[Cite as State v. Taylor,
2024-Ohio-5331.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
SEVENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
HARRISON COUNTY
STATE OF OHIO,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
PHILIP J. TAYLOR,
Defendant-Appellant.
OPINION AND JUDGMENT ENTRY
Case No. 24 HA 0002
Criminal Appeal from the
Court of Common Pleas of Harrison County, Ohio
Case No. CRI 2023-0024
BEFORE:
Carol Ann Robb, Cheryl L. Waite, Katelyn Dickey, Judges.
JUDGMENT:
Affirmed.
Atty. Lauren E. Knight, Harrison County Prosecutor, for Plaintiff-Appellee and
Atty. Christopher P. Lacich, Roth, Blair, for Defendant-Appellant.
Dated: November 6, 2024
–2–
Robb, P.J.
{¶1} Appellant, Philip J. Taylor, appeals the March 20, 2024 judgment convicting
him of one count of domestic violence. Appellant argues the evidence was insufficient to
support his conviction and his conviction is against the manifest weight of the evidence.
Appellant also claims his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to file notice of his claim
of self defense and the trial court erred by failing to provide the self-defense jury
instruction. For the following reasons, we affirm.
Statement of the Facts and Case
{¶2} Appellant was indicted in April of 2023 and charged with one count of
felonious assault, a second-degree felony in violation of R.C. 2903.11(A)(1) and (D)(1)(a);
a second count of felonious assault, a second-degree felony in violation of R.C.
2903.11(A)(2) and (D)(1)(a); and one count of domestic violence, a first-degree
misdemeanor in violation of R.C. 2919.25(A), with a repeat violent offender specification
in violation of R.C. 2929.01 due to a prior murder conviction in 1983. (April 14, 2023
Indictment.)
{¶3} Appellant was arraigned in April of 2023 and entered a plea of not guilty.
The court set a motion deadline, discovery deadline, and an August 8, 2023 trial date.
The court also appointed counsel to represent Appellant. Appellant’s attorney demanded
discovery and was granted permission to secure a competency evaluation to assess his
mental condition at the time the offense was committed.
{¶4} The court subsequently ordered the report to be sealed and found Appellant
was able to appreciate the charges against him and assist in his defense. Appellant
indicated he wanted new counsel, and the court advised him to request new counsel in
writing. The court returned the case to its active docket and reset trial to January of 2024.
(September 27, 2023 Judgment.)
{¶5} Appellant’s first counsel of record moved to withdraw in December of 2023.
(December 19, 2023 Motion to Withdraw.) New counsel was appointed the next day and
moved for discovery and requested a bill of particulars. Appellant’s jury trial was reset to
March 13, 2024.
Case No. 24 HA 0002
–3–
{¶6} Appellant then filed a motion in limine seeking to prohibit the state from
mentioning his prior murder conviction pursuant to Evid.R. 404(B). (February 28, 2024.)
The court granted the motion and prohibited the state from introducing evidence in this
regard, unless Appellant testified or presented character evidence. (March 7, 2024
Judgment.)
{¶7} The matter proceeded to trial. Jason Laponte testified first. Laponte is a
Washington Township Fire Department EMT. He was asleep when he received a call
about a stabbing. When Laponte arrived at the scene, he was met by Appellant, Philip
Taylor. Appellant was distraught and asked Laponte to help save his brother.
{¶8} Appellant’s brother, Charles Taylor, was upstairs inside the home. He had
several lacerations across his abdomen. Some were an inch deep and eight to nine
inches long. Charles told Laponte that his brother had cut him with a box cutter. (Trial
Tr. 79-84.)
{¶9} Michelle Moodie, a paramedic with the Hopedale Fire Department, testified
she responded to a call about a stabbing. The patient was in an ambulance when she
arrived. She saw several deep wounds, and one had fatty tissue exposed. She decided
the man needed to be life flighted to secure medical treatment. Moodie was asked how
often she sees patients with self-inflicted stab wounds. She said “maybe 25%” are self-inflicted, but those are usually not deep stab wounds and there are usually not multiple
stab wounds when they are self-inflicted. Moodie thinks Charles had at least five stab
wounds. (Trial Tr. 86-91)
{¶10} Charles Taylor also testified. He is Appellant’s brother. At the time of the
stabbing, Charles lived in a home with his stepfather, his stepfather’s fiancé, his younger
brother, and Appellant. Charles said he lived there for about four to five years without
any physical altercations. His older brother, Appellant, moved in because he was having
some problems. On the day of the incident, Appellant woke up Charles at about 4:30
a.m. Appellant was drinking a bottle of liquor in Charles’ bedroom. (Trial Tr. 93-97.)
{¶11} Charles recalled he asked where Appellant had been all night, which
agitated Appellant. Charles described Appellant as the aggressor, and said he punched
me, so I punched him back. He then explained:
Case No. 24 HA 0002
–4–
[Appellant] came up off the floor and he lunged into me and when he lunged
into me[,] I slipped on a banana. . . . There was a banana in the doorway.
I slipped on the banana when he grabbed me and lunged into me. We hit
the doorway and I thought he was hitting me in the side. He wasn’t hitting
me. He was gutting me with that razor knife he had. . . . I looked down, I
seen the blood and then I seen the knife coming out of my skin the final
time.
(Trial Tr. 99-100.)
{¶12} Charles said he did not want to fight, and Appellant always had a box cutter
with him. Charles watched Appellant put the box cutter back in his pocket and go
downstairs.
{¶13} Charles stated Appellant “cut my gut sack” and I could “see my guts.” He
was life-flighted to a hospital in Pittsburgh. He spent three to four days in the hospital.
He still has occasional pain. Charles showed four scars on his abdomen during trial.
(Trial Tr. 98-104.)
{¶14} On cross-examination, Charles agreed he is on disability. At the time of the
altercation, he was working under the table driving a van. Charles denied telling anyone
that Appellant was punching himself in the face. (Trial Tr. 108-119.)
{¶15} Deputy Saylor’s body camera footage was played during Charles’
testimony. During the recording, Charles can evidently be heard saying Appellant hit
himself. Charles denies having possession of a knife during the altercation. (Trial Tr.
120-128.)
{¶16} Appellant and Charles’ stepfather, Michael, also testified. Michael said
Appellant was living with him, his fiancé Christine, their ten-year-old son, and Charles at
the time of the incident.
{¶17} On the day of the altercation, Michael woke up to yelling and heard Charles
say “he cut me.” Michael exited his bedroom and saw Appellant standing over Charles,
who was on the ground. Michael said “Phil was over top of him, had him by his T-shirt
and was doing something. . . . When I hollered, he turned toward his right and put
something in his pocket. . . . It looked like a razor knife or something of that nature.”
When asked if Appellant could have been putting his glasses in his pocket, Michael said
Case No. 24 HA 0002
–5–
no because Appellant was wearing his glasses. Michael then said Appellant went
downstairs and exited the home. Christine locked the door behind him. Michael said he
had previously seen Appellant with a fold-up razor knife a “couple times.” (Trial Tr. 134-
140.)
{¶18} On cross-examination, Michael agreed he testified at the preliminary
hearing, but did not recall his testimony there. At that hearing, Michael stated he did not
see Appellant with a knife, whereas, during trial Michael said he saw Appellant put the
knife in his pocket. (Trial Tr. 147-148.)
{¶19} Christine also testified at trial. She recounted being woken up by Appellant
entering the home at approximately 4:30 a.m. She was sleeping on the downstairs couch
at the time. She said Appellant was noisy and agitated. Christine woke up a second time
to a commotion. She heard the brothers arguing about “who started it” and remembers
Appellant going back upstairs to retrieve his cell phone before going outside. She locked
the door because she was afraid. (Trial Tr. 156-161.)
{¶20} Deputy Ben Chaney testified he was at the scene of the incident. He said
Appellant smelled of alcohol. Chaney performed the pat down search of Appellant and
said he had no weapons and no visible wounds. Appellant denied cutting and stabbing
his brother. (Trial Tr. 192.)
{¶21} Detective Sergeant Knight of the Harrison County Sheriff’s Office also
testified. He took photos of Appellant’s hands after Appellant was in handcuffs. Appellant
had blood on one of his index fingers. The photo was introduced at trial. Appellant told
Knight that Charles cut himself with his own knife. (Trial Tr. 207-221.)
{¶22} Two witnesses testified for the defense. Appellant’s childhood friend Mary
Withrow testified that she has known him since he was 14 years old. She said Appellant
lived with her and her husband in Maryland for about 18 months without incident. She
denied asking Appellant to leave her home. (Trial Tr. 293.)
{¶23} Mary said she “did not know” Appellant to carry a box cutter. She said he
was left-handed. Mary also knew Appellant’s brother Charles. She said Appellant is
honest, but Charles does not have a reputation for being honest. She has known both
since they were all teenagers. (Trial Tr. 296-297.)
Case No. 24 HA 0002
–6–
{¶24} Appellant testified on his own behalf. He moved to Ohio in 2023 to get away
from a “bad situation,” which he described as a relative’s home with drugs and guns.
Appellant moved in with his brother Charles, their stepfather Michael, Michael’s fiancé,
and their son.
{¶25} Appellant said he was employed, paying rent, and had loaned his brother
Charles money. Charles wanted Appellant to share a room with him so they could watch
television together. Appellant had an alarm set to wake up Charles at 5 a.m. because
Charles had a hard time hearing alarms.
{¶26} According to Appellant, Charles was unemployed when he first moved in
and repeatedly asked Appellant for money. Charles threatened to “mess up” Appellant’s
probation if he did not comply with Charles’ requests. Appellant worked afternoon shift,
and explained how he would delay going home to avoid being interrogated by Charles.
{¶27} The week of the altercation, Appellant had decided to relocate to Buffalo.
He had already told Charles he was moving, and his things were packed. Appellant said
Charles was very upset he was leaving. (Trial Tr. 331-333.)
{¶28} On the morning of the altercation, Appellant woke up Charles. Charles
wanted Appellant to drink a shot of liquor with him, so he did. When Appellant refused to
take a second drink, Charles became agitated saying Appellant thought he was “better
than” him. According to Appellant, Charles initiated the fight by hitting him while Appellant
was in a chair in the bedroom. Appellant got up to leave the bedroom and the situation,
and he said he was backing up when Charles slapped Appellant, knocking his hat and
glasses off.
{¶29} Appellant said Charles was the aggressor and had a knife. Appellant was
backing away from Charles, leaving the shared bedroom, and attempting to go to his own
room. Appellant admits to pushing Charles and “pinning his arm” against him. Appellant
was holding Charles against totes or bins that were stacked in the hallway. Appellant
denies having a knife or cutting his brother. Appellant thinks Charles cut himself when
Appellant was pushing his arm away and when Charles was still swinging at Appellant
with the knife. (Trial Tr. 334-346.)
{¶30} Appellant recalled seeing blood on Charles, so he called for Mike and
Christine. He said Mike came out of his room with a gun and was threatening to shoot
Case No. 24 HA 0002
–7–
Appellant. So Appellant went outside and called 911. Appellant waited for the police and
paramedics to arrive. Appellant said if he had done something wrong, he would not have
stayed. (Trial Tr. 346-348.)
{¶31} Defense counsel argued in his closing argument that Charles was not a
credible witness. Counsel urged the jury to consider how Charles had changed “his story”
and how Charles could be heard in body camera footage telling officers that Appellant
punched himself in the face. Defense counsel also argued that Appellant should be found
not guilty since Charles cut himself when Appellant pushed on his knife-wielding arm
while Charles was swinging it at Appellant. (Trial Tr. 400-409.)
{¶32} The jury returned its verdict and found Appellant not guilty of count one and
two, the two felonious assault charges, but found him guilty of the domestic violence
charge in violation of R.C. 2919.25(A). (March 15, 2024 Judgment.)
{¶33} Appellant was later sentenced to 180 days local incarceration with 364 days
of jail-time credit. The court also directed him to sign a no contact order and ordered
Appellant was banned from possessing a firearm or other dangerous ordnance. (March
20, 2024 Judgment.)
{¶34} Appellant raises four assignments of error.
Sufficiency and Manifest Weight of the Evidence
{¶35} We address Appellant’s first and fourth assigned errors collectively, which
assert:
“[No. 1] The trial court erred and abused its discretion when it failed to grant the
defendant’s Rule 29(A) motion for the evidence to convict him of domestic violence was
legally insufficient.”
“[No. 4] The jury’s verdict was against the weight of the evidence.”
{¶36} Whether evidence is legally sufficient to sustain a verdict is a question of
law, which appellate courts review de novo. State v. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380
(1997); In re J.V.,
2012-Ohio-4961, ¶ 3. A challenge on sufficiency grounds involves the
state's burden of production rather than its burden of persuasion.
Thompkins, supra, at
549 (Cook, J., concurring).
{¶37} On appeal, we determine whether the evidence presented, viewed in a light
most favorable to the prosecution, allows a rational trier of fact to find the essential
Case No. 24 HA 0002
–8–
elements of the crime established beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Dent, 2020-Ohio-
6670, ¶ 15. We must view the evidence and all reasonable inferences in favor of the
state. State v. Goff, 1998-Ohio-369 (1998).
{¶38} On the other hand, a manifest weight review requires us to review the
evidence and determine whether this is an exceptional case in which it is patently
apparent that the jury lost its way. State v. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380, 389 (1997).
The reversal of a jury's verdict on manifest weight grounds requires a unanimous
concurrence of all three judges.
Id.
The . . . weight of the evidence addresses the evidence's effect of inducing
belief. . . . In other words, a reviewing court asks whose evidence is more
persuasive—the state's or the defendant's? . . . [A]lthough there may be
sufficient evidence to support a judgment, it could nevertheless be against
the manifest weight of the evidence. . . . ‘When a court of appeals reverses
a judgment of a trial court on the basis that the verdict is against the weight
of the evidence, the appellate court sits as a “thirteenth juror” and disagrees
with the factfinder's resolution of the conflicting testimony.’
State v. Wilson, 2007-Ohio-2202, ¶ 25.
{¶39} “[T]he weight to be given the evidence and the credibility of the witnesses
are primarily for the trier of the facts.” State v. DeHass, 10 Ohio St.2d 230 (1967),
paragraph one of the syllabus. “A jury is free to believe all, some, or none of the testimony
of each witness appearing before it.” State v. Ellis,
2013-Ohio-1184, ¶ 18 (8th Dist.),
citing Iler v. Wright,
2002-Ohio-4279, ¶ 25 (8th Dist.).
{¶40} As stated, Appellant was convicted of domestic violence in violation of R.C.
2919.25(A), which states: “No person shall knowingly cause or attempt to cause physical
harm to a family or household member.”
{¶41} Appellant urges us to conclude that his conviction is not supported by
sufficient evidence since the knife was not located, there were no eyewitnesses to the
altercation, and since Appellant did not flee the scene but stayed and called 911. We
disagree.
{¶42} Although there were two differing versions of the fight, there was more than
sufficient evidence showing Appellant knowingly caused physical harm to his brother.
Case No. 24 HA 0002
–9–
Charles testified Appellant was the aggressor and Appellant punched him first. Charles
also described how Appellant cut him in the abdomen several times during the exchange.
It is undisputed the brothers lived together at the time. Thus, upon viewing the evidence
presented in a light most favorable to the prosecution, we find that a rational trier of fact
could find the essential elements of the crime established beyond a reasonable doubt.
Accordingly, Appellant’s first assigned error lacks merit.
{¶43} As for Appellant’s manifest weight of the evidence argument, we conclude
this is not an exceptional case and do not disagree with the jury’s resolution of the
evidence. As stated, both men testified and gave competing views of the fight. Appellant
said Charles was the aggressor and he inadvertently cut himself with the knife he was
yielding. Meanwhile, Charles described Appellant as the aggressor and stated Appellant
sliced open his abdomen.
{¶44} It appears the jury evidently believed Appellant’s version of the fight, at least
to some extent, since it found him not guilty of the two felonious assault charges.
Notwithstanding, it found Appellant guilty of domestic violence. We do not disagree with
the jury’s conclusion. Although there were varying versions of the altercation, the jury
was in the best position to view the evidence and assess credibility based on aspects of
testimony not readily captured by a record on appeal. Seasons Coal Co. v. City of
Cleveland, 10 Ohio St.3d 77, 80 (1984) (appellate courts must defer to factfinder’s
credibility determinations because the jurors can best view and determine witness
believability based on body language, eye contact, and voice inflections).
{¶45} Based on this record, we do not find the jury lost its way. Accordingly,
Appellant’s fourth assigned error is overruled.
Self Defense Arguments
{¶46} Appellant’s second assignment of error asserts:
“[2.] The trial court committed reversible error and abused its discretion when it
failed to instruct the jury on self-defense, after trial counsel requested the same and the
evidence supported such an instruction.”
{¶47} Appellant contends the jury should have been given the burden-shifting self-defense instruction because Appellant presented evidence that he used reasonable and
proportional force to defend himself. Appellant testified he was attacked by his brother
Case No. 24 HA 0002
– 10 –
and Charles caused the physical altercation during which Charles was stabbed or
slashed. Although Appellant was not certain how Charles was cut, Appellant denies
cutting him or having control or possession of the utility knife that day. Thus, Appellant
claims that both jury instructions should have been given (deadly force as well as nondeadly force) since it is unclear whether the force used in this case was deadly or not.
{¶48} We review a trial court's refusal to give a requested jury instruction under
the abuse of discretion standard. State v. Adams, 2015-Ohio-3954, ¶ 240.
{¶49} R.C. 2901.05(B)(1) states in part:
A person is allowed to act in self-defense. . . If, at the trial of a person who
is accused of an offense that involved the person's use of force against
another, there is evidence presented that tends to support that the accused
person used the force in self-defense, . . . the prosecution must prove
beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused person did not use the force
in self-defense, defense of another, or defense of that person's residence,
as the case may be.
{¶50} The trial court denied Appellant’s request for the self-defense instruction
since it was not sought 30 days before trial in compliance with Crim.R. 12.2, which states
in part:
Whenever a defendant in a criminal case proposes to offer evidence or
argue self-defense, . . . the defendant shall, not less than thirty days before
trial in a felony case . . ., give notice in writing of such intent. The notice
shall include specific information as to any prior incidents or circumstances
upon which defendant intends to offer evidence related to conduct of the
alleged victim, and the names and addresses of any witnesses defendant
may call at trial to offer testimony related to the defense. If the defendant
fails to file such written notice, the court may exclude evidence offered by
the defendant related to the defense, unless the court determines that in the
interest of justice such evidence should be admitted.
(Emphasis added.) The notice requirement in Crim. R. 12.2 was a response to the
change in the law that shifted the burden of production to the prosecution to establish a
defendant did not act in self-defense. 2022 Staff Notes to Crim. R. 12.2.
Case No. 24 HA 0002
– 11 –
{¶51} Defense counsel conceded he did not file the requisite notice in Appellant’s
case, indicating he deemed it unnecessary because this was not the typical case of self-defense. The defense changed its position mid-trial. The issue of self-defense was
discussed out of the jury’s presence and after the close of evidence and the denial of the
defense’s renewed motion for an acquittal. Defense counsel explained why he chose not
to file a Crim.R. 12.2 notice, stating:
Your Honor, to be clear on this matter, the court’s correct I did not file a
notice of self-defense. To me, the way I was trained, self-defense is when
you are admitting to essentially that the State is correct that yes, I used a
gun or I used a knife, and then you’re saying I was legally justified doing so
because of these circumstances.
...
In this case, the defense is saying the alleged victim had the knife and was
swinging it. . . . the gist of it is that the victim was swinging at me and I
shoved him and that caused [the victim to stab himself.]
(Trial Tr. 389-389.)
{¶52} The trial court permitted Appellant to fully develop the evidence and allowed
defense counsel to argue in closing remarks that Appellant should be found not guilty if it
finds that Charles cut himself. However, the court did not permit the jury instruction;
consequently, the burden of proof was not shifted to the prosecution.
{¶53} Because Crim.R. 12.2 uses the word “shall,” the notice is mandatory and
since the requisite notice was not given here, we find no error based on the court’s
application of the rule. However, despite Appellant’s failure to provide the 30-day notice,
the court allowed the evidence, which Appellant contends shows he was acting in defense
of himself. Crim.R. 12.2 states the court may exclude evidence about a defendant’s
claimed self-defense; it does not address the corresponding jury instruction.
{¶54} The evidence here was already before the jury when the defense requested
the instruction. The trial court was not capable of excluding evidence already presented
and heard by the jury. We decline to find the trial court abused its discretion. This
assignment of error lacks merit.
{¶55} Appellant’s third assignment of error contends:
Case No. 24 HA 0002
– 12 –
“[3.] Trial counsel was ineffective for his failure to file a notice of self-defense as
required under Criminal Rule 12.2, and Appellant suffered prejudice, per se, as a result.”
“When considering an allegation of ineffective assistance of counsel, a twostep process is usually employed. First, there must be a determination as
to whether there has been a substantial violation of any of defense counsel's
essential duties to his client. Next, and analytically separate from the
question of whether the defendant's Sixth Amendment rights were violated,
there must be a determination as to whether the defense was prejudiced by
counsel's ineffectiveness.”
State v. Bradley, 42 Ohio St.3d 136, 141-42, (1989), quoting State v. Lytle (1976),
48
Ohio St.2d 391, 396-397, vacated in part on other grounds (1978),
438 U.S. 910.
“An error by counsel, even if professionally unreasonable, does not warrant
setting aside the judgment of a criminal proceeding if the error had no effect
on the judgment. Cf. United States v. Morrison, 449 U.S. 361, 364-365 [
101
S.Ct. 665, 667–68,
66 L.Ed.2d 564] (1981).” Strickland, supra, 466 U.S. at
691, 104 S.Ct. at 2066. To warrant reversal, “[t]he defendant must show
that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional
errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. A reasonable
probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the
outcome.” Strickland, supra, at 694, 104 S.Ct. at 2068.
State v. Bradley, supra, at 142.
{¶56} Appellant claims his trial counsel’s failure to file the Crim.R. 12.2 notice was
an error and resulted in substantial prejudice, i.e., his domestic violence conviction. We
disagree.
{¶57} Appellant was convicted of domestic violence in violation of R.C.
2919.25(A), which states: “No person shall knowingly cause or attempt to cause physical
harm to a family or household member.”
{¶58} Neither the state nor the defense detailed what conduct corresponded with
which count in the indictment during or before trial.
{¶59} As detailed previously, Appellant testified Charles was the aggressor and
Charles hit and slapped him first, forcing Appellant to defend himself. Appellant testified
Case No. 24 HA 0002
– 13 –
he defended himself—he acknowledged pushing Charles and pinning down his arm in an
effort to defend himself and get away. Appellant testified he does not know exactly how
Charles sustained his injuries. Appellant denied cutting his brother. Appellant likewise
denied having possession or control over the utility knife.
{¶60} Nevertheless, Appellant surmised that Charles may have cut himself with
the knife Charles was holding when Appellant was pushing Charles away and/or pinning
him down. Appellant acknowledged this was possible, and the jury evidently believed
him in light of its decision finding him not guilty of the two felonious assault charges.
{¶61} Charles, however, described Appellant as the aggressor. He said Appellant
punched him first, so Charles punched him back. This occurred before the struggle, which
resulted in Charles sustaining stab wounds.
{¶62} As emphasized by the state, Appellant was acquitted of the two felonious
assault charges corresponding with Charles’ stab wounds such that the jury evidently
believed Charles caused these injuries to himself. Thus, regardless of counsel’s potential
failure to secure the burden-shifting self-defense instruction, Appellant was acquitted of
the two charges corresponding with the stab wounds and Appellant’s testimony about the
struggle.
{¶63} As for the domestic violence charge, Charles testified Appellant punched
him first and Appellant was the aggressor. To the contrary, Appellant testified that
Charles was the aggressor, and Charles hit and slapped him first. This initial conduct,
whichever version believed, immediately preceded the struggle which caused Charles’
stab wounds.
{¶64} Because the jury could have based the domestic violence verdict on
Charles’ testimony that Appellant punched Charles before the two struggled; before
Charles was stabbed; and before Appellant’s claim of self-defense was applicable, we do
not find there is a reasonable probability the result of the proceedings would have been
different.
{¶65} Based on the foregoing, we decline to find that counsel’s error, if any,
resulted in prejudice. State v. Bradley, 42 Ohio St.3d 136, 145 (1989) (Absent a showing
of prejudice, it is unnecessary to consider whether counsel's actions were deficient).
Appellant’s third assignment of error lacks merit.
Case No. 24 HA 0002
– 14 –
Conclusion
{¶66} Each of Appellant’s assignments of error lacks merit, and as such, we affirm
the trial court’s judgment.
Waite, J., concurs.
Dickey, J., concurs.
Case No. 24 HA 0002
[Cite as State v. Taylor, 2024-Ohio-5331.]
For the reasons stated in the Opinion rendered herein, the assignments of error
are overruled and it is the final judgment and order of this Court that the judgment of the
Court of Common Pleas of Harrison County, Ohio, is affirmed. Costs waived.
A certified copy of this opinion and judgment entry shall constitute the mandate in
this case pursuant to Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure. It is ordered that a
certified copy be sent by the clerk to the trial court to carry this judgment into execution.
NOTICE TO COUNSEL
This document constitutes a final judgment entry.
