[Cite as State v. Williams,
2024-Ohio-5164.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
ELEVENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
TRUMBULL COUNTY
STATE OF OHIO, CASE NO. 2024-T-0007
Plaintiff-Appellee,
Criminal Appeal from the
- vs - Court of Common Pleas
KASHAUN ROBIN WILLIAMS
a.k.a. ROBIN KASHAUN WILLIAMS, Trial Court No. 2023 CR 00216
Defendant-Appellant.
OPINION
Decided: October 28, 2024
Judgment: Affirmed
Dennis Watkins, Trumbull County Prosecutor, and Ryan J. Sanders, Assistant
Prosecutor, Administration Building, Fourth Floor, 160 High Street, N.W., Warren, OH
44481 (For Plaintiff-Appellee).
Michael A. Partlow, P.O. Box 1562, Stow, OH 44224 (For Defendant-Appellant).
EUGENE A. LUCCI, P.J.
{¶1} Appellant, Kashaun Robin Williams (“Williams”), appeals the judgment of
the Trumbull County Court of Common Pleas, after a trial by jury, convicting him of
Aggravated Murder, Attempted Murder, Kidnapping, Aggravated Burglary, Receiving
Stolen Property, Having Weapons Under Disability, and Assault on a Peace Officer (along
with various associated specifications). For the reasons discussed in this opinion, the
judgment is affirmed.
I. General Background
{¶2} In April 2023, the murder victim, J.C., and his girlfriend, M.M., the
attempted-murder victim, lived together with J.C.’s dogs at 690 Lerner, Warren, Trumbull
County, Ohio. At the time of the incidents, J.C. and Williams, whose nickname is “Rudy,”
were friends and had known each other for many years. Indeed, Williams referred to J.C.
as “Big bro.” Williams had been to J.C.’s residence on many occasions and was well
acquainted with M.M. as well.
{¶3} On April 1, 2023, J.C. invited his mother, Lasonya Lynk (“Ms. Lynk”), and
his two sisters to stay at his home because his family had lost power at their residence in
Liberty, Ohio, due to a storm. J.C. took his family to dinner and then drove his mother and
sisters back to his house. Ms. Lynk and her daughters watched television and eventually
fell asleep on J.C.’s couch.
{¶4} Earlier on the day of April 1, M.M. attended a party where Williams was
present. Later that evening, M.M. went to a local bar. J.C., after taking his family to dinner,
met M.M. at the bar. The couple later went to a different bar after which they left in
separate vehicles. J.C. returned to the residence, and M.M. went to a local Sheetz store
to get gas. At the gas station, M.M. saw Williams with his girlfriend, Amoria. While M.M.
was waiting to pay for gas, she noticed that Williams was maced by Amoria. Police arrived
to address the matter. Once police officers moved their cruisers, M.M. returned to the
house on Lerner.
{¶5} At the Lerner residence, J.C. assisted his mother and youngest sister, a 16-
year-old girl (“A.L.”), into the guest bedroom. J.C.’s older sister, J.M., a 21-year-old
woman, slept on the living room couch. Both J.C. and M.M. then went to bed.
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II. The State’s Theory of the Case
{¶6} Later, in the early morning hours of April 2, 2023, Ms. Lynk and J.C.’s
younger sister, A.L., were awakened by a disturbance outside the home. The guest
bedroom in which they were sleeping was adjacent to the home’s driveway. Ms. Lynk
heard a male’s voice clearly shouting “J-Bae, Jae Bae,” which was J.C.’s nickname.
{¶7} The voice continued, stating “J-Bae, Jae Bae, come outside, mother fucker.
I’m gonna shoot these dogs. I’m gonna shoot these cars. This my shit. I run this.” Ms.
Lynk then heard two gun shots. The gunfire sounded as though it was “right outside the
window.” Ms. Lynk called to J.C. from the guest bedroom and alerted him that someone
was outside.
{¶8} J.C. and M.M. awoke. J.C. put on black socks and a T-shirt. The T-shirt was
on backwards. According to Ms. Lynk, J.C. was not “angry or argumentative” as he went
to investigate the disturbance. J.C. went outside with M.M. When they exited the home,
Ms. Lynk overheard J.C. say, “Dog, what is you doing? My mom and my sisters is in
here.”
{¶9} Ms. Lynk could overhear fragments of a conversation; in particular, she
heard J.C. question, “But what this got to do with me?” She then heard the other male,
identified as Williams, state, “But I love you though, J-Bae.” Ms. Lynk thought any conflict
had de-escalated, but then overheard the male voice declare, “Mother fucker, I beat your
ass.” She then heard J.C. respond, “Man, do whatever you gonna do.” Ms. Lynk then
heard two additional gunshots.
{¶10} Meanwhile, J.M., J.C.’s older sister, had retreated into the guest bedroom
with Ms. Lynk and A.L. Ms. Lynk, A.L., and J.M. hid in the bedroom closet. J.M. confirmed
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the substance of the conversation Ms. Lynk had overheard outside, including the two
initial gunshots.
{¶11} Specifically, J.M. heard a male’s voice, identified as Williams, stating “J-
Bae, J-Bae,” in almost “a singing” intonation. The voice kept announcing “We need to talk
. . . N . . . .r you better come outside. I’m gonna shoot these dogs . . . I’m gonna shoot
through all these cars.” J.M. heard Williams declare “I love you, though, J-Bae.” She then
heard J.C. state, “What that got to do with anything though?” J.M. asserted J.C. sounded
confused.
{¶12} According to J.M., M.M. entered the guest bedroom and explained Williams
was “mad ‘cause his girlfriend got maced at the gas station or something.’” A second
round of gunshots were heard and M.M. left the room while J.M. called 911.
{¶13} J.M. stated M.M. subsequently returned to the bedroom and exclaimed,
“Mama, he shot [J.C.].” M.M. again left the bedroom. J.M. heard additional shots, after
which she heard “like an impact, like somebody was hitting or something.” J.M. then
heard M.M. pleading “Rudy, please stop” to which Williams replied, “Bitch, don’t say my
name.” J.M. also heard noises like “feet dragging or something,” and she then heard
police arriving. J.M. exited the bedroom and observed M.M. in the living room. M.M’s face
was bloody and her wig was torn from her head.
{¶14} Sergeant Trevor Sumption of the Warren Police Department responded to
a “shots-fired” call at the residence. Upon arrival, he observed M.M. struggling with
Williams near a vehicle; Williams appeared to be “yanking” M.M. out of the vehicle. It was
difficult to see, but Sergeant Sumption stated the individuals were fighting over a firearm.
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The sergeant exited his cruiser with his firearm pointed at Williams. Williams then ran
from the scene, jumping a fence abutting a wooded area of the home’s backyard.
{¶15} Officer Raegan Hoffman of the Warren Police Department also responded.
Upon arrival, she observed Sergeant Sumption chasing Williams. Officer Hoffman gave
chase, shouting “police” and “stop.” The officer was able to catch up to Williams who
abruptly turned to her and punched her in the chest. The two fell to the ground in a
struggle. Officer Phillip Sajnovsky of the Warren Police Department was approximately
15 feet behind Officer Hoffman at the time and assisted her in handcuffing Williams.
{¶16} Upon being detained, Williams explained he did not know he was being
chased by police and claimed he had been stabbed in the back. A claim which was
confirmed false.
{¶17} Meanwhile, Sergeant Sumption and Officer Abigail Krafcik of the Warren
Police Department entered the residence to check on any additional victims. Upon her
arrival, Officer Krafcik observed J.C. and confirmed he was dead. Officer Krafcik found
M.M. frantic and crying, wearing a bloody T-shirt with her face covered in blood. M.M.
advised the officer that Williams attacked her, shot her, and beat her. M.M.’s wig and a
firearm, that was later confirmed forensically to be the weapon used in the murder and
attempted murder, were recovered in the driveway of the residence.
{¶18} Warren Police Department Detective Brian Crites arrived at the residence
to process the crime scene. Upon his arrival, he observed two victims, one, J.C.,
deceased and another, M.M., who had not only been shot, but had sustained other
obvious injuries to her legs and face.
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{¶19} The detective collected the wig and the firearm from the driveway. The
firearm, a Springfield Armory 9mm Luger semi-automatic pistol, model XDS-9
(“Springfield XDS”), had ostensible blood staining throughout the hardware. Detective
Crites also collected two bullet casings in the living room, two from the front yard, and
one from across the street. He additionally collected pieces of a projectile from the living
room.
{¶20} Detective Crites was given consent to search the Hyundai SUV, in which
Williams arrived at the residence. The detective took photos and evidence from the SUV.
The detective found, among other things, a 9mm magazine with cartridges in it; a large
amount of cash; and a 9mm handgun under the driver’s seat.1
{¶21} Deputy Jeff Marsolo of the Trumbull County Sheriff’s Office took a report of
a stolen Springfield XDS handgun from a residence in Fowler, Trumbull County, Ohio, on
January 19, 2023. The serial number from the stolen Springfield XDS matched the serial
number from the firearm recovered in the driveway at the scene of the incident.
{¶22} Keith Jennings, a resident of Fowler, Trumbull County, filed a report in
January 2023. He reported a Springfield XDS 9mm firearm, inter alia, was stolen from his
home. Mr. Jennings provided the serial number of the firearm to the sheriff’s office.
{¶23} Mr. Jennings did not know Williams nor did he sell the firearm to Williams.
Nevertheless, the serial number matched the weapon found on the driveway of the crime
scene.
1. Neither this firearm, a SCCY 9mm Luger handgun, model CPX-2, nor a third firearm found in the yard of
the residence, a Taurus 9mm Luger semi-automatic pistol, model 709 Slim, were directly connected to the
crimes committed during the incident in question. The firearms were tested for DNA and results showed no
presumptive positives for blood and, although some DNA was identified, it was insufficient to compare to a
standard from an individual.
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{¶24} David Miller, a supervisor in the DNA Unit of the Ohio Bureau of Criminal
Investigation (“BCI”), took DNA swabs from the Springfield XDS firearm found on the
driveway of the residence and determined the samples were suitable for comparison. Mr.
Miller found Williams and M.M. were major contributors of the blood DNA on the slide of
the firearm. M.M.’s DNA was also found on the bottom of the firearm’s magazine, which
had tested presumptive positive for blood staining.
{¶25} Joshua Barr, a forensic scientist in the firearms section of BCI, determined
the Springfield XDS firearm, which was found on the driveway of the residence of the
crime scene, was fully operable and capable of firing projectiles. Mr. Barr pointed out that
a firearm’s barrel includes “lands and grooves,” which are high and low marks or spots
inside the barrel. Lands and grooves occur during the manufacturing process and exist
to stabilize bullets in flight.
{¶26} Mr. Barr also discussed “class characteristics” and “individual
characteristics” as they relate to particular firearms. “Class characteristics” relate to
similarities of like firearms manufactured in the same place with the same type of firing
pin and same shape. “Individual characteristics” relate to each individual firearm and can
be framed as that firearm’s “individual fingerprint.” Mr. Barr concluded that the five casings
recovered from the crime scene were fired from the Springfield XDS firearm.
{¶27} Mr. Barr also tested four bullet-jacket fragments that were recovered from
the living room of the residence. He was able to compare two of the fragments and
determined they were fired from the Springfield XDS firearm.
{¶28} Dr. George Sterbenz, a forensic pathologist and deputy coroner for the
Trumbull County Coroner’s Office, performed the autopsy on J.C. Dr. Sterbenz pointed
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out J.C.’s shirt was worn backwards the night of the homicide, and J.C. was shot in the
back. Accordingly, the front of the T-shirt had significant blood staining.
{¶29} The doctor was able to note that there was a large “torn defect” on the shirt
which represented what he designated as the bullet entry for the “medial wound.” Also,
Dr. Sterbenz observed soot and gun-powder residue injected into the entrance of the
medial wound. Considering these points, the doctor identified the medial wound had “an
abraded muzzle imprint . . . and that muzzle imprint will reflect the - - the gun.” The doctor
therefore concluded the medial wound was “a contact range injury.” The bullet entry of
the medial wound, among other significant internal damage, severed J.C.’s spinal cord.
{¶30} Dr. Sterbenz also opined that the non-contact wound, i.e., the “lateral
wound,” caused a fracture of J.C.’s left eighth rib. The bullet then perforated his left lung
and continued through his heart and into the pulmonary artery. The bullet causing the
lateral wound then exited the body by perforating J.C.’s breastplate or sternum.
{¶31} The trajectory of the bullet causing the medial wound passed through the
spinal cord, through the right lung, through the liver, and then exited the body. Although
Dr. Sterbenz did not form an express opinion regarding which bullet was fired first, his
report designates the lateral-entrance wound as “gunshot wound #1” and the medial-
entrance wound as “gunshot wound #2.” The doctor stated that the severance of the
spinal cord would cause a person to immediately collapse and therefore one could
reasonably infer that the medial-entrance wound or the “contact-injury” wound was the
second shot that was fired.
{¶32} The bullet giving rise to the lateral wound caused 1.6 liters of blood, nearly
a half-gallon, to flood J.C.’s chest cavity. The bullet causing the medial wound resulted
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in an additional 300 cubic centimeters, a little over a cup of blood to fill J.C.’s body. The
doctor concluded that J.C.’s death was caused by the multiple gunshot wounds at the
hands of another individual.
III. Williams’ Testimony and his Version of Events
{¶33} According to Williams, on April 1, 2023, he was at a coming-home-from-
prison party for his sister. He acknowledged M.M. attended the party. Later, he went to
a bar where he met his girlfriend, Amoria, and again saw M.M. Later, at approximately
12:30 a.m. on April 2, 2023, Williams went to a second bar where he again met Amoria.
The couple left that bar at approximately 2:00 a.m. and went to a Sheetz gas station.
While there, a female friend gave Williams a hug which, according to Williams, caused
Amoria to mace him. Police arrived and Williams claimed they made him leave the gas
station.
{¶34} Williams asserted he intended on going home but the person who he was
with left without him. He contacted another friend, a Kelsey Squeglia, who told Williams
she last saw Amoria with M.M. Williams enlisted Ms. Squeglia to drive him to J.C.’s and
M.M.’s residence expecting to locate his girlfriend.
{¶35} Once Williams and Ms. Squeglia arrived at the residence, Williams exited
the vehicle and “banged” on the front screen door. Williams, however, received no
response from the occupants.
{¶36} Williams admitted to addressing J.C outside the home. Williams admitted
he repeatedly called for J.C., “J-Bae, J-Bae, J-Bae open up the door.” Williams also
conceded he called out “Y’all gonna make me get on some bullshit. Amoria, if you in
there, we’re going to get into it.” Williams admitted he heard dogs barking and stated, “if
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one of these dogs break loose, I’m gonna kill one of them.” Despite this threat, Williams
maintained he had no weapon or firearm on his person.
{¶37} Ultimately, Williams stated J.C. and M.M. emerged from the home, and J.C.
asked why Williams was banging on the door. J.C. then sent M.M. back inside the
residence; Williams claimed he was at the house to find his girlfriend, Amoria. According
to Williams, a verbal exchange occurred during which he told J.C., “I beat your ass . . . I’ll
knock you the fuck out here.”
{¶38} After the exchange, Williams claimed that M.M. appeared and immediately
went back inside. She then reappeared and allegedly stated, “boy, get the fuck on. Get
the fuck out of here,” to which Williams responded, “Bitch, shut the fuck up before I smack
you.” At this point, Williams claimed that J.C. put his finger near Williams’ face, which
Williams smacked away. Williams asserted a “tussle” ensued wherein J.C. tried to sweep
him to the ground.
{¶39} The men spun, and Williams stated he heard “boom, boom.” After hearing
the shots, Williams claimed J.C. fell to the ground immediately.
{¶40} Afterwards, Williams asserted M.M. was aiming a gun in his direction. He
claimed he tried to take the weapon and, in the process, struck M.M. in the face
“approximately eight to ten times before she finally released the gun.” Williams then shot
the gun into the home, into which M.M. had fled.
{¶41} Williams admitted his intention was to shoot M.M. Despite admitting his
intent to shoot M.M., Williams claimed he went inside the residence, dropped the gun,
and attempted to help M.M. According to Williams, however, M.M. tried to grab the
weapon, and Williams admitted to striking M.M. again.
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{¶42} As the struggle continued, M.M. asked, “Rudy, why are you doing this?
Rudy, what are you doing?” To which Williams responded, “Stop saying my fucking name.
If you wouldn’t have brought that gun outside and stayed in the house none of this would
have happened.” Williams claimed he then attempted to force M.M. into Ms. Squeglia’s
vehicle to assist her in seeking medical attention for her injuries. According to Williams,
police arrived, he panicked, and then ran away.
{¶43} Williams was apprehended and was notably uncooperative during his
arrest.
IV. Charges and Proceedings
{¶44} On April 6, 2023, Williams was indicted on the following charges: Count
One: Aggravated Murder with a Specification of Aggravating Circumstances, a Repeat
Violent Offender Specification, and a Firearm Specification, in violation of R.C.
2903.01(A) and (G), R.C. 2941.145, R.C. 2941.149, R.C. 2929.04(A)(5), and R.C.
2929.04(A)(7); Count Two: Aggravated Murder with a Specification of Aggravating
Circumstances, a Repeat Violent Offender Specification, and a Firearm Specification, in
violation of R.C. 2903.01(B) and (G), R.C. 2941.145, R.C. 2941.149, R.C. 2929.04(A)(5),
and R.C. 2929.04(A)(7); Count Three: Attempted Murder, a felony of the first degree, with
a Repeat Violent Offender Specification and a Firearm Specification, in violation of R.C.
2923.02(A) and (E)(1), R.C. 2903.02(B) and (D), R.C. 2941.145, and R.C. 2941.149;
Count Four: Felonious Assault, a felony of the second degree, with a Repeat Violent
Offender Specification and a Firearm Specification, in violation of R.C. 2903.11(A)(1) and
(D)(1)(a), R.C. 2941.145, and R.C. 2941.149; Count Five: Kidnapping, a felony of the first
degree, with a Firearm Specification and a Repeat Violent Offender Specification, in
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violation of R.C. 2905.01(A)(2) and (C)(1), R.C. 2941.145, and R.C. 2941.149; Count Six:
Aggravated Burglary, a felony of the first degree, with a Firearm Specification and a
Repeat Violent Offender Specification, in violation of R.C.2911.11(A)(1) and (B), R.C.
2941.145, and R.C. 2941.149; Count Seven: Having Weapons While Under Disability, a
felony of the third degree, with a Firearm Specification, in violation of R.C. 2923.13(A)(2)
and (B), and R.C. 2941.145; Count Eight: Receiving Stolen Property, a felony of the fourth
degree, in violation of R.C. 2913.51(A) and (C); and Count Nine: Assault on a Peace
Officer, a felony of the fourth degree, in violation of R.C. 2903.13(A) and (C)(5).2
{¶45} Williams pleaded not guilty to the charges and the matter proceeded to a
jury trial. After trial, the state moved the trial court to amend the indictment. The state
maintained the amendment did not change the name, identity, or degree of the offense
of the charge, but merely sought to correct a clerical error. The state sought to amend
Count Four: Felonious Assault to conform with the evidence and jury instruction that
Williams shot M.M., by means of a deadly weapon, and caused physical harm. The trial
court granted the motion.
{¶46} The jury entered a verdict of guilty on each offense, as well as the
associated specifications, with the exception of the specifications of Repeat Violent
Offender and the offense of Having Weapons Under Disability; as it pertained to those
determinations, Williams requested the trial court to issue a verdict. The trial court found
Williams guilty on those specifications and that charge.
2. The multiple “Repeat Violent Offender” specifications were ostensibly premised upon Williams’ past
record which included two felonious assault convictions as well as an abduction conviction. Williams
testified to each prior crime of violence. And, at the time of the indictment in the matter sub judice, Williams
was still on parole. Williams admitted at trial that he had a long history of “beating and hitting other people,”
some of whom were women.
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{¶47} The matter proceeded to the mitigation phase, after which the jury declined
to impose the death penalty. Instead, it recommended a sentence of life in prison without
the possibility of parole.
{¶48} At sentencing, the trial court merged Counts One and Two for purposes of
sentencing. The state elected to proceed to sentencing on Count One. Similarly, the trial
court merged Counts Three and Four for purposes of sentencing, and the state elected
to proceed to sentencing on Count Three.
{¶49} The trial court imposed an aggregate prison sentence of life without the
possibility of parole, plus an indefinite sentence of a minimum of 81 years up to a
maximum sentence of 86 and one-half years. This appeal follows.
V. Sufficiency and Weight of the Evidence
{¶50} Williams’ first assignment of error provides:
{¶51} “Appellant’s convictions are not supported by sufficient evidence and are
against the manifest weight of the evidence.”
{¶52} When an appealing party challenges both the sufficiency and the weight of
the evidence, the appellate court need only address the manifest weight argument if it
concludes that the verdict is consistent with the manifest weight because this conclusion
presupposes the verdict was also supported by sufficient evidence. State v. Masters,
2020-Ohio-864, ¶ 17 (11th Dist.).
{¶53} With this point in mind, a court reviewing a challenge to the manifest weight
of the evidence considers the entire record, weighs the evidence and all reasonable
inferences, considers the credibility of the witnesses and determines whether, in resolving
conflicts in the evidence, the jury lost its way such that a manifest miscarriage of justice
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resulted requiring a reversal of the conviction and a new trial ordered. State v. Schlee,
1994 WL 738452, *5 (11th Dist. Dec. 23, 1994). In other words, an appellate court must
assess conflicting testimony, review rational inferences that may be drawn from the
evidence, and evaluate the strength of the conclusions drawn therefrom. State v.
McFeely,
2009-Ohio-1436, ¶ 78 (11th Dist.) A challenge to the weight of the evidence
requires the reviewing court to assess whether the state met its burden of persuasion.
Id.
{¶54} We shall first consider whether the jury lost its way in finding the state’s
theory of the case relating to the aggravated murder conviction was more credible than
Williams’ rendition of events.
A. Aggravated Murder Conviction
{¶55} In his appellate brief, Williams initially argues that his version of events
relating to the shooting of J.C. was more credible than the state’s theory due to the
position of J.C.’s body after the homicide.
{¶56} Specifically, Williams points out that M.M. admitted she did not see the
shooting; still, M.M. testified, after leaving J.C. and Williams outside the house, and then
hearing gunshots, she observed J.C. lying on his back with his feet on the porch area of
the residence near the threshold of the front door.
{¶57} Williams argues there was no forensic evidence that could support M.M.’s
description of J.C.’s body positioning. Williams posits that if, as the state maintains, he
shot J.C. twice in the back and J.C. was walking toward the front door, J.C. would
necessarily fall forward (i.e., face down) toward the door. As such, he contends the state’s
rendition of events is unreasonable, and his theory that M.M. shot J.C. in an effort to hit
him is significantly more tenable.
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{¶58} We do not agree with Williams’ underlying premises.
{¶59} M.M., Ms. Lynk, and J.M. each testified that the two shots fired (that were
reasonably associated with the fatal shots) occurred in rapid succession. Ms. Lynk
testified that M.M. was inside the house during the exchange which occurred outside the
home between J.C. and Williams. Ms. Lynk stated that she asked M.M. “what’s going
on,” to which M.M. responded, referring to Williams, “I don’t know, mama. I don’t know.
He mad. He mad about something.” Ms. Lynk testified that, when she heard the second
round of shots, M.M. was “in the front room or the hallway because she screamed . . .
and ran to where I was and was like ‘Mama, he shot [J.C.].”
{¶60} Similarly, J.C.’s older sister, J.M., testified that while J.C. was outside
addressing Williams, M.M. had returned to the guest bedroom and stated that Williams
was angry because “his girlfriend got maced at the gas station or something.” While M.M.
was in the bedroom, J.M. heard two shots fired outside. J.M. testified she then called 911.
According to J.M., M.M. left the bedroom and then ran back exclaiming, “Mama, he shot
[J.C], He shot [J.C.].”
{¶61} The foregoing testimony demonstrates that M.M. was not the shooter
because, during the relevant times the witnesses heard gunfire, she was with them in the
guest bedroom.
{¶62} Moreover, contrary to Williams’ assertions, Dr. Sterbenz’s testimony and
report established a reasonable, medico-forensic basis for the state’s theory (as well as
substantiating M.M.’s observation of the positioning of J.C.’s body).
{¶63} According to the doctor’s report and testimony, the lateral-entrance wound
caused significant internal trauma due to the puncturing of the left lung, the heart,
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pulmonary artery, and then exited J.C.’s sternum or breastplate. The damage of the shot
entering laterally created massive hemorrhaging which began to fill J.C.’s chest cavity
with nearly one-half gallon of blood.
{¶64} According to Dr. Sterbenz, the other shot, deemed the medial-entrance
wound, was a contact wound to J.C.’s back. This shot severed J.C.’s spinal cord (among
other catastrophic injuries) and ultimately exiting J.C.’s body. The doctor testified the
initial trauma from the shot causing the medial-entrance wound would cause a person to
“immediately collapse.”
{¶65} Given this evidence, the jury could reasonably conclude the lateral wound
occurred first, as J.C. was walking away from Williams, and Williams approached J.C.
and shot him a second time in the back, causing the medial entrance wound, severing
the spinal cord.
{¶66} Simply because J.C. was walking away from Williams when he was initially
shot in the back, does not mean he would necessarily fall forward. The second shot,
according to the doctor, “passes through the back bone, or in this case the thoracic
vertebra at level T10, and it went through the spinal cord.” Dr. Sterbenz testified, “if one
is standing and this injury were to occur, you would fall down.” The forensic evidence
supports the conclusion that J.C. would suddenly collapse and, depending on his
wavering balance, fall onto his back.
{¶67} The forensic evidence offered by the state via Dr. Sterbenz, in conjunction
with the witness testimony, demonstrates, beyond a reasonable doubt, that Williams
could have shot J.C. in the back causing the lateral entrance wound. That wound, while
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causing catastrophic internal trauma, would not necessarily cause J.C. to immediately
collapse.
{¶68} The testimony of M.M., Ms. Lynk, and J.M. provide a reasonable basis for
the conclusion that the shots which are connected to J.C.’s murder occurred in quick
succession. In this regard, the jury could reasonably conclude Williams shot J.C. causing
the lateral-entrance wound, then quickly shot J.C. causing the medial-entrance, contact
wound that severed the spinal cord. This injury, per Dr. Sterbenz, would necessarily
cause J.C. to immediately fall to the ground.
{¶69} Accepting, as we must, this reasonable construction of the evidence, a
reasonable jury could conclude that J.C. dropped backwards after having his spinal cord
severed, onto his back so that his feet would be facing the front door of the residence.
{¶70} It bears mention that Williams’ argument is additionally problematic
because Dr. Sterbenz reported that each of the shots passed through J.C.’s body.
Significantly, the shot causing the lateral wound exited J.C.’s body via his sternum or
breastplate. During cross-examination of Williams, he admitted that, according to his
version of events, he and J.C. were struggling, and during the struggle, they were hanging
onto one another. The prosecutor and Williams then had the following exchange:
[PROSECUTOR]: So a bullet comes through [J.C.’s] back,
goes through his lungs and through his breastplate and never
hits you?
[WILLIAMS]: No. sir. You were saying something different
than what I said. I said that we were - - we started off tussling
and his back was towards the entry of the house when he first
started tussling. My back is towards [M.M.] I never seen [M.M.]
with a weapon or anything.[J.C.] put - - [J.C.] tried to clip slam
me, and as we spin - - as we were spinning two shots went
off. My back hit the base of the house. As I looked up, [M.M.]
was in reaching distance.
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Case No. 2024-T-0007
[PROSECUTOR]: So you fell down?
[WILLIAMS]: I never fell down.
[PROSECUTOR] Well, you’re 6’3?
[WILLIAMS]: Yes.
[PROSECUTOR]: He’s 5’9. His chest is probably in your
midsection somewhere. And that bullet goes completely
through him and miraculously misses you?
[WILLIAMS]: Yes, sir. The way we were turning - - the way we
were turning and the way - - the way [J.C.] fell, it was like he
was like more so towards my left. And it’s like he - - it’s like
he almost tried to, like, turn around to see where the shots
came from as he was falling.
{¶71} This dialogue indicates that, according to Williams, M.M. shot J.C. from (at
least) some distance, but neither of the bullets which passed through his body, struck
Williams. Williams agreed with the prosecutor that the bullet that passed through J.C.’s
chest “miraculously” missed him. The jury was at liberty to find Williams’ explanation not
credible, especially in light of the evidence adduced by other witnesses and Dr. Sterbenz.
{¶72} Further, the jury had already heard Dr. Sterbenz’s testimony that the medial
wound was a contact wound. Williams’ version of events does not account for this
evidence. While he stated M.M. was “in reaching distance,” this does not imply she was
so close that she pointed and placed the barrel of the firearm directly on J.C.’s back and
shot him. This is especially problematic because Williams’ theory implies that M.M. fired
the shots trying to shoot him, not J.C. To the extent the jury believed Dr. Sterbenz’s
opinion regarding the nature of the medial, contact wound, Williams’ rendition of events
lacks credibility. After all, M.M., in attempting to shoot Williams would not, at the same
time, place the barrel of the firearm on J.C.’s back and fire the weapon.
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{¶73} Williams’ argument, in this respect, lacks merit.
B. Attempted Murder, Aggravated Burglary, and Kidnapping Convictions
{¶74} Next, Williams takes issue with the jury’s verdict regarding the attempted
murder, aggravated burglary, and kidnapping convictions relating to M.M. Williams argues
the state did not provide any evidence of motive which might support these convictions.
Instead, in his appellate brief, Williams maintains, “[he] was obviously trying to get her
medical attention. The same can be said of the aggravated burglary charge.”
{¶75} First of all, the state is not required to prove motive to meet its burden of
production in a prosecution. State v. Woodson, 2010-Ohio-1671, ¶ 24 (8th Dist.) (“Motive
is not an element of the offense of aggravated murder that the state must prove beyond
a reasonable doubt.”), citing State v. Lancaster,
167 Ohio St. 391 (1958), paragraphs one
and two of the syllabus
{¶76} We are aware that establishing a motive is useful for a factfinder to
understand and appreciate the sequence of events which lead to eventualities relevant
to a case under consideration. “There can be no question that evidence of motive in
murder cases is always relevant and material.” Lancaster. at 396. This observation
applies with similar force to attempted murder, kidnapping, and aggravated burglary
cases. Nevertheless, motive is not an element of any of the crimes with which Williams
takes issue.
{¶77} Despite this point, the evidence adduced by the state created a persuasive
tableau that undermines Williams’ claim that he was simply interested in “helping” M.M.
after he shot her. In other words, his convictions for Attempted Murder, Aggravated
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Burglary, and Kidnapping are supported by sufficient evidence as well as the greater
weight of credible evidence.
{¶78} Williams does not dispute he shot M.M. He testified that he fired shots while
M.M. was reentering the home, and his intention was “[t]o hit her.” Defense counsel asked
“[t]o shoot her?” and appellant responded in the affirmative.
{¶79} Williams was found guilty of and convicted of Attempted Murder. To
establish the elements of attempted murder, the state was required to prove that the
defendant engaged in conduct that, if successful, would cause the death of another that
is a proximate result of the offender’s committing or attempting to commit an offense of
violence that is a felony of the first or second degree. R.C. 2903.02(B); R.C. 2923.02(A).
{¶80} Williams admitted to intentionally trying to shoot M.M. with a firearm that
had already killed another. The jury did not err in finding Williams guilty of Attempted
Murder.
{¶81} M.M. testified that, after she returned inside the residence at J.C.’s request,
she heard gunshots. She ran to the front door and observed J.C. on the ground. She
testified:
As I’m standing there, his eyes is wide open. He’s just laying
there. But, like, I could tell that he was - - he was gone. So I
hear, like, gravel, like rocks. So I look back over my shoulder
and Rudy is coming up, but as he’s running up he has the gun
in his hand pointing at me. So I got up, I go to run back in the
house but in my head I’m thinking, like, if I run straight down
this hallway and try to, like, run in our room or run somewhere,
I could get shot out at my back so I hit the floor. So he comes
in behind, like, as he come in he, like, trips over [J.C.’s] feet.
He don’t fall but he stumbled. He get to shooting. I’m, like, at
this point I’m in between our couches trying to get around, but
the foot of the couch was up because his sister was on that
couch. He - - still he comes in. He, like, flipped, like, flipped
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Case No. 2024-T-0007
the table, our center table, and he grabbed me by the back of
my head. He was like, “Huh-uh, bitch.”
He grabbed me. He pulled me back. He get to beating me with
the gun. I don’t feel it but I can hear it. So I get to screaming,
like “Rudy, stop. Please stop. Stop.” He still hitting me, like,
“Bitch, stop saying my name. Stop saying my name. Stop
saying my name.” So he’s dragging me, like, to bring me
outside. So as he’s dragging me, of course he got to drag me
over [J.C’s] feet because [J.C.’s] feet is right there in the door.
So, like, we’re tussling, like, I’m trying to pull away as he’s still
pulling me.
So we get outside. He pulls me over [J.C’s] feet. He pulls me
off the porch. He’s pulling me through the gravel. My legs and
everything was all scraped up. I’m bleeding, like, a lot on my
head, not even knowing that I was shot or anything.
{¶82} Williams was found guilty of and convicted of Kidnapping, in violation of R.C.
2905.01(A)(2), a felony of the first degree, which provides: “No person, by force . . . shall
remove another from the place where the other person is found or restrain the liberty of
the other person, for any of the following purposes . . . [t]o facilitate the commission of
any felony or flight thereafter . . . .”
{¶83} Williams was also found guilty of and convicted of Aggravated Burglary, in
violation of R.C. 2911.11(A)(1), a felony of the first degree, which provides: “No person,
by force, stealth, or deception, shall trespass in an occupied structure . . . when another
person other than an accomplice of the offender is present, with purpose to commit in the
structure . . . any criminal offense, if any of the following apply . . . [t]he offender inflicts,
or attempts or threatens to inflict physical harm on another . . . .” Criminal trespass is
defined in R.C. 2911.21(A)(1), which states, “[N]o person, without privilege to do so, shall
. . . [k]nowingly enter or remain on the land or premises of another . . . .” “Privilege”
is defined as “an immunity, license, or right conferred by law, bestowed by express or
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implied grant, arising out of status, position, office, or relationship, or growing out of
necessity.” R.C. 2901.01(A)(12).
{¶84} Williams was additionally found guilty of felonious assault (but not convicted
of this count due to its merger, for purposes of sentencing, with Count Three, Attempted
Murder), in violation of R.C. 2903.11(A)(1), a felony of the second degree, which
provides: “No person shall knowingly do either of the following . . . Cause serious physical
harm to another or to another's unborn . . . .]”
{¶85} The evidence demonstrated Williams, after shooting and beating M.M.,
forcibly removed her from the residence, dragged her across the driveway, and attempted
to force her into a vehicle. This evidence establishes kidnapping beyond a reasonable
doubt.
{¶86} Further, the evidence supports the credible conclusion that Williams
engaged in a trespassory entry into the residence. Shell casings were found in the
residence. Williams does not deny he tried to shoot M.M. and, if the shots were fired
inside the residence, this is sufficient, credible evidence to support the aggravated
burglary conviction, either by way of the guilty finding on the felonious assault count or
the conviction on the attempted murder count.
{¶87} M.M.’s testimony, unto itself, demonstrates Williams committed attempted
murder, felonious assault, and kidnapping. She was shot by Williams, she was severely
beaten by Williams, and she was then forcibly dragged out of the home by Williams who
attempted to shove her in a vehicle to flee from the scene. Although Williams’ testified he
was merely removing M.M. as a “good Samaritan” to take her to the hospital due to her
wounds, the jury was free to disregard his version of events.
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{¶88} The substantial weight of the evidence militates against Williams’
arguments.
{¶89} Williams’ convictions for attempted murder, aggravated robbery, and
kidnapping are therefore supported by sufficient, credible evidence.
C. Receiving Stolen Property
{¶90} Williams also, in passing, contends the state “presented no evidence
whatsoever that the stolen firearm in question had been stolen by [him] as opposed to
[M.M.] or one of her cohorts.” Williams’ contention is misplaced.
{¶91} Williams was charged with Receiving Stolen Property, in violation of R.C.
2913.51(A), which provides: “[N]o person shall receive, retain, or dispose of property of
another knowing or having reasonable cause to believe that the property has been
obtained through commission of a theft offense.”
{¶92} The state was not obligated to establish Williams actually stole the firearm
used in the offenses at issue, only that he received or retained it with reasonable cause
to believe the firearm was obtained through the commission of a theft offense. We hold
the state offered sufficient, credible evidence to meet the elements of the crime.
{¶93} Although Williams claimed he was not armed when he arrived at the
residence, M.M. also testified she was unarmed. She additionally testified that Williams
was in possession of the firearm and shot her after he delivered the fatal shots to J.C.
And there was forensic evidence establishing that the firearm stolen from Mr. Jennings’
home was used in the murder and attempted murder.
{¶94} The evidence and testimony demonstrated that Williams actually arrived at
the residence with the firearm in question, the firearm had been confirmed stolen by Mr.
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Case No. 2024-T-0007
Jennings from his home, and Williams used the firearm in the murder of J.C. and the
attempted murder of M.M.
{¶95} Additionally, and critically, the state established that Williams was a
convicted felon and had no legal ability to purchase or possess a firearm. The
circumstantial evidence supports the conclusion, beyond a reasonable doubt, that
Williams possessed and used the stolen firearm during the incident and, owing to his
status as a convicted felon, would have reasonable cause to believe the firearm was
obtained through a theft.
{¶96} The receiving stolen property conviction is supported by credible evidence.
D. Prior Calculation and Design
{¶97} Williams next argues the state failed to establish he acted with “prior
calculation and design,” a necessary element to support the aggravated murder
conviction. He claims the prosecution’s theory of the case failed to set forth a discernable
motive for the crimes, let alone one which would permit the inference that he had a pre-
existing plan to commit the crimes. Williams claims the record is devoid of any evidence
supporting a finding of prior calculation and design. Although Williams draws the
foregoing conclusions, he fails to connect specific facts that would support a rationale for
his position.
{¶98} As observed above, the state is not required to establish a motive to ensure
a conviction. It must, however, prove the elements of the crime charged beyond a
reasonable doubt. That said, R.C. 2903.01(A) provides: “No person shall purposely, and
with prior calculation and design, cause the death of another . . . .” The General Assembly
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explicitly rejected the notion that brief premeditation prior to a murder could establish prior
calculation and design:
“[R.C. 2903.01(A) employs] the phrase, ‘prior calculation and
design,’ to indicate an act of studied care in planning or
analyzing the means of the crime, as well as a scheme
compassing the death of the victim. Neither the degree of care
nor the length of time the offender takes to ponder the crime
beforehand are critical factors in themselves, but they must
be sufficient to meet the proposed test of ‘prior calculation and
design.’ In this context, momentary deliberation is considered
insufficient to constitute a studied scheme to kill.”
(Emphasis added in Walker.) State v. Walker, 2016-Ohio-8295, ¶ 17, quoting Ohio
Legislative Service Commission, Proposed Ohio Criminal Code: Final Report of the
Technical Committee to Study Ohio Criminal Laws and Procedures, at 71 (1971).
{¶99} The mens rea of “purpose” is defined as follows: “[a] person acts purposely
when it is the person’s specific intention to cause a certain result . . . .” R.C. 2901.22(A).
Evidence of purpose, however, does not necessarily imply the existence of prior
calculation and design. Walker at ¶ 17, citing State v. Campbell,
2000-Ohio-183, 341.
(“purpose to kill is not the same thing as prior calculation and design and does not by
itself satisfy the mens rea element of R.C. 2903.01(A).” (Emphasis sic.)). As R.C.
2903.01(A) plainly states, aggravated murder requires proof of both purpose and prior
calculation and design.
{¶100} The phrase, “prior calculation and design” implies “advance reasoning to
formulate the purpose to kill.” Walker at ¶ 18. Evidence of a killing committed on the spur
of the moment or after momentary consideration is not sufficient to establish a
premeditated decision or a “studied consideration” of the method and the means to
effectuate a death.
Id.
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{¶101} The General Assembly has determined that it is a greater offense to
premeditate or to plan ahead and purposely kill another, rather than to merely kill with
purpose. Id.,2016-Ohio-8295. In this regard, it is reasonable to conclude that aggravated
murder may be established where a killing occurs with purpose and the defendant formed
the design or intent to kill before the act, i.e., “prior calculation and design” does not
necessarily require that the act be planned, contrived, or schemed beforehand, but there
must be evidence of reflection or deliberation before the defendant’s purposeful action(s).
{¶102} The Supreme Court of Ohio has underscored that there is no “bright-line
test that emphatically distinguishes between the presence or absence of ‘prior calculation
and design.’ Instead, each case turns on the particular facts and evidence presented at
trial.” State v. Taylor, 1997-Ohio-243, 20; State v. Braden,
2003-Ohio-1325, ¶ 61; State
v. Maxwell,
2014-Ohio-1019, ¶ 148.
{¶103} Instead, the court has commonly considered three factors in determining
whether a defendant acted with prior calculation and design: “(1) Did the accused and
victim know each other, and if so, was that relationship strained? (2) Did the accused give
thought or preparation to choosing the murder weapon or murder site? and (3) Was the
act drawn out or ‘an almost instantaneous eruption of events?’” Taylor at 19,
quoting State v. Jenkins,
48 Ohio App.2d 99, 102 (8th Dist. 1976). Considering these
factors, “prior calculation and design” may be viewed as a state of mind generally
established circumstantially through drawing inferences from a defendant’s conduct in
light of the totality of the circumstances.
{¶104} Regarding the above factors, it is undisputed that Williams and J.C. knew
each other for many years and Williams considered him like an older brother.
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Case No. 2024-T-0007
{¶105} Although Williams claimed he did not arrive at the scene with a firearm, the
jury heard testimony from M.M., Ms. Lynk, and J.M. that, prior to the murder, Williams
was heard outside threatening to shoot dogs as well as the cars in the residence’s
driveway. Moreover, prior to the murder and attempted murder, each of the women heard
gunshots outside the residence. Ms. Lynk heard two shots prior to J.C. exiting the home;
J.M. heard “one. [I]t could have been two.” M.M. also testified that she heard gunshots as
she and J.C. were walking out of their bedroom.
{¶106} Finally, M.M., Ms. Lynk, and J.M. heard Williams entreating J.C. to come
outside and confront him. That is, Williams was overheard calling J.C. by his nickname
several times. Ms. Lynk asserted she heard Williams order J.C. to “come outside, mother
fucker . . . This is my shit. I run this.” Similarly, J.M. heard Williams exclaim “N . . . .r, you
better come outside. I’m gonna shoot these dogs.” This testimony provides strong
evidence that not only did Williams arrive at the residence (the murder site) with a firearm,
but that he arrived at the residence with the murder weapon and was purposefully
interested in creating a confrontation with J.C.
{¶107} From these points, the jury could reasonably conclude that the episode was
sufficiently “drawn out” such that Williams, in possession of the firearm, threatening to
shoot dogs and cars, and ordering J.C. to come outside, involved a process which
included thinking about shooting J.C. before he engaged in the homicidal conduct. Put
differently, the murder was not the result of an instantaneous or near instantaneous
explosion of sudden events.
{¶108} And, significantly, there was no evidence of provocation on J.C.’s part. To
the contrary, Williams’ conduct prior to encountering and during his encounter with J.C.,
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and nothing else, evince a form of reflection and deliberation that can reasonably be
viewed as premeditation. His confrontation was planned, he arrived at the residence
armed and, after the confrontation, purposely shot an unarmed man in the back causing
his death.
{¶109} In our view, the state presented sufficient, credible evidence that Williams
acted with the intention and purpose to kill J.C. and this intention and purpose was
supported by evidence which would allow a jury to conclude, beyond a reasonable doubt,
that he acted with prior calculation and design.
{¶110} As a reviewing court, we “‘give great deference’” to the jury’s evaluation of
the evidence and witness’s credibility. State v. Cook, 2017-Ohio-7953, ¶ 75 (11th Dist.),
citing State v. Covington,
2002-Ohio-7037, ¶ 28 (10th Dist.). The jury is charged with
assessing a witness’ credibility, and an appellate court cannot substitute its judgment for
that of the jury. State v. Awan,
22 Ohio St.3d 120, 123 (1986). And “[a] reviewing court
must interpret the evidence consistent with the verdict if it is susceptible to more than one
interpretation.” (Citations omitted.) Cook at ¶ 75
{¶111} Accordingly, we conclude that the judgment of conviction is premised upon
sufficient evidence and is consistent with the manifest weight of the evidence.
{¶112} Williams’ first assignment of error lacks merit.
VI. Amendment of the Indictment
{¶113} Under his second assigned error, Williams alleges:
{¶114} “The trial court erred by permitting the state to amend the indictment after
closing arguments, jury instructions[,] and submission of the case to the jury.”
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Case No. 2024-T-0007
{¶115} Williams claimed error rests solely on the timing of the indictment’s
amendment and does not assert error in the actual changes made to the instrument.
{¶116} In this case, the state moved to amend the indictment after the jury
instructions had been issued in order to reflect the full language of the felonious assault
statute with which Williams was charged. In the original indictment, Williams was charged
with Felonious Assault, a felony of the second degree, alleging he “did knowingly cause
serious physical harm to another, one [M.M.]”
{¶117} The state’s motion to amend requested the court to permit the amendment
to conform with the evidence and the jury instruction upon which the parties ostensibly
agreed.3 The instruction issued by the court provided: “Count 4, Felonious Assault of
[M.M.] . . . you must find beyond a reasonable doubt that on or about April 2nd, 2023, and
in Trumbull County, Ohio the defendant caused or attempted to cause physical harm to
[M.M.] by means of a deadly weapon.”
{¶118} Both the original indictment and proposed amendment involved a charge of
Felonious Assault, a felony of the second degree.
{¶119} Crim.R. 7(D) provides: “The court may at any time before, during, or after a
trial amend the indictment . . . in respect to any defect, imperfection, or omission in form
or substance, or of any variance with the evidence, provided no change is made in the
name or identity of the crime charged.” (Emphasis added.)
{¶120} “‘Under Crim.R. 7(D), a court may amend an indictment “at any time” if the
amendment does not change “the name or identity of the crime charged.”’” State v. Pence,
2024-Ohio-3067, ¶ 16 (11th Dist.), quoting State v. Davis,
2008-Ohio-4537, ¶ 1. The
3. There is nothing to suggest that defense counsel objected to the instruction.
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amendment did not change the name or identity of the crime charged. We discern no
error in the trial court’s general decision to permit the amendment.
{¶121} If an amendment to an indictment does not change the name or identity of
the crime charged, however, then an appellate court applies an abuse of discretion
standard of review to the trial court’s decision to allow a Crim.R. 7(D) amendment. See
State v. Jones, 2015-Ohio-4116, ¶ 125 (2d Dist.). An abuse of discretion connotes a trial
court’s failure to exercise reasonable and sound decision-making. See, e.g.,
Pence at ¶
19. In addition, an appealing party must show prejudice as a result of the
amendment. State v. Madding,
2011-Ohio-3865, ¶ 11 (2d Dist.).
{¶122} In this case, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in granting the motion
and Williams did not suffer prejudice. Although Williams was found guilty of Felonious
Assault, as charged in Count Four, that charge merged with Count Three, Attempted
Murder, for purposes of sentencing. The state elected to proceed to sentencing on the
Attempted Murder verdict.
{¶123} A conviction requires both a verdict of guilty and the imposition of
sentence. State v. Whitfield, 2010-Ohio-2, ¶ 12. Because the trial court imposed no
sentence for the Felonious Assault verdict, Williams was not convicted of that offense.
State v. Daniels,
2021-Ohio-790, ¶ 105 (11th Dist.). Without a conviction relating to the
amended Felonious Assault charge under Count Four, Williams suffered no prejudice
from the amendment.
{¶124} Despite the foregoing analysis, Williams claims that his “trial counsel had
no opportunity to argue terms of the statute properly before the jury . . . and a new trial
must be ordered.” He essentially makes a due-process argument in a vacuum. We find
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Case No. 2024-T-0007
this argument unavailing, particularly considering our conclusion that Williams suffered
no prejudice due to the amendment.
{¶125} The language “at any time before, during, or after a trial” in Crim.R. 7(D)
implies that even after jury instructions are issued, the state could properly amend the
indictment if there was no change to the “name or identity of the crime charged.” Here,
the motion was filed on November 8, 2023, it was granted on the same day, and the jury’s
verdict was rendered on November 9, 2023. As noted, there was no change to the name
or identity of the crime. Therefore, the timing of the amendment was proper when
conducted before the jury verdict. See also State v. Isenogle, 2022-Ohio-1257, ¶ 18, 38
(5th Dist.) (upholding a trial court’s ability to amend an indictment after a jury verdict so
long as the name or identity of the crime is not changed).
{¶126} Williams had notice of the elements of the crime and an opportunity to
defend the same at trial. The amendment merely adjusted the charge to conform to the
jury instructions and the evidence that Williams did not dispute. Williams admitted to
knowingly and intentionally shooting M.M (i.e., the crime of Felonious Assault which
merged with the Attempted Murder crime). The amendment reflected this admission. We
cannot fathom how Williams’ right to due process could have been violated under these
circumstances.
{¶127} The amendment at issue conformed with Crim.R. 7(D); moreover, the trial
court acted within its sound discretion in granting the same and Williams has failed to
establish prejudice.
{¶128} Williams’ final assigned error lacks merit.
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VII. Conclusion
{¶129} The Trumbull County Court of Common Pleas judgment is affirmed.
MATT LYNCH, J.,
ROBERT J. PATTON, J.,
concur.
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