[Cite as State v. Walton,
2024-Ohio-5214.]
COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA
STATE OF OHIO, :
Plaintiff- Appellee, :
No. 113688
v. :
KAREEM WALTON, :
Defendant-Appellant. :
_______________________________________
JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION
JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED
RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: October 31, 2024
Criminal Appeal from the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas
Case No. CR-16-607989-A
Appearances:
Michael C. O’Malley, Cuyahoga County Prosecuting
Attorney, and Anthony T. Miranda and Kerry Sowul,
Assistant Prosecuting Attorneys, for appellee.
Patituce & Associates, LLC, and Joseph C. Patituce, for
appellant.
MICHELLE J. SHEEHAN, J.:
Kareem Walton appeals the trial court’s denial of his motion to
withdraw his guilty plea. Because the trial court did not abuse its discretion in
denying Walton’s motion, we affirm.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY AND RELEVANT FACTS
On July 26, 2016, Walton was indicted with three counts of
aggravated vehicular homicide, second-degree felonies in violation of
R.C. 2903.06(A)(1)(a); three counts of aggravated vehicular homicide, third-degree
felonies in violation of R.C. 2903.06(A)(2)(a); two counts of aggravated vehicular
assault, third-degree felonies in violation of R.C. 2903.08(A)(1)(a); two counts of
aggravated vehicular assault, fourth-degree felonies in violation of
R.C. 2903.08(A)(2)(b); and one count of operating vehicle under the influence of
alcohol or drugs, a first-degree misdemeanor in violation of R.C. 4511.19(A)(1)(a).
The indictment followed a July 9, 2016 incident in which the then 20-year old
Walton, while traveling at a high rate of speed, crashed his vehicle into a tree in the
Glenville neighborhood of Cleveland. Three teenage girls died from injuries
sustained; two other people were injured.
On June 12, 2017, the trial court held a hearing on Walton’s motion
to suppress a blood test indicating he had alcohol in his blood. Prior to the hearing,
Walton’s trial counsel and the State stipulated that (1) blood draws were taken from
Walton after he was admitted to the hospital following the incident; (2) the blood
was properly maintained for purposes of analysis; (3) the State did not need to call
the person who drew the blood; (4) there was no chain of custody issue with any
documented substance analysis result; and (5) the results were authentic and
admissible.
During the suppression hearing, Walton presented an expert witness
who testified that because Walton had suffered severe trauma, the blood alcohol test
could lead to a false positive result and/or elevate the results. As such, Walton
argued that the test should be suppressed. Through its expert witness, the State
presented conflicting testimony regarding the accuracy of the results of the blood
test. The State argued that Walton’s expert’s testimony merely attacked the weight
or credibility, not the admissibility, of the blood test. The trial court denied the
motion to suppress on this ground.
On June 13, 2017, appellant pled guilty to the charges in a plea
agreement, with the State agreeing that the six counts alleging aggravated vehicular
homicide would merge into three counts; the four counts alleging aggravated
vehicular assault would merge into two counts; and it would advocate for a sentence
that did not exceed 25 years’ imprisonment. On June 16, 2017, the trial court
imposed a sentence of 25 years.
Walton, pro se, filed an appeal of his convictions. This court
appointed appellate counsel, who thereafter filed a brief pursuant to Anders v.
California, 386 U.S. 738, (1967), and moved to withdraw. Walton, acting pro se,
filed two assignments of error, arguing that the State breached the terms of his plea
agreement and that the trial court impermissibly considered his juvenile record
when imposing sentence. State v. Walton,
2018-Ohio-1963 (8th Dist.) (“Walton I”)
In Walton I, this court independently reviewed the record, overruled Walton’s pro
se assignments of error, and affirmed his convictions. Id. at ¶ 27-28. This court
specifically stated that we “found no nonfrivolous issues for review regarding
appellant’s guilty plea . . . .” Id. at ¶ 27.
After his convictions were affirmed, Walton sought to reopen
Walton I by asserting appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to raise error
regarding the trial court’s denial of his motion to suppress. This court denied the
motion and held “Walton did not demonstrate that the test was sufficiently
unreliable that the results should be excluded. Therefore, Walton has not
demonstrated a colorable claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel.” State
v. Walton, 2018-Ohio-4021, ¶ 14 (8th Dist.) (“Walton II”).
On March 10, 2022, Walton filed a postconviction motion to
withdraw his guilty plea. Within the motion, he argued that his plea constituted a
manifest injustice because he received ineffective assistance of counsel. Specifically,
he argued trial counsel was ineffective because he did not file a comprehensive
motion to suppress, did not challenge the manner in which the blood was taken or
tested at the hospital, and did not challenge the fact that the State’s expert at the
suppression hearing did not draw the blood or perform the testing.
On May 10, 2022, the trial court held a hearing on the motion in
which Walton’s trial counsel testified. On direct examination, he explained that he
investigated the law, obtained an expert, and filed a motion to suppress the blood
tests. When asked about the motion to suppress, trial counsel stated that he
challenged the results of the test because the expert could refute the results. Trial
counsel also testified that he researched the law but could not be precise about the
research because of the five-year gap between the case and his testimony. Trial
counsel also said he did not challenge the manner in which the blood was drawn at
the hospital. As to his memory of why he advised Walton to plead, he recounted that
there were sympathetic victims, the outcome of a jury trial would have been a “crap
shoot,” and there was a possibility Walton could receive a maximum sentence.
On cross-examination, trial counsel admitted that his advice to
defendants as to whether to plea included consideration of a defendant’s criminal
record and whether the defendant faced multiple cases. As to Walton, trial counsel
testified that his advice to plea would include consideration that Walton made
admissions to drinking alcohol, the police had detected an odor of alcohol on his
breath, and witnesses observed him driving at a high rate of speed prior to the crash.
On November 18, 2022, the trial court denied the motion to
withdraw. It found that it did not have jurisdiction over the motion to withdraw
plea. Walton appealed the denial of his motion. In State v. Walton, 2023-Ohio-
2879 (“Walton III”), we reversed the trial court’s denial of the motion to withdraw
plea. In doing so, we found the trial court did have jurisdiction to consider Walton’s
postconviction motion to withdraw plea and remanded the case for the trial court to
determine the motion on its merits. Id. at ¶ 21.
After remand, the trial court denied the motion to withdraw on
March 1, 2024. It is from this denial that Walton now appeals.
LAW AND ARGUMENT
Walton raises one assignment of error, which reads:
The trial court erred when it denied Defendant’s Motion to Withdraw
his Guilty Plea where trial counsel’s admission to being ineffective
constituted a manifest injustice.
Walton argues his plea was not knowingly, voluntarily, and
intelligently made because he relied upon trial counsel’s advice and trial counsel
provided ineffective assistance. He alleges counsel was ineffective because “he had
no strategy to attack the allegations that Mr. Walton was driving while impaired and
. . . there were valid defenses that demonstrate Mr. Walton may be innocent of these
charges.” The State argues that Walton did not receive ineffective assistance of
counsel and that there is nothing in the record indicating that even if Walton
received ineffective assistance of counsel, he would have not have entered his guilty
plea.
We review a trial court’s denial of a motion to withdraw a guilty plea
for an abuse of discretion. State v. Xie, 62 Ohio St.3d 521, 527,
584 N.E.2d 715
(1992). An abuse of discretion occurs when a court exercises its judgment in an
unwarranted way regarding a matter over which it has discretionary authority.
Johnson v. Abdullah,
2021-Ohio-3304, ¶ 35.
A criminal defendant has a right to the effective assistance of counsel
when deciding whether to enter a guilty plea. State v. Ayesta, 2015-Ohio-1695, ¶ 14
(8th Dist.), citing Padilla v. Kentucky,
559 U.S. 356, 364 (2010). When arguing
ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant has to satisfy the two-part test
enunciated in Strickland v Washington,
466 U.S. 668 (1984), which requires the
defendant to show that 1) counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard of
reasonableness and 2) he was prejudiced by counsel’s deficient performance.
Padilla at 367. “In the context of constitutional challenges to guilty pleas, the
prejudice prong of the test requires that the defendant show that there is a
reasonable probability that were it not for counsel’s errors, he would not have
pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial.” Ayesta,
2015-Ohio-1695,
¶ 14, citing Hill v. Lockhart,
474 U.S. 52, 59 (1985).
As to whether the first prong of the Strickland test was met, Walton
argues trial counsel had no strategy to attack the methodology of blood alcohol
testing and posits that such challenge would be meritorious under our opinion in
State v. Harper, 2018-Ohio-690 (8th Dist.). In Harper, we found that a trial court
did not abuse its discretion in suppressing the results of the blood test where “[t]he
expert testimony that the State presented during the trial court’s suppression
hearing failed to indicate that the results of Harper’s blood test were, in fact, valid,
accurate, or reliable.” Id. at ¶ 37. We also found “[t]here was no direct evidence or
testimony indicating that the policies and procedures were followed when Harper’s
blood was drawn and tested.” Id. at ¶ 29. We further found the State’s expert
“acknowledged during the suppression hearing that he had not performed any of his
own work in the case.” Id. at ¶ 27.
Walton’s argument presumes the State would not have been able to
present the foundational requirements found lacking in Harper. However, the State
was relieved of this burden because of the stipulations made before the suppression
hearing. As such, Walton’s reliance on Harper is misplaced. Further, Walton has
not pointed to anything in the record to indicate the State would not have been able
to present such evidence had there been no stipulation or there existed a basis for
trial counsel to challenge the method of the blood testing or that such challenge
would have resulted in the suppression of the blood test. As such, we cannot say
trial counsel’s decision to enter the stipulation and focus his efforts on challenging
the results of the blood testing through expert testimony fell below an objective
standard of reasonableness.
As to the second prong of the Strickland test, Walton argues his
challenges to his conviction throughout his appeals and his motion to withdraw plea
are evidence that had trial counsel not been ineffective he would have gone to trial.
We note that there is no affidavit or testimony by Walton stating affirmatively he
would have gone to trial. In this case, Walton, who had a criminal record and was
facing multiple cases, faced 34 years’ imprisonment if convicted of the charges in
this indictment had he not entered into a plea agreement. Even had the blood results
been suppressed, the State had evidence Walton was operating a motor vehicle at a
high rate of speed, crashed into a tree, killed three teenage girls, and injured two
others. It further had evidence of his impairment; police detected an odor of alcohol
from Walton after the accident and Walton admitted he had been drinking earlier
that day. Given these circumstances and where there was other evidence of Walton’s
impairment beyond the blood alcohol testing, we are not persuaded that Walton has
shown he would not have entered his guilty plea.
Accordingly, we cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion
by denying Walton’s motion to withdraw guilty plea where the record does not show
trial counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness or
that even had he suffered ineffective assistance of counsel, he would not have
entered his guilty plea.
Walton’s sole assignment of error is overruled.
CONCLUSION
Walton argues that his plea was not knowingly, voluntarily, and
intelligently made because trial counsel provided ineffective assistance because he
had no strategy to attack blood alcohol testing beyond accuracy of the tests. Walton
has not identified anything in the record to indicate had counsel done so, blood
alcohol tests would have been suppressed. Because of this, we cannot find trial
counsel’s strategy to challenge the results of the blood testing through expert
testimony fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. Further, Walton has
not identified anything in the record that affirmatively shows that had trial counsel
pursued a strategy to attack the blood results on other grounds and been successful
he would not have entered his guilty plea where the record contained other evidence
of his impairment.
Judgment affirmed.
It is ordered that appellee recover of appellant costs herein taxed.
The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the
common pleas court to carry this judgment into execution.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27
of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.
___________________________
MICHELLE J. SHEEHAN, JUDGE
EILEEN A. GALLAGHER, P.J., and
SEAN C. GALLAGHER, J., CONCUR
