State v. Reed

[Cite as State v. Reed, 

.]




                       IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
                           THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
                               HANCOCK COUNTY




STATE OF OHIO
                                                          CASE NO. 5-23-50
         PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE,

    v.

ERIC A. REED, A.K.A.
ERIC ALANZO JONES,                                        OPINION
A.K.A. ERIC A. REED, III,

         DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.



                Appeal from Hancock County Common Pleas Court
                          Trial Court No. 2022CR00216

                                      Judgment Affirmed

                             Date of Decision: October 7, 2024



APPEARANCES:

         Lawrence A. Gold for Appellant

         Colleen P. Limerick for Appellee
Case No. 5-23-50




WILLAMOWSKI, P.J.

       {¶1} Defendant-appellant Eric A. Reed (“Reed”) appeals the judgment of the

Hancock County Court of Common Pleas, arguing that his convictions are not

supported by sufficient evidence; that his convictions are against the manifest

weight of the evidence; and that the trial court abused its discretion by permitting

expert testimony at trial. For the reasons set forth below, the judgment of the trial

court is affirmed.

                           Facts and Procedural History

       {¶2} In November of 2016, Brian McQuistion (“McQuistion”) had several

criminal charges pending against him and agreed to work with law enforcement as

a confidential informant. Over the next several months, McQuistion participated in

thirteen controlled buys, purchasing drugs from five or six different individuals. In

two of these operations, he bought drugs from Dominique Blakely (“Blakely”). On

October 31, 2017, a grand jury returned an indictment that charged Blakely with

two fifth-degree felonies based on these two controlled buys.

       {¶3} On November 2, 2017, Blakely was arrested and subsequently

discovered that McQuistion had been working as a confidential informant. Blakely

then told his uncle, Reed, about this situation. Blakely later testified that Reed

responded by telling him “to be careful” and by saying that “he was going to look *



                                         -2-
Case No. 5-23-50


… into it, or take care of it ….” (Tr. 680). In 2017, Reed was living in Texas

but visited Blakely where he lived in Fostoria, Ohio.

       {¶4} On November 24, 2017, Reed spent the night at Blakely’s house. On

the following day, Reed and Blakely drove to a party on Parkside Place in Findlay,

Ohio to watch Ohio State University play Michigan. Blakely testified that, after the

football game was over, he drove Reed in a white car to the area where McQuistion

lived on East Foulke Avenue in Findlay. Blakely testified that he dropped Reed off

near McQuistion’s house so that Reed could “take care of Brian [McQuistion].” (Tr.

699). Blakely then drove to a local gas station where he filled up his vehicle while

he waited for Reed to call him for a ride.

       {¶5} During this time, Grant Householder (“Householder”) was visiting at

McQuistion’s house. After the Ohio State-Michigan football game was over,

Householder was in the living room with McQuistion when they heard someone

knock on the front door. McQuistion then left the living room and went into an

adjacent room where he opened the front door. Householder then heard the sound

of a gunshot. Householder then waited in the living room for a few minutes before

he left through the back of the house.

       {¶6} As he walked away from McQuistion’s house, Householder called his

girlfriend, Stephanie Eisentrager (“Eisentrager”). During their conversation, his

girlfriend told him to call the police. Householder then dialed 9-1-1 at 5:51 P.M.

and told the dispatcher that he heard a gunshot while he was walking in the area of

                                         -3-
Case No. 5-23-50


East Foulke Avenue. He later testified that he did not provide more information

because he was “scared for [his] life.” (Tr. 370-371). While a patrol car was sent

to this area, the officer did not observe any unusual activity and cleared the call.

       {¶7} In between 5:46 and 5:49 P.M., Reed placed three calls to Blakely.

During the time of the first two calls, Blakely was still at the gas station. But by the

time of the third call, Blakely was several blocks away from East Foulke Avenue in

the area of George Street. Blakely testified that he picked up Reed near the

intersection of George Street and Main Street. They drove back to the house on

Parkside Place where they had watched the football game earlier.

       {¶8} After Householder had called 9-1-1, Eisentrager drove to pick him up.

At the time of the shooting, Eisentrager had been with McQuistion’s girlfriend,

Tamara Arce (“Arce”). Householder, Eisentrager, and Arce then went to a local

Waffle House to purchase drugs. They then went to Arce’s house. At 8:03 P.M.,

Arce called 9-1-1 and reported that McQuistion had been shot.

       {¶9} The police were dispatched to McQuistion’s address and found that the

interior door to his house was partially open, though the screen door was closed.

The police then discovered McQuistion’s body lying on the floor with a gunshot

wound to his head. McQuistion was pronounced dead at 8:14 P.M. on November

25, 2017. The police did not locate any shell casings in the vicinity of his body.

During the autopsy, a bullet was removed from McQuistion’s head.



                                          -4-
Case No. 5-23-50


       {¶10} On March 28, 2018, the State moved for dismissal of one of the

charges against Blakely that had arisen out of the controlled buys with McQuistion.

In its motion, the State indicated that this request was being made pursuant to plea

negotiations and because “an essential witness [wa]s not available ….” (Ex. 114).

While he had been charged with two fifth-degree felonies for his involvement in the

controlled buys, Blakely ended up pleading guilty to a first-degree misdemeanor.

       {¶11} During the investigation into McQuistion’s death, the police requested

geolocation information from Google to determine whether any identifiable cellular

devices were in the vicinity of the crime scene at the time of the murder. This data

indicated that a cellular device belonging to Blakely moved to an alleyway near to

McQuistion’s house at 5:40 P.M. and was situated at that point for roughly thirty

seconds before leaving. By 5:42, Blakely’s device was located at an area gas station.

At 5:47, the device left the gas station and had moved to a location on George Street

by 5:50 before returning to a house on Parkside Place at 5:55.

       {¶12} Law enforcement then sought security camera footage from various

locations along the route that Blakely’s cellular phone had taken according to the

geolocation data. In security camera footage obtained from the gas station, a white

car can be seen pulling into the parking lot at the time the geolocation data indicated

Blakely’s cellular phone was in that area. When presented with images from this

security camera footage, Blakely identified himself as the person who got out of this

white car at the gas station.

                                          -5-
Case No. 5-23-50


       {¶13} The police then obtained recordings from a security camera near the

intersection of George Street and Main Street. In this footage, a pedestrian can be

seen at roughly 5:48 P.M. on November 25, 2017 walking down Main Street. This

pedestrian was wearing apparel that resembled what Reed had been wearing in a

selfie he had posted on Facebook earlier that day. At trial, Blakely identified Reed

as the pedestrian in the footage.

       {¶14} On October 25, 2018, the police executed a search warrant on

Blakely’s residence and located a twenty-two caliber revolver that contained two

spent shell casings. Blakely testified that Reed had given this gun to him for

protection. He also testified that he was not sure whether Reed knew where the

revolver was kept at the house and that he did not see Reed with a gun on the date

of McQuistion’s death.

       {¶15} The police later examined Facebook messages between Reed and

Blakely. On January 10, 2018, the following exchange occurred:

       [Reed]: Nephew dont get us f**k up by bringing tht hot a** thing out

       [Blakely]: UNC calm down i jus wanted to know where it was at jus
       n there is an emergency

       [Reed]: I am gonna get u something

       [Blakely]: ok bet good looking

       [Reed]: Really. You need to get rid of tht for good

       [Reed]: Tht got our life on it


                                        -6-
Case No. 5-23-50


       [Blakely]: I’m not even Guna touch it unless I have to

       [Reed]: Ok when i come back i will bring you one

       [Blakely]: Cool

       [Reed]: And we will get rid of tht together

(Ex. 94). Blakely testified at trial that they were talking about what to do with the

revolver because it “was the gun that was used … to kill Brian [McQuistion]”

and was evidence. (Tr. 783). He further testified that, while Reed indicated in these

messages that they would get rid the gun together, Reed never returned to Ohio to

dispose of the revolver.

       {¶16} This revolver was later tested at the Ohio Bureau of Criminal

Investigation (“BCI”) by Kevin Kramer (“Kramer”).           In his report, Kramer

determined that the bullet recovered from McQuistion’s remains was fired from a

gun with similar class characteristics to the revolver from Blakely’s house.

However, the bullet recovered from McQuistion was “heavily damaged.” (Tr. 617).

For this reason, the individual characteristics of the bullet were not sufficiently

similar to support a conclusion as to whether this was the gun that was fired at

McQuistion. Based on the class characteristics, Kramer could only conclude that

this gun “could have fired the bullet.” (Tr. 614).

       {¶17} During his testimony, Kramer also explained that the shell casings for

this revolver remain inside the cylinder and are not automatically ejected when the

gun is fired. Officer Kevin Cieplowski testified that no shell casings were located

                                         -7-
Case No. 5-23-50


around McQuistion’s body at the scene of the homicide. Detective Brandon Bell

also testified that the revolver found in Blakely’s house could hold nine bullets. At

the time this gun was discovered, the police observed that the revolver contained

“seven live unfired rounds” and “two spent shell casings.” (Tr. 570). Blakely later

testified that he had fired one of these rounds “in the air” to scare a “crackhead”

away from him. (Tr. 770).

       {¶18} On March 25, 2021, Blakely was interviewed by the police while he

was serving time in prison in Wood County for charges unrelated to this case.

Initially, Blakely was not forthcoming with officers about what transpired on

November 25, 2017. However, after the police showed him the security camera

footage of him at the gas station, he admitted that he had driven Reed to a location

near to McQuistion’s house on the night of the murder. Blakely later gave testimony

before a grand jury proceeding that implicated Reed in McQuistion’s death.

       {¶19} On April 26, 2022, Reed was indicted on one count of aggravated

murder in violation of R.C. 2903.01(A), an unclassified felony; one count of having

weapons while under disability in violation of R.C. 2923.13(A)(2), a third-degree

felony; and one count of having weapons while under disability in violation of R.C.

2923.13(A)(3), a third-degree felony. The count of aggravated murder carried a

three-year firearm specification pursuant to R.C. 2941.145(A).

       {¶20} On October 23, 2023, a jury trial commenced on these charges.

Householder and Blakely testified as witnesses for the State. On October 27, 2023,

                                         -8-
Case No. 5-23-50


the jury returned verdicts of guilty on all the charges against Reed. At sentencing,

the trial court determined that the two counts of having weapons while under

disability merged. The State elected to proceed on the count that charged Reed with

a violation of R.C. 2923.13(A)(2). The trial court issued its judgment entry of

sentencing on October 31, 2023.

       {¶21} Reed filed his notice of appeal on November 16, 2023. On appeal, he

raises the following three assignments of error:

                            First Assignment of Error

       The trial court erred in denying Appellant’s Crim.R. 29 motion.

                          Second Assignment of Error

       The jury’s verdict was against the manifest weight of the evidence
       presented at trial.

                           Third Assignment of Error

       The trial court abused its discretion by allowing expert testimony
       from a witness that was not designated as an expert.

We are going to consider the third assignment of error before proceeding to the first

and second assignments of error.

                            Third Assignment of Error

       {¶22} Reed argues that the trial court abused its discretion by permitting

Kramer to testify when the State never made a formal statement that expressly

tendered him as an expert witness.



                                         -9-
Case No. 5-23-50


                                 Standard of Review

       {¶23} In general, a determination on the admissibility of relevant evidence

is entrusted to the sound discretion of the trial court. State v. Little, 2016-Ohio-

8398, ¶ 8 (3d Dist.). For this reason, a trial court’s ruling on the admission of

evidence is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. State v. Sullivan, 

 (3d Dist.). Thus, an appellate court is not to substitute its judgment for that of

the trial court but will reverse a trial court’s decision only if it is unreasonable,

arbitrary, or capricious. State v. Howton, 

 (3d Dist.).

       {¶24} However, if no objection is raised to the evidence at trial, all but plain

error is waived on appeal. State v. Baskin, 

 (3d Dist.).

Crim.R. 52(A) states that “[p]lain errors or defects affecting substantial rights may

be noticed although they were not brought to the attention of the court.”

       For plain error to apply, the trial court must have deviated from a legal
       rule, the error must have been an obvious defect in the proceeding,
       and the error must have affected a substantial right. … Under the
       plain error standard, the appellant must demonstrate that there is a
       reasonable probability that, but for the trial court’s error, the outcome
       of the proceeding would have been otherwise.

(Citations omitted.) State v. Bradshaw, 

 (3d Dist.). Plain

error is recognized “with the utmost caution, under exceptional circumstances and

only to prevent a manifest miscarriage of justice.” State v. Long, 

(1978), paragraph three of the syllabus.




                                           -10-
Case No. 5-23-50


                                   Legal Standard

       {¶25} Under Evid.R. 702, a witness may offer testimony as an expert if he

or she meets the following criterion:

       (A) The witness’ testimony either relates to matters beyond the
       knowledge or experience possessed by lay persons or dispels a
       misconception common among lay persons;

       (B) The witness is qualified as an expert by specialized knowledge,
       skill, experience, training, or education regarding the subject matter
       of the testimony;

       (C) The witness’ testimony is based on reliable scientific, technical,
       or other specialized information and the expert’s opinion reflects a
       reliable application of the principles and methods to the facts of the
       case. …

Evid.R. 702. “Courts should favor the admissibility of expert testimony when the

expert testimony is relevant and meets the Evid.R. 702 criteria.” State v. Morris,

 (3d Dist.).

                                   Legal Analysis

       {¶26} On appeal, Reed points out that the State did not make a formal request

to designate Kramer as an expert witness at trial. However, he does not argue that

Kramer did not have the qualifications to testify as an expert or challenge any of the

conclusions that he reached. See State v. Alley, 

 (6th Dist.).

Further, since Reed concedes that no objection was raised over this issue at trial, we

will review this argument for plain error only.




                                        -11-
Case No. 5-23-50


       {¶27} In this case, the State called Kramer to testify about the tests that had

been performed on the revolver discovered at Blakely’s residence. His testimony

began with an extensive discussion of his training, education, and experience. He

stated that, in the ten years he had worked in the firearm section of BCI, he had

tested “hundreds” of guns and had been qualified to testify as an expert in roughly

forty trials. (Tr. 582). The State also presented a copy of Kramer’s curriculum vitae

for admission into evidence.

       {¶28} The record contains ample information that establishes that Kramer

was qualified to testify as an expert witness. In response to this information, Reed

has advanced no argument that explains how he was prejudiced by the State’s failure

to make a formal request to designate Kramer as an expert witness. For this reason,

we conclude that Reed has not carried the burden of establishing plain error. State

v. Powell, 

; State v. Thompson, 

.

Accordingly, the third assignment of error is overruled.

                               First Assignment of Error

       {¶29} Reed argues that his convictions for aggravated murder and having

weapons while under disability are not supported by sufficient evidence.

                                    Legal Standard

       {¶30} A sufficiency-of-the-evidence analysis examines whether the State

has carried its burden of production at trial. State v. Richey, 

(3d Dist.). On review, an appellate court is not to consider whether the evidence at

                                         -12-
Case No. 5-23-50


trial should be believed but whether the evidence, if believed, could provide a legal

basis for the finder of fact to conclude that the defendant is guilty of the crime

charged. State v. Smith, 

 (3d Dist.). Accordingly, the

applicable standard “is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most

favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found that the

essential elements of the crime were proven beyond a reasonable doubt.” State v.

Plott, 

 (3d Dist.).

       {¶31} To establish a conviction for aggravated murder in violation of R.C.

2903.01(A), the State must prove that the defendant “purposely, and with prior

calculation and design, cause[d] the death of another ….” R.C. 2903.01(A).

Further, to establish a firearm specification under R.C. 2941.145(A), the State must

prove “that the offender had a firearm on or about the offender’s person or under

the offender’s control while committing the offense and displayed the firearm,

brandished the firearm, indicated that the offender possessed the firearm, or used it

to facilitate the offense.” R.C. 2941.145(A).

       {¶32} To establish a conviction for having weapons while under disability in

violation of R.C. 2923.13(A)(2), the State must prove that the defendant “knowingly

acquire[d], ha[d], carr[ied], or use[d] any firearm or dangerous ordinance”; was

“under indictment for or has been convicted of any felony offense of violence or has

been adjudicated a delinquent child for the commission of an offense that, if

committed by an adult, would have been a felony offense of violence”; and had not

                                        -13-
Case No. 5-23-50


been “relieved from disability under operation of law or legal process.” R.C.

2923.13(A)(2).

                                    Legal Analysis

       {¶33} First, Reed argues that the prosecution did not produce sufficient

evidence to establish that he committed aggravated murder. At trial, the State

presented evidence that McQuistion was a confidential informant who purchased

drugs from Blakely in a controlled buy. Blakely testified that Reed was his

“mentor” and “a father figure” to him. (Tr. 742). He stated that, after being charged

over these transactions, he informed Reed of McQuistion’s work as a confidential

informant. Blakely testified that Reed responded by saying that “all snitches got to

go” and “that he was going to look … into it, or take care of it ….” (Tr. 680-

681). He also affirmed that Reed told him that “snitches must die[.]” (Tr. 787).

       {¶34} Blakely further testified that, after the football game on November 25,

2017, he drove Reed to East Foulke Avenue in Findlay so that Reed could “take

care of Brian [McQuistion].” (Tr. 699). In a police interview, Blakely stated that

Reed was going to rob McQuistion or intimidate him into not testifying against him

(Blakely). However, he eventually admitted that he knew that Reed was going “to

kill Brian.” (Tr. 700). At trial, Blakely also testified that, after McQuistion’s death,

Reed told him “that he killed Brian.” (Tr. 762).

       {¶35} Additionally, the police produced geolocation data that tracked

Blakely’s cellular phone on the night of November 25, 2017. The State then

                                         -14-
Case No. 5-23-50


presented the jury with security camera footage that placed Blakely at a gas station

at the time of McQuistion’s death. The State then introduced cell phone records

that indicated Reed had called Blakely three times just after the time of the shooting

at McQuistion’s house. The evidence at trial indicates that, after Blakely had

received a call from Reed, Blakely used Google to get directions to a location near

Main Street.

       {¶36} Blakely testified that he picked Reed up near the intersection of

George Street and Main Street. The State presented geolocation data that indicates

that Blakely’s cellular phone went to the place he identified at trial. The State then

presented additional security camera footage of a pedestrian walking down Main

Street in this timeframe. Blakely identified this pedestrian as Reed. From this

evidence, a reasonable trier of fact could conclude that the State presented sufficient

evidence to establish that Reed committed the offense of aggravated murder.

       {¶37} Next, Reed argues that the State failed to produce evidence that he was

in possession of a firearm on the night of November 25, 2017. At trial, Kramer

indicated that, since the bullet removed from McQuistion was damaged, testing

could not conclude that the revolver located in Blakely’s house was not the weapon

that was used to kill McQuistion. Blakely testified that Reed had given this gun to

him for protection and that Reed had spent the night before McQuistion’s death at

his (Blakely’s) house.



                                         -15-
Case No. 5-23-50


       {¶38} The State also introduced copies of text messages sent by Reed in

which he told Blakely to “get rid of tht for good” because “tht got our life on it.”

(Ex. 94). Blakely testified that these texts were about disposing of the gun that was

used … to kill Brian [McQuistion].” (Tr. 783). From this evidence, a reasonable

trier of fact could infer that Reed was in possession of a firearm on the night of

November 25, 2017 because McQuistion died from a gunshot wound and Blakely

testified that Reed expressly admitted to killing McQuistion.

       {¶39} Having examined the record in a light most favorable to the

prosecution, we conclude that the State produced some evidence from which a

reasonable trier of fact could conclude that Reed had committed the offenses of

aggravated murder and having weapons while under disability. For this reason,

Reed has failed to demonstrate that his convictions are not supported by legally

sufficient evidence. Accordingly, the first assignment of error is overruled.

                            Second Assignment of Error

       {¶40} Reed argues that his convictions for aggravated murder and having

weapons while under disability are against the manifest weight of the evidence.

                                   Legal Standard

       {¶41} “A manifest-weight analysis examines whether the State has carried

its burden of persuasion at trial.” State v. Carroll, 

 (3d Dist.).

On review, “an appellate court’s function … is to determine whether the greater



                                        -16-
Case No. 5-23-50


amount of credible evidence supports the verdict.” State v. Harvey, 

 (3d Dist.), quoting State v. Plott, 

 (3d Dist.).

       Appellate courts “must review the entire record, weigh the evidence
       and all of the reasonable inferences, consider the credibility of
       witnesses, and determine whether in resolving conflicts in the
       evidence, the factfinder ‘clearly lost its way and created such a
       manifest miscarriage of justice that the conviction must be reversed
       and a new trial ordered.’”

State v. Randle, 

 (3d Dist.), quoting 

, quoting State

v. Thompkins, 

 (1997).

       {¶42} In this analysis, “the credibility of witnesses is primarily a

determination for the trier of fact.” Morris, 

, quoting State v.

Banks, 

 (8th Dist.). For this reason, an appellate court must

“allow the trier of fact appropriate discretion on matters relating to the weight of the

evidence and the credibility of the witnesses.” Sullivan, 

,

quoting State v. Coleman, 

 (3d Dist.). “Only in exceptional

cases, where the evidence ‘weighs heavily against the conviction,’ should an

appellate court overturn the trial court’s judgment.” State v. Hunter, 2011-Ohio-

6524, ¶ 119, quoting 

.

                                    Legal Analysis

       {¶43} Reed raises three main arguments herein. He first argues that his

convictions are against the manifest weight of the evidence because Blakely and

Householder were not reliable witnesses. At trial, Blakely testified that he had been


                                         -17-
Case No. 5-23-50


charged with complicity to aggravated murder for his actions on November 25,

2017. However, pursuant to an agreement with the State, he pled guilty to a charge

of complicity to involuntary manslaughter and was sentenced to serve thirteen years

in prison. As part of this arrangement, he agreed to testify truthfully about the events

surrounding McQuistion’s death.

       {¶44} Blakely was also questioned about his statements to the police in

several interviews. Initially, he told the police that Reed drove by himself to

McQuistion’s house in his (Blakely’s) car. But Blakely admitted that this was a lie

after he was presented the camera footage of him at the gas station. Blakely also

reported that he had dropped off Reed and another person named Natasha near to

where McQuistion lived. However, he later admitted that no one else was in the car

with him and Reed on the night of the murder. He testified that he had given

Natasha’s name to law enforcement “to get the heat off” of him and had lied to get

out of trouble. (Tr. 729).

       {¶45} Further, Blakely initially made “vague” statements to the detectives

about why he drove Reed to where McQuistion lived. (Tr. 700). He had stated that

Reed was going “to take care of Brian [McQuistion]” or was going to rob him. (Tr.

699). However, he ultimately admitted that he drove Reed to East Foulke Avenue,

knowing that Reed intended to “kill Brian.” (Tr. 700). At trial, Blakely also

indicated that he had also been using synthetic marijuana. However, he testified

that this drug use did not interfere with his ability to remember what had transpired.

                                         -18-
Case No. 5-23-50


Blakely also admitted to having been convicted for his drug-related activities in

Wood County.

       {¶46} At trial, Householder testified that, just before he heard a knock on the

front door, he had gone into the bathroom to ingest cocaine. However, he stated

that this did not interfere with his ability to remember the events of that evening

clearly. He also stated that, after hearing the gunshot, he left the house without

checking on McQuistion or attempting to render him any aid. Householder also

admitted that he was not honest when he called 9-1-1 and told the dispatcher that he

heard a gunshot while taking a walk. He stated that he was not forthcoming because

he was scared for his life.

       {¶47} Householder testified that, just after the shooting, he bought drugs

from a person who went by the name “Dog.” In one of his statements to the police,

he had suggested that Dog might have been involved in the shooting. The basis for

this belief was that he heard someone make a “D” sound at the door just before

McQuistion was shot. However, he testified that he did not hear anyone say the

name “Dog” at the door and simply gave this name as a potential lead. Householder

also admitted that he was not honest in the first interview he had with the police.

He indicated that, in a second interview, the police confronted him with statements

from his girlfriend that were inconsistent with his story and that he then decided to

be truthful.



                                        -19-
Case No. 5-23-50


         {¶48} In this case, the jury was presented with extensive information about

Blakely and Householder’s criminal histories, their actions on November 25, 2017,

their lies during this investigation, and their failures to be immediately forthcoming

with the police. As the triers of fact, the jurors were free to believe all, some, or

none of testimony provided by Blakely and Householder. Harvey, 

. “A verdict is not against the manifest weight of the evidence because the [jury]

chose to believe the State’s witnesses rather than the defendant’s version of the

events.”    State v. Hooper, 

 (3d Dist.), quoting State v.

Martinez, 

 (9th Dist.). Thus, the first argument is without

merit.

         {¶49} Next, Reed asserts that the geolocation data that was used to trace the

movements of Blakely’s phone was “junk science.”             (Appellant’s Brief, 26).

However, he has not raised any arguments in support of this assertion. Courts have

routinely allowed the introduction of various forms of location data from cellular

phones at trials. State v. White, 

 (2d Dist.); State v. Morris,

 (3d Dist.); State v. Gilmer, 

 (6th Dist.);

State v. Hagwood, 

 (8th Dist.).

         {¶50} Reed also argues that this geolocation data could only establish that

Blakely’s phone—not Blakely—was at the gas station at the time of the homicide.

However, the State also introduced images from a security camera that showed a

person getting out of a white car at a gas station in the timeframe that the geolocation

                                         -20-
Case No. 5-23-50


data placed Blakely’s phone in this area. At trial, Blakely identified himself as the

person getting out this car. The jurors were presented with this testimony and given

copies of these security camera images for their own evaluation. In this case, the

geolocation data was not used in isolation to establish Blakely’s whereabouts at the

time of the homicide. Thus, the second argument is without merit.

       {¶51} Finally, Reed asserts that his convictions are against the manifest

weight of the evidence because the State did not perform testing that could link him

to the revolver through DNA or fingerprint analyses. However, this Court has

previously concluded that the absence of “physical evidence such as fingerprints or

DNA linking [the defendant] to the firearm” does not render a conviction against

the manifest weight of the evidence. State v. Cassidy, 

 (3d

Dist.). Carroll, 

, citing State v. Poindexter, 

 (10th Dist.); State v. Peabody, 

 (6th Dist.). Thus, the

third argument is without merit.

       {¶52} In conclusion, having reviewed the evidence in the record on the basis

of its weight and credibility, we have found no indication that the finder of fact

clearly lost its way and returned a verdict against the manifest weight of the

evidence. Accordingly, the second assignment of error is overruled.




                                        -21-
Case No. 5-23-50


                                   Conclusion

       {¶53} Having found no error prejudicial to the appellant in the particulars

assigned and argued, the judgment of the Hancock County Court of Common Pleas

is affirmed.

                                                              Judgment Affirmed

WALDICK and ZIMMERMAN, J.J., concur.

/hls




                                       -22-