[Cite as State v. Medlock,
2024-Ohio-5208.]
COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA
STATE OF OHIO, :
Plaintiff-Appellee, :
No. 113273
v. :
LESHAWN MEDLOCK, :
Defendant-Appellant. :
JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION
JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED
RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: October 31, 2024
Criminal Appeal from the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas
Case Nos. CR-21-655664-A and CR-21-660862-A
Appearances:
Michael C. O’Malley, Cuyahoga County Prosecuting
Attorney, and Nora Bryan, Assistant Prosecuting
Attorney, for appellee.
Law Office of John T. Forristal and John T. Forristal, for
appellant.
MARY J. BOYLE, J.:
Defendant-appellant, Leshawn Medlock (“Medlock”), appeals his
felony convictions for two counts of sexual battery and two counts of attempted
gross sexual imposition arguing that his pleas were not knowingly, intelligently, and
voluntarily entered. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm Medlock’s
convictions.
I. Facts and Procedural History
In July 2021, Medlock was indicted in two separate cases. In
Cuyahoga C.P. No. CR-21-655664-A, Medlock was charged in a two-count
indictment. Both counts charged Medlock with rape, felonies of the first degree,
with furthermore clauses asserting that the victim was under the age of ten, as well
as specifications for notice of prior conviction (“NPC”); repeat violent offender
(“RVO”); and sexually violent predator (“SVP”).1 The case involved one named
victim.
In Cuyahoga C.P. No. CR-21-660862-A, Medlock was charged in an
eight-count indictment that included one count of rape, a felony of the first degree,
with a furthermore clause alleging that the victim was under the age of ten; five
counts of gross sexual imposition of a victim under the age of 13, felonies of the third
degree; one count of rape of a victim under the age of 13, a felony of the first degree;
and one count of attempted kidnapping with a sexual motivation specification, a
felony of the second degree. All counts included a SVP specification. The case
involved two named victims.
1 As charged, Medlock was facing life without parole.
After numerous pretrials, the case was set for trial. On September 26,
2022, Medlock declined the State’s first plea offer of four counts of rape, felonies of
the first degree, and two counts of sexual battery, felonies of the third degree,
deleting the furthermore clauses and the specifications. A jury trial began later that
day. The following day, before a jury was empaneled, the court was informed that
the parties had come to a plea agreement. The State placed the plea agreement on
the record. In Cuyahoga C.P. No. CR-21-655664-A, Medlock would plead guilty to
one count of sexual battery of a victim under the age of 13, a felony of the second
degree. In Cuyahoga C.P. No. CR-21-660826-A, Medlock would plead to one count
of sexual battery of a victim under the age of 13, a felony of the second degree, and
two counts of attempted gross sexual imposition, felonies of the fourth degree. The
plea agreement encompassed all three named victims. In exchange for Medlock’s
guilty plea, the State would dismiss all remaining counts, as well as the
specifications. As part of the plea agreement, the parties agreed to a recommended
sentence of 10-18 years in prison for both cases. Medlock’s counsel confirmed that
this was their understanding of the plea agreement.
The trial court then engaged in the Crim.R. 11 plea colloquy, learning
that Medlock was 48 years old and a citizen and had graduated from high school and
attended two years of college. The court went through each constitutional and
procedural right that Medlock was waiving by pleading guilty to which he stated that
he understood. The trial court then inquired:
COURT: Do you understand, sir, that a plea of guilty is a complete
admission of your guilt?
MEDLOCK: Yes.
COURT: And by entering such a plea, you are waiving all of these rights
except for the right to counsel?
MEDLOCK: Yes.
COURT: Do you understand that upon acceptance of your plea, the
Court may proceed to judgment and sentence?
MEDLOCK: Yes.
THE COURT: Has anyone, including your attorney, the prosecutor or
this Court made any promises, threats or other inducements to you to
cause you to enter this plea?
DEFENSE COUNSEL: Other than —
COURT: Other than what we said on the record here today.
MEDLOCK: No.
THE COURT: The charges of sexual battery as amended in Counts 1 in
both Cases 660862 and 655664 are felonies of the second degree. Each
is punishable by a possible term of incarceration of 2 to 8 years in yearly
increments as well as a possible fine of up to $15,000. Do you
understand the charge and the penalty for those two counts, Count 1 in
each case?
MEDLOCK: I’m not sure. You say the fines?
COURT: Up to $15,000.
MEDLOCK: I understand.
COURT: And then do you understand that attempted gross sexual
imposition as amended in Count 5 and Count 7 of Case Number
660862 are felonies of the fourth degree punishable by a possible term
of incarceration of 6 to 18 months in one-month increments as well as
a possible fine of up to $5,000? Do you understand those charges and
the possible penalties?
MEDLOCK: Yes.
COURT: Do you understand that the Court can run those sentences
concurrently, meaning all or some to be served at the same time, or
consecutive, again, meaning all or some would run —
MEDLOCK: Yes.
...
COURT: Is there anything about your case or this proceeding that you
do not understand?
MEDLOCK: I mean, I get everything.
COURT: Are you satisfied with the representation you have received
from your attorney?
MEDLOCK: I mean, you know, it is what it is, but —
COURT: Well, you went from mandatory life with no parole to less
than 20 years. You don’t call that good enough?
MEDLOCK: Well, I mean, I’m not saying nothing bad either but, you
know, I was —I mean, — I’m not guilty.
COURT: Are you satisfied with —
MEDLOCK: I’m not guilty
COURT: —his representation
MEDLOCK: Of course. I mean, I’m grateful.
COURT: How do you wish to plead to amended Count 1 in 660862,
sexual battery, felony 2.
MEDLOCK: I plead guilty.
COURT: Voluntary plea done of your own free will and desire?
MEDLOCK: Yes.
(Tr. 36-42.) The court then went through the remaining counts with Medlock, each
time asking how he pleads and whether such plea was a “voluntary plea done of [his]
own free will and desire.” (Tr. 42-43.) Thereafter, Medlock’s counsel stated that he
believed his client’s pleas were “done in a knowing, voluntary and intelligent
fashion.” (Tr. 46.) Medlock’s counsel explained that Medlock attended some college
and that “he’s one of the smarter clients that [he] ever had.” (Tr. 46.) Medlock’s
counsel also stated to the court that “[he] think[s] [Medlock] understands exactly
what’s going on.” (Tr. 46.) Finally, both the State and Medlock confirmed that the
court followed the dictates of Crim.R. 11.
On November 21, 2022, Medlock was sentenced to an 18-year prison
term at the Lorain Correctional Institution. Additionally, the trial court imposed a
five-year term of postrelease control and ordered Medlock to register as a Tier III
sex offender.
It is from this order that Medlock appeals, raising one assignment of
error for our review:
[Medlock’s] guilty pleas are unconstitutional and must be vacated as
they were not entered knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily because
he professed his innocence, and the trial court failed to comply with the
Alford mandates by conducting the required inquiry prior to accepting
the guilty pleas.
II. Law and Analysis
In his sole assignment of error, Medlock contends that his plea was
not knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily entered because the trial court failed to
follow the requirements in North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 37-38 (1970),
when he proclaimed his innocence prior to entering his guilty plea. After a thorough
review, we find Medlock’s argument unpersuasive.
Where a defendant enters a guilty plea in a criminal matter, “‘the plea
must be made knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily[, and f]ailure on any of those
points renders enforcement of the plea unconstitutional under both the United
States Constitution and the Ohio Constitution.’” State v. Nevels, 2020-Ohio-915,
¶ 17 (8th Dist.), quoting State v. Engle,
74 Ohio St.3d 525, 527 (1996); see also State
v. Veney,
2008-Ohio-5200, ¶ 7. In determining whether a criminal defendant
knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily entered a guilty plea, we must first review
the record to determine whether the trial court complied with Crim.R. 11(C).
Id.,
citing State v. Kelley,
57 Ohio St.3d 127, 128-129 (1991); State v. Brown, 2019-Ohio-
3516, ¶ 17 (8th Dist.).
Medlock does not argue that the court failed to comply with
Crim.R. 11; accordingly, “[w]hen a trial court complies with Crim.R. 11(C)(2) in
accepting a plea, there is a presumption that the defendant’s plea was knowingly,
intelligently, and voluntarily made.” Id., citing State v. Nelson,
2019-Ohio-3365,
¶ 16 (8th Dist.). In considering whether a plea was made knowingly, intelligently,
and voluntarily, we examine the totality of the circumstances through a de novo
review.
Id., citing State v. Albright,
2019-Ohio-1998, ¶ 16 (8th Dist.).
Medlock contends that his guilty pleas should be vacated because the
circumstances of his guilty pleas were similar to those of an Alford plea. In Alford,
the defendant was charged with the capital crime of first-degree murder and was
facing a possible death sentence or life imprisonment. Alford, 400 U.S. at 25-26.
Alford was offered a plea agreement of second-degree murder. Because of the strong
evidence against him, Alford pled guilty while disclaiming his guilt.
Id. The trial
court heard testimony from a police officer summarizing the case and two witnesses,
as well as Alford himself. Alford indicated that he was pleading guilty to avoid the
death penalty. The appellate court found that Alford’s plea was involuntary because
it was motivated by fear.
Id. The United States Supreme Court disagreed, holding
that guilty pleas linked with claims of innocence may be accepted provided the
“defendant intelligently concludes that his interests require entry of a guilty plea and
the record before the judge contains strong evidence of actual guilt.”
Id. at 37. This
became known as an Alford plea.
Ohio courts have explained that an Alford plea is a unique type of
guilty plea where the defendant, although pleading guilty, continues to deny his guilt
but enters the guilty plea because the defendant believes that the offered plea
outweighs the risk of being found guilty at trial. State v. Piacella, 27 Ohio St.2d 92
(1971); see also State v. Wilkerson,
2014-Ohio-3919, ¶ 17 (8th Dist.) (“An Alford plea
results when a defendant pleads guilty yet maintains actual innocence of the crime
charged.”); State v. May,
2021-Ohio-261, ¶ 9 (3d Dist.); State v. Carey, 2011-Ohio-
1998, ¶ 6 (3d Dist.). In cases involving Alford pleas, there is a “heightened duty upon
the trial court to ensure that the defendant’s rights are protected and that entering
the plea is a rational decision on the part of the defendant.” Carey at ¶ 6.
Consequently, “[w]here the defendant interjects protestations of innocence into the
plea proceedings, and fails to recant those protestations of innocence, the trial court
must determine that the defendant has made a rational calculation to plead guilty
notwithstanding his belief that he is innocent.” State v. Padgett,
67 Ohio App.3d
332, 337-338 (2d Dist. 1990). “This requires, at a minimum, inquiry of the
defendant concerning his reasons for deciding to plead guilty notwithstanding his
protestations of innocence; it may require, in addition, inquiry concerning the
state’s evidence in order to determine that the likelihood of the defendant’s being
convicted of offenses of equal or greater magnitude than the offenses to which he is
pleading guilty is great enough to warrant an intelligent decision to plead guilty.”
Id. at 338-339.
Medlock cites to this court’s decision in Nevels, 2020-Ohio-915 (8th
Dist.), to support his position; however, we find the facts in that case are
distinguishable. In Nevels, the defendant was charged with multiple counts of rape,
kidnapping, and aggravated robbery. Nevels’s counsel filed a motion to dismiss the
rape charges arguing consent. In addition, the defendant protested his innocence
prior to the plea, during the plea, and again at the sentencing hearing. This did not
happen in the case at hand.
Notably, in the matter before us, Medlock never represented to the
trial court or the State that his plea would be an Alford plea, nor did the State agree
to such a qualified plea. In fact, Medlock’s counsel stated that he believed his client
would be making a knowing and voluntary plea. Further, when the trial court
engaged in the Crim.R. 11 plea colloquy, Medlock acknowledged that he understood
each of the rights he was waiving. He answered in the affirmative when asked, “Do
you understand, sir, that a plea of guilty is a complete admission of your guilt?” (Tr.
36-37.) It was only when Medlock was asked if he was satisfied with his attorney
that he made two vague denials as to his guilt. Nevertheless, immediately after his
denials, he pled guilty as to each count of the amended indictment. And when he
was asked whether it was a “[v]oluntary plea done of your own free will and desire?”
after each guilty plea, Medlock answered, “yes.” (Tr. 42-43.)
As stated previously, the trial court’s heightened duty is not triggered
unless “the defendant interjects protestations of innocence into the plea
proceedings, and fails to recant those protestations of innocence[.]” (Emphasis
added.) Padgett, 67 Ohio App.3d at 338-339. Based on the totality of
circumstances, we find that Medlock’s comment that he was not guilty when asked
whether he was satisfied with his attorney, but then immediately reversed his
position and acknowledged his guilt throughout the rest of the proceedings,
including the sentencing, is not sufficient to trigger a trial court’s heightened duty
under Alford. Because Medlock was not protesting his innocence to the level
required under Alford and Padgett, we find that his plea was knowingly,
intelligently, and voluntarily entered.
Accordingly, Medlock’s sole assignment of error is overruled.
Judgment affirmed.
It is ordered that appellee recover from appellant costs herein taxed.
The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the
common pleas court to carry this judgment into execution. The appellant’s
conviction having been affirmed, any bail pending appeal is terminated. Case
remanded to the trial court for execution of sentence.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27
of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.
________________________
MARY J. BOYLE, JUDGE
LISA B. FORBES, P.J., CONCURS;
ANITA LASTER MAYS, J., DISSENTS (WITH SEPARATE OPINION)
ANITA LASTER MAYS, J., DISSENTING:
I respectfully dissent from the majority opinion. I would vacate the
appellant’s plea and remand to the trial court.
The trial court fully complied with Crim.R. 11 (C)(2). However, when
the trial court asked Medlock if he was satisfied with his trial counsel’s
representation, Medlock replied: “Well, I mean, I’m not saying nothing bad either
but, you know, I was — I mean, I’m not guilty.” Tr. 42. The trial court again tried to
ask Medlock about his satisfaction with his attorney’s representation, and Medlock
interrupted, stating, “I’m not guilty.” Id. Medlock then continued to plead guilty to
the amended charges.
“An Alford plea exists where a defendant enters a guilty plea
contemporaneously with a ‘protestation of innocence.’” State v. Alvelo, 2017-Ohio-
742, ¶ 23, citing Alford, 400 U.S. 25, at 37-38. “Where a defendant enters an Alford
plea, the trial court must inquire into the factual basis surrounding the charges to
determine whether the defendant is making an intelligent and voluntary guilty plea.”
Id. “The trial court may accept the guilty plea only if a factual basis for the guilty
plea is evidenced by the record.”
Id.
“To constitute an Alford plea, the defendant ‘must enter a guilty plea
and at the same time protest innocence.’” Smith, 2024-Ohio-1979, at ¶ 10 (8th
Dist.), quoting Johnson,
2016-Ohio-2840, at ¶ 27 (8th Dist.). It is well understood
that Alford will not apply if the protestation of innocence is made after and not
contemporaneously with the guilty plea. Id. at ¶ 11. Although neither Medlock nor
his trial counsel specifically represented to the trial court that Medlock was making
an Alford plea, a valid Alford plea exists where the defendant enters a guilty plea
while proclaiming his innocence on the record. See Nevels,
2020-Ohio-915, at ¶ 25
(8th Dist.).
In the majority opinion, it states that Medlock did not alert the trial
court or the State that he would make an Alford plea. However, there is no
requirement that Medlock or his trial counsel represent to the trial court that
Medlock intended to enter an Alford plea, and the majority opinion does not cite
any case law to demonstrate there is a requirement of advanced notice.
Additionally, the majority opinion states that it is clear from the
record that Medlock was not protesting his innocence. A review of the record shows
that this statement is conflicting. Medlock twice stated at the plea hearing that he
was not guilty. The trial court did not respond to Medlock’s assertions, but rather
continued to take his plea. “The proper taking of a guilty plea requires ‘a meaningful
dialogue between the court and the defendant.’” Id. at ¶ 28, quoting Garfield Hts.
v. Brewer, 17 Ohio App.3d 216, 218 (8th Dist. 1984). “And where a defendant
protests innocence but nevertheless is willing to plead guilty, the trial court must
determine that the defendant ‘has made a rational calculation’ to plead guilty
notwithstanding his belief that he is innocent.”
Id., quoting Padgett,
67 Ohio App.3d
332, at 338-339 (2d Dist. 1990). “The defendant’s protestations require the court’s
inquiry, ‘at a minimum,’ into the defendant’s reasons for deciding to plead guilty
notwithstanding his purported innocence.”
Id., quoting
Padgett at 338. “The
defendant’s protestations may require ‘inquiry concerning the state’s evidence in
order to determine that the likelihood of the defendant being convicted of offenses
of equal or greater magnitude than the offenses to which he is pleading guilty is great
enough to warrant an intelligent decision to plead guilty.’”
Id., quoting
Padgett at
338-339.
The trial court failed to inquire into Medlock’s reasons for deciding to
plead guilty while also professing his innocence. As stated above, the case law is
clear in requiring the trial court to, at minimum, make this inquiry. “To constitute
an Alford plea, the defendant ‘must enter a guilty plea and at the same time protest
innocence.’” Smith, 2024-Ohio-1979, at ¶ 10 (8th Dist.), quoting Johnson, 2016-
Ohio-2840, at ¶ 27 (8th Dist.), citing State v. Tyner,
2012-Ohio-2770, ¶ 6 (8th Dist.).
The majority opinion fails to identify relevant case law as to why the trial court did
not err when failing to at least inquire about Medlock’s protestations.
Therefore, because the trial court failed, in error, to determine that
Medlock made a rational calculation to plead guilty notwithstanding his belief that
he is innocent, Medlock’s guilty plea should be vacated.
For these reasons, I respectfully dissent.
