[Cite as State v. Carter,
2024-Ohio-5295.]
STATE OF OHIO ) IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
)ss: NINTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
COUNTY OF SUMMIT )
STATE OF OHIO C.A. No. 30840
Appellee
v. APPEAL FROM JUDGMENT
ENTERED IN THE
REGINALD CARTER COURT OF COMMON PLEAS
COUNTY OF SUMMIT, OHIO
Appellant CASE No. CR-2021-09-3126
DECISION AND JOURNAL ENTRY
Dated: November 6, 2024
CARR, Judge.
{¶1} Defendant-Appellant Reginald Carter appeals the judgment of the Summit County
Court of Common Pleas. This Court affirms.
I.
{¶2} Following a drive-by shooting on July 23, 2021, which seriously injured two young
men, an indictment was filed in September 2021, charging Carter with two counts of felonious
assault and one count of having weapons while under disability. Two firearm specifications
accompanied each of the felonious assault counts. The matter proceeded to a jury trial but ended
in a mistrial. A second jury trial ensued. Carter was found guilty of the charges and was
subsequently sentenced.
{¶3} Carter has appealed, raising four assignments of error for our review. Some of the
assignments of error will be addressed out of sequence and will be consolidated with other
assignments of error to facilitate our review.
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II.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW BECAUSE THE STATE
FAILED TO ESTABLISH ON THE RECORD SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO
SUPPORT THE CHARGES LEVIED AGAINST MR. REGINALD CARTER.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR IV
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING MR. REGINALD CARTER’S
CRIM[.R.] 29 MOTION FOR ACQUITTAL.
{¶4} Carter argues in his first assignment of error that his convictions for felonious
assault and having a weapon while under disability are based on insufficient evidence. He asserts
in his fourth assignment of error that the trial court erred in denying his Crim.R. 29 motion.
{¶5} Carter argues that the State did not demonstrate that Carter fired the gun or even
possessed a gun.
{¶6} Crim.R. 29(A) provides, in relevant part:
The court on motion of a defendant or on its own motion, after the evidence on
either side is closed, shall order the entry of a judgment of acquittal of one or more
offenses charged in the indictment, information, or complaint, if the evidence is
insufficient to sustain a conviction of such offense or offenses. The court may not
reserve ruling on a motion for judgment of acquittal made at the close of the state’s
case.
{¶7} When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, this Court must review the
evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution to determine whether the evidence before the
trial court was sufficient to sustain a conviction. State v. Jenks, 61 Ohio St.3d 259, 279 (1991).
An appellate court’s function when reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to
support a criminal conviction is to examine the evidence admitted at trial to
determine whether such evidence, if believed, would convince the average mind of
the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. The relevant inquiry is whether,
after viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational
trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime proven beyond a
reasonable doubt.
Id. at paragraph two of the syllabus.
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{¶8} R.C. 2903.11(A)(2) states that “[n]o person shall knowingly …[c]ause or attempt
to cause physical harm to another or to another’s unborn by means of a deadly weapon or
dangerous ordnance.” A firearm constitutes a deadly weapon. See R.C. 2903.11(E)(1); R.C.
2923.11(A); R.C. 2923.11(B).
A person acts knowingly, regardless of purpose, when the person is aware that the
person’s conduct will probably cause a certain result or will probably be of a certain
nature. A person has knowledge of circumstances when the person is aware that
such circumstances probably exist. When knowledge of the existence of a
particular fact is an element of an offense, such knowledge is established if a person
subjectively believes that there is a high probability of its existence and fails to
make inquiry or acts with a conscious purpose to avoid learning the fact.
R.C. 2901.22(B).
{¶9} R.C. 2923.13(A)(3) indicates that:
Unless relieved from disability under operation of law or legal process, no person
shall knowingly acquire, have, carry, or use any firearm or dangerous ordnance, if
…[t]he person is under indictment for or has been convicted of any felony offense
involving the illegal possession, use, sale, administration, distribution, or
trafficking in any drug of abuse or has been adjudicated a delinquent child for the
commission of an offense that, if committed by an adult, would have been a felony
offense involving the illegal possession, use, sale, administration, distribution, or
trafficking in any drug of abuse.
{¶10} Further, with respect to the two counts of felonious assault, the jury was instructed
on complicity as an aider and abettor. R.C. 2923.03(A)(2) provides that “[n]o person, acting with
the kind of culpability required for the commission of an offense, shall … [a]id or abet another in
committing the offense[.]” “A charge of complicity may be stated in terms of this section, or in
terms of the principal offense.” R.C. 2923.03(F). “A conviction based on complicity by aiding
and abetting under R.C. 2923.03(A)(2) must be based on evidence showing that the defendant
supported, assisted, encouraged, cooperated with, advised, or incited the principal in the
commission of the crime, and that the defendant shared the criminal intent of the principal. This
intent may be inferred from the surrounding circumstances.” (Internal quotations and citations
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omitted.) State v. Moore, 2020-Ohio-3708, ¶ 12 (9th Dist.). Accordingly, if the evidence
supported that Carter was complicit in committing felonious assault, he could have been found
guilty even if he was not the shooter. See State v. Ross,
2023-Ohio-1185, ¶ 23 (9th Dist.).
{¶11} On July 23, 2021, in Springfield Township, a little before 8:00 pm, 18-year-olds
M.R. and S.W. went to go check on a younger neighborhood child who had been bullied earlier in
the day as the two had concerns that the child might be assaulted again. M.R. and S.W.
encountered a group of children, some of whom were congregated on a porch. M.R. described a
lot of yelling among the children but no physical altercation. Then one of the boys on the porch
said, “Wait right here.” M.R. then had a feeling something bad was going to happen.
{¶12} Shortly after, a car described as a black Cadillac with tinted windows pulled up.
Surveillance video would confirm that a black sedan was in the area of the crime scene around the
time of the shooting. M.R. testified that the car “pulled up and two grown men jumped out and
they started shooting.” M.R. described the driver as a bald African American man with a bushy
beard. M.R. was unable to describe the passenger. M.R. testified that the driver had a handgun
and then M.R. saw a flash. M.R. fell to the ground and could not feel his legs anymore. M.R. saw
people running and screaming and observed the car drive away at a high rate of speed.
{¶13} M.R. was shot in his hip. He required surgery and had a lengthy hospital stay. At
trial, M.R. identified Carter as the man in the driver’s seat that pointed a gun at him.
{¶14} S.W. indicated that the car was a newer four-door black Cadillac. It pulled up and
then the shooting started. S.W. remembered seeing two men and two guns but did not see anyone
fire when he got shot. At trial, S.W. identified the driver as Carter. S.W. expressed certainty that
Carter was the driver. S.W. had difficulty at trial remembering what the passenger looked like,
but stated he was African American and at least 20. S.W. did not remember the driver getting out
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of the vehicle but recalled seeing the top half of the other man, who pointed his gun at S.W. When
S.W. saw the guns, he turned and ran. S.W. was shot from behind in the left shoulder. S.W. ran
to M.R.’s house and was ultimately transported to a hospital.
{¶15} When S.W. first talked to the police, he told them that the shooter came from the
rear of the vehicle, was approximately 18 to 25 years old, was wearing a gray hoodie, and had light
facial hair. He also told police that he could not remember whether the shooter was on the driver
or passenger side of the vehicle but did say the driver was not the shooter.
{¶16} At the crime scene, fifteen shell casings were recovered and sent for analysis. It
was determined that all of them were fired from a single gun. No DNA or fingerprints were found.
The gun was never recovered. Police were given the nickname “Dunk” or “Dump” as being
possibly involved and were also provided with an anonymous tip which provided them with
Carter’s name. When police looked up Carter’s driver’s license information, it was discovered
that the photo resembled the description provided by S.W. M.R. identified Carter with 95%
certainty in a photo array as the person who shot him. S.W. identified Carter as a suspect in a
photo array with 100% certainty.
{¶17} Police also learned that a 2017 black Cadillac was registered to Carter. While
investigating, police came to believe that Carter had ties to Tika Phelps who owned the house near
where the shooting took place and to a child who the victims identified as being on the porch of
the house before the shooting. Ultimately, police located the Cadillac registered to Carter and
obtained a search warrant for the infotainment system in the vehicle. The report from the
infotainment system listed Ms. Phelps’ name and phone number and the child’s name.
{¶18} Cell phone data was also analyzed during the investigation. There was testimony
that a cell phone with the number that Carter used was in downtown Akron around 5:00 pm on the
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day of the shooting. At 7:45 pm, that same phone utilized a cell tower that was 639 yards from
the crime scene. Police received a shots fired call at 7:48 pm. At 7:50 pm, the same cell phone
utilized a different cell tower that was still within the area of the crime scene. However, by 8:08
pm, the cell phone was several miles away from the crime scene.
{¶19} Viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the State, we conclude that Carter
has not demonstrated that the trial court erred in denying his Crim.R. 29 motion or that his
convictions were based on insufficient evidence. There was ample evidence connecting Carter to
the crimes and crime scene. Both victims identified Carter as the driver of the vehicle and S.W.
testified that both men had guns. Both M.R. and S.W. testified that the driver, Carter, had a gun.
While not all of the evidence pointed to Carter being the shooter, there was evidence that Carter
did fire the shots. During the photo array, M.R. identified Carter as the man who shot him and, at
trial, testified that the driver had a gun, M.R. saw a flash, and he fell. Moreover, as discussed
above, the jury was instructed as to complicity with respect to the felonious assault charges, so it
was not essential that Carter was demonstrated to be the shooter. Further, even if Carter did not
fire the gun, there was substantial evidence that he had a gun; he did not have to fire it to be found
guilty of violating R.C. 2923.13(A)(3). See R.C. 2923.13(A)(3).
{¶20} Carter’s first and fourth assignments of error are overruled.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR II
MR. REGINALD CARTER’S CONVICTIONS WERE AGAINST THE
MANIFEST WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE IN VIOLATION OF THE DUE
PROCESS CLAUSE OF THE CONSTITUTION (CLAUSE XIV, SECTION 1,
UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION).
{¶21} Carter argues in his second assignment of error that his convictions are against the
manifest weight of the evidence.
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{¶22} A conviction that is supported by sufficient evidence may still be found to be
against the manifest weight of the evidence. State v. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380, 387 (1997).
In determining whether a criminal conviction is against the manifest weight of the
evidence, an appellate court must review the entire record, weigh the evidence and
all reasonable inferences, consider the credibility of witnesses and determine
whether, in resolving conflicts in the evidence, the trier of fact clearly lost its way
and created such a manifest miscarriage of justice that the conviction must be
reversed and a new trial ordered.
State v. Otten, 33 Ohio App.3d 339, 340 (9th Dist. 1986). An appellate court should exercise the
power to reverse a judgment as against the manifest weight of the evidence only in exceptional
cases.
Id. We are mindful that “the jury is free to believe all, part, or none of the testimony of
each witness.” (Internal quotations and citations omitted.) State v. Darr,
2018-Ohio-2548, ¶ 32
(9th Dist.). This Court will not overturn a conviction on a manifest weight challenge only because
the jury found the testimony of certain witnesses to be credible. See State v. Crowe, 2005-Ohio-
4082, ¶ 22 (9th Dist.).
{¶23} Carter makes a fairly limited argument in support of this assignment of error. In so
doing, he points to some of the discrepancies between the two victims’ testimonies about certain
details including the identity and location of the shooter. Carter also argues that, given the location
of his home, the cell phone data was not reliable in placing him at the crime scene, as he could
have been at home.
{¶24} This Court has thoroughly and independently reviewed the record, and we cannot
say that Carter has demonstrated that the jury lost its way in finding him guilty of the challenged
charges. In reaching this conclusion, we remain mindful that the jury was in the best position to
make credibility determinations and that the jury was also instructed as to complicity with respect
to the two felonious assault charges. See State v. Yost, 2024-Ohio-545, ¶ 26 (9th Dist.). Further,
even if the cell phone data was unreliable in placing Carter at the crime scene, the testimony of
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both victims placed Carter there. In summary, Carter has not demonstrated that his convictions
are against the manifest weight of the evidence.
{¶25} Carter’s second assignment of error is overruled.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR III
THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY ADMITTING THE
STATE OF OHIO’S EXHIBITS OVER MR. REGINALD CARTER’S
OBJECTION.
{¶26} Carter argues in his third assignment of error that the trial court erred in admitting
certain exhibits over his objection. Specifically, Carter argues that M.R.’s medical records were
not admissible due to the absence of testimony by a records custodian. In addition, he asserts that
certain video evidence was inadmissible as it violated his rights under the Confrontation Clause
and because it was not the body camera video of the officer who presented it at trial.
{¶27} Generally, “a trial court has broad discretion in the admission or exclusion of
evidence and this Court will not disturb a trial court’s ruling on the admission of evidence absent
an abuse of discretion and material prejudice to the defendant.” (Internal quotations and citations
omitted.) State v. Suggs, 2024-Ohio-1961, ¶ 33 (9th Dist.); see also State v. Wooden, 2015-Ohio-
2633, ¶ 10 (9th Dist.). However, “evidentiary rulings that implicate the Confrontation Clause are
reviewed de novo.” State v. Briggs,
2023-Ohio-1931, ¶ 30 (9th Dist.). Nonetheless, such rulings
are likewise subject to a harmless-error analysis. See id. at ¶ 33.
{¶28} With respect to M.R.’s medical records, even if we were to assume that they were
inadmissible, but see State v. Wooden, 2015-Ohio-2633, ¶ 10-11 (9th Dist.), the record does not
support that Carter was prejudiced by their admission. There was testimony about M.R.’s injuries,
video of M.R. prior to being transported to the hospital, and a fairly graphic photograph of M.R.
in a hospital bed presented at trial and also admitted into evidence. On appeal, Carter asserts that
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the medical records were prejudicial because they showed the extent of M.R.’s injuries. However,
given the testimony, photograph, and video evidence presented, we fail to see how the medical
records were anything other than cumulative in light of Carter’s argument.
{¶29} With respect to Carter’s objection as to two video clips played for the jury and
admitted into evidence, Carter asserts that they were prejudicial because a 6-year-old in the video
identified the shooter as “Dunk[.]” In reviewing the clips several times, this Court could not hear
the child making the aforementioned identification. It therefore seems very unlikely the jury was
able to discern it as the jury did not even know to look for it. Thus, it is difficult to understand
how Carter was prejudiced.
{¶30} As to Carter’s assertion that the body camera footage was introduced through an
officer who was not wearing that camera, Carter did not make this argument in the trial court and
has not argued plain error on appeal. See State v. Chapman, 2018-Ohio-1142, ¶ 23 (9th Dist.).
Moreover, the person through whom the video was introduced witnessed the events displayed and
Carter has not explained why this person thus could not authenticate the video. See Evid.R.
901(A), (B)(1).
{¶31} Accordingly, Carter’s third assignment of error is overruled.
III.
{¶32} Carter’s assignments of error are overruled. The judgment of the Summit County
Court of Common Pleas is affirmed.
Judgment affirmed.
There were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
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We order that a special mandate issue out of this Court, directing the Court of Common
Pleas, County of Summit, State of Ohio, to carry this judgment into execution. A certified copy
of this journal entry shall constitute the mandate, pursuant to App.R. 27.
Immediately upon the filing hereof, this document shall constitute the journal entry of
judgment, and it shall be file stamped by the Clerk of the Court of Appeals at which time the period
for review shall begin to run. App.R. 22(C). The Clerk of the Court of Appeals is instructed to
mail a notice of entry of this judgment to the parties and to make a notation of the mailing in the
docket, pursuant to App.R. 30.
Costs taxed to Appellant.
DONNA J. CARR
FOR THE COURT
STEVENSON, P. J.
FLAGG LANZINGER, J.
CONCUR.
APPEARANCES:
KRISTOPHER IMMEL, Attorney at Law, for Appellant.
ELLIOT KOLKOVICH, Prosecuting Attorney, and C. RICHLEY RALEY, JR., Assistant
Prosecuting Attorney, for Appellee.
