[Cite as State v. Vidale,
2024-Ohio-5001.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
SEVENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
MAHONING COUNTY
STATE OF OHIO,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
TERRILL JUSTIN NIGEL VIDALE,
Defendant-Appellant.
OPINION AND JUDGMENT ENTRY
Case No. 24 MA 0043
Criminal Appeal from the
Mahoning County Court #4 of Mahoning County, Ohio
Case No. 2023 TRD 4775
BEFORE:
Mark A. Hanni, Cheryl L. Waite, Katelyn Dickey, Judges.
JUDGMENT:
Affirmed.
Atty. Gina DeGenova, Mahoning County Prosecutor, and Atty. Edward A. Czopur,
Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, Mahoning County Prosecutor's Office, for Plaintiff-Appellee and
Atty. Matthew G. Vansuch and Atty. Brian A. Coulter, Brouse McDowell LPA, for
Defendant-Appellant.
Dated: October 15, 2024
–2–
HANNI, J.
{¶1} Defendant-Appellant, Terrill Justin Nigel Vidale, appeals from a Mahoning
County Court No. 4 judgment finding him guilty of speeding. Appellant argues the trial
court abused its discretion by refusing to sanction the State for failing to provide requested
discovery in a timely manner. For the following reasons, we affirm the trial court’s
judgment.
{¶2} On November 6, 2023, Ohio State Highway Patrol Officer Nicholas Cayton
issued Appellant a citation for speeding. The citation alleged Appellant was driving 85
mph on a road with a posted speed of 65 mph.
{¶3} On December 18, 2023, a pretrial hearing was held. After no plea
agreement was reached, the court scheduled a trial for January 10, 2024.
{¶4} On December 20, 2023, Appellant filed a request for evidence and
discovery. Among other items, Appellant requested:
Any written or recorded statement by the Defendant, including, but
not limited to police summaries of such statements and the body and dash
camera footage up to and including the stop at issue in this case;
...
Results of physical or mental examinations, experiments or scientific
test, including but not limited to the certification of the laser, radar, or other
manner of speed-detecting device used in this case and that of the peace
officers or the Ohio State Highway Patrol to operate the same.
{¶5} On the initial trial date, January 10, 2024, the State did not provide the
requested discovery or evidence Appellant requested, so Appellant moved to dismiss the
matter. (Pretrial Tr. 3). The assistant prosecuting attorney indicated that he was unaware
of the discovery request and the request should have been presented to him at the
pretrial. He represented that he checked with the state trooper and he asked the court
for a continuance so he could provide the defense with the body camera footage from the
officer and the dash camera footage of the traffic stop. He further stated:
Case No. 24 MA 0043
–3–
Outside of that, we have no other information about any of the other
things that he’s asking for. They don’t exist, they wouldn’t exist - - they
would not exist. The narrative that he wants is confined to the four corners
of the citation, which gives him the weather report in addition to other factual
situations, and the troopers sign these tickets under penalty of perjury.
(Pretrial Tr. 4).
{¶6} The trial court denied Appellant’s motion to dismiss and granted the
prosecution’s motion to continue the case to allow for discovery completion. (Pretrial Tr.
4). The court rescheduled the trial for March 20, 2024.
{¶7} In early 2024, the State provided Appellant with the audio and video from
the dashboard camera and the citation with Trooper Cayton’s notes. No certification
information was provided.
{¶8} On the morning of trial, Appellant filed a second motion to dismiss the
charge against him or to prohibit the prosecution from soliciting evidence or testimony
from any witnesses from the discovery the prosecution failed to provide. The motion was
personally served on the assistant prosecuting attorney on that date.
{¶9} Immediately prior to the start of the trial, the assistant prosecuting attorney
handed defense counsel the documents defense counsel had requested, which included:
the trooper’s initial training certificate from the academy; the trooper’s annual certification
of proficiency in operating electronic speed monitoring devices; and the manufacturer’s
certification of the calibration of the laser detection device used by the trooper on the day
of the traffic stop. These documents were admitted at trial, over defense counsel’s
objection, as Exhibits A, B, and C. Trooper Cayton testified that his certifications were
maintained at the local post so that he could testify in court. (Tr. 14).
{¶10} Before trial began, Appellant’s counsel informed the court of his second
motion to dismiss and explained that the prosecution was asked to provide “the laser
certification and calibration, the officer’s certification, all those sorts of things.” (Tr. 4).
Defense counsel stated that he was told by the assistant prosecuting attorney that those
documents did not exist.
{¶11} The record shows that the assistant prosecuting attorney again
mischaracterized Appellant’s request regarding the certification of the laser. The
Case No. 24 MA 0043
–4–
assistant prosecuting attorney believed Appellant was requesting the State provide a
“state certification” which does not exist. (Tr. 5). Appellant’s counsel pointed out that the
request made was not for a state certification, but rather the request was for any
certification. (Tr. 5-6). The trial court denied the motion to dismiss or to exclude the
evidence and ordered the trial to proceed.
{¶12} At trial, Trooper Cayton testified that on the day in question, he observed
Appellant’s white passenger car traveling at a speed he believed to be greater than the
posted speed limit. (Tr. 11). Importantly, Trooper Cayton testified that he has received
updated training on visual observation. (Tr. 12). He further testified to his training and
qualifications regarding the use of electronic speed-measuring devices. (Tr. 12-13).
Specifically, Trooper Cayton noted that he received 40 hours of initial training, five days
to be certified by the Ohio Patrol to run laser radar, and then certification for additional
annual training. (Tr. 12-13). The last time Trooper Cayton received training on the use
of the laser was June 14, 2023. (Tr. 14).
{¶13} Trooper Cayton highlighted in detail the procedures and step-by-step
process he takes each day to ensure his laser is operating correctly and can be placed
into service. (Tr. 17-18). He testified that the lasers are calibrated at the manufacturing
facility before they are put into service. (Tr. at 15). Exhibit C was presented to Trooper
Cayton, which he verified as the certification of calibration that accompanied the laser
device he is assigned to and uses. (Tr. 16). He further testified that based on his training,
education, and experience, the laser was operating correctly on the day in question. (Tr.
16).
{¶14} Trooper Cayton further detailed the specific procedures he uses at the
beginning and end of each shift to place the device into service and ensure its proper
operation. (Tr. 17). He also described how he uses the laser while out on patrol. (Tr. 18,
22-23). Trooper Cayton testified that he acted in accordance with the procedures on the
date of the offense, and when doing so, he measured the speed of Appellant’s vehicle
twice, clocking his vehicle at 85 mph and 84 mph. (Tr. 19). Lastly, Trooper Cayton
testified that at the conclusion of the traffic stop, Appellant stated that he believed he was
going 81 mph. (Tr. 20).
Case No. 24 MA 0043
–5–
{¶15} On cross-examination, Trooper Cayton explained that if a failure in the laser
device was detected upon initiating the device, it would be returned to the manufacturer
and internal paperwork would be filed to show it was returned. (Tr. 25). He also explained
that he received training on visually estimating the speed of vehicles and he performed a
visual estimate of Appellant’s vehicle before pulling the trigger on the laser detector. (Tr.
25). He detailed how the laser recorded the first and second checks. (Tr. 25). Trooper
Cayton stated he held, then pulled the trigger of the device, and it produced two readings
simultaneously. (Tr. 30). However, he conceded that he was not sure for how many
seconds he held the trigger. (Tr. 30). He also admitted that no documentation of his first
or second detection of Appellant’s speed existed, aside from the speeding citation. (Tr.
26). He further admitted that the reading on the laser was not recorded by his body
camera. (Tr. 26-27).
{¶16} The trial court found Appellant guilty on the speeding citation. (Tr. 35-36).
{¶17} Appellant timely filed a notice of appeal on April 17, 2024, raising one
assignment of error.
{¶18} Appellant’s sole assignment or error states:
THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY NOT IMPOSING ANY
SANCTION ON THE STATE FOR FAILURE TO PROVIDE DISCOVERY
IN A TIMELY MANNER.
{¶19} Appellant first asserts that the State willfully violated Crim.R. 16. The Rule
provides:
The trial court may make orders regulating discovery not inconsistent
with this rule. If at any time during the course of the proceedings it is brought
to the attention of the court that a party has failed to comply with this rule or
with an order issued pursuant to this rule, the court may order such party to
permit the discovery or inspection, grant a continuance, or prohibit the party
from introducing in evidence the material not disclosed, or it make such
other order as it deems just under the circumstances.
Case No. 24 MA 0043
–6–
{¶20} Appellant asserts that although speed-measuring devices are admissible
without expert testimony, Appellant’s timely-filed discovery request specifically asked for
the State to prove the accuracy of the particular speed-measuring device and the
qualifications of the person who used it. Appellant contends that no matter how the
assistant prosecuting attorney claims to have misinterpreted the written request (“state
certification”), Appellant requested the documents that he expected the State to introduce
to meet its burden of proof.
{¶21} Appellant emphasizes that the State asserted that the documents he
requested, “don’t exist, they wouldn’t exist – they would not exist”. (Pretrial Tr. 4). Thus,
Appellant contends he reasonably relied on the assistant prosecuting attorney’s
representation in his preparation for trial.
{¶22} Appellant cites State v. Darmond, 2013-Ohio-966, ¶ 29, and notes that
Crim.R. 16(A) serves the purpose of providing a just determination of criminal
proceedings and to secure the fair, impartial, and speedy administration of justice.
Appellant also cites the Darmond Court’s reiteration of the three factors that govern a trial
court’s exercise of discretion in imposing a sanction for a prosecutor’s discovery violation:
(1) whether the failure to disclose was a willful violation of Crim.R. 16, (2) whether
foreknowledge of the undisclosed material would have benefited the accused in
preparation of a defense, and (3) whether the accused was prejudiced. Id. at ¶ 35, citing
State v. Parson, 6 Ohio St.3d. 442 (1983), syllabus. In addition, Appellant acknowledges
that “a court must impose the least severe sanction that is consistent with the purpose of
the discovery rules.” Lakewood v. Papadelis,
32 Ohio St.3d 1 (1987).
{¶23} Appellant contends that Darmond supports the conclusion that a lesser
sanction would not be consistent with the purposes of the criminal discovery rules.
Appellant concedes that the trial court was not required to impose the most severe
sanction of dismissal to fulfill the purposes of the criminal discovery rule.
{¶24} However, Appellant asserts that the trial court could have just prevented the
State from introducing the evidence and testimony into the record. He cites Rule 9(E) of
the Mahoning County Criminal Local Rules of Court in support, noting that the court
should have excluded from trial the supplemental discovery that the State failed to provide
Case No. 24 MA 0043
–7–
seven days before trial unless the court granted leave for good cause shown. See State
v. Treharn, 2009-Ohio-2638, at ¶ 16 (7th Dist.).
{¶25} Appellant continues that without the certification evidence or Trooper
Cayton’s testimony, the State would not have been able to meet its burden of proof.
Appellant also states that even if Appellant’s violation was clear, the discovery withheld
from him would have benefited him in the preparation for trial and he was prejudiced.
State v. Joseph, 73 Ohio St.3d. 450, 458 (1995). Appellant also requests that the Court
consider the State’s initial representation to the court that the requested documents “don’t
exist” and it is prejudicial for the State to provide evidence material to its case and the
preparation of the defendant’s defense minutes before trial. State v. Kasper, 2009-Ohio-
5502, ¶ 24 (6th Dist.).
{¶26} Essentially, Appellant contends that the State predicated its case on the
documentation it willfully withheld. Appellant asserts that the trial court could have
continued the case to give him the opportunity to examine the evidence he received on
the morning of trial or the court could have excluded the evidence. Appellant submits that
the court abused its discretion because it treated the discovery violation with the “no harm
no foul” rule and allowed the State to proceed as if nothing happened.
{¶27} This Court has held the following regarding trial court discretion over
discovery violations:
If a discovery violation is brought to the court's attention, the court
may order discovery, grant a continuance, prohibit the party from
introducing the undisclosed evidence or make some other order it deems
just under the circumstances. Crim.R. 16 (E)(3). Under a local rule,
discovery violations, including a failure to provide supplemental discovery
seven days before trial, will result in undisclosed material being excluded
from trial unless the court grants leave for good cause shown. Mah. Cty.
Loc. Crim.R. 9(E).
The trial court's decision on these matters, including the decision to
deny a mistrial as a remedy for the discovery violation, will not be reversed
absent an abuse of discretion. See, e.g., State v. Garner (1995), 74 Ohio
Case No. 24 MA 0043
–8–
St.3d 49, 59 (mistrial in general); Pang v. Minch (1990), 53 Ohio St.3d 186,
194 (local discovery rule violation); State v. Parson (1983),
6 Ohio St.3d
442, 445 (Crim.R. 16 violation). In exercising its general discretion, the court
is to inquire into the circumstances of the discovery violation and impose
the least severe sanction consistent with the purpose of the discovery rules,
which is to prevent surprise and the secreting of evidence favorable to the
other party. Lakewood v. Papadelis (1987), 32 Ohio St.3d 1, 3.
In Parson, this Court found that the trial court did not abuse its
discretion in refusing to exclude undisclosed evidence where: (1) nothing in
record showed the lack of disclosure was willful; (2) nothing showed how
foreknowledge of the undisclosed statement would have benefited the
defense; and (3) the statement's prejudicial effect was not demonstrated
where counsel had time to counteract it. Parson, 6 Ohio St.3d at 445.
State v. Treharn,
2009-Ohio-2638, ¶ 16-18 (7th Dist.).
{¶28} “Abuse of discretion” is more than an error of judgment; it implies that the
court’s attitude is unreasonable, arbitrary or unconscionable”. State v. Adams, 62 Ohio
St.2d. 151, 157 (1980).
{¶29} Here, Rule 9(E) of the Mahoning County Criminal Local Rules of Court
requires:
All exchanges of supplemental discovery shall be completed no later
than seven days before the day of trial. Matter not provided by either side
to the other in violation of this rule shall not be used at trial without leave of
Court for good cause shown.
{¶30} According to its own Rule, the trial court should have excluded the
certification discovery that the prosecution failed to produce seven days before trial.
However, the trial court has wide discretion in imposing sanctions for discovery violations
and we find that the court did not abuse its discretion by failing to dismiss this case or by
allowing this evidence into the trial.
Case No. 24 MA 0043
–9–
{¶31} While the assistant prosecuting attorney should have acted more diligently
and clarified the discovery requests, the record shows no conclusive evidence that the
assistant prosecuting attorney willfully withheld the requested discovery. It appears that
the State’s failure to divulge Appellant’s discovery requests was based on a lack of
knowledge or confusion rather than willful withholding.
{¶32} The assistant prosecuting attorney stated at the initial trial date on January
10, 2024, he was unaware that any discovery request had been made and requested a
continuance to rectify the discrepancy. (Pretrial Tr. 3-4). Shortly after that hearing, the
prosecution produced the dash camera and the body camera footage to Appellant.
{¶33} However, the assistant prosecuting attorney did not produce Trooper
Cayton’s speeding certificate at that time because he believed Appellant was asking for
a state certificate which does not exist. On the day of the March 20, 2024 trial, the
prosecution produced to Appellant: Trooper Cayton’s training certificate from the
Highway Patrol Academy certifying him to use electronic speed-measuring devices; the
trooper’s most recent annual training on his use of electronic speed-measuring devices;
and the manufacturer’s certificate of calibration for the laser. (Tr. 4). Thus, we find that
the assistant prosecuting attorney’s lack of disclosure was not willful.
{¶34} Further, we disagree with Appellant’s assertion that had the trial court
barred introduction of the requested discovery, the State would not have met its burden.
The Ohio Supreme Court has held:
the results of a speed-measuring device using either radar or laser
technology are admissible in court without expert testimony establishing, or
the court taking judicial notice of, the reliability of the scientific principles
underlying that technology. However, the factfinder is required to determine
whether the evidence presented concerning the accuracy of the particular
speed-measuring device and the qualifications of the person who used it is
sufficient to support a conviction based on the device's results.
City of Brook Park v. Rodojev, 2020-Ohio-3253, ¶ 19.
{¶35} We have held that an officer’s testimony was both adequate and legally
sufficient to establish that a laser device was in working condition and the officer was
Case No. 24 MA 0043
– 10 –
properly trained to operate it. State v. Packer, 2021-Ohio-4636, ¶ 27 (7th Dist.). In State
v. Pavetic,
2021-Ohio-4637, ¶ 18 (7th Dist.), we held that the trooper’s testimony was
sufficient to establish that he was trained to use the device and the device was properly
working where he testified that he was trained and proficient on the use of the laser device
and he properly checked it for calibration utilizing proper procedures before and after his
shift.
{¶36} Here, Trooper Cayton, like the trooper in Pavetic, testified to his training
qualifications regarding the use of electronic speed-measuring devices and to his laser
device’s proper working order. (Tr. 12-13). He testified that his initial training at the
academy involved 40 hours of training, five days to be certified by the Ohio Patrol to run
laser radar, and then four years annually every day for additional training. (Tr. at 12-13).
He further testified that the last date he received training on the laser was June 14, 2023.
{¶37} Trooper Cayton further testified in great detail the procedures and step-bystep process he takes daily to ensure his laser is operating correctly and can be placed
into service. (Tr. 17-18). Trooper Cayton affirmed on the day in question that based on
his training, education, and experience, the laser device was operating correctly.
{¶38} Trooper Cayton also testified as to how he uses the laser on patrol and the
procedures he employs to ensure the laser is working from the time it is put into service
that day until the time it is taken out of service. (Tr. 18, 22-23). He testified that he acted
in accordance with the required laser procedures on the date of the offense, and he
measured the speed of Appellant’s vehicle twice, clocking his vehicle at 85 mph and 84
mph. (Tr. 19). Lastly, Trooper Cayton testified that Appellant admitted that he believed
he was driving 81 mph. (Tr. 20). This speed is well over the posted speed limit.
{¶39} Accordingly, we find that Trooper Cayton’s testimony sufficed to meet the
burden of proof that Appellant was speeding, and the speed certificate was immaterial to
meeting this burden. Moreover, Appellant was not prejudiced by the later production of
the certification documents as the certificates were valid and updated and Appellant does
not assert otherwise. (Tr. 4). Trooper Cayton’s testimony as to the certifications of his
training on the device and the certification of the device itself sufficed to establish his
training on the laser device and the proper working order of the laser device.
Case No. 24 MA 0043
– 11 –
{¶40} Accordingly, Appellant’s sole assignment of error lacks merit and is
overruled.
{¶41} For the reasons above, the trial court’s judgment is affirmed.
Waite, J., concurs.
Dickey, J., concurs.
Case No. 24 MA 0043
[Cite as State v. Vidale, 2024-Ohio-5001.]
For the reasons stated in the Opinion rendered herein, the assignment of error is
overruled and it is the final judgment and order of this Court that the judgment of the
Mahoning County Court #4 of Mahoning County, Ohio is affirmed. Costs to be taxed
against the Appellant.
A certified copy of this opinion and judgment entry shall constitute the mandate in
this case pursuant to Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure. It is ordered that a
certified copy be sent by the clerk to the trial court to carry this judgment into execution.
NOTICE TO COUNSEL
This document constitutes a final judgment entry.
