[Cite as In re T.S.,
2024-Ohio-4841.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
UNION COUNTY
IN RE: CASE NO. 14-24-14
T.S.,
ADJUDICATED DELINQUENT CHILD O P I NI O N
AND SERIOUS YOUTHFUL OFFENDER.
IN RE: CASE NO. 14-24-15
T.S.,
ADJUDICATED DELINQUENT CHILD O P I NI O N
AND SERIOUS YOUTHFUL OFFENDER.
IN RE: CASE NO. 14-24-16
T.S.,
ADJUDICATED DELINQUENT CHILD O P I NI O N
AND SERIOUS YOUTHFUL OFFENDER.
IN RE: CASE NO. 14-24-17
T.S.,
ADJUDICATED DELINQUENT CHILD O P I NI O N
AND SERIOUS YOUTHFUL OFFENDER.
Case Nos. 14-24-14, 15, 16, 17, 18
IN RE: CASE NO. 14-24-18
T.S.,
ADJUDICATED DELINQUENT CHILD O P I NI O N
AND SERIOUS YOUTHFUL OFFENDER.
Appeals from Union County Common Pleas Court
Juvenile Division
Trial Court Nos. 21620183, 21620184, 21720059, 21720060 and 21720106
Judgments Affirmed
Date of Decision: October 7, 2024
APPEARANCES:
Stephanie Kessler for Appellant
Courtland A. Perry for Appellee
ZIMMERMAN, J.
{¶1} Petitioner-appellant, T.S., brings this appeal from the January 9, 2024
judgment entries of the Union County Court of Common Pleas, Juvenile Division,
denying his petition for post-conviction relief. For the reasons set forth below, we
affirm.
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Case Nos. 14-24-14, 15, 16, 17, 18
{¶2} On June 16, 2020, the juvenile court invoked the adult portion of T.S.’s
serious-youthful-offender (“SYO”) sentence. The juvenile court also designated
T.S. as a tier III sex offender.
{¶3} Two days later, on June 18, 2020, T.S. turned 21.
{¶4} On July 16, 2020, T.S. appealed the June 16, 2020 judgment entries of
the juvenile court.1 See In re T.S., 2021-Ohio-638, ¶ 4 (3d Dist.). In that direct
appeal, we affirmed the judgments of the trial court. In re T.S. at ¶ 19.
{¶5} On September 2, 2021, T.S. filed a petition for post-conviction relief
under R.C. 2953.21. On January 9, 2024, the juvenile court dismissed T.S’s petition
for lack of jurisdiction because it was filed after T.S. had attained the age of 21.
{¶6} On February 8, 2024, T.S. filed a notice of appeal. T.S. raises five
assignments of error for our review. We will address the assignments of error
together.
First Assignment of Error
The trial court erred when it determined that it lacked
jurisdiction to hear [T.S.]’s petition for post-conviction because
the petition was filed after [T.S.] reached 21 years of age.
Second Assignment of Error
The trial court erred when it concluded that relief under the terms
of R.C. § 2953.21 is not available to [T.S.] to challenge the
invocation of an SYO sentence.
1
In T.S.’s direct appeal, this court recited much of the factual and procedural background of this case, and
we will not duplicate those efforts here.
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Case Nos. 14-24-14, 15, 16, 17, 18
Third Assignment of Error
The trial court’s findings that [T.S.] is unable to pursue post-conviction relief renders the SYO statutory scheme
unconstitutional as applied.
Fourth Assignment of Error
The trial court erred by denying [T.S.]’s post-conviction petition
without conducting an evidentiary hearing as required by R.C. §
2953.21(D).
Fifth Assignment of Error
The trial court erred by failing to address [T.S.]’s second and
third claims of error set forth in his post-conviction petition.
{¶7} In his first assignment of error, T.S. argues that the trial court erred by
dismissing his petition for post-conviction relief based on lack of subject matter
jurisdiction. In his second assignment of error, T.S. argues that the trial court erred
by concluding that post-conviction relief is not available to challenge the invocation
of an SYO sentence. In his third assignment of error, T.S. argues that the SYO
statutory scheme is unconstitutional as applied to him. Finally, in his fourth and
fifth assignments of error, T.S. argues that the trial court erred by not conducting an
evidentiary hearing prior to dismissing his petition for post-conviction relief and not
addressing his constitutional claims raised therein.
Standard of Review
{¶8} “Subject-matter jurisdiction ‘connotes the power to hear and decide a
case upon its merits.’” State v. Apanovitch, 2018-Ohio-4744, ¶ 38, quoting
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Case Nos. 14-24-14, 15, 16, 17, 18
Morrison v. Steiner, 32 Ohio St.2d 86 (1972), paragraph one of the syllabus.
Whether a trial court has subject-matter jurisdiction to consider a petition for post-
conviction relief is a question of law, which we review de novo.
Apanovitch at ¶
24.
Analysis
{¶9} “The general rule is that a juvenile court has jurisdiction over juveniles
who have been adjudicated delinquent until they reach the age of 21.” In re R.B.,
2020-Ohio-5476, ¶ 27. The plain language of R.C. 2152.02(C)(6) provides, in
relevant part, that “[t]he juvenile court has jurisdiction over a person who is
adjudicated a delinquent child or juvenile traffic offender prior to attaining eighteen
years of age until the person attains twenty-one years of age.”
This language is straightforward. It states that juvenile courts have
jurisdiction over adjudicated delinquents until they are 21 years old.
The obvious flip side of that statement is that juvenile courts do not
have jurisdiction over adjudicated delinquents once they are 21 years
old.
In re J.V., 2012-Ohio-4961, ¶ 23 (concluding that the juvenile court lacked
jurisdiction to impose post-release control after the adjudicated delinquent had
turned 21).
{¶10} In this case, T.S. was adjudicated delinquent on January 16, 2018. See
In re T.S., 2021-Ohio-638, at ¶ 2 (3d Dist.). Thus, the juvenile court had jurisdiction
over T.S. until he turned 21. See R.C. 2152.02(C)(6). Even though T.S. turned 21
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Case Nos. 14-24-14, 15, 16, 17, 18
on June 18, 2020, he filed a petition for post-conviction relief in the juvenile court
on September 2, 2021—more than one year after attaining the age of 21.
{¶11} Importantly, this case is analogous to In re D.J., 2023-Ohio-3523, ¶ 5
(9th Dist.), wherein an adjudicated delinquent filed a petition for post-conviction
relief in the juvenile court more than one year after attaining the age of 21. In In re
D.J., the Ninth District recognized
When delinquency proceedings have concluded and no independent
statutory authority exists for a juvenile court’s continued exercise of
jurisdiction, the [Ohio] Supreme Court has repeatedly found that
juvenile courts lose jurisdiction once an adjudicated delinquent turns
twenty-one.
Id. at ¶ 13, citing In re A.W., 2020-Ohio-1457, ¶ 8 (concluding that the juvenile
court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to invoke the adult portion of the SYO
sentence because the adjudicated delinquent had turned 21); State ex rel. Jean-
Baptiste v. Kirsch,
2012-Ohio-5697, ¶ 32 (holding that the juvenile court lacked
jurisdiction to conduct an initial juvenile-offender-registration hearing after the
juvenile had fully satisfied the court’s delinquency adjudication and had turned 21).
{¶12} The Ninth District further noted that “[w]hile the post-conviction relief
statute allows a person adjudicated delinquent to seek post-conviction relief, it does
not alter the subject matter jurisdiction of the juvenile court.” In re D.J. at ¶ 14. See
R.C. 2953.21(A)(1)(a) (2017) (current version at R.C. 2953.21(A)(1)(a)(i) (2021)).
“Nor does R.C. 2151.23 expressly grant the juvenile court exclusive original
jurisdiction to conduct post-conviction proceedings.” In re D.J. at ¶ 14.
-6-
Case Nos. 14-24-14, 15, 16, 17, 18
Absent a legislative amendment to the statutes governing the
jurisdiction of the juvenile court or the post-conviction relief statute,
we have no choice but to conclude that the juvenile court lacked
jurisdiction to consider D.J.’s petition for post-conviction relief.
Id. at ¶ 15.
{¶13} This logic is sound and we agree with the Ninth District. Only the
General Assembly can expand the jurisdiction of the juvenile court to conduct post-
conviction proceedings after an adjudicated delinquent attains the age of 21.
Therefore, we conclude that the juvenile court lacked jurisdiction to consider T.S.’s
petition for post-conviction relief since the petition was filed after T.S. had attained
the age of 21 and its dismissal of T.S.’s petition was correct.
{¶14} T.S.’s first assignment of error is overruled.
{¶15} Based on our disposition of T.S.’s first assignment of error, his
remaining assignments of error are moot. See App.R. 12(A)(1)(c). Consequently,
we decline to address them.
{¶16} Having found no error prejudicial to the appellant herein in the
particulars assigned and argued, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.
Judgments Affirmed
WILLAMOWSKI, P.J. and MILLER, J., concur.
/hls
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