State v. Wright

[Cite as State v. Wright, 

.]


                              IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO

                                   TENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

State of Ohio,                                     :
                                                                  No. 24AP-444
                 Plaintiff-Appellee,               :           (C.P.C. No. 05CR-5233)

v.                                                 :     (ACCELERATED CALENDAR)

Shawn R. Wright,                                   :              No. 24AP-445
                                                               (C.P.C. No. 05CR-5906)
                 Defendant-Appellant.              :
                                                         (ACCELERATED CALENDAR)
                                                   :


                                             D E C I S I O N

                                    Rendered on October 22, 2024


                 On brief: G. Gary Tyack, Prosecuting Attorney, and
                 Kimberly M. Bond, for appellee.

                 On brief: Shawn R. Wright, pro se.


                  APPEAL from the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas

EDELSTEIN, J.

        {¶ 1} Defendant-appellant, Shawn R. Wright, appeals, pro se, from the June 17,
2024 judgment of the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas denying his post-conviction
motions to waive fines imposed by the trial court when Mr. Wright was sentenced in 2006.
        {¶ 2} Because we find the trial court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to consider
Mr. Wright’s motions, we affirm the judgment below.

I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL OVERVIEW
        {¶ 3} On April 17, 2006, Mr. Wright entered a counseled guilty plea to aggravated
burglary, aggravated robbery, and kidnapping offenses—all first-degree felonies with
firearm specifications—in case Nos. 05CR-5233 and 05CR-5906. We need not belabor the
nature of these offenses, as it is not relevant to the issue before us in this case.
Nos. 24AP-444 & 24AP-445                                                                   2

       {¶ 4} Mr. Wright appeared for sentencing on both cases with counsel on May 10,
2006. Of note, the transcript from that hearing is not in the record before us. On May 19,
2006, the trial court entered its final judgments memorializing Mr. Wright’s conviction and
sentence. As reflected in those entries, the trial court imposed an aggregate prison sentence
of 23 years and ordered Mr. Wright to pay fines, court costs, and restitution. Mr. Wright
did not appeal from those judgments.
       {¶ 5} This appeal concerns the trial court’s denial of Mr. Wright’s June 2024
motions requesting waiver of the “mandatory” fines imposed at his 2006 sentencing
pursuant to R.C. 2929.19(B)(5).
       {¶ 6} In 2017, Mr. Wright unsuccessfully moved the trial court for an order setting
aside fines, costs, and restitution imposed in his two cases. In its September 13, 2017 entry
denying those motions, the trial court found it lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to
“suspend or modify … financial sanctions ” imposed as part of a criminal sentence
after a valid final judgment has been entered. (Emphasis added.) (Sept. 13, 2017 Decision
and Entry at 2, quoting State ex rel. Hansen v. Reed, 

 (1992).)
       {¶ 7} Instead of appealing from that 2017 judgment, Mr. Wright unsuccessfully
sought waiver of restitution and fines again in 2020. (See Feb. 17, 2021 Decision and
Entry.) However, in December 2023, after Mr. Wright filed motions a month earlier
seeking waiver of court costs, the trial court found he had successfully “demonstrated his
indigency status and inability to pay the court costs” assessed in his two cases. (Dec. 8,
2023 Decision and Entry at 2.) Thus, having retained jurisdiction to waive or modify the
payment of court costs after sentencing under R.C. 2947.23(C), the trial court waived any
remaining court costs assessed in case Nos. 05CR-5233 and 05CR-5906.
       {¶ 8} In June 2024, Mr. Wright moved the trial court to waive the $80,000 fine
imposed in case No. 05CR-5233 and the $20,000 fine imposed in case No. 05CR-5906.
Relying on R.C. 2929.19(B)(1) and (B)(5), Mr. Wright contended that because the trial court
found him indigent and unable to pay the court costs imposed as part of his sentence in
December 2023, it “must do the same with his fines.” (June 13, 2024 Mot. at 1.)
       {¶ 9} On June 17, 2024, the trial court entered a judgment denying Mr. Wright’s
motions “[f]or the reasons stated in its September 13, 2017 Decision and Entry,” which
Nos. 24AP-444 & 24AP-445                                                                                3

included, most notably, lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. (June 17, 2024 Decision and
Entry.)
        {¶ 10} Mr. Wright now appeals from that decision and asserts the following two
assignments of error for our review:

                [I.] WHERE AN OFFENDER FILES AN AFFIDAVIT OF
                INDIGENCE AND THE TRIAL COURT MAKES A FINDING
                OF INDIGENCE, A TRIAL COURT “SHALL NOT IMPOSE THE
                MANDATORY FINES OF AN OFFENDER” R.C. 2929.18.

                [II.] DEFENDANT NOT PROPERLY SENTENCED TO POST-RELEASE CONTROL (PRC) UNDER R.C. 2967.28 BECAUSE
                THE LANGUAGE IN THE SENTENCING ENTRY STATING
                THAT PRC WAS APPLICABLE FOR (5) YEARS. PRC WAS
                MANDATORY FOR DEFENDANT, AND WAS NOT PUT IN
                THE JOURNAL ENTRY.
(Sic passim.)

II. ANALYSIS
        {¶ 11} As a preliminary matter, we note that Mr. Wright’s second assignment of
error—contending he was not properly sentenced to post-release control—does not
attribute any error to any rulings made in the trial court’s June 17, 2024 judgments that are
the subject of this appeal. It is well-established that a party cannot raise new issues or legal
theories for the first time on appeal. See, e.g., State v. Oliver, 10th Dist. No. 21AP-449,

; State v. Wintermeyer, 

, 

.
Thus, pursuant to Article IV, Section 3(B)(2) of the Ohio Constitution, we lack jurisdiction
to rule upon issues not first addressed in judgments or final orders of the trial court. See,
e.g., Wintermeyer at ¶ 10, citing Goldfuss v. Davidson, 

 (1997), and
State v. Glaros, 

 (1960), paragraph one of the syllabus.
        {¶ 12} On review of the record, it is clear Mr. Wright did not present arguments
relating to the imposition of post-release control in his June 13, 2024 motions the trial court
ruled on in its June 17, 2024 judgment.1 As such, we lack jurisdiction to consider, in the
first instance, Mr. Wright’s challenge to the imposition of post-release control at his 2006
sentencing hearing. For this reason, we overrule his second assignment of error.

1 On August 1, 2024—after this case was commenced—Mr. Wright filed motions in case Nos. 05CR-5233 and

05CR-5906 requesting the trial court vacate the imposition of post-release control. The trial court denied
those motions on August 7, 2024, but those judgments are not the subject of this appeal.
Nos. 24AP-444 & 24AP-445                                                                                          4

        {¶ 13} We next turn to his first assignment of error. When framed appropriately,
the ultimate issue presented in that assignment of error is whether the trial court erred in
denying Mr. Wright’s post-conviction motions for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction or
otherwise. For the following reasons, we conclude it did not.

         A. Subject-Matter Jurisdiction
        {¶ 14} Subject-matter jurisdiction refers to a court’s power to entertain and
adjudicate a particular class of cases on the merits.2 Bank of Am., N.A. v. Kuchta, 

, 

, ¶ 19, citing Morrison v. Steiner, 

 (1972).
Because a court is powerless to hear a case without subject-matter jurisdiction, “ ‘[a] court’s
subject-matter jurisdiction is determined without regard to the rights of the individual
parties involved in a particular case.’ ” Corder v. Ohio Edison Co., 

,

, ¶ 14, quoting Kuchta at ¶ 19. “Instead, ‘the focus is on whether the forum
itself is competent to hear the controversy.’ ” Id. at ¶ 14, quoting State v. Harper, 

, 

, ¶ 23, citing 18A Wright, Miller & Cooper, Federal Practice and
Procedure, Section 4428, at 6 (3d Ed.2017) (“Jurisdictional analysis should be confined to
the rules that actually allocate judicial authority among different courts.”).
        {¶ 15} Common pleas courts “have such original jurisdiction over all justiciable
matters … as may be provided by law.” Ohio Constitution, Article IV, Section 4(B). Thus,
when a common pleas court patently and unambiguously lacks jurisdiction to hear a case,
“ ‘it is almost always because a statute explicitly removed that jurisdiction.’ ” Schlegel v.
Sweeney, 

, 

, quoting Ohio High School Athletic Assn.
v. Ruehlman, 

, 

. “Where a court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction, it must announce its lack of jurisdiction and dismiss the matter; any
other proclamation by a court lacking subject-matter jurisdiction is void.” Hulbert v.
Buehrer, 10th Dist. No. 16AP-474, 

, citing Pratts at ¶ 11, quoting State
ex rel. Jones v. Suster, 

, 75 (1998), citing Scudere v. France, 10th Dist. No.
09AP-422, 

, ¶ 6.

2 In comparison, “[a] court’s jurisdiction over a particular case refers to the court’s authority to proceed or rule

on a case that is within the court’s subject-matter jurisdiction.” Bank of Am., N.A. v. Kuchta, 

, 

, ¶ 19, citing Pratts v. Hurley, 

, 

, ¶ 12. Unlike subject-matter jurisdiction, jurisdiction over a particular case involves consideration of the rights of the parties. Id. at
¶ 19. “Personal jurisdiction” refers to a court’s power to render a valid judgment against a particular individual.
See, e.g., State v. Henderson, 

, 

.
Nos. 24AP-444 & 24AP-445                                                                                          5

        {¶ 16} An appellate court reviews the issue of subject-matter jurisdiction de novo.

, quoting Klosterman v. Turnkey-Ohio, L.L.C., 

, 2009-
Ohio-2508, ¶ 19 (10th Dist.). See also Pointer v. Smith, 10th Dist. No. 20AP-555, 2021-
Ohio-2247, ¶ 8, citing Pankey v. Ohio Dept. of Rehab. & Corr., 10th Dist. No. 13AP-701,

.

          B. Analysis
        {¶ 17} In his first assignment of error, Mr. Wright maintains the trial court erred
when it denied his post-conviction motions to waive “mandatory” fines. We disagree.
        {¶ 18} As an initial matter, we note that, contrary to Mr. Wright’s representations
otherwise, the record does not suggest mandatory fines were imposed in the cases below.
Mr. Wright contends these fines were “mandatory” because his argument relies, in part, on
his misapplication of the procedure for waiving mandatory fines provided in R.C.
2929.18(B)(1). But, under that provision, a sentencing court is required to impose a fine
“[f]or a first, second, or third degree felony violation of any provision of Chapter 2925.,
3719., or 4729. of the Revised Code.” R.C. 2929.18(B)(1).
        {¶ 19} All of Mr. Wright’s first-degree felony convictions in the cases below were
under either Chapter 2911 or Chapter 2905 of the Revised Code: aggravated burglary (R.C.
2911.11), aggravated robbery (R.C. 2911.01), and kidnapping (R.C. 2905.01). Moreover, the
May 2006 judgment entries memorializing Mr. Wright’s sentences in case Nos. 05CR-5233
and 05CR-5906 did not state the fine imposed in either case was mandatory. No appeal
from those entries—including the imposition of fines—was taken by either party. And the
transcript from Mr. Wright’s 2006 sentencing hearing is not in the record before us. For
these reasons, we find no basis to conclude the imposed fines were mandatory. As such,
the procedure for waiving mandatory fines provided for in R.C. 2929.18(B)(1)3 is irrelevant
to our analysis of the discretionary fines imposed by the trial court in this case.


3 And, even if the fines imposed in Mr. Wright’s two cases were mandatory, R.C. 2929.19(B)(1) would still have

no application to Mr. Wright’s post-conviction motions for waiver. R.C. 2929.18(B)(1) provides, in relevant
part: “If an offender alleges in an affidavit filed with the court prior to sentencing that the offender is indigent
and unable to pay the mandatory fine and if the court determines the offender is an indigent person and is
unable to pay the mandatory fine described in this division, the court shall not impose the mandatory fine
upon the offender.” No such affidavit was filed prior to Mr. Wright’s sentencing in either case, as is required
for the waiver provisions of R.C. 2929.19(B)(1) to apply. See, e.g., State v. Williamson, 10th Dist. No. 22AP-
135, 

 (finding trial counsel ineffective for failing to timely move for waiver of
mandatory fines). We also note that, “[f]or purposes of [mandatory fine waiver], being ‘indigent’ and being
Nos. 24AP-444 & 24AP-445                                                                                        6

        {¶ 20} We likewise reject Mr. Wright’s claim that the trial court’s December 8, 2023
post-conviction judgment waiving court costs suggests the trial court has subject-matter
jurisdiction to waive fines imposed as part of his criminal sentences.
        {¶ 21} A court of common pleas “has original jurisdiction of all crimes and
offenses, except in cases of minor offenses the exclusive jurisdiction of which is vested in
courts inferior to the court of common pleas.” R.C. 2931.03. See also State ex rel. Mason
v. Griffin, 

, 

, ¶ 15-16; Ohio Constitution, Article IV,
Section 4(B) (conferring “original jurisdiction over all justiciable matters … as may be
provided by law” upon the courts of common pleas). The jurisdiction of a court of common
pleas is invoked by the return of an indictment. Click v. Eckle, 

, 89 (1962).
See R.C. 2901.11. Once the criminal proceedings are complete, a trial court’s jurisdiction
over a criminal matter is limited. See State ex rel. Davis v. Janas, 

,

.
        {¶ 22} Generally, a trial court’s jurisdiction over a criminal matter ends once a valid
final judgment has been issued pursuant to Crim.R. 32. See, e.g., State v. Gilbert, 

, 

, ¶ 8-9; State v. Carlisle, 

, 

 (a judgment of conviction is final when it meets each of the requirements of Crim.R.
32(C)). See also 

 (observing that “a trial court loses jurisdiction to modify its
judgment once that judgment has been affirmed on appeal”).
        {¶ 23} Accordingly, “[r]elief from final judgments in criminal cases is confined to
the procedures authorized by statute or rule.” 

, citing State v. Davis, 

, 

. See also State v. Enyart, 10th Dist. No. 22AP-645, 2023-
Ohio-3373, ¶ 26; 

 (“Absent statutory authority, a trial court is generally not
empowered to modify a criminal sentence by reconsidering its own final judgment.”). Thus,
“except when authorized by statute or rule, a trial court lacks jurisdiction to modify a
criminal sentence once it has become final and it is either affirmed on appeal or the time to




‘unable to pay’ are not the same.” State v. Delgadillo-Banuelos, 10th Dist. No. 18AP-729, 

. “Indigency concerns a defendant’s current financial situation, whereas an inability to pay encompasses
[his] future financial situation as well.” 

 citing State v. Gipson, 

 (1998). Further, we
have recognized “that there is a difference between indigency for the purposes of receiving appointed counsel
and inability to pay a mandatory fine.” Williamson at ¶ 54, citing State v. Powell, 

(3d Dist.1992), and State v. Stevens, 2d Dist. No. 2023-CA-20, 

.
Nos. 24AP-444 & 24AP-445                                                                                      7

appeal has expired.” See, e.g., State v. Brasher, 

, 

(O’Connor, C.J., concurring).4
        {¶ 24} These limitations on a trial court’s post-judgment authority over criminal
matters are consistent with the Supreme Court of Ohio’s repeated affirmation of its
commitment to the principle that finality of judgments creates “certainty in the law and
public confidence in the system’s ability to resolve disputes.” (Internal quotation marks
omitted.) Gilbert at ¶ 8, quoting Miller v. Nelson-Miller, 

, 2012-Ohio-
2845, ¶ 18, quoting Strack v. Pelton, 

 (1994), quoting Knapp v.
Knapp, 

 (1986).                    “The purpose of a court is to resolve
controversies, not to prolong them. When issues are constantly relitigated, there is no
resolution and hence no finality.” State v. Steffen, 

 (1994). Thus,
because the law desires finality of judgments, trial courts cannot reconsider their own valid
final judgments in criminal cases. See, e.g., State ex rel. White v. Junkin, 

 (1997), citing Hansen, 

; State v. Fedor, 10th Dist. No. 22AP-
386, 

.
        {¶ 25} On review of the record and briefing in this matter, it is clear Mr. Wright does
not claim the May 19, 2006 judgment entries fail to accurately state the amount of the fines
actually imposed by the trial court at his May 10, 2006 sentencing hearings. Nor could we
determine as much since the transcript of his sentencing hearing is not in the record before
us. Mr. Wright did not appeal from the May 19, 2006 judgments of conviction imposing
fines, and his time to appeal from those judgments has long expired. Mr. Wright does not
claim the imposition of fines in either judgment entry was not valid or final under Crim.R.
32(C). Nor has he sought to withdraw his April 2006 guilty pleas pursuant to Crim.R. 32.1.
Instead, his June 13, 2024 motions asked the trial court to reconsider and modify its valid
final judgments issued on May 19, 2006 by waiving the $80,000 fine imposed in case No.
05CR-5233 and the $20,000 fine imposed in case No. 05CR-5906 on the grounds that he
is indigent.




4 Of course, a trial court also retains jurisdiction under Crim.R. 36 to correct clerical errors in judgments by

issuance of a nunc pro tunc order reflecting what the court actually decided. See, e.g., State ex rel. Womack
v. Marsh, 

, 

, citing State ex rel. Cruzado v. Zaleski, 

,

, ¶ 18-19, and Crim.R. 36.
Nos. 24AP-444 & 24AP-445                                                                      8

       {¶ 26} R.C. 2947.23(C) provides that a sentencing court “retains jurisdiction to
waive, suspend, or modify the payment of the costs of prosecution … at the time of
sentencing or at any time thereafter.” (Emphasis added.) However, court costs (which
were waived in the trial court’s December 8, 2023 decision) and fines (which are the subject
of the instant appeal) are meaningfully different. Strattman v. Studt, 

(1969).
       {¶ 27} Court costs are “a civil debt,” and entirely separate from a criminal sentence.
See, e.g., State v. Taylor, 

, 

; State v. Harris, 1st
Dist. No. C-220251, 

, quoting State v. Ushery, 1st Dist. No. C-120515,

. By their very nature, court costs are nonpunitive since they are
“assessed to defray the administrative costs of the litigation.” See 

;
Middleburg Hts. v. Quinones, 

, 

 (describing the
legislature’s purpose in imposing court costs on a defendant convicted of a crime as being
“to finance the court system, not to punish the defendant additionally on each charge”).
Indeed, R.C. 2947.23(A)(1) requires that, “[i]n all criminal cases” resulting in a conviction,
“the costs of prosecution” “shall [be] include[ed] in the sentence.” See also Quinones at ¶ 8-
9. Most significantly, R.C. 2947.23(C) provides that a sentencing court “retains jurisdiction
to waive, suspend, or modify the payment of the costs of prosecution … at the time of
sentencing or at any time thereafter.” (Emphasis added.)
       {¶ 28} In contrast, R.C. 2929.18(A)(3)(a) vests a trial court with the authority to
impose up to $20,000 in fines on an individual convicted of a first-degree felony offense as
part of their criminal sentence. Thus, unlike court costs, fines “serve a punitive, retributive,
or rehabilitative purpose.” 

. They are financial sanctions, not “costs of
prosecution.” See R.C. 2947.23(C).
       {¶ 29} While R.C. 2947.23(C) permits a court to retain jurisdiction to modify or
vacate the “costs of prosecution,” there is no similar statutory authority permitting trial
courts to modify or vacate properly imposed financial sanctions (including fines) after a
valid final judgment has been entered. See, e.g., Harris at ¶ 10-14.
       {¶ 30} Based on the foregoing, we conclude the trial court lacked subject-matter
jurisdiction to substantively reconsider and modify, in June 2024, its valid final judgments
imposing fines as part of Mr. Wright’s criminal sentence in May 2006. As such, the trial
Nos. 24AP-444 & 24AP-445                                                             9

court properly denied Mr. Wright’s June 2024 motions to vacate the fines imposed when
he was sentenced in May 2006.
      {¶ 31} Accordingly, we overrule Mr. Wright’s first assignment of error.

III. CONCLUSION
      {¶ 32} Having overruled Mr. Wright’s two assignments of error, we affirm the
June 17, 2024 judgment of the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas.

                                                                     Judgment affirmed.

                       MENTEL, P.J. and DORRIAN, J., concur.