State v. Williams

[Cite as State v. Williams, 

.]

                               COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO

                              EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
                                 COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA

STATE OF OHIO,                                       :

                 Plaintiff-Appellee,                 :
                                                              No. 113721
                 v.                                  :

MALIK WILLIAMS,                                      :

                 Defendant-Appellant.                :


                                JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION

                 JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED
                 RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: December 5, 2024


          Criminal Appeal from the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas
                             Case No. CR-23-682919-A


                                               Appearances:

                 Michael C. O’Malley, Cuyahoga County Prosecuting
                 Attorney, and Krystal Hyojong Lee, Assistant Prosecuting
                 Attorney, for appellee.

                 Mary Catherine Corrigan, for appellant.


MICHAEL JOHN RYAN, J.:

                In this appeal, defendant-appellant Malik Williams challenges the trial

court’s imposition of a five-to-seven and one-half year prison sentence on him for a

second-degree trafficking offense; he was sentenced under the Reagan Tokes Law.
According to Williams, the sentence was contrary to law. After a thorough review of

the facts and pertinent law, we affirm.

            In August 2023, Williams was charged in a six-count indictment with

drug-related, theft, and weapons crimes and specifications. The charges resulted

after Williams was searched and contraband was found on his person. The search

was conducted when Williams was found standing by a stolen Maserati with his dog

on the hood of the vehicle. Another individual was standing by the stolen vehicle

too and had the key for the vehicle.

            After negotiations with the State of Ohio, Williams pleaded guilty to

Count 1, trafficking, amended from a felony of the first degree to a felony of the

second degree, along with four forfeiture specifications. In exchange for Williams’s

plea, the remaining charges and specifications were dismissed. At the time of his

plea, Williams was out on bond; the trial court continued the bond and warned

Williams to stay out of trouble and show up for sentencing. Specifically, the court

warned Williams, “[I]f you don’t show up, it’s a maximum sentence.” (Tr. 29.)

Williams promised, “I’ll show up.” 

            Sentencing was set for January 17, 2024. The defense requested, and

the trial court allowed for, a presentence investigation. Williams failed to show for

the scheduled interview with the probation department, however. Williams also

failed to appear for the January 17 sentencing. The trial court issued a warrant for

Williams, and the sentencing hearing was held on January 26, 2024, with Williams

present. The trial court imposed a prison sentence of five-to-seven and one-half
years. Williams appeals, raising the following sole assignment of error: “The trial

court’s sentence was contrary to law.”

             In support of his contention that the sentence was contrary to law,

Williams argues that “the trial court blatantly failed to take into consideration any

of the mitigation, namely the Appellant’s lack of adult criminal history, his young

age, and his lack of positive guidance growing up.”

             When reviewing felony sentences, appellate courts apply the standard

of review found in R.C. 2953.08(G)(2). State v. Marcum, 

.

Under R.C. 2953.08(G)(2), an appellate court may increase, reduce, or modify a

sentence, or it may vacate the sentence and remand for resentencing, only if it

“clearly and convincingly” finds either (1) that the record does not support certain

specified findings or (2) that the sentence imposed is contrary to law.

            R.C. 2953.08(G)(2)(b) “does not provide a basis for an appellate court

to modify or vacate a sentence based on its view that the sentence is not supported

by the record under R.C. 2929.11 and 2929.12.” State v. Jones, 

. Further,

      if the sentence is within the statutory range for the offense and the trial
      court considered both the purposes and principles of felony sentencing
      in R.C. 2929.11 and the seriousness and recidivism factors in R.C.
      2929.12, the court’s imposition of any prison term for a felony
      conviction is not contrary to law.

State v. Phillips, 

 (8th Dist.).

             Although trial courts are required to consider both R.C. 2929.11 and

2929.12 before imposing a prison sentence, they are not required to make specific
findings under either of the statutes. 

, citing State v. Wilson, 2011-

Ohio-2669, ¶ 31; State v. Arnett, 

. “Indeed, consideration of the

factors is presumed unless the defendant affirmatively shows otherwise.” 

, citing State v. Wright, 

 (8th Dist.). Moreover, a statement

in a trial court’s sentencing entry that it considered all the required factors of law is

sufficient to fulfill a trial court’s obligation under the sentencing statutes. State v.

Riemer, 

 (8th Dist.).

             The trial court’s sentencing entry in this case contains all the necessary

findings. The court stated that it “considered all required factors of the law” and

that it “finds that prison is consistent with the purpose of R.C. 2929.11.” Moreover,

the trial court admonished Williams at the plea hearing that he needed to stay out

of trouble and show up for sentencing; he failed to show for the originally scheduled

sentencing hearing.

              At the second scheduled sentencing hearing, Williams’s counsel

explained Williams’s failure to show the first time. According to counsel, there was

“a communications breakdown” between Williams and the probation department,

which resulted in Williams not attending his scheduled presentence investigation

interview with the department. (Tr. 34.) Williams was able to meet with his

assigned probation officer at a later date, however. According to counsel, the officer

told Williams that because the meeting was at the “11th hour,” the report would not

be prepared in time for the sentencing hearing and so the hearing was off and

Williams did not need to attend. 

 The trial court judge responded, “I don’t believe
that at all,” took a recess, and spoke with Williams’s probation officer. Id. at 34-35,

37. The trial court judge reported that the probation officer “100 percent denies that

she said that.” Id. at 37.

              Defense counsel advocated for a two-year sentence for Williams and

cited potentially mitigating factors for the court’s consideration. Williams has not

affirmatively demonstrated that the trial court failed to consider the statutory

factors. On this record, the trial court’s sentence was not contrary to law. Williams’s

sole assignment of error is overruled.

              Judgment affirmed.

      It is ordered that appellee recover from appellant costs herein taxed.

      The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.

      It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the

common pleas court to carry this judgment into execution.            The defendant’s

conviction having been affirmed, any bail pending appeal is terminated. Case

remanded to the trial court for execution of sentence.

      A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27

of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.




________________________
MICHAEL JOHN RYAN, JUDGE

MARY J. BOYLE, P.J., and
SEAN C. GALLAGHER, J., CONCUR