[Cite as State v. Hinkle,
2024-Ohio-5499.]
COURT OF APPEALS
MUSKINGUM COUNTY, OHIO
FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
STATE OF OHIO : JUDGES:
: Hon. Patricia A. Delaney, P.J.
Plaintiff-Appellee : Hon. Craig R. Baldwin, J.
: Hon. Andrew J. King, J.
-vs- :
:
TREVOR J. HINKLE : Case No. CT2024-0079
:
Defendant-Appellant : OPINION
CHARACTER OF PROCEEDING: Appeal from the Court of Common
Pleas, Case Nos. CR2021-0255 &
CR2021-0257
JUDGMENT: Affirmed
DATE OF JUDGMENT: November 20, 2024
APPEARANCES:
For Plaintiff-Appellee For Defendant-Appellant
JOSEPH A. PALMER TREVOR J. HINKLE, PRO SE
27 North Fifth Street #799-097
Zanesville, OH 43702 Belmont Correctional Institution
P.O. Box 540
St. Clairsville, OH 43950
Muskingum County, Case No. CT2024-0079 2
King, J.
{¶ 1} Defendant-Appellant Trevor Hinkle appeals the June 11, 2024 judgment of
the Muskingum County Court of Common Pleas which denied Hinkle's pro se motion to
withdraw his July 19, 2021 guilty plea. Plaintiff-Appellee is the State of Ohio. We affirm
the trial court.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
{¶ 2} This case involves two related trial court case numbers. On May 13, 2021,
the Muskingum County Grand Jury returned an indictment in case number CR2021-0257,
charging Hinkle with one count each of possession of a fentanyl-related compound with
a forfeiture specification, a felony of the fifth degree, corrupting another with drugs, a
felony of the second degree, and involuntary manslaughter, a felony of the first degree.
On May 18, 2021, in case number CR2021-0255, the Muskingum County Grand Jury
returned an indictment charging Hinkle with one count each of corrupting another with
drugs, a felony of the second degree, involuntary manslaughter, a felony of the first
degree, and trafficking in a fentanyl-related compound, a felony of the fifth degree.
{¶ 3} Following plea negotiations with the state, on July 19, 2021 Hinkle entered
guilty pleas in both cases. In case number CR2021-0255 Hinkle entered pleas of guilty to
corrupting another with drugs and involuntary manslaughter. In exchange, the State
agreed to dismiss the remaining counts of the indictment and to make no
recommendation at sentencing. In case number CR2021-0257, Hinkle entered pleas of
guilty to corrupting another with drugs and involuntary manslaughter. In exchange, the
state agreed to dismiss the remaining counts of the indictment and to make no
recommendation at sentencing. Counsel for Hinkle indicated he had reviewed the plea
Muskingum County, Case No. CT2024-0079 3
forms with Hinkle and that Hinkle had signed the forms in front of counsel indicating his
understanding of the plea agreement. Transcript of plea hearing (T.) 3-6
{¶ 4} Before accepting his pleas, the trial court engaged Hinkle in a Crim.R. 11
plea colloquy wherein Hinkle indicated he understood the rights he waived by entering
his pleas, the nature of the charges, potential defenses and penalties, understood the
plea negotiations, and was satisfied with his counsel's representation. The State then
recited the facts of the cases. In case number CR2021-0255 Hinkle provided fentanyl to
L.C., who subsequently died of an overdose. In case number CR2021-0257 Hinkle
provided fentanyl to L.W., who subsequently died of an overdose. Hinkle stipulated to the
facts as recited by the State. The trial court accepted Hinkle's pleas, ordered a
presentence investigation, and set the matter over for sentencing. Transcript of plea
hearing (T.) 6-19.
{¶ 5} Hinkle appeared for sentencing on May 2, 2022 and was sentenced to an
aggregate indefinite sentence of 8 to 12 years.
{¶ 6} Hinkle did not appeal or otherwise challenge his conviction. Instead, on May
13, 2024, more than two years after his sentencing, Hinkle filed a motion to withdraw his
guilty pleas. Hinkle claimed the postmortem toxicology reports of L.C. and L.W.
demonstrated they did not die of a fentanyl overdose because the reports indicated the
victims had ingested a mixture of drugs. He further claimed his counsel rendered
ineffective assistance by intentionally concealing this evidence and conspiring with the
State to do so. The state filed a response arguing Hinkle's motion was moot because his
arguments were barred by res judicata. The trial court denied the motion without a
hearing. Its judgment entry stated in its entirety:
Muskingum County, Case No. CT2024-0079 4
This matter comes before the Court on the defendant's motion for
withdrawal of plea of guilty. Upon review of the motion and the State
of Ohio's opposition the motion is hereby denied.
{¶ 7} Hinkle filed an appeal and the matter is now before this court for
consideration. He raises 14 assignments of error as follow:
I
{¶ 8} "THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION AND ERRED AS A
MATTER OF LAW IN DENYING THE APPELLANT’S MOTION TO WITHDRAW HIS
GUILTY PLEAS WHERE: A. THE TRIAL COURT FAILED TO PROPERLY CONSIDER
THE TOXICOLOGY REPORT AND SWORN AFFIDAVIT ATTACHED TO THE MOTION
TO WITHDRAW; B. WHEN IT CONCLUDED THAT RES JUDICATA BARRED THE
MOTION."
II
{¶ 9} "THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT ADOPTED THE STATE’S
PROPOSED FINDINGS OF FACTS AND CONCLUSION OF LAW."
III
{¶ 10} "THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE AND PLAIN ERROR BY
FAILING TO HOLD A HEARING ON HIS POST-SENTENCE MOTION TO WITHDRAW
HIS GUILTY PLEA."
IV
{¶ 11} "THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED PLAIN ERROR AND ABUSED ITS
DISCRETION BY DENYING THE APPELLANT’S MOTION FOR DISCLOSURE OF
Muskingum County, Case No. CT2024-0079 5
EXCULPATORY EVIDENCE AND REFUSING TO ORDER THE PROSECUTION TO
PROVIDE THE DEATH CERTIFICATES OF BOTH VICTIMS, IN VIOLATION OF
APPELLANT’S 4TH, 5TH, 6TH, & 14TH U.S. CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENTS AND
ARTICLE I, SEC.S 10, 14 & 16 OF THE OHIO CONSTITUTION."
V
{¶ 12} "DEFENDANT’S GUILTY PLEA WAS NOT KNOWINGLY, VOLUNTARILY,
OR INTELLIGENTLY GIVEN DUE TO TRIAL COUNSEL’S INEFFECTIVENESS WHERE
COUNSEL FAILED TO OBTAIN AND/OR DISCLOSE TO DEFENDANT, PRIOR TO
ADVISING DEFENDANT TO PLEAD GUILTY AND PRIOR TO ENTERING THE GUILTY
PLEA, THE POTENTIALLY EXCULPATORY EVIDENCE OF THE CORONER’S DEATH
CERTIFICATE REPORT PROVIDING THE CAUSE OF DEATH OF BOTH LARRY
COMPTON AND LAIKYN WISECARVER. THUS, DUE TO THE MIXTURE OF DRUGS
FOUND IN THE DECEASED TOXICOLOGY REPORT, THE CAUSE OF DEATH
CANNOT BE LEGALLY LISTED AS FENTANYL OVERDOSE."
VI
{¶ 13} "APPELLANT’S GUILTY PLEA WAS NOT KNOWINGLY, VOLUNTARILY,
OR INTELLIGENTLY GIVEN DUE TO PROSECUTOR MISCONDUCT WHERE THE
PROSECUTOR MISREPRESENTED THE FACTS AND EVIDENCE DURING THE
PLEA NEGOTIATION PROCESS, AND DURING THE PLEA AND SENTENCING
HEARING."
VII
{¶ 14} "APPELLANT’S GUILTY PLEA WAS NOT KNOWINGLY, VOLUNTARILY,
OR INTELLIGENTLY GIVEN DUE TO INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL AND
Muskingum County, Case No. CT2024-0079 6
PROSECUTOR MISCONDUCT NO BRADY VIOLATION WHERE COUNSEL
CONSPIRED WITH THE PROSECUTOR TO WITHHOLD AND PREVENT APPELLANT
FROM REVIEWING THE TOXICOLOGY REPORT AND THE CORONER DEATH
CERTIFICATE REPORT LISTING THE CAUSE OF DEATH OF LARRY COMPTON AND
LAIKYN WISECARVER, PRIOR TO ADVISING HIM TO PLEAD GUILTY, AND PRIOR
TO ENTERING THE GUILTY PLEA."
VIII
{¶ 15} "DEFENDANT’S GUILTY PLEA WAS NOT KNOWINGLY, VOLUNTARILY
OR INTELLIGENTLY GIVEN DUE TO INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL
WHERE COUNSEL FAILED TO DISCLOSE TO DEFENDANT THE TOXICOLOGY
REPORT PRIOR TO ADVISING HIM TO PLEAD GUILTY, AND PRIOR TO ENTERING
THE GUILTY PLEA.
IX
{¶ 16} "APPELLANT’S GUILTY PLEA WAS NOT KNOWINGLY, VOLUNTARILY,
OR INTELLIGENTLY GIVEN DUE TO INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL
WHERE COUNSEL FAILED TO ADEQUATELY INVESTIGATE THE FACTS OF THE
CASE, FAILED TO CONSULT OR OBTAIN EXPERT WITNESS WHO COULD HAVE
CHALLENGED THE EVIDENCE CONDUCT RESEARCH, AND ADVISE ON POSSIBLE
THEORIES OF APPLICABLE LEGAL DEFENSES TO THE CHARGES, BEFORE
ADVISING HIM TO PLEAD GUILTY, PARTICULARLY THE AVAILABLE DEFENSE OF
THE PREDICATE OFFENSE OF INVOLUNTARY MANSLAUGHTER OR CORRUPTING
ANOTHER WITH DRUGS."
X
Muskingum County, Case No. CT2024-0079 7
{¶ 17} "DEFENDANT’S GUILTY PLEA WAS NOT KNOWINGLY, VOLUNTARILY,
OR INTELLIGENTLY GIVEN DUE TO INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF TRIAL
COUNSEL WHERE COUNSEL FAILED TO ADVISE DEFENDANT OF THE NATURE
OF THE CHARGE AGAINST HIM."
XI
{¶ 18} "APPELLANT’S GUILTY PLEA WAS NOT KNOWINGLY, VOLUNTARILY,
OR INTELLIGENTLY GIVEN DUE TO INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF TRIAL
COUNSEL WHERE COUNSEL ADVISED HIM TO PLEAD GUILTY TO INVOLUNTARY
MANSLAUGHTER AND CORRUPTING ANOTHER WITH DRUGS WHEN THERE WAS
INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE THAT DEFENDANT’S ALLEGED CONDUCT OF
SUPPLYING FENTANYL WAS THE ACTUAL OR LEGAL CAUSE OF THE
DECEDENT’S DEATH."
XII
{¶ 19} "APPELLANT’S GUILTY PLEA WAS NOT KNOWINGLY, VOLUNTARILY,
OR INTELLIGENTLY GIVEN DUE TO INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL
WHERE COUNSEL PROVIDED FALSE AND INADEQUATE LEGAL ADVICE PRIOR TO
ENTERING THE GUILTY PLEA."
XIII
{¶ 20} "THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AND THEREBY DEPRIVED APPELLANT
OF DUE PROCESS OF LAW AS GUARANTEED BY THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT
TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION AND COMPARABLE PROVISIONS OF
THE OHIO CONSTITUTION BY DENYING APPELLANT’S MOTION TO WITHDRAW
HIS GUILTY PLEA AND FINDING NO MANIFEST INJUSTICE WHERE EVIDENCE WAS
Muskingum County, Case No. CT2024-0079 8
PRESENTED THAT THE STATE WITHHELD AND CONCEALED EXCULPATORY
BRADY MATERIAL."
XIV
{¶ 21} "DEFENDANT’S GUILTY PLEA WAS NOT KNOWINGLY, VOLUNTARILY,
OR INTELLIGENTLY GIVEN DUE PROSECUTOR MISCONDUCT WHERE THE
PROSECUTOR COMMITTED A BRADY VIOLATION BY INTENTIONALLY
CONCEALED EVIDENCE OF THE DEATH CERTIFICATES OF BOTH VICTIMS THAT
WILL PROVE THAT THE DEATH OF DECEDENTS WAS NOT DUE TO FENTANYL,
THEREBY PROVIDING EVIDENCE OF DEFENDANT’S INNOCENCE."
I, II, III, IV, XIII
{¶ 22} Hinkle's assignments of error are repetitive. For ease of discussion we will
address assignments together as well as out of order. We first address Hinkle's
complaints directed at the trial court, specifically assignments of error one through four
and thirteen.
{¶ 23} In these assignments of error, Hinkle argues the trial court erred or abused
its discretion when it 1.) denied his motion to withdraw his guilty pleas without a hearing;
2.) adopted the State's proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law; 3.) denied his
motion for disclosure of exculpatory evidence by refusing to order the State to provide
death certificates of both victims; 4.) concluded Hinkle's motion was barred by res
judicata, and 5.) denied his motion to withdraw his pleas where evidence was presented
to demonstrate the State committed a Brady violation.
Applicable Law
Muskingum County, Case No. CT2024-0079 9
Guilty Pleas Generally
{¶ 24} The entry of a guilty plea is a grave decision by an accused to dispense with
a trial and allow the state to obtain a conviction without following the otherwise difficult
process of proving his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. See Machibroda v. United States,
368 U.S. 487 (1962). A plea of guilty constitutes a complete admission of guilt. Crim.R.
11(B)(1). "By entering a plea of guilty, the accused is not simply stating that he did the
discreet acts described in the indictment; he is admitting guilt of a substantive crime."
United States v. Broce,
488 U.S. 563, 570 (1989).
{¶ 25} Guilty pleas must be made knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily. Crim.R.
11. Literal compliance with Crim. R. 11 is preferred, however, the trial court need only
"substantially comply" with the rule when dealing with the non-constitutional elements of
Crim.R. 11(C). State v. Ballard, 66 Ohio St.2d 473, 475 (1981), citing State v. Stewart,
51
Ohio St.2d 86 (1977). In State v. Griggs,
2004-Ohio-4415, the Ohio Supreme Court noted
the following test for determining substantial compliance with Crim.R. 11:
The right to be informed that a guilty plea is a complete admission of
guilt is nonconstitutional and therefore is subject to review under a
standard of substantial compliance. State v. Nero, 56 Ohio St.3d at
107, 564 N.E.2d 474. Though failure to adequately inform a
defendant of his constitutional rights would invalidate a guilty plea
under a presumption that it was entered involuntarily and
unknowingly, failure to comply with nonconstitutional rights will not
invalidate a plea unless the defendant thereby suffered prejudice. Id.
Muskingum County, Case No. CT2024-0079 10
at 108, 564 N.E.2d 474. The test for prejudice is "whether the plea
would have otherwise been made." Id. Under the substantial-
compliance standard, we review the totality of circumstances
surrounding Griggs's plea and determine whether he subjectively
understood that a guilty plea is a complete admission of guilt. Id.
{¶ 26} Griggs at ¶ 12.
Withdrawal of a Guilty Plea
{¶ 27} Crim.R. 32.1 governs the withdrawal of a guilty or no-contest plea. The rule
states:
A motion to withdraw a plea of guilty or no-contest may be made only
before sentence is imposed; but to correct manifest injustice the
court after sentence may set aside the judgment of conviction and
permit the defendant to withdraw his or her plea.
{¶ 28} A defendant seeking to withdraw a post-sentence plea "bears the burden of
establishing manifest injustice based on specific facts contained in the record or supplied
through affidavits attached to the motion." State v. Walsh, 2015-Ohio-4135, ¶16 (5th
Dist.), citing State v. Graham,
2013-Ohio-600 (5th Dist.). "A 'manifest injustice'
comprehends a fundamental flaw in the path of justice so extraordinary that the defendant
could not have sought redress from the resulting prejudice through another form of
application reasonably available to him or her." State v. Hartzell,
1999 WL 957746, *2 (2d
Muskingum County, Case No. CT2024-0079 11
Dist. Aug. 20, 1999). Under the manifest injustice standard, a post-sentence motion to
withdrawal is allowable only in extraordinary cases. State v. Aleshire,
2010-Ohio-2566,
¶60 (5th Dist.), citing State v. Smith,
49 Ohio St.2d 261 (1977).
{¶ 29} Hinkle's request to withdraw his plea was made more than two years after
he was sentenced. He was therefore required to demonstrate a manifest injustice. State
v. Smith, 49 Ohio St.2d 261 (1977), paragraph one of the syllabus; State v. Aleshire,
2010-Ohio-2566, ¶ 60 (5th Dist.).
{¶ 30} A defendant must support the allegations made in a motion to withdraw a
plea with affidavits and/or the record. State v. Hutchinson, 2018-Ohio-200,
104 N.E.3d
91, ¶43 (5th Dist.). A defendant is "not entitled to a hearing where he or she failed to
provide evidentiary-quality materials raising sufficient operative facts which would entitle
the defendant to the requested relief."
Id. A defendant must present evidence which
meets a minimum level of cogency to support his or her motion.
Id. Moreover, self-serving
affidavits are generally insufficient to demonstrate manifest injustice. State v. Passafiume,
2018-Ohio-1083, ¶ 26 (8th Dist.). A record which reflects compliance with CrimR. 11 has
more probative value than appellant's self-serving affidavit provided to demonstrate a
manifest injustice because of the presumption that appellant knowingly, intentionally, and
voluntarily entered his guilty pleas.
Id.
Res Judicata as Applied to Crim.R. 32.1 Motions
{¶ 31} The failure to appeal a judgment of conviction bars as res judicata any
subsequent attempt to litigate issues that could have been raised in a direct appeal. State
v. Dick, 2000-Ohio-1685 (3d Dist.), citing State v. Harmon,
103 Ohio App.3d 595, 598,
(1st Dist. 1995.)
Muskingum County, Case No. CT2024-0079 12
{¶ 32} In State v. Ketterer, 2010-Ohio-3831, appellant Ketterer appealed the
denial of his motion to withdraw his guilty pleas which was based on issues raised after
his direct appeal. The Supreme Court of Ohio noted res judicata may apply to a motion
to withdraw a guilty plea:
Res judicata bars the assertion of claims against a valid, final
judgment of conviction that have been raised or could have been
raised on appeal. State v. Perry (1967), 10 Ohio St.2d 175,
39
O.O.2d 189,
226 N.E.2d 104, paragraph nine of the syllabus. Ohio
courts of appeals have applied res judicata to bar the assertion of
claims in a motion to withdraw a guilty plea that were or could have
been raised at trial or on appeal. See State v. McGee, 8th Dist.
Cuyahoga No. 91638, 2009-Ohio-3374, ¶ 9; State v. Totten, 10th
Dist. Franklin No. 05AP–278 and 05AP-508, 2005-Ohio-6210, ¶ 7.
{¶ 33} Ketterer ¶ 59, emphasis added. The Court went on to conclude:
In Ketterer's first appeal, this court considered most of the claims that
Ketterer raised on remand as a basis to withdraw his guilty pleas. We
found that Ketterer was adequately informed of his rights before
pleading guilty; that his plea was knowingly, voluntarily, and
intelligently made; and that his counsel was not ineffective in
providing him advice on his guilty pleas. State v. Ketterer, 111 Ohio
Muskingum County, Case No. CT2024-0079 13
St.3d 70, 2006-Ohio-5283,
855 N.E.2d 48, ¶ 13-14, 75-79, and 80-
90. Thus, res judicata was a valid basis for rejecting these claims.
{¶ 34} Id. ¶ 60.
Hinkle's Arguments
{¶ 35} Turning to Hinkle's arguments, we first note that upon our review of the
transcript of the change-of-plea hearing, the trial court properly complied with the
requirements of Crim.R. 11, and Hinkle does not argue otherwise. Instead, Hinkle's
motion to withdraw his guilty pleas centered on the toxicology reports for the victims which
were provided to Hinkle's trial counsel in discovery. Hinkle attached the reports to his
motion to withdraw his plea along with his own self-serving affidavit. He speculated that
the toxicology reports proved the victims did not die of a fentanyl overdose because the
reports indicate the victims had ingested other drugs in addition to fentanyl.
{¶ 36} First, we have reviewed the the reports and find they do not support Hinkle's
contention. They contain no opinion as to cause of death. Further, there are no death
certificates contained in the record nor attached to Hinkle's motion to withdraw his pleas.
While Hinkle claims the state withheld the death certificates, and his counsel failed to
provide him with the toxicology reports, the record is devoid of any evidence to support
either contention. Hinkle supports his claims with only his own self-serving affidavit.
Second, any defects in discovery or representation are matters that could have been
Muskingum County, Case No. CT2024-0079 14
raised in a direct appeal but were not and are therefore barred by res judicata. The trial
court therefore properly denied Hinkle's motion without a hearing.
{¶ 37} Hinkle also faults the trial court for failing to review the toxicology reports
and his affidavit, and adopting the state's findings of fact and conclusions of law. However,
the trial court's judgment entry indicates it reviewed Hinkle's motion and Hinkle points to
no evidence to the contrary. The judgment entry also does not indicate it adopted the
state's findings of fact and conclusions of law. In fact, the record is devoid of any evidence
that the state ever submitted the same.
{¶ 38} Hinkle further faults the trial court for denying his June 13, 2024 public
records request for the death certificates of each victim. We note the trial court never
ruled on this motion. Generally, when a trial court fails to rule on a motion, we presume it
denied the motion. State v. Barcus, 2015-Ohio-2255, ¶ 23 (5th Dist.) In this matter,
however, we note Hinkle filed his notice of appeal 11 business days after he filed his
motion for the death certificates and without obtaining a ruling on his motion. "With few
exceptions, a trial court loses jurisdiction over a case once a notice of appeal is filed."
Middleton v. Luna's Restaurant & Deli, L.L.C.,
2012-Ohio-348, ¶11 (5th Dist.).
{¶ 39} In summary, Hinkle's belief that there was a potential challenge to the
state's evidence does not invalidate his plea. See, e.g., State v. Piacella, 27 Ohio St.2d
92, 94 (1971), quoting Brady v. United States,
397 U.S. 742, 757 (1970) (A plea is not
invalidated by a defendant's failure to "correctly assess every relevant factor" or "because
he discovers long after the plea has been accepted that his calculus misapprehended the
quality of the State's case[.]"); State v. Graham,
2024-Ohio-1300, ¶27 (6th Dist.). The
challenges raised by Hinkle were either barred by res judicata or without merit and the
Muskingum County, Case No. CT2024-0079 15
trial court was not required to hold a hearing on the motion. Accordingly, the first, second,
third, fourth and thirteenth assignments of error are overruled.
V, VIII, IX, X, XI, XII
{¶ 40} In his fifth, eighth, ninth, tenth, eleventh, and twelfth assignments of error,
Hinkle alleges he was denied effective assistance of trial counsel. We disagree.
Applicable Law
{¶ 41} To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must
demonstrate: (1) deficient performance by counsel, i.e., that counsel's performance fell
below an objective standard of reasonable representation, and (2) that counsel's errors
prejudiced the defendant, i.e., a reasonable probability that but for counsel's errors, the
result of the trial or proceeding would have been different. Strickland v. Washington, 466
U.S. 668, 687–688 (1984); State v. Bradley,
42 Ohio St.3d 136 (1989), paragraphs two
and three of the syllabus. "Reasonable probability" is "probability sufficient to undermine
confidence in the outcome."
Strickland at 694.
Hinkle's Arguments
{¶ 42} Hinkle alleges trial counsel failed to: 1.) show him the toxicology reports and
death certificates; 2.) adequately investigate the case and possible defenses before
advising Hinkle to plead; 3.) inform him of the elements of the offenses of involuntary
manslaughter and corrupting another with drugs; 4.) advise him that the state had
insufficient evidence to convict him.
{¶ 43} As noted above, the issue of trial counsel's alleged failures could have been
raised on direct appeal. A criminal defendant cannot raise any issue in a post-sentence
Muskingum County, Case No. CT2024-0079 16
motion to withdraw a guilty plea that was or could have been raised at trial or on direct
appeal. State v. Brown, 167 Ohio App.3d 239, ¶7 (10th Dist.). Moreover, as also noted
above, Hinkle has failed to support his allegations of ineffective assistance of trial counsel
with evidentiary-quality materials.
{¶ 44} Accordingly, Hinkle's fifth, eighth, ninth, tenth, eleventh, and twelfth
assignments of error are overruled.
VI, XIII
{¶ 45} In his sixth and fourteenth assignments of error, Hinkle alleges prosecutorial
misconduct. He alleges the prosecutor 1.) misrepresented the facts and evidence during
the plea negotiation process and plea; 2.) committed a Brady violation by withholding the
death certificates; and 3.) lead him to believe that if he testified against his co-defendants
he would receive a reduced sentence.
{¶ 46} Again, Hinkle fails to support his allegations with evidentiary-quality
materials, the record does not support his allegations, and his complaints are barred.
Moreover, during the trial court's Crim.R. 11 plea colloquy Hinkle stated he had not been
promised anything other than the state's agreement to dismiss certain charges and to
make no recommendation during sentencing and stipulated to the facts of the underlying
offenses as recited by the state on the record. (T.) 11-19.
{¶ 47} Hinkle's Brady argument is also without merit. There is nothing in the record
to support a finding that the death certificates are exculpatory or that they were not
provided in discovery. Hinkle extrapolates his theory that they are exculpatory from the
toxicology reports alone which as discussed previously, provide no such conclusion.
{¶ 48} The sixth and fourteenth assignments of error are overruled.
Muskingum County, Case No. CT2024-0079 17
VII
{¶ 49} Hinkle's remaining assignment of error alleges both prosecutorial
misconduct and ineffective assistance of counsel. In this assignment of error, he rehashes
his previous complaints against the state and trial counsel, but claims his trial counsel
"conspired with the prosecutor to conceal, withhold and prevent Appellant from reviewing
the Toxicology report and the Coroner's Death Certificate Report listing the cause of death
of [L.C.] and [L.W.], prior to counsel advising him to plead guilty, and prior to pleading
guilty." Brief of appellant at 13.
{¶ 50} Upon review, we find no evidence in the record, nor has Hinkle provided
any evidence, to support a conclusion that the state and Hinkle's counsel were joined in
a conspiracy to withhold or conceal any evidence from Hinkle.
{¶ 51} Hinkle's seventh assignment of error is overruled
Conclusion
{¶ 52} We are unpersuaded the trial court abused its discretion in declining to find
a manifest injustice warranting the extraordinary step of withdrawing appellant's guilty
pleas. We therefore affirm the trial court's decision overruling Hinkle's motion to withdraw
his guilty pleas.
{¶ 53} The judgment of the Muskingum County Court of Common Pleas is
affirmed.
By King, J.,
Delaney, P.J. and
Baldwin, J. concur.
