State v. Green

[Cite as State v. Green, 

.]




                       IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
                           THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
                               MARION COUNTY




STATE OF OHIO,
                                                          CASE NO. 9-23-59
         PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE,

    v.

ZIAIR GREEN,                                              OPINION

         DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.



                 Appeal from Marion County Common Pleas Court
                                 General Division
                            Trial Court No. 21-CR-070

                                      Judgment Affirmed

                           Date of Decision: November 4, 2024



APPEARANCES:

         Timothy B. Hackett for Appellant

         Raymond A. Grogan Jr. for Appellee
Case No. 9-23-59



MILLER, J.

        {¶1} Defendant-appellant, Ziair E. Green (“Green”), appeals the July 28,

2023 judgment entry denying his petition for postconviction relief. For the reasons

that follow, we affirm.

        {¶2} This case arises from a January 18, 2021 incident in which Green, then

17-years old, shot and killed Ricco McGhee (“McGhee”), his former stepfather.

This court recited much of the factual and procedural background of this case in

Green’s direct appeal, and we will not duplicate those efforts here. See State v.

Green, 

 (3d Dist.), appeal accepted, State v. Green, 2024-Ohio-

2781.

        {¶3} Relevant to this appeal, on February 24, 2021, the Marion County

Grand Jury indicted Green on three counts: Count One of murder in violation of

R.C. 2903.02(A), an unclassified felony; Count Two of murder in violation of R.C.

2903.02(B), an unclassified felony; and Count Three of felonious assault in

violation of R.C. 2903.11(A)(1), a second-degree felony. Each of the counts

included a three-year firearm specification pursuant to R.C. 2941.145 and R.C.

2929.14(D).

        {¶4} Following a trial, which commenced on February 1, 2022, the jury

found Green not guilty of Count One, but guilty of Counts Two and Three and their




                                        -2-
Case No. 9-23-59


associated specifications.    The court merged the two counts and Green was

sentenced to an aggregate term of 18 years to life in prison.

        {¶5} On March 25, 2022, Green filed a notice of appeal. He raised eight

assignments of error for our review. Specifically, Green argued on direct appeal

that (1) the trial court violated his constitutional right to present a complete defense

by denying his request for expert funds and prohibiting him from presenting

evidence that would have shown he acted in self-defense and undermined the

credibility of the State’s witnesses; (2) the trial court erred by instructing the jury

that Ohio’s stand-your-ground statute did not govern Green’s trial; (3) the trial court

erred by instructing the jury that Green had a duty to retreat; (4) his trial counsel

was ineffective for failing to propose a “stand-your-ground” jury instruction and for

failing to ask Green on the witness stand about specific instances of McGhee’s prior

violent conduct; (5) the jury’s verdict that Green did not act in self-defense or

defense of another was against the manifest weight of the evidence presented at trial;

(6) Green’s statutory and due process rights were violated when he was indicted on

charges and specifications in the adult court that were not filed in or transferred from

the juvenile court; (7) Ohio’s mandatory transfer statutes violate his right to due

process; and (8) the cumulative effect of the alleged errors deprived Green of his

right to a fair trial.




                                          -3-
Case No. 9-23-59


         {¶6} In a decision issued on December 4, 2023, we overruled Green’s eight

assignments of error and affirmed his conviction and sentence.1 Green, 2023-Ohio-

4360, at ¶ 161.

         {¶7} On May 22, 2023, Green filed a petition for postconviction relief. In

his petition, Green set forth six grounds for relief. Specifically, Green alleged that

his convictions were void or voidable for the following reasons: (1) he was denied

his due-process right to an in-camera inspection of certain Children Protective

Services (“CPS”) records; (2) he was denied effective assistance of counsel because

his counsel unreasonably failed to furnish the court with supplemental police reports

supporting his request for the records; (3) he was denied effective assistance of

counsel because his trial counsel failed to research and present case law relating to

other-acts testimony in self-defense cases; (4) his trial counsel was ineffective due

to his alleged mistaken understanding relating to battered-child evaluations; (5) his

trial counsel was ineffective for failing to correct the trial court’s alleged

misconceptions relating to the evidence permitted to establish battered child

syndrome; and (6) the cumulative effect of alleged legal errors and procedural

regularities deprived Green of his right to present a complete defense. On May 31,

2023, the parties filed a joint motion to extend the briefing schedule. In the joint


1
 A certified conflict regarding whether Ohio’s stand-your-ground law applies in situations where the conduct
occurred prior to the statute’s effective date but the trial occurred after the statute’s effective date is currently
pending in the Supreme Court of Ohio. See State v. Wagner, 

; State v. Green, 2024-Ohio-
2781. The Supreme Court of Ohio accepted Green’s discretionary appeal, and, at the time of publication, the
matter is pending before the Supreme Court. See State v. Green, 

.


                                                        -4-
Case No. 9-23-59


motion, the parties requested the trial court adopt their recommended briefing

schedule which proposed that Green would file amendments to the petition for

postconviction relief by June 20, 2023 and the State would file its response to the

petition by June 30, 2023.

       {¶8} In a judgment entry filed on June 1, 2023, the trial court stated that it

was interpreting the parties’ joint motion as two separation motions: (1) a motion

for the State to extend the time to respond and (2) a motion to allow Green to amend

his petition. The trial court granted the State’s motion to extend time. The trial

court stated that it would take under advisement whether leave for additional

grounds not filed in the initial petition is warranted after receiving the State’s

response.

       {¶9} On June 5, 2023, State filed its response to Green’s petition for

postconviction relief. In a judgment entry filed on June 8, 2023, the trial court stated

that because neither party appeared to have addressed the issue of res judicata, the

trial court was unsure whether Green should be permitted to amend his arguments

pursuant to R.C. 2953.21(G)(3). The trial court then ordered Green to file a copy

of his proposed amended petition with his motion for leave and to explain why the

issues raised would not be barred by res judicata.

       {¶10} On June 20, 2023, Green filed his motion for leave to vacate and set

aside judgment. In the filing, Green requested that the trial court permit him to

amend the initial petition for postconviction relief “not to add new or additional

                                          -5-
Case No. 9-23-59


claims, but to include a copy of Dr. Karla Fischer’s curriculum vitae and domestic

violence report” which had not been completed at the time of the filing of the initial

petition. (Doc. No. 389). That same day, Green also filed his response to the trial

court’s June 8, 2023 order to respond. In his filing, Green argued that because the

State did not assert the defense of res judicata in its initial reply, the State waived

the defense and the trial court was barred from considering res judicata. Green also

argued that even if res judicata could be considered, his petition for postconviction

relief is not barred by res judicata because it relies on evidence outside the record.

         {¶11} The trial court granted Green’s request to amend the petition on July

11, 2023. On July 25, 2023, the State filed its opposition to Green’s amended R.C.

2935.21 petition for postconviction relief.2 On July 28, 2023, the trial court filed its

judgment entry denying Green’s petition for postconviction relief on the grounds of

res judicata.

         {¶12} On August 25, 2023, Green filed his notice of appeal. He raises four

assignments of error for our review.

                                    First Assignment of Error

         The trial court erred when it determined that res judicata bars
         consideration of all six of Ziair’s postconviction claims, because
         all six claims rely on evidence dehors the trial record and because
         five of those claims assert ineffective assistance of counsel relying
         on evidence outside the trial record. State v. Blanton, 

, 

; State v. Bunch, 

,

2
  On August 1, 2024, Green filed his response to the State’s opposition to Green’s motion for postconviction
relief. However, the trial court’s judgment entry denying Green’s petition for postconviction relief had been
filed on July 28, 2023.

                                                    -6-
Case No. 9-23-59


       

; Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S.
       Constitution; Article I, Sections 1, 10, and 16 of the Ohio
       Constitution.

                           Second Assignment of Error

       The trial court erred as a matter of law when it sua sponte raised
       the affirmative defense of res judicata on behalf of the
       prosecution, who had failed to timely do so in its first responsive
       pleading. Civ.R. 8, 12; Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the
       U.S. Constitution; Article I, Sections 1, 10, 16 of the Ohio
       Constitution.

                            Third Assignment of Error

       The trial court also violated the principle of party presentation
       and violated Ziair’s procedural and substantive due process
       rights when it abandoned its role as a neutral arbiter and
       dismissed Ziair’s postconviction petition based on an affirmative
       defense that the court itself raised sua sponte, on behalf of the
       state.    Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S.
       Constitution; Article I, Sections 1, 10, 16 of the Ohio Constitution.

       {¶13} In his first assignment of error, Green argues that the trial court erred

when it determined that each of the six grounds for relief presented in his petition

for postconviction relief were barred by res judicata because the claims were

predicated on evidence outside the record. In his second assignment of error, Green

argues that the trial court erred by sua sponte raising the affirmative defense of res

judicata on behalf of the prosecution, who had failed to timely do so in its initial

response to Green’s petition for postconviction relief. In this third assignment of

error, Green argues that the trial court erred by allegedly sua sponte raising the issue

of res judicata on behalf of the State, thereby abandoning its role as neutral arbiter.


                                          -7-
Case No. 9-23-59


Green’s first, second, and third assignments of error are interrelated, therefore we

will address his second and third assignments of error together, followed by this first

assignment of error.

       {¶14} “Although a defendant may challenge his conviction and sentence by

either a direct appeal or a petition for postconviction relief, any claims raised in a

postconviction relief petition will be barred by res judicata where the claim was or

could have been raised on direct appeal.” State v. Schwieterman, 

 (3d Dist.). “‘[U]nder the doctrine of res judicata, a final judgment of conviction

bars a convicted defendant who was represented by counsel from raising and

litigating in any proceeding except an appeal from that judgment, any defense or

any claimed lack of due process that was raised or could have been raised by the

defendant . . . on an appeal from that judgment.’” (Emphasis sic.) State v. Troglin,

 (3d Dist.), quoting State v. Perry, 

 (1967),

paragraph nine of the syllabus. The doctrine “promotes the principles of finality

and judicial economy by preventing endless relitigation of an issue on which a

defendant has already received a full and fair opportunity to be heard.” State v.

Saxton, 

, ¶ 18, citing State ex rel. Willys-Overland Co. v. Clark,

 (1925). Thus, the doctrine of res judicata bars all claims

except those that were not available at trial or on appeal because they are based on

evidence outside the record. See State v. Jones, 

 (3d Dist.).



                                          -8-
Case No. 9-23-59


       {¶15} In his second assignment of error, Green argues that the State forfeited

the affirmative defense of res judicata by not raising it in response to Green’s initial

petition for postconviction relief.   Green argues that because the State allegedly

forfeited the affirmative defense of res judicata, the trial court was precluded from

relying on res judicata to deny his petition for postconviction relief. In his third

assignment of error, Green argues that the trial court violated the principle of party

presentation and violated Green’s due process rights by sua sponte raising the

affirmative defense of res judicata on behalf of the State. However, after reviewing

the record, we disagree.

       {¶16} “Res judicata is not contemplated directly in the Ohio Rules of

Criminal Procedure, but Crim.R. 57(B) requires that we ‘look to the rules of civil

procedure and to the applicable law’ in their absence.” State v. Gibson, 2019-Ohio-

383, ¶ 41 (10th Dist.). “Civ.R. 8(C) classifies ‘res judicata’ as an ‘affirmative

defense’” and “[i]nterpretative caselaw is consistent with this designation, even in

the context of criminal cases.” 

 See State ex rel. West v. McDonnell, 2014-Ohio-

1562, ¶ 16 (“because res judicata is an affirmative defense . . . resolution of a res

judicata defense typically requires resort to materials outside the pleadings”).

       {¶17} Although Green claims that the State did not raise res judicata in its

initial response to his petition for postconviction relief, we find otherwise. In its

initial response, the State asserted “The arguments presented by Defendant in his

Petition are generally the same or similar arguments that were presented to the Ohio

                                          -9-
Case No. 9-23-59


Third District Court of Appeals. As such, the State’s response, in many instances,

will mirror the State’s responses that were raised in the appeal.” (Doc. No. 386).

Accordingly, although the State did not use the term “res judicata” in its reply, the

State expressly indicated to the trial court that the arguments raised in Green’s

petition for postconviction relief were the same as the arguments raised in his direct

appeal. Accordingly, the State raised the claim that the issues had been previously

argued prior to the trial court alluding to res judicata in its June 8, 2023 judgment

entry.

         {¶18} Furthermore, the parties’ May 31, 2023 joint filing contemplated an

amendment to Green’s petition for postconviction relief, which the trial court

subsequently granted.3 Moreover, in the State’s response to Green’s amended

petition for postconviction relief, the State argued that the issues raised in Green’s

amended petition for postconviction relief were barred by res judicata.

         {¶19} Accordingly, Green’s arguments that the State waived res judicata or

that the trial court improperly raised res judicata are without merit. Green’s second

and third assignments of error are overruled.

         {¶20} We next turn to the argument, raised in Green’s first assignment of

error, that the trial court erred in its determination that the grounds for relief outlined

in Green’s petition for postconviction relief were barred by res judicata.


3
  Importantly, the parties’ joint motion indicates that, prior to the State’s response to Green’s initial petition
for postconviction relief, the parties agreed that Green’s petition for postconviction relief would subsequently
be amended, after which the State would have the opportunity to file a response.

                                                      -10-
Case No. 9-23-59


       {¶21} The first ground for relief set out in Green’s petition for postconviction

relief was that the trial court violated his due process right to an in-camera inspection

of CPS records involving McGhee. First, we note that this argument is substantially

the same as the argument Green raised in his first assignment of error in his direct

appeal. Green, 

. In an effort to avoid the application of

res judicata, Green argues that this allegation is supported by evidence outside the

record. Specifically, Green references a subpoena to Marion County Children’s

Services requesting documents involving McGhee, supplemental police reports

dated January 21, 2021 and January 26, 2021, another supplemental report dated

January 29, 2021 referencing CPS involvement relating to McGhee’s home, a

document appearing to be a printout from the Statewide Automated Child Welfare

Information System (“SACWIS”) for Green’s mother, Kimberly Floyd (“Floyd”),

and a document appearing to be a printout from SACWIS for McGhee.

       {¶22} Even if the documents referenced support Green’s claim that CPS

records exist, there is nothing in the record on appeal to show the documents Green

references were not available to Green at the time of trial. See State v. Adams, 2005-

Ohio-348, ¶ 39 (11th Dist.) (“For a defendant to avoid dismissal of the petition by

res judicata, the evidence supporting the claims in the petition must be competent,

relevant, and material evidence outside the trial court’s record, and it must not be

evidence that existed or was available for use at the time of trial.”). Moreover, we

do not find the information contained in the referenced documents to be material to

                                          -11-
Case No. 9-23-59


Green’s petition for postconviction relief as it relates to the in-camera inspection.

Accordingly, the trial court did not err by determining that res judicata applied.

       {¶23} The next four grounds for relief presented in Green’s petition for

postconviction relief allege that Green’s trial counsel was ineffective. The doctrine

of res judicata bars all claims except those that were not available at trial or on

appeal because they are based on evidence outside the record. See Jones, 2007-

Ohio-5624, at ¶ 19. Further, “[t]he evidence submitted outside the record must be

competent, relevant, and material to the issue at hand.” State v. Jackson, 2017-

Ohio-2651, ¶ 59 (8th Dist.). However, “since ‘counsel cannot realistically be

expected to argue his own incompetence, res judicata does not act to bar a defendant

represented by the same counsel at trial and upon direct appeal from raising a claim

of ineffective assistance of counsel in a petition for postconviction relief.’” State v.

Lentz, 

 (1994), quoting State v. Cole, 

(1982), fn. 1. But, “where a defendant was represented by new counsel on direct

appeal ‘who was in no way enjoined from asserting the ineffectiveness of

appellant’s trial counsel,’ claims of ineffective assistance must be brought on direct

review.” (Emphasis sic.) State v. Bradley, 

 (3d Dist.), quoting

. “However, if an ineffective assistance of counsel issue concerns a

matter outside the record, the appellate court could not consider it on direct appeal

because the court can only consider matters contained in the record.” State v. Scott-

Hoover, 

 (3d Dist.), citing State v. Smith, 

,

                                         -12-
Case No. 9-23-59


101 (1985), fn. 1. Although ineffective assistance of trial counsel should ordinarily

be raised on direct appeal, res judicata does not bar a defendant from raising

ineffective assistance in a petition for postconviction relief if the claim is based on

evidence outside the record. 

 “This principle applies even when the issue of

ineffective assistance of counsel was raised on direct appeal.” 

       {¶24} “‘To overcome the res judicata bar, evidence offered [outside] the

record must demonstrate that the petitioner could not have appealed the

constitutional claim based upon information in the original record.’” State v. Lewis,

 (3d Dist.), quoting State v. Slagle, 

 (4th

Dist.), citing Ohio v. Franklin, 

, *7 (1st Dist. Jan. 25, 1995); State

v. Lawson, 

 (12th Dist. May 8, 1995). “‘This means that

the evidence relied upon must not be evidence which was in existence or available

for use at the time of trial or direct appeal, and finally, cannot be merely cumulative

of the evidence already presented.’” 

 quoting State v. Murphy, 

, *3 (10th Dist. Dec. 26, 2000).

       {¶25} Green alleges that his trial counsel was ineffective for: (1) failing to

furnish the court with supplemental police reports supporting his request for CPS

records; (2) failing to research and provide the trial court with case law establishing

that other-act testimony is admissible in self-defense cases to prove state of mind;

(3) trial counsel failed to correct alleged misconceptions regarding battered child

evaluations; and (4) that the trial court did not correct alleged legal misperceptions

                                         -13-
Case No. 9-23-59


regarding the interplay between battered-child evidence and NGRI and whether

such evidence amounts to an impermissible “diminished capacity” defense.

       {¶26} As an initial matter, we find that Green was represented by new

counsel for his direct appeal. Accordingly, Green’s claims of ineffective assistance

of trial counsel are barred by res judicata unless they are based on evidence outside

the record. See Jones, 

.

       {¶27} After reviewing Green’s arguments, we do not find the trial court erred

by determining that Green’s arguments were barred by res judicata. Although Green

now frames the arguments in terms of his trial counsel’s alleged ineffectiveness, he

raised the underlying arguments in his direct appeal, which this court considered

and rejected.

       {¶28} Nonetheless, in an effort to avoid the application of res judicata, Green

contends his arguments are supported by evidence outside the record. Specifically,

Green references the documents attached to his original petition for postconviction

relief and the additional documents attached to the amended motion for

postconviction relief, to wit:

   • Exhibit A - a copy of Dr. Houle’s September 7, 2021 report of her
     psychological evaluation of Green;

   • Exhibit B – an affidavit dated May 18, 2023 of Dr. Karla Fischer, a research
     psychologist who evaluated Green in May 2023;

   • Exhibit B-1 – Dr. Fischer’s preliminary report dated June 16, 2023;

   • Exhibit B-2 – Dr. Fischer’s curriculum vitae;

                                        -14-
Case No. 9-23-59


   • Exhibit C – a portion of a document titled “Case Supplemental Report” dated
     January 21, 2021;

   • Exhibit D – a subpoena file stamped March 25, 2021 to the Marion County
     Children Services seeking all documents relating to McGhee;

   • Exhibit E – a document titled “Case Supplemental Report” dated January 26,
     2021;

   • Exhibit F – a document dated January 26, 2021 appearing to be printout from
     SACWIS for Floyd;

   • Exhibit G – a document dated January 27, 2021 appearing to be a printout
     from SACWIS for McGhee;

   • Exhibit H – a document titled “Case Supplemental Report” dated January 29,
     2021;
   • Exhibit I – a document titled “Case Supplemental Report” dated January 21,
     2021.

       {¶29} Accordingly, all of the material Green references, with the exception

of Green’s Exhibits B, B-1, and B-2 were available at the time of his direct appeal.

Green argues that Dr. Fischer’s opinion that Green “was a battered child” and,

specifically, witnessed the physical abuse of his mother by McGhee and was the

victim of physical and emotional abuse by McGhee, would have “shaped his

perceptions of the danger he faced before, during, and after the shooting.” (Exhibit

B). Dr. Fischer also opined that the evidence of prior violence between Green and

McGhee should not have been excluded if the jury was to understand Green’s frame

of mind and for Green to have a fair trial. (Exhibits B, B-1). The fact Green’s

current counsel was successful in employing an expert who rendered an opinion


                                       -15-
Case No. 9-23-59


potentially beneficial to a defense does not mean trial counsel was not functioning

as counsel contemplated by the Sixth Amendment.

         {¶30} Further, Dr. Fischer’s affidavit and report are not directly relevant to

the specific issues Green raises on appeal. Notably, Green does not specifically

argue in his petition for postconviction relief that his trial counsel was ineffective

for failing to locate Dr. Fischer or have Green evaluated by her prior to trial.4

Rather, in his second ground for relief he argued his trial counsel was ineffective

for failing to furnish the trial court with CPS records. In his fourth and fifth grounds

for relief, Green argues that the exclusion of the battered child evaluation in the case

“may be attributed to trial counsel’s own failure to thoroughly research the issue

and provide [the trial] Court with governing caselaw.” (Amended R.C. 2953.21

Petition to Vacate and Set Aside Judgment). Specifically, he argues that the trial

court and trial counsel erred by mischaracterizing “battered child syndrome.” He

contends that his trial counsel had a mistaken understanding of battered child’s

syndrome and could not, therefore, successfully petition the trial court for a

domestic-violence evaluation which would have supported Green’s argument that

he shot and killed McGhee in self-defense. Green also argues that his trial counsel

was ineffective for alleged legal misperceptions regarding the relationship between

evidence of battered child syndrome, a pleading of NGRI, and an impermissible


4
 We note, as addressed in detail in Green’s direct appeal, Green’s trial counsel vehemently attempted to find
an expert to evaluate Green for battered syndrome, but he was unsuccessful. State v. Green, 2023-Ohio-
4360, ¶ 43-59 (3d Dist.), appeal accepted, State v. Green, 

.

                                                   -16-
Case No. 9-23-59


“diminished capacity” defense. Additionally, in his third ground for relief, Green

argues his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to adequate research relevant case

law related to the admissibility of “other acts” evidence as it relates to the

defendant’s state of mind in a self-defense case. Accordingly, the specific issues

that Green raises with respect to his trial counsel’s alleged deficient performance

are not materially related to the information provided by Dr. Fischer. Furthermore,

Green did actually argue on direct appeal that the trial court did not allow him to

fully investigate a possible battered child syndrome defense and that the trial court

erred by excluding evidence relating to specific acts of past violence between Green,

McGhee, and Floyd. Accordingly, the trial court did not err by finding that Green’s

grounds for relief citing ineffective assistance of counsel were barred by res

judicata.

       {¶31} Moreover, even if Green’s arguments that his trial counsel was

ineffective were not barred by res judicata, we do not find that Green established

that his trial counsel was ineffective. See State v. Salyers, 

, ¶ 36-

46 (3d Dist.). Green’s underlying arguments were raised and addressed in his direct

appeal and we found them to be without merit. See Green, 

. Furthermore, Green’s arguments are speculative in nature. Accordingly, even

if Green’s arguments relating to his trial counsel were not barred by res judicata,

Green’s grounds for relief relating to his trial counsel were still without merit.



                                         -17-
Case No. 9-23-59


       {¶32} Finally, in Green’s sixth ground for relief, he argues that his

convictions and sentence are void or voidable due to the cumulative effect of the

legal errors. The trial court, having found that the prior grounds for relief were

barred by res judicata and without merit, did not err by also finding Green’s sixth

ground for relief to be without merit.

       {¶33} Having found that the trial court did not err by finding that the claims

presented in his petition for postconviction relief were barred by res judicata, we

overrule Green’s first assignment of error.

                           Fourth Assignment of Error

       The cumulative errors committed by the trial court deprived
       Ziair of a fair adjudication, in violation of his fundamental due
       process rights. Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S.
       Constitution; Article I, Sections 1, 10, 16 of the Ohio Constitution.

       {¶34} In his fourth assignment of error, Green summarily argues that the

cumulative effect of the alleged errors outlined in his other assignments of error

deprived him of his due process right to a fair adjudication. We disagree.

       {¶35} Under the cumulative-error doctrine, “a conviction will be reversed

when the cumulative effect of errors in a trial deprives a defendant of a fair trial

even though each of the numerous instances of trial court error does not individually

constitute cause for reversal.” State v. Spencer, 

 (3d Dist.). “To

find cumulative error, a court must first find multiple errors committed at trial and

determine that there is a reasonable probability that the outcome below would have


                                         -18-
Case No. 9-23-59


been different but for the combination of harmless errors.” In re J.M., 2012-Ohio-

1467, ¶ 36 (3d Dist.). Moreover, “[t]he ‘cumulative errors doctrine’ applies to errors

that occur in the criminal trial. A postconviction relief petition is a collateral civil

attack.” State v. Ludwick, 

 (4th Dist.). Moreover, we have not

found that the trial court committed any errors, let alone multiple errors. Therefore,

the cumulative-error doctrine does not apply. See State v. Jamison, 2016-Ohio-

5122, ¶ 40, abrogated on other grounds, State v. Haynes, 

 (“If there

[are] not multiple errors, … the cumulative error doctrine does not apply.”); State

v. Carpenter, 

 (3d Dist.).

       {¶36} Green’s fourth assignment of error is overruled.

       {¶37} Having found no error prejudicial to the appellant herein in the

particulars assigned and argued, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.



                                                                  Judgment Affirmed

WILLAMOWSKI, P.J. and WALDICK, J., concur.

/jlm




                                         -19-