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2024 Ohio 5268

State v. Tenney

Ohio Court of Appeals

Decided November 4, 2024

Ohio Court of Appeals · decided 2024-11-04

CRIMINAL LAW - motion for final appealable order; voidable sentence; res judicata; law of the case.

Relies on State v. Perry · Nolan v. Nolan · State v. Szefcyk

Decided 2024-11-04

[Cite as State v. Tenney, 
2024-Ohio-5268
.]



                 IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
                           ELEVENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
                                TRUMBULL COUNTY

STATE OF OHIO,                                   CASE NO. 2024-T-0053

                 Plaintiff-Appellee,
                                                 Criminal Appeal from the
        - vs -                                   Court of Common Pleas

MICHAEL RUSSELL TENNEY,
                                                 Trial Court No. 2017 CR 00159
                 Defendant-Appellant.


                                             OPINION

                                     Decided: November 4, 2024
                                         Judgment: Affirmed


Dennis Watkins, Trumbull County Prosecutor, and Ryan J. Sanders, Assistant
Prosecutor, Administration Building, Fourth Floor, 160 High Street, N.W., Warren, OH
44481 (For Plaintiff-Appellee).

Michael Russell Tenney, pro se, PID# A704-630, Belmont Correctional Institution, P.O.
Box 540, St. Clairsville, OH 43950 (Defendant-Appellant).


MARY JANE TRAPP, J.

        {¶1}     Defendant-appellant, Michael Russell Tenney (“Mr. Tenney”), pro se,

appeals the judgment of the Trumbull County Court of Common Pleas denying his motion

for a final appealable order with respect to his 2018 conviction.

        {¶2}     Mr. Tenney asserts a single assignment of error, contending the trial court

erred by denying his motion.

        {¶3}     After a careful review of the record and pertinent law, we find that the trial

court did not err by denying Mr. Tenney’s motion for a final appealable order. Mr. Tenney
did not contend in his motion that his 2018 sentencing entry was void. In fact, the

governing authority holds that the alleged errors that Mr. Tenney identified did not render

the entry void; therefore, Mr. Tenney’s arguments were barred by the doctrines of res

judicata and the law of the case.

          {¶4}   Thus, Mr. Tenney’s sole assignment of error is without merit, and we affirm

the judgment of the Trumbull County Court of Common Pleas.

                             Substantive and Procedural History

          {¶5}   This appeal involves Mr. Tenney’s latest attempt to revisit his 2018

conviction.

          {¶6}   In 2018, a jury found Mr. Tenney guilty of felonious assault (count one) and

two counts of endangering children (counts two and three). The trial court merged the

three counts and sentenced Mr. Tenney to eight years in prison on count one. Mr. Tenney

appealed, and this court affirmed his conviction in State v. Tenney, 
2019-Ohio-927
 (11th

Dist.).

          {¶7}   Mr. Tenney filed successive applications to reopen his direct appeal in 2019

and 2021, which this court overruled. Mr. Tenney appealed the latter order to the

Supreme Court of Ohio, which declined jurisdiction. See State v. Tenney, 2021-Ohio-

4033.1

          {¶8}   In November 2023, Mr. Tenney filed a pro se motion for a final appealable

order in the trial court.     He argued that the 2018 sentencing entry was not a final

appealable order because it did not expressly state the offenses of which he was found




1. In 2023, Mr. Tenney filed a mandamus complaint against the trial court judge pursuant to the Public
Records Act, which this court subsequently dismissed. See State ex rel. Tenney v. Rice, 
2023-Ohio-4269
.
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Case No. 2024-T-0053
guilty. He also alleged a discrepancy between the verdict form and the trial court’s

judgment on the verdict.

       {¶9}   In February 2024, Mr. Tenney filed a pro se complaint in this court

requesting a writ of procedendo directing the trial court judge to rule on his motion. Later

that month, the trial court filed a judgment entry summarily denying Mr. Tenney’s motion.

This court dismissed Mr. Tenney’s procedendo complaint as moot. See State ex rel.

Tenney v. Rice, 
2024-Ohio-1116
 (11th Dist.).

       {¶10} In April 2024, Mr. Tenney filed in this court a pro se “motion to dismiss for

lack of jurisdiction in reg[a]rds to 2018-T-0019.” This court, sua sponte, ordered the clerk

of courts to strike Mr. Tenney’s motion because he failed to serve a copy on appellee, the

State of Ohio.

       {¶11} In June 2024, Mr. Tenney filed another pro se “motion to dismiss for lack of

jurisdiction in regards to 2018-T-0019.” He argued that this court lacked jurisdiction over

his direct appeal in Tenney, 
2019-Ohio-927
 (11th Dist.), because the trial court’s 2018

sentencing entry was not a final appealable order. He also stated that the verdict form

for count three indicated that the jury found him guilty of a third-degree felony rather than

the second-degree felony charged in the indictment.

       {¶12} We overruled Mr. Tenney’s motion.            We explained that his appeal

concluded in 2019 and that his motion to vacate did not constitute any of the post-

judgment motions or applications we are legally permitted to consider under the Rules of

Appellate Procedure. In addition, we noted that Mr. Tenney did not assign the alleged

errors on direct appeal or in his applications for reopening. Further, due to merger, Mr.

Tenney was only “convicted” of count one. See State v. Whitfield, 
2010-Ohio-2, ¶ 12
 (“a

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Case No. 2024-T-0053
‘conviction’ consists of a guilty verdict and the imposition of a sentence or penalty”)

(Emphasis in original.)

          {¶13} We subsequently granted Mr. Tenney’s motion for leave to file a delayed

appeal from the trial court’s February 2024 judgment entry.2 He now raises a single

assignment of error:

          {¶14} “The trial court erred when it denied appellant’s motion for a final appealable

order.”

                                       Standard of Review

          {¶15} Mr. Tenney did not identify the statute or procedural rule pursuant to which

he filed his motion for a final appealable order. However, Mr. Tenney’s motion implicated

issues of law, which we review de novo. See State v. Mitchell, 
2022-Ohio-1009, ¶ 21

(11th Dist.).

                                         Legal Principles

          {¶16} The preliminary and dispositive issue in this case is whether Mr. Tenney

was permitted to revisit his 2018 conviction through a motion for a final appealable order

filed over five years later.

          {¶17} “A criminal sentence is final upon issuance of a final order.”               State v.

Carlisle, 
2011-Ohio-6553, ¶ 11
. “Crim.R. 32(C) lists the requirements for a valid final

judgment in a criminal case. It provides that a judgment must set forth the fact of the

conviction, the sentence, the judge’s signature, and the time stamp indicating that the

clerk entered the judgment in the journal.” State v. Gilbert, 
2014-Ohio-4562
, ¶ 8. “[T]he




2. This court overruled Mr. Tenney’s first motion for a delayed appeal because he failed to comply with
App.R. 5(A). See State v. Tenney, 
2024-Ohio-1652
 (11th Dist.).
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Case No. 2024-T-0053
purpose of Crim.R. 32(C) is to ensure that a defendant is on notice concerning when a

final judgment has been entered and the time for filing an appeal has begun to run.” State

v. Lester, 
2011-Ohio-5204, ¶ 10
. “Absent statutory authority, a trial court is generally not

empowered to modify a criminal sentence by reconsidering its own final judgment.”

Carlisle at ¶ 1
. This is because “[o]nce a final judgment has been issued pursuant to

Crim.R. 32, the trial court’s jurisdiction ends.” Gilbert at ¶ 9.

       {¶18} One exception to this general rule is when a sentence is void. “A sentence

is void only if the sentencing court lacks jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case or

personal jurisdiction over the accused.” State v. Henderson, 
2020-Ohio-4784, ¶ 27
.

“‘Conversely, where a judgment of conviction is rendered by a court having jurisdiction

over the person of the defendant and jurisdiction of the subject matter, such judgment is

not void, and the cause of action merged therein becomes res judicata as between the

state and the defendant.’” State v. Harper, 
2020-Ohio-2913, ¶ 22
, quoting State v. Perry,

10 Ohio St.2d 175, 178-179
 (1967).

                                          Analysis

       {¶19} We find no error in the trial court’s denial of Mr. Tenney’s motion. Mr.

Tenney did not contend that his sentence was void. In fact, the governing authority holds

that the alleged errors Mr. Tenney identified did not render the 2018 sentencing entry

void. The Supreme Court of Ohio has held that “the technical failure to comply with

Crim.R. 32(C) . . . does not render the judgment a nullity.” State ex rel. DeWine v. Burge,

2011-Ohio-235, ¶ 19
. Rather, the court has “consistently regarded Crim.R. 32(C) errors

as clerical mistakes subject to nunc pro tunc correction.” Snead v. Ferenc, 2014-Ohio-

43, ¶ 10. This court has held that an error in a verdict form renders the subsequent

                                               5

Case No. 2024-T-0053
conviction voidable, not void. Perry v. Sloan, 
2016-Ohio-1605, ¶ 7
 (11th Dist.), aff’d,

2017-Ohio-1404
.

       {¶20} Since the 2018 sentencing entry is not void, Mr. Tenney’s arguments were

barred by the doctrine of res judicata. “[A] convicted defendant is precluded under the

doctrine of res judicata from raising and litigating in any proceeding, except an appeal

from that judgment, any defense or any claimed lack of due process that was raised or

could have been raised by the defendant at the trial which resulted in that judgment of

conviction or on appeal from that judgment.” State v. Szefcyk, 
77 Ohio St.3d 93, 96

(1996). Mr. Tenney could have raised his arguments on direct appeal, which would have

been the proper time and vehicle. He “may not now find his way into court through a side

entrance and upon the back of what appears to be a pre-textual motion and appeal

therefrom.” State v. Grenter, 
2011-Ohio-6003
, ¶ 12 (11th Dist.).

       {¶21} Mr. Tenney’s Crim.R. 32(C) argument was also barred by the doctrine of

the law of the case. That doctrine provides that “the decision of a reviewing court in a

case remains the law of that case on the legal questions involved for all subsequent

proceedings in the case at both the trial and reviewing levels.” Nolan v. Nolan, 
11 Ohio St.3d 1, 3
 (1984). “[T]he rule is necessary to ensure the consistency of results in a case,

to avoid endless litigation by settling the issues, and to preserve the structure of superior

and inferior courts as designed by the Ohio Constitution.” 
Id.

       {¶22} Mr. Tenney appealed his conviction, and this court affirmed in Tenney,

2019-Ohio-927
 (11th Dist.). We also denied his subsequent applications for reopening.

Thus, Mr. Tenney and this court have always proceeded under the presumption that the

2018 sentencing entry was a final appealable order. The law of the case doctrine

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Case No. 2024-T-0053
precludes both the trial court and this court from concluding otherwise. See State v.

Mitchell, 
2020-Ohio-3417, ¶ 73
 (11th Dist.); State v. I’Juju, 
2016-Ohio-3078, ¶ 10
 (10th

Dist.).

          {¶23} Accordingly, Mr. Tenney’s sole assignment of error is without merit.

          {¶24} For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the Trumbull County Court of

Common Pleas is affirmed.



EUGENE A. LUCCI, P.J.,

MATT LYNCH, J.,

concur.




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Case No. 2024-T-0053

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