreement with the state and
thereafter pleaded guilty to the charge of third-degree felony aggravated possession of
drugs in exchange for the first-degree misdemeanor theft and possession of drug abuse
instruments offenses being dismissed. The trial court accepted Mills' plea upon finding
the plea was knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily entered. The trial court did this after
advising Mills that by entering a guilty plea he would be subject to an optional two-year
postrelease control term should he be sentenced to serve time in prison at his sentencing
hearing.
{¶ 4} On November 20, 2023, the trial court held a sentencing hearing where it
sentenced Mills to serve a 24-month prison term, less 55 days of jail-time credit. The trial
court issued this decision after advising Mills that it was "[i]ncorporat[ing] the post-release
control that we covered at the plea agreement." The trial court then issued its sentencing
entry, which included a complete and correct postrelease control notification. Mills then
appealed. Mills' appeal now properly before this court for decision, Mills has raised two
assignments of error for review.
II. Law and Analysis
A. Imposition of Postrelease Control
{¶ 5} Mills' first assignment of error states:
TRIAL COURT ERRED BY FAILING TO PROPERLY OR
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ADEQUATELY NOTIFY JOSHUA OF THE POST RELEASE
CONTROL CONDITION AT HIS SENTENCING HEARING.
{¶ 6} In his first assignment of error, Mills argues the trial court erred by failing to
properly impose postrelease control at his sentencing hearing.
{¶ 7} Referencing R.C. 2967.28 in State v. Bates, 2022-Ohio-475, the Ohio
Supreme Court stated, "[i]t is established that 'a trial court has a statutory duty to provide
notice of postrelease control at the sentencing hearing.'" Id. at ¶ 11, quoting State v.
Jordan,
2004-Ohio-6085, ¶ 23, overruled on other grounds by State v. Harper, 2020-Ohio-
2913. "The trial court must advise the offender at the sentencing hearing of the term of
supervision, whether postrelease control is discretionary or mandatory, and the
consequences of violating postrelease control."
Id., citing State v. Grimes, 2017-Ohio-
2927, ¶ 11.
{¶ 8} Based on our recent decisions in State v. Bryars, 2024-Ohio-2765 (12th
Dist.) and State v. Ward,
2024-Ohio-2858 (12th Dist.), we find the trial court failed to
properly impose postrelease control in this case when it merely stated at Mills' sentencing
hearing, without further elaboration, that it was "[i]ncorporat[ing] the post-release control
that we covered at the plea agreement." This holds true even though, as noted above,
the trial court's sentencing entry provided Mills with a complete and correct postrelease
control notification. This is because, as this court stated in Bryars, "[n]otice of postrelease
control at the plea hearing and in the sentencing entry does not correct the trial court's
failure to impose a term of postrelease control at the sentencing hearing." Id. at ¶ 9, citing
State v. Nascembeni,
2022-Ohio-1662 (8th Dist.) and State v. Davis,
2022-Ohio-2373 (2d
Dist.). The trial court must also announce the proper postrelease control sanction at the
defendant's sentencing hearing. See, e..g., State v. Gross,
2024-Ohio-2598, ¶ 10
(remanding case for resentencing where the trial court "did not announce the postrelease
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control sanction at the sentencing hearing"). Therefore, in accordance with this court's
recent decisions in Bryars and Ward, we find the trial court failed to properly impose
postrelease control at Mills' sentencing hearing. Accordingly, finding merit to Mills'
argument raised herein, Mills' first assignment of error is sustained.
B. Knowing, Intelligent, and Voluntary Plea
{¶ 9} Mills' second assignment of error states:
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED TO JOSHUA'S PREJUDICE BY
ACCEPTING HIS GUILTY PLEA WHICH WAS NOT
KNOWINGLY, INTELLIGENTLY OR VOLUNTARILY MADE.
{¶ 10} In his second assignment of error, Mills argues the trial court erred by
accepting his guilty plea because the plea was not knowingly, intelligently, or voluntarily
entered.1 We disagree.
a. Crim.R. 11(C) Standard
{¶ 11} "'A criminal defendant's choice to enter a plea of guilty or no contest is a
serious decision.'" State v. Johnson, 2024-Ohio-1089, ¶ 12 (12th Dist.), quoting State v.
Clark,
2008-Ohio-3748, ¶ 25. Given the seriousness of such a decision, "'[w]hen a
defendant enters a plea in a criminal case, the plea must be made knowingly, intelligently,
and voluntarily. Failure on any of those points renders enforcement of the plea
unconstitutional under both the United States Constitution and the Ohio Constitution.'"
State v. Hawkins,
2023-Ohio-2915, ¶ 7 (12th Dist.), quoting State v. Engle,
74 Ohio St.3d
525, 527,
1996-Ohio-179.
{¶ 12} "A trial court's obligations in accepting a defendant's plea as being
knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily entered is dependent 'upon the level of offense to
1. Mills bases his argument on the strict/substantial compliance framework set forth by the Ohio Supreme
Court some twenty years ago in State v. Griggs, 2004-Ohio-4415. "However, a [more] recent decision of
the Ohio Supreme Court reveals that whether a trial court substantially complies with Crim.R. 11(C)(2) is
no longer part of the analysis in reviewing a trial court's plea colloquy." State v. Rogers,
2020-Ohio-4102,
¶ 15 (12th Dist.), citing State v. Dangler,
2020-Ohio-2765.
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which the defendant is pleading.'" State v. Muhire, 2023-Ohio-1181, ¶ 11 (12th Dist.),
quoting State v. Jones,
2007-Ohio-6093, ¶ 6. "Crim.R. 11(C) prescribes the procedure a
trial court must follow in felony cases before accepting a guilty or no contest plea." State
v. Martin,
2019-Ohio-2792, ¶ 26 (12th Dist.). The rule "ensures an adequate record on
review by requiring the trial court to personally inform the defendant of his rights and the
consequences of his plea and determine if the plea is understandingly and voluntarily
made." State v. Stone,
43 Ohio St.2d 163, 168 (1975). This requires the trial court to
notify the defendant of the constitutional rights set forth in Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(c). State v.
Oliver,
2021-Ohio-2543, ¶ 41 (12th Dist.). This also requires the trial court to make the
necessary determinations and give the defendant the necessary warnings set forth in
Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(a) and (b).
Id.
{¶ 13} Specifically, pursuant to Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(a), (b), and (c):
(2) In felony cases the court may refuse to accept a plea of
guilty or a plea of no contest, and shall not accept a plea of
guilty or no contest without first addressing the defendant
personally either in-person or by remote contemporaneous
video in conformity with Crim.R. 43(A) and doing all of the
following:
(a) Determining that the defendant is making the plea
voluntarily, with understanding of the nature of the
charges and of the maximum penalty involved, and, if
applicable, that the defendant is not eligible for
probation or for the imposition of community control
sanctions at the sentencing hearing.
(b) Informing the defendant of and determining that the
defendant understands the effect of the plea of guilty
or no contest, and that the court, upon acceptance of
the plea, may proceed with judgment and sentence.
(c) Informing the defendant and determining that the
defendant understands that by the plea the defendant
is waiving the rights to jury trial, to confront witnesses
against him or her, to have compulsory process for
obtaining witnesses in the defendant's favor, and to
require the state to prove the defendant's guilt beyond
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a reasonable doubt at a trial at which the defendant
cannot be compelled to testify against himself or
herself.
{¶ 14} "[I]in order to satisfy the requirement of informing a defendant of the effect
of a plea, a trial court must inform the defendant of the appropriate language under
Crim.R. 11(B)." State v. Chatman, 2019-Ohio-5026, ¶ 13 (12th Dist.). "Crim.R. 11(B)(1)
provides the applicable language for a plea of guilty." Johnson,
2024-Ohio-1089 at ¶ 15.
That rule states, "[t]he plea of guilty is a complete admission of the defendant's guilt."
Crim.R. 11(B)(1).
b. Crim.R. 11(C) and a Showing of Prejudice
{¶ 15} A defendant is generally "not entitled to have his plea vacated unless he
demonstrates he was prejudiced by a failure of the trial court to comply with the provisions
of Crim.R. 11(C)." State v. Dangler, 2020-Ohio-2765, ¶ 16. There are two exceptions to
this rule, however. State v. Luttrell,
2022-Ohio-1148, ¶ 17 (12th Dist.). Those two
exceptions being: "(1) when the trial court fails to explain the constitutional rights set forth
in Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(c) that a defendant waives by pleading guilty or no contest, and (2) a
trial court's complete failure to comply with a portion of Crim.R. 11(C)." (Emphasis in
original.)
Id., quoting
Dangler at ¶ 15. "Under either exception, the defendant is not
required to show prejudice." State v. Henson,
2022-Ohio-2828, ¶ 6 (12th Dist.). That is
to say, when either of those two exceptions apply, the defendant need not establish that
his or her guilty plea "would [not] have otherwise been made." (Brackets in original.)
State v. Leonicio,
2023-Ohio-2433, ¶ 34 (12th Dist.), quoting State v. Henson, 12th Dist.
Fayette No. CA2021-12-029,
2022-Ohio-2828, ¶ 6. Prejudice is instead presumed to
have occurred as a matter of law. State v. Fabian,
2020-Ohio-3926, ¶ 15 (12th Dist.).
Prejudice, when required, "must be established on the face of the record and not solely
by virtue of challenging a plea on appeal." Hawkins,
2023-Ohio-2915 at ¶ 12.
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c. Whether Mills Was Required to Show Prejudice
{¶ 16} The focus when enforcing Crim.R. 11(C) is not on whether the trial court
recited the precise language set forth within the rule. This holds true for the language set
forth in Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(a), (b), and (c). The focus is instead "on whether the dialogue
between the court and the defendant demonstrates that the defendant understood the
consequences of his plea." State v. Tancak, 2023-Ohio-2578, ¶ 16. But despite the focus
not being on whether the trial court recited the precise language set forth within Crim.R.
11(C), Mills argues that the trial court completely failed to satisfy the requirements of
Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(a) by "not reading any facts for the alleged offense" into the record to
ensure that he "understood the nature of the crime to which he was pleading guilty." But
as this court has stated previously, the trial court “need not advise the defendant of the
elements of the crime[]” for which he or she is pleading guilty before the trial court can
find the defendant's plea was made with an understanding of the nature of the charge
pursuant to Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(a). State v. Huston,
2018-Ohio-2818, ¶ 19 (12th Dist.).
"[R]ather, 'it is sufficient if the totality of the circumstances warrant the trial court in making
a determination [that] the defendant understands the charge[].'"
Id., quoting State v.
Goens,
2006-Ohio-4324, ¶ 10 (12th Dist.). To the extent Mills argues otherwise, such
argument lacks merit.
{¶ 17} Here, the record firmly establishes that Mills understood the nature of the
charge to which he would be pleading guilty, third-degree felony aggravated possession
of drugs, prior to entering his guilty plea. The trial court, in fact, expressly advised Mills
of the nature of the charge at the start of the plea hearing, stating:
Mr. Mills plans to plead guilty to aggravated possession of
methamphetamine, bulk amount. That's a felony of the third
degree that carries up to 36 months in prison and a maximum
fine of $10,000.
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The trial court then turned to Mills and asked, "Mr. Mills, do you understand what you're
doing, sir?" To this, Mills responded, "Yes, Your Honor." Therefore, given the record
properly before this court, we find the trial court did not completely fail to comply with the
requirements set forth in Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(a). The trial court instead fully complied with
the rule by expressly advising Mills of the nature of the charge to which he would be
pleading guilty, third-degree felony aggravated possession of drug, prior to entering his
guilty plea. To the extent Mills argues otherwise, such argument again lacks merit.
{¶ 18} The record also clearly demonstrates that the trial court did not completely
fail to advise Mills, prior to entering the guilty plea, that the effect of entering a guilty plea
would serve as a complete admission of his guilt in accordance with Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(b).
This holds true even though the trial court did not advise Mills that, upon the acceptance
of his guilty plea, it could proceed with judgment and sentence. See State v. Jones, 2020-
Ohio-3919, ¶ 10-15 (3d Dist.). This is because, as the record plainly reveals, the trial
court specifically advised Mills that, if he were to plead guilty, he would be "admitting [he]
committed the offense" and waiving his "rights to a trial." When asked by the trial court if
he was "aware of that," Mills again responded, "Yes, Your Honor."
{¶ 19} A "complete failure" involves a trial court's complete omission in advising
about a distinct component of Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(a) or (b). Hawkins, 2023-Ohio-2915 at ¶
10. No "complete failure" occurred in this case. Therefore, despite Mills' claims, because
the trial court did not completely fail to comply with either Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(a) or (b) prior
to Mills entering his guilty plea, Mills was required to demonstrate prejudice by the trial
court's failure to fully comply with the rule, i.e., that his plea would not have otherwise
been made. Mills has failed to demonstrate any such prejudice. Mills instead claims that
the prejudice is "clear" that he "could not plead guilty voluntarily, knowingly, or
intelligently" under the "circumstances of this plea." This falls well short of what was
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required of Mills to demonstrate prejudice in this case. Accordingly, finding no error in
the trial court's decision to accept Mills' guilty plea, Mills' second assignment of error lacks
merit and is overruled.
III. Conclusion
{¶ 20} For the reasons set forth above, and having sustained Mills' first assignment
of error, we reverse Mills' sentence and remand this matter to the trial court for the limited
purpose of permitting the trial court to employ the postrelease control correction
procedures set forth in R.C. 2929.191. The judgment of the trial court in all other respects
is affirmed.
{¶ 21} Judgment affirmed in part, reversed in part, and the matter remanded.
S. POWELL, P.J., and M. POWELL, JJ., concur.
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