State v. Fleckinger

[Cite as State v. Fleckinger, 

.]




                   IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
               FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT OF OHIO
                   HAMILTON COUNTY, OHIO


 STATE OF OHIO,                                  :   APPEAL NO.   C-240253
                                                     TRIAL NO.    B-2304839
       Plaintiff-Appellee,                       :

    vs.                                          :

 JENNIFER FLECKINGER,                            :        OPINION

       Defendant-Appellant.                      :



Criminal Appeal From: Hamilton County Court of Common Pleas

Judgment Appealed From Is: Affirmed

Date of Judgment Entry on Appeal: December 4, 2024



Melissa A. Powers, Hamilton County Prosecuting Attorney, and Sean M. Donovan,
Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for Plaintiff-Appellee,

Schuh & Goldberg, LLP, and Brian T. Goldberg, for Defendant-Appellant.
                 OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS


WINKLER, Judge.

        {¶1}   Defendant-appellant Jennifer Fleckinger appeals her conviction for

possession of cocaine under R.C. 2925.11(A). In her sole assignment of error, she

contends that the trial court erred in denying her motion to suppress evidence found

in her car following a traffic stop. We find no merit in this assignment of error, and

we affirm her conviction.

        {¶2} The record shows that on September 28, 2023, Agent Andrew Cadell of

the Hamilton County Sheriff’s Office was assigned to the Regional Enforcement

Narcotics Unit. On that afternoon, he was in a marked cruiser conducting “highway

interdiction” along I-75 southbound when he saw a vehicle with extremely tinted front

windows and windshield. The tint was heavy enough that he could not tell whether

the driver of the vehicle was male or female.

        {¶3} When Agent Cadell first noticed the vehicle, he was behind it, and he

believed that the driver changed his or her behavior upon seeing his cruiser. He

positioned his cruiser in front of the vehicle, but not in the same lane, and slowed down

to let the vehicle pass him so that he could initiate a traffic stop. The vehicle would

not pass him. Eventually, when he slowed down to less than 40 m.p.h. in a 65-m.p.h.

zone, the vehicle passed him and he conducted the stop. He noticed that the vehicle’s

front windows were up while it was in motion, but after the stop, they were rolled

down.

        {¶4} Agent Cadell identified Fleckinger as the driver. He informed her that

she was pulled over because “the window tint is extremely dark” and that she was

driving at a slow speed. She told him that the vehicle belonged to a friend and that she

had picked it up for him. When Agent Cadell asked her for her driver’s license, she

produced it and informed him that it was under suspension.


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                OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS


       {¶5} Agent Cadell asked his partner to test the tint level.        His partner

reported back that it was 96 percent, which was consistent with Agent Cadell’s

observations, although he did not know which window his partner had tested. He then

filled out a uniform traffic citation charging Fleckinger with excessive window tint

under R.C. 4513.241. During the course of the stop, the officers found that Fleckinger

possessed a small amount of cocaine.

       {¶6} After the trial court denied her motion to suppress, Fleckinger entered

a plea of no contest to one count of possession of cocaine. She was sentenced to one

year of community control. This appeal followed.

       {¶7}   In her sole assignment of error, Fleckinger contends that the trial court

erred in denying her motion to suppress. She argues that the police officers lacked

probable cause to stop her vehicle. This assignment of error is not well taken.

       {¶8} Appellate review of a motion to suppress presents a mixed question of

law and fact. We must accept the trial court’s findings of fact as true if competent,

credible evidence supports them. But we must independently determine whether the

facts satisfy the applicable legal standard. State v. Burnside, 

, ¶ 8;

State v. Houston, 

 (1st Dist.).

       {¶9} An investigative stop is a seizure within the meaning of the Fourth

Amendment that must be supported by objective justification. State v. Andrews, 

 (1991); 

. The standard is not probable cause but

reasonable suspicion. 

; State v. Erkins, 

 (1st

Dist.). The police officers must point to specific and articulable facts that, taken

together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant that intrusion.

, quoting Terry v. Ohio, 

 (1968). The standard is objective:

would the facts available to the officers at the moment of the seizure have warranted


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                OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS


an individual of reasonable caution in the belief that the action taken was appropriate?

; 

.

       {¶10} Specifically, in relation to automobiles, if there is a reasonable and

articulable suspicion that an automobile or its occupants are subject to seizure for a

violation of the law, stopping that automobile and detaining its occupants are

reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. Delaware v. Prouse, 

(1979); 

. A court determines the validity of an investigative stop by

looking at the totality of the circumstances. State v. Freeman, 

(1980), paragraph one of the syllabus; 

.

       {¶11} Reasonable suspicion is an elusive concept, and “[p]recisely defining

reasonable suspicion is not possible.” It is not readily reduced to a “neat set of legal

rules.” State v. Hawkins, 

, quoting Ornelas v. United States, 

 (1996); State v. Fisher 

 (1st Dist.). It is a less

demanding standard than probable cause. 

; 

. But it is

something more than an “inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or ‘hunch.’”

; 

.

       {¶12} Fleckinger acknowledges that window-tint violations may provide

reasonable suspicion for a traffic stop. See State v. McDonald, 

(8th Dist.); State v. Davenport, 

 (2d Dist.). She argues that the

state failed to show that a window-tint violation occurred.

       {¶13} When read together, R.C. 4513.241 and Adm.Code 4501-43-03 provide

that tinted windows preventing a person from seeing into the vehicle are prohibited,

subject to the standards in the Ohio Administrative Code. The administrative code

then sets out the specific light transmittance standards for each window. State v.

Scott, 

 (1st Dist.).


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                 OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS


       {¶14} The administrative code requires that “light transmittance be at least 70

percent (plus or minus three percent) for windshields and at least 50 percent (plus or

minus three percent) for front side windows” Id. at ¶ 16. It defines “transmittance” as

“the ratio of the amount of total light, expressed in percentages, which is allowed to

pass through the product or material, including glazing, to the amount of total light

falling on the product or the material and the glazing.” Id. at ¶ 15, quoting Adm.Code

4501-41-02(C).

       {¶15} Agent Cadell testified that when he first observed the vehicle, it had dark

window tint on the windows, including the windshield. He described it as “extremely

dark” to the point that he could not tell who the driver was or if the driver was male or

female. That violation of R.C. 4513.241 gave him reasonable suspicion to stop the

vehicle.

       {¶16} Video footage recorded by Agent Cadell’s dashboard camera and his and

his partner’s body cameras was admitted into evidence. Fleckinger argues that even

though Cadell testified that the windshield and the driver’s window were extremely

dark, the video footage showed that he could see through the windshield from the back

of the vehicle. While Agent Cadell acknowledged that he could see through the

windshield from the back, he said it was “still too dark.” He added that “it is a lot easier

to see out of a tinted windshield than into a tinted window.”

       {¶17} Fleckinger further argues that Agent Cadell wrote on the citation that

the tint was 96 percent because that was reported to him by his partner. But he did

not check the windows himself, and he was not sure which window his partner had

tested. The testing did not occur until after the stop had taken place. In reviewing the

propriety of a stop, a court only looks at the facts the officer knew at the time of the

stop. Dayton v. Erickson, 

 (1996); McDonald, 

, at


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                    OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS


¶ 30 (8th Dist.).

       {¶18} Fleckinger’s arguments relate more to whether she was guilty of the

charged offense. But the police are not required to “correctly predict that a conviction

will result.” State v. Sims, 

 (1st Dist.). Whether a driver could

ultimately be found guilty of a window-tint violation is not determinative of whether

police had reasonable suspicion to conduct a traffic stop. State v. Daniels, 2024-Ohio-

3392, ¶ 11 (1st Dist.); 

.

       {¶19} The trial court’s findings that the window tint was “excessively dark,”

and that the police had reasonable suspicion to stop the vehicle were supported by

competent, credible evidence. Consequently, the trial court did not err in denying

Fleckinger’s motion to suppress. We overrule Fleckinger’s assignment of error, and

affirm the trial court’s judgment.

                                                                   Judgment affirmed.

BERGERON, P.J., and CROUSE, J., concur.

Please note:

The court has recorded its entry on the date of the release of this opinion.




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