[Cite as Angelo v. Angelo,
2024-Ohio-5163.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
ELEVENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
PORTAGE COUNTY
JACQUELINE L. ANGELO, CASE NO. 2024-P-0013
Plaintiff-Appellee,
Civil Appeal from the
- vs - Court of Common Pleas,
Domestic Relations Division
SCOTT M. ANGELO, et al.,
Defendant-Appellant. Trial Court No. 2017 DR 00150
OPINION
Decided: October 28, 2024
Judgment: Affirmed
Amanda J. Lewis, Paoloni & Lewis, 250 South Water Street, P.O. Box 762, Kent, OH
44240 (For Plaintiff-Appellee).
Corrine Hoover Six, Hoover Kacyon, LLC, 527 Portage Trail, Cuyahoga Falls, OH 44221
(For Defendant-Appellant).
EUGENE A. LUCCI, P.J.
{¶1} Appellant, Scott M. Angelo (“Husband”), appeals the judgment modifying
his spousal support obligation to appellee, Jacqueline L. Angelo (“Wife”). We affirm.
{¶2} The parties married in 1992, and three children were born as issue of the
marriage. Prior to marriage, Wife had acquired her master’s degree in education. She
was working as a schoolteacher when the parties married. In 1995, Wife stopped teaching
when the parties’ first child was born. Wife did not work again during the marriage until
2011, when Wife began teaching yoga part time. During the parties’ marriage, Husband
earned a master’s degree in business administration. In or about 2016, Husband obtained
a position as a Chief Information Officer (“CIO”) at an immigration law firm, which involved
extensive travel. Husband’s employment contract provided for a base salary of $800,000
per year, a signing bonus of $25,000, and annual bonuses of at least $200,000 per year.
During their marriage, the parties enjoyed a comfortable lifestyle.
{¶3} In 2017, after approximately 25 years of marriage, the parties divorced
through a decree that incorporated a separation agreement and shared parenting plan
relative to their youngest child, born in 2000, who has since emancipated. At the time of
their divorce, the parties were both 53 years old. Wife was in good health. Husband had
been diagnosed with diabetes, heart disease, and high blood pressure.
{¶4} In the separation agreement, the parties agreed to divide the real property
as follows: Wife received the parties’ primary residence in Aurora, Ohio (the “Nautilus
Trail” property), and Husband received the parties’ second home in Pittsburgh,
Pennsylvania (the “Resaca Place” property). The separation agreement provided that
each party would be liable for the mortgage loans associated with the real property they
received. The separation agreement further provided that Husband would be responsible
for the home equity line of credit relative to the Nautilus Trail property in the amount of
$89,222, a debt owing to Pentagon Federal Credit Union in the amount of $32,000, a debt
owing to Home Depot in the amount of $83,233, student loans incurred for the benefit of
the parties’ adult sons in the amount of $80,000, and a loan from Husband’s 401(k) in the
amount of $28,255.
{¶5} The parties further agreed that, aside from a State Teachers Retirement
System (“STRS”) account worth $17,487, which was retained by Wife, the parties’
retirement benefits would be equally divided, with each party receiving approximately
$281,500. In addition, Husband retained possession of approximately $1,000 in stock.
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Wife received bank accounts with a value of approximately $67,548, and Husband
received bank accounts with a value of approximately $67,000.
{¶6} With respect to their motor vehicles, the parties each retained the use of,
and liability for, their respective leased vehicles: a BMW 528 leased by Wife, and a 2017
Mercedes Benz GLA 250 leased by Husband. In addition, Husband was allocated the
following titled vehicles/watercraft and the corresponding liabilities associated with each:
a 2013 Mercedes E350, a 2009 Ford F-350, a 2013 Harley-Davidson Road Glide
motorcycle, a 2013 Polaris Razor, a 2006 Honda jet-ski and dock, and a 2015 Mastercraft
Prostar Boat and lift.
{¶7} Moreover, the parties agreed that Husband would pay Wife spousal support
pursuant to the following provision:
Husband shall pay to Wife, as spousal support (alimony), the
sum of Fourteen Thousand Five Hundred Eighty-three and
33/100 Dollars ($14,583.33) per month, commencing upon
January 1, 2018 for a term of not more than one hundred eight
(108) months. The payments required by this Section shall be
included in Wife’s gross income and deducted by Husband for
income tax purposes. Husband shall also continue to pay
Wife’s cell phone bill for a period of twenty four months
starting December 1, 2017. The parties further agree that the
Court shall retain jurisdiction to modify spousal support.
In the event of the death of either party, spousal support shall
terminate. In the event Wife remarries or cohabits, the amount
of spousal support shall be reduced to Two Thousand Eighty-three and 33/100 Dollars ($2,083.33) per month until the
mortgage securing the loan on the parties’ Nautilus Trail
property is paid in full, not to exceed the original term.
In the event Husband pays the Nautilus Trail mortgage in full
prior to the expiration of the term of spousal support,
Husband’s spousal support obligation shall be reduced by
Two Thousand Eighty-three and 33/100 Dollars ($2,083.33)
per month from the current monthly amount due at the time
the mortgage is paid in full.
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The Court shall retain jurisdiction over this provision.
{¶8} Although the parties did not reference their respective incomes with respect
to spousal support specifically in the separation agreement, for purposes of the statutory
child support calculation, the parties agreed to impute income to Wife in the amount of
$16,952 per year and agreed that Husband earned $800,000 per year.
{¶9} Further, within the separation agreement, Wife waived any claim to
Husband’s bonus for 2017 and subsequent years, but the parties agreed that the court
could consider the entirety of Husband’s gross income for purposes of modification
proceedings.
{¶10} In 2022, Husband’s employer eliminated the CIO position. As a result,
Husband sought and obtained employment at a different entity. In January 2023,
Husband filed a motion to modify the spousal support obligation due to a significant
decrease in his annual income.
{¶11} Following a hearing on Husband’s motion, the trial court issued an order on
January 31, 2024, decreasing Husband’s spousal support obligation to $13,000 per
month commencing January 1, 2024, for the remainder of the original term of spousal
support. We address the findings and additional provisions contained in the January 31,
2024 judgment in our discussion of Husband’s assigned errors.
{¶12} To facilitate our discussion, we first address Husband’s fourth assigned
error, in which he argues:
{¶13} “The trial court erred in its decision modifying spousal support without
considering the relative incomes of the parties at the time of the post decree litigation in
comparison to at the time of the original award of support.”
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{¶14} “A trial court’s decision on a motion to modify spousal support is reviewed
for an abuse of discretion and its judgment cannot be disturbed on appeal absent a
showing that the trial court abused its discretion.” Mencini v. Mencini, 2010-Ohio-2409, ¶
10 (11th Dist.), citing Blakemore v. Blakemore,
5 Ohio St.3d 217, 218 (1983). “‘The term
“abuse of discretion” is one of art, “connoting judgment exercised by a court, which does
not comport with reason or the record.”’” Willoughby v. Willoughby,
2014-Ohio-743, ¶ 24
(11th Dist.), quoting In re V.M.B.,
2013-Ohio-4298, ¶ 26, quoting State v. Underwood,
2009-Ohio-2089, ¶ 30 (11th Dist.), citing State v. Ferranto,
112 Ohio St. 667, 676-678
(1925).
{¶15} Pursuant to R.C. 3105.18(E)(1):
[T]he court that enters the decree of divorce . . . does not have
jurisdiction to modify the amount or terms of . . . spousal
support unless the court determines that the circumstances of
either party have changed and unless . . . the decree or a
separation agreement of the parties to the divorce that is
incorporated into the decree contains a provision specifically
authorizing the court to modify the amount or terms of alimony
or spousal support.
{¶16} Where a decree retains jurisdiction of the trial court to modify spousal
support and a change in circumstances has occurred, the trial court “then must analyze
‘whether the existing spousal support order should be modified.’” (Emphasis in original.)
Anspach v. Anspach, 2007-Ohio-5207, ¶ 14 (11th Dist.), quoting Leighner v. Leighner,
33
Ohio App.3d 214, 215 (10th Dist. 1986). “‘In other words, the court reexamines the
existing award to determine if it is still appropriate and reasonable.’”
Anspach at ¶ 14,
quoting Barrows v. Barrows,
2004-Ohio-4878, ¶ 7 (9th Dist.). “The burden of showing that
a reduction in spousal support is warranted is on the party seeking the reduction.”
Anspach at ¶ 14, citing Reveal v. Reveal,
2003-Ohio-5335, ¶ 14 (2d Dist.).
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{¶17} “In determining whether or not the existing award remains ‘appropriate and
reasonable under the circumstances,’ the court’s discretion is not unlimited, but is to be
guided by its consideration of the factors set forth in R.C. 3105.18(C).” Anspach at ¶ 16,
quoting DeChristefero v. DeChristefero,
2003-Ohio-2234, ¶ 15 (11th Dist.). R.C.
3105.18(C) provides:
(1) In determining whether spousal support is appropriate and
reasonable, and in determining the nature, amount, and terms
of payment, and duration of spousal support, which is payable
either in gross or in installments, the court shall consider all of
the following factors:
(a) The income of the parties, from all sources, including, but
not limited to, income derived from property divided,
disbursed, or distributed under section 3105.171 of the
Revised Code;
(b) The relative earning abilities of the parties;
(c) The ages and the physical, mental, and emotional
conditions of the parties;
(d) The retirement benefits of the parties;
(e) The duration of the marriage;
(f) The extent to which it would be inappropriate for a party,
because that party will be custodian of a minor child of the
marriage, to seek employment outside the home;
(g) The standard of living of the parties established during the
marriage;
(h) The relative extent of education of the parties;
(i) The relative assets and liabilities of the parties, including
but not limited to any court-ordered payments by the parties;
(j) The contribution of each party to the education, training, or
earning ability of the other party, including, but not limited to,
any party’s contribution to the acquisition of a professional
degree of the other party;
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(k) The time and expense necessary for the spouse who is
seeking spousal support to acquire education, training, or job
experience so that the spouse will be qualified to obtain
appropriate employment, provided the education, training, or
job experience, and employment is, in fact, sought;
(l) The tax consequences, for each party, of an award of
spousal support;
(m) The lost income production capacity of either party that
resulted from that party’s marital responsibilities;
(n) Any other factor that the court expressly finds to be
relevant and equitable.
(2) In determining whether spousal support is reasonable and
in determining the amount and terms of payment of spousal
support, each party shall be considered to have contributed
equally to the production of marital income.
{¶18} Further, pursuant to R.C. 3105.18(F)(2), “In determining whether to modify
an existing order for spousal support, the court shall consider any purpose expressed in
the initial order or award and enforce any voluntary agreement of the parties.”
{¶19} Here, there is no dispute that the separation agreement retained jurisdiction
to modify spousal support or that there existed a change in the circumstances of the
parties warranting modification. Instead, Husband argues that the trial court failed “to
address the 40% narrowing of the gap in incomes between the parties from the original
divorce to the current income of the parties” when it reduced Husband’s spousal support
obligation by only 11 percent.
{¶20} However, in its January 31, 2024 judgment, the trial court considered each
relevant spousal support factor and noted the circumstances that had changed since the
time of the divorce.
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{¶21} With respect to Husband’s income and relative earning ability (R.C.
3105.18(C)(1)(a) and (C)(1)(b)), the court found that, following the divorce, Husband
earned $1,250,000 in 2019 and $1,216,269 in 2020 at the firm where he was employed
at the time of the parties’ divorce in 2017. In July 2022, Husband’s employer notified him
that the CIO position at the firm was to be terminated. Husband’s last day at the firm was
October 28, 2022. Husband received a severance package from the firm for nine months
of employment, totaling $675,000, which was contingent upon Husband executing a two-
year non-compete agreement.1
{¶22} After receiving notification that the CIO position at the firm was to be
terminated, Husband sought employment based in Pennsylvania that required less travel.
He obtained such employment commencing November 1, 2022, as a CIO, presumably at
an entity that did not practice immigration law pursuant to the terms of his non-compete
agreement. Husband’s contract at the new entity set his salary at $475,000 per year plus
a maximum bonus of $25,000 per year and provided him eligibility for a salary review in
January 2024.
{¶23} In addition, Husband received the Resaca Place property as part of the
property division in the divorce decree. Although Husband had previously rented out the
property, he testified at the hearing on his motion to modify that he had not placed the
property for rent in the last two years. He did not provide any basis for foregoing rental
income.
1. The trial court’s judgment noted that Husband’s severance package required that he execute a non-compete agreement to refrain from working in immigration-related services for one year. However, the
testimony and exhibit admitted at hearing indicate that the non-compete agreement was for a term of two
years, with approximately one year remaining on the agreement as of the time of hearing.
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{¶24} With respect to Wife’s income and relative earning ability (R.C.
3105.18(C)(1)(a) and (C)(1)(b)), following the parties’ divorce, Wife attempted to find full-
time teaching positions, but, because teaching philosophies had changed significantly
during the 22 years that Wife was out of the teaching field, she was unable to secure an
interview for the full-time positions for which she applied. Wife obtained work as an on-
call substitute teacher until the outbreak of COVID-19. When substitute teaching was no
longer feasible due to the pandemic, Wife obtained a position in the front office of a
podiatrist’s practice, where she continued to work, earning approximately $30,784 per
year. In addition, Wife continued to teach yoga on a part-time basis, earning between
$3,000 to $5,000 per year. Accordingly, the spousal support received from Husband
constituted Wife’s primary source of income.
{¶25} Concerning the ages and the physical, mental, and emotional conditions of
the parties (R.C. 3105.18(C)(1)(c)), the court found that Husband was 59 years old and
continued to suffer from diabetes, heart disease, and high blood pressure, but there was
no evidence admitted indicating that these conditions had worsened following the divorce.
However, subsequent to the divorce, Husband suffered a mini-stroke, from which he had
no lasting effects. Wife was nearly 59 years old and remained in good health.
{¶26} In regard to the retirement benefits of Husband (R.C. 3105.18(C)(1)(d)), the
court noted that no evidence was presented as to the amount of benefits Husband could
receive from social security. Further, although Husband had been a member of the
military reserves for over ten years, he testified that he was not entitled to any retirement
benefits as a result of his service. The court found that three of Husband’s retirement
accounts had a total value of $683,702 as of the time of hearing. However, although
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Husband acknowledged he has retirement benefits as a result of his new employment,
he did not disclose this account on his financial disclosure affidavit. Husband’s paystubs
reflected twice monthly contributions of $1,250 to his current 401(k). Although Husband’s
contract with his new employer provided that he was entitled to pension and profit sharing,
no evidence was presented at the hearing as to the accumulated value of these benefits.
{¶27} In regard to the retirement benefits of Wife (R.C. 3105.18(C)(1)(d)), Wife
utilized the $281,500 she received as her share of the retirement accounts from the
divorce to open accounts with Ameriprise. She then regularly contributed $6,000 per
month into the Ameriprise accounts following the divorce, resulting in the accounts’
valuing $719,878 at the time of the modification hearing. The court found that Wife would
be eligible for social security benefits and a small STRS benefit of less than $5,000 per
year. Wife’s employment did not provide her with retirement benefits.
{¶28} With respect to the duration of marriage (R.C. 3105.18(C)(1)(e)), the court
noted that the parties were married for approximately twenty-five years.
{¶29} Concerning the extent to which it would be inappropriate for a party,
because that party will be custodian of a minor child of the marriage, to seek employment
outside the home (R.C. 3105.18(C)(1)(f)), the parties’ children were emancipated at the
time of the hearing, and, thus, the court found this factor inapplicable.
{¶30} In regard to the standard of living of the parties established during the
marriage (R.C. 3105.18 (C)(1)(g)), the court found that the parties enjoyed “a very nice”
standard of living during the marriage. They owned a nice home with a pool and a vacation
property. They drove luxury vehicles and owned recreational vehicles and watercraft.
Although Wife continued to reside in the marital residence following the divorce, she did
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not own vacation homes, had “downgraded the prestige of her motor vehicle,” and did not
own any other titled vehicles or watercraft. However, since the divorce, Husband
remarried and purchased a new primary residence in Sewickley, Pennsylvania, with his
new spouse, that is worth approximately twice that of the marital residence at the time of
the divorce. Husband and his new spouse purchased an additional vacation home in
Sandusky, Ohio. The court further found that Husband maintained the “prestige” of the
motor vehicles he owned and upgraded to newer models. The court determined that,
although Wife “opted to live conservatively and invest a portion of her spousal support to
protect her future,” Husband “opted to improve his standard of living and lifestyle. . . .”
{¶31} With respect to the education of the parties and the contribution of each
party to the education, training, or earning ability of the other party (R.C. 3105.18 (C)(1)(h)
and (C)(1)(j)), Wife obtained her master’s degree in education prior to the marriage;
although due to the significant amount of time that she was absent from the teaching field,
her advanced degree had not provided her with any increased earning ability. Husband
obtained his master’s degree in business administration during the marriage. No
testimony was provided as to the marital contributions to Husband’s advanced degree.
{¶32} With respect to the relative assets and liabilities of Husband (R.C. 3105.18
(C)(1)(i)), the court found that the balance in Husband’s bank accounts as of the time of
the hearing totaled approximately $855,729 (which included approximately $414,383
from Husband’s severance pay). Although both the Sewickley residence and Sandusky
home were jointly titled to both he and his new spouse, Husband paid the entirety of the
mortgages, property taxes, and insurance for each property, totaling $5,453.36 per month
for the Sewickley property and $2,000 per month for the Sandusky property. Husband
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paid $1,217.71 per month on the mortgage loans encumbering the Resaca Place
property. The court found that Husband owned a 2020 GMC Sierra, the loan for which he
fully paid following the divorce; a 2020 BMW, which had an outstanding auto loan of
$39,333.92, for which Husband made monthly payments of $625; a 2020 Honda, the loan
for which Husband fully paid following the divorce; a 2021 Harley-Davidson motorcycle,
for which there was no evidence as to an associated loan; and a 2021 Ranger boat, which
had an outstanding loan balance of $100,185.85, for which Husband made monthly
payments of $716.45. In addition, Husband indicated that his wife is the owner of a Chris-
Craft boat, but he pays the monthly expenses associated with the boat in the amount of
$1,108 per month. The court found that Husband had paid off the entirety of the
unsecured debts due to Pentagon and Home Depot allocated to him in the divorce. He
had also reduced the student loan balance for his sons to $16,000.
{¶33} As to the assets and liabilities of Wife (R.C. 3105.18(C)(1)(i)), the court
found that, as of the time of hearing on Husband’s motion, the balance in Wife’s savings
accounts totaled approximately $113,164. Wife retained the Nautilus Trail property and
paid $2,205 per month for the mortgage (which she had refinanced into her sole name),
taxes, insurance, and homeowners’ association fees pertaining to the property. Wife had
acquired no other real property since the divorce. Wife leased a Toyota Camry, and
owned no titled vehicles, recreational vehicles, or watercraft.
{¶34} Concerning the time and expense necessary for Wife to acquire education,
training, or job experience so that she would be qualified to obtain appropriate
employment (R.C. 3105.18(C)(1)(k)), the court found that Wife had already attempted to
re-enter the teaching field following the divorce, and no evidence as to the time or
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expense of her efforts was introduced. Nor was any evidence introduced as to the
potential cost of any further training or education.
{¶35} Relative to the tax consequences of spousal support (R.C.
3105.18(C)(1)(l)), the parties specifically agreed to retain the tax allocation set forth in the
separation agreement; namely, spousal support would be tax deductible for Husband and
taxable income for Wife.
{¶36} In regard to the lost income production capacity of either party that resulted
from that party’s marital responsibilities (R.C. 3105.18(C)(1)(m)), the court found it clear
that Wife lost income production capacity due to her staying at home to raise the parties’
children. Despite her master’s degree in teaching, she did not utilize her teaching skills
from 1995 to 2017, approximately 22 years, while she was a stay-at-home parent.
{¶37} Concerning any other relevant factors (R.C. 3105.18(C)(1)(n)), the court
noted that Husband’s new spouse earns in excess of $355,000 per year, but the new
spouse pays only the utilities associated with the Sewickley property. The court further
noted that two of the parties’ adult children reside with Wife at the Nautilus Trail property,
but they do not contribute to the household expenses.
{¶38} In addition, Husband pays for insurance for himself and his new spouse at
an annual cost of $16,686.24, and he deposits $7,000 per year into a health savings
account. Moreover, Husband pays some of his mother’s living expenses.
{¶39} Following its review of the statutory factors, the trial court reduced
Husband’s spousal support obligation by $1,583.33 per month, concluding that the
monthly amount of support of $13,000 was reasonable and appropriate under the
circumstances. Although Husband advocates for a larger decrease based upon the
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narrowing gap between the parties’ incomes, nothing in the parties’ separation agreement
or the statutory factors provides for a modification in strict proportionality with the
lessened difference in the parties’ income. Accordingly, Husband’s fourth assigned error
lacks merit.
{¶40} In his first and second assigned errors, Husband argues:
[1.] The trial court erred in making the amount of spousal
support, set forth in the parties’ Separation Agreement as
modifiable, nonmodifiable in amount in its post decree
judgment entry.
[2.] The trial court erred in making spousal support only
modifiable in the future in an increased amount without also
allowing for downward modifications.
{¶41} In his first two assigned errors, Husband maintains that the trial court erred
as a matter of law in altering the continuing jurisdiction of the court to modify spousal
support.2 We review errors of law de novo without deference to the trial court’s legal
conclusions. Szokan v. Stevens, 2020-Ohio-7001, ¶ 35 (11th Dist.); State ex rel. Ames v.
Portage Cty. Bd. of Commrs.,
2022-Ohio-105, ¶ 6 (11th Dist.).
{¶42} Pursuant to R.C. 3105.18(F)(2), “Absent an agreement of the parties, the
court shall not modify the continuing jurisdiction of the court as contained in the original
decree.”
{¶43} Here, Husband maintains that the trial court’s January 31, 2024 judgment
removed “the parties agreed upon reservation of jurisdiction,” and Husband reads the trial
court’s judgment as “further ordering that the amount of [Husband’s] spousal support
2. In his first assigned error, Husband references the standard of review applicable to “a trial court’s action
with respect to a magistrate’s decision . . . .” However, Husband’s motion was heard by a judge, not a
magistrate, and thus no magistrate’s decision was issued with respect to Husband’s motion.
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could not be decreased for the remainder of the original term but could be increased in
the event that Husband resumed making $800,000.”
{¶44} However, for the reasons that follow, we disagree with Husband’s reading
of the January 31, 2024 judgment. The judgment specifically states as follows:
The Court finds that it is reasonable and appropriate to modify
[Husband]’s spousal support award to Thirteen Thousand
Dollars ($13,000.00) per month, at this time. IT IS HEREBY
ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that [Husband]’s
spousal support obligation is modified to Thirteen Thousand
Dollars ($13,000.00) per month, plus processing fee. Spousal
support shall be included in gross income and taxable to
[Wife] and deducted by [Husband] for income tax purposes.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED
that the Court retains jurisdiction to modify spousal support as
originally reserved in the Judgment Entry – Decree of Divorce.
{¶45} Although Husband recognizes that the above provision retains the original
reservation of jurisdiction, he maintains that the following provisions contained in the
judgment effectively limit the application in the manner advanced in his brief:
[1.] IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND
DECREED that [Husband] shall pay [Wife] spousal support as
ordered herein for the remainder of the original term of 108
months as prescribed in the Judgment Entry – Decree of
Divorce. . . .
[2.] IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND
DECREED that [Husband] shall provide [Wife] with a copy of
his federal income tax return, along with all associated
schedules and W-2, no later than February 15th of each
calendar year. Just cause should be evidenced why
[Husband]’s spousal support obligation to [Wife] should not be
restored to its original award in the event he earns annual
gross income of Eight Hundred Thousand Dollars
($800,000.00).
{¶46} We read nothing in these provisions that limits the trial court’s reservation
of jurisdiction to modify spousal support. The first provision decreases the amount of the
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monthly spousal support obligation without modification of the original term. The second
provision recognizes that, given the parties’ initial agreement, wherein the parties agreed
that Husband earned $800,000 per year, restoration of the original agreed amount may
likely be appropriate if he were to again earn such an amount. However, it does not limit
future modification to this situation. Accordingly, these provisions neither explicitly nor
implicitly prevent either party from seeking an upward or downward modification of
spousal support. Thus, we disagree with the premise on which Husband’s first and
second assigned errors are based.
{¶47} Accordingly, Husband’s first and second assigned errors lack merit.
{¶48} In his third assigned error, Husband maintains:
The trial court erred in requiring the spousal support obligor to
provide his yearly income tax returns to the spousal support
obligee for the purposes of increasing the spousal support
amount should be (sic.) earn more money, without also
requiring the spousal support obligee to provide her income
tax returns for the purposes of any downward adjustment
pursuant to the factors set forth in O.R.C. §3105.18(C)(1).
{¶49} As set forth in our discussion of Husband’s first and second assigned errors,
in the January 31, 2024 judgment, the trial court required Husband to provide Wife with a
copy of his federal income tax return, including all schedules and his W-2, prior to
February 15 each year. The court ordered no similar requirement of Wife.
{¶50} Generally, appellate courts review a trial court’s judgment in a domestic
relations case for an abuse of discretion. Willoughby, 2014-Ohio-743, at ¶ 24 (11th Dist.),
citing Booth v. Booth,
44 Ohio St.3d 142, 144 (1989). “As a court of equity, a trial court
‘must have discretion to do what is equitable upon the facts and circumstances of each
case[.]’”
Willoughby at ¶ 24, quoting
Booth at 144, citing Cherry v. Cherry,
66 Ohio St.2d
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348, 355 (1981). As set forth in our discussion of Husband’s fourth assigned error, “‘[t]he
term “abuse of discretion” is one of art, “connoting judgment exercised by a court, which
does not comport with reason or the record.”’”
Willoughby at ¶ 24, quoting In re V.M.B.,
2013-Ohio-4298, at ¶ 26, quoting Underwood,
2009-Ohio-2089, at ¶ 30, citing Ferranto,
112 Ohio St. at 676-678.
{¶51} In support of his third assigned error, Husband argues that “taking away the
modification clause in the original agreement, only allowing for a future increase in the
spousal support amount, coupled with only one party ordered to produce their tax returns
is ‘arbitrary, unreasonable, or unconscionable’ by the court and, as such constitutes an
abuse of discretion.” However, as set forth in our discussion of Husband’s first and second
assignments of error, the trial court specifically retained the original modification provision
and did not limit future modifications to only increases in the spousal support obligation.
{¶52} With respect to the requirement that Husband provide a copy of his tax
return to Wife each year, Husband does not argue that the trial court lacked authority to
require the parties to exchange federal tax returns. See Ossai-Charles v. Charles, 2011-
Ohio-3766, ¶ 42 (12th Dist.) (trial court order requiring the parties exchange tax returns
during a term of spousal support was not an abuse of discretion). Instead, Husband
maintains that the requirement that only he provide a copy of his tax return each year was
unreasonable, arbitrary, or unconscionable.
{¶53} However, as discussed above, the evidence at the hearing established
Husband’s income was significantly higher than $800,000 in the years following the
divorce. Wife testified that she was unaware of Husband’s increased income during this
period, and she requested that the court require Husband to thereafter provide her with
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Case No. 2024-P-0013
copies of his tax returns. Husband made no similar request for such a requirement to be
made of Wife, despite her approximate $15,000 annual increase in income from that
which was imputed to her at the time of the divorce.
{¶54} Further, it was contemplated that Husband could potentially earn greater
amounts, as he was bound to a two-year non-compete agreement at the time he began
his new employment, and he was eligible for a salary review in January 2024. There was
no indication that Wife would earn substantially more during the remainder of the support
term. To the contrary, the trial court found that there was little likelihood that Wife’s
advanced degree in education which was acquired prior to the marriage would be of any
significant benefit in improving her earnings ability. The court determined that Wife’s
“anticipated earning ability between yoga instruction and W-2 wages” to be between
$35,000 and $37,000.
{¶55} We cannot say that the trial court’s order for only Husband to produce his
tax returns was an abuse of discretion.
{¶56} Accordingly, Husband’s third assigned error lacks merit.
{¶57} The judgment is affirmed.
MATT LYNCH, J.,
ROBERT J. PATTON, J.,
concur.
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