State v. Barnes

[Cite as State v. Barnes, 

.]




                       IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
                           THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
                                HARDIN COUNTY




STATE OF OHIO,
                                                          CASE NO. 6-24-03
         PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT,

    v.

DAVID HALE BARNES,                                        OPINION

         DEFENDANT-APPELLEE.



                 Appeal from Hardin County Common Pleas Court
                           Trial Court No. CRI20232164

                                      Judgment Affirmed

                           Date of Decision: December 16, 2024



APPEARANCES:

         Morgan S. Fish for Appellant
Case No. 6-24-03


WILLAMOWSKI, P.J.

       {¶1} The State of Ohio appeals the judgment of the Hardin County Court of

Common Pleas, arguing that the trial court erred by granting the motion to suppress

filed by defendant-appellee David H. Barnes (“Barnes”). For the reasons set forth

below, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

                           Facts and Procedural History

       {¶2} On June 10, 2023, Patrolman Lucas Risner (“Patrolman Risner”) was

parked in the vicinity of Barnes’s house. On prior dates, law enforcement had

received reports of suspicious activities transpiring at Barnes’s residence and had

responded to drug overdoses at that location. For these reasons, the police believed

that the house where he lived was the site of drug-related activities. Around 2:00

P.M., Patrolman Risner saw Barnes leave his house in a pickup truck and observed

him make at least three turns without properly activating his turn signal.

       {¶3} Because he “believed that it could potentially become a narcotics

investigation,” Patrolman Risner contacted the handler in a canine unit, Officer

Melvin Yoder (“Officer Yoder”), to determine whether a drug-detection dog was

available. (Tr. 143). In response, Officer Yoder got his canine partner and headed

towards Patrolman Risner’s location. After initiating a traffic stop, Patrolman

Risner approached the pickup truck. Barnes was the driver while Ginger Williams

(“Williams”) and Charles Wilcox (“Wilcox”) were passengers. Patrolman Risner



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obtained Barnes’s driver’s license and gave this information to dispatch for a

records search.

       {¶4} Officer Yoder arrived at the scene roughly ten minutes after the traffic

stop had been initiated. By this point, dispatch had not yet provided Patrolman

Risner with the information he had requested. The canine was deployed to examine

Barnes’s vehicle and alerted after walking to the middle of the passenger side of the

pickup truck. At this point, the three occupants of the vehicle were directed to exit

the vehicle.

       {¶5} After Barnes exited the truck, Officer Yoder performed a pat-down

search of Barnes’s person but did not locate any weapons. Officer Yoder then began

to search the driver’s side of the vehicle. Since Patrolman Risner was standing on

the passenger side of the vehicle, he engaged Wilcox and Williams after they exited

the pickup truck. He directed Williams to “empty out [her] … pockets” and

“shake out …[her] bra.” (Ex. 5). He later explained that he gave this directive

because “[i]t is very common for women to hide contraband in their bra.” (Tr. 115).

       {¶6} At this time, Barnes was walking towards where Wilcox was located

besides the police cruiser. Patrolman Risner approached Barnes and stated, “Did he

already—here, I’m going to double check.” (Ex. 5). Patrolman Risner then reached

into one of Barnes’s pockets and pulled out a cellular phone. After Barnes told him

to stop, Patrolman Risner reached into this pocket again and retrieved an old film



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canister. The canister was opened and found to contain what appeared to be

methamphetamines.

       {¶7} Officer Yoder had stopped searching the vehicle when he heard

Patrolman Risner speaking to Barnes about the contents of his pockets. When the

police indicated that they were going to resume the search of the pickup truck,

Williams stated that her purse was inside the vehicle and contained a drug pipe and

a syringe. After the police located these items in her purse, they discovered two

other drug pipes inside the center console of the vehicle. Once the search of the

vehicle was completed, the police officers decided not to arrest Barnes and

permitted him to leave on his own accord.

       {¶8} On September 14, 2023, Barnes was indicted on one count of

aggravated possession of drugs in violation of R.C. 2925.11(C)(1)(a), a fifth-degree

felony. On January 19, 2024, Barnes filed a motion to suppress. Patrolman Risner

and Officer Yoder testified at the suppression hearing. Footage from Patrolman

Risner’s body camera was presented. On March 18, 2024, the trial court granted

Barnes’s motion to suppress, finding that the police did not have reasonable

suspicion or probable cause to conduct the “second warrantless search of the

defendant’s person.” (Doc. 46).

       {¶9} The State filed its notice of appeal on March 21, 2024. On appeal, the

State raises the following three assignments of error:



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                            First Assignment of Error

       The trial court improperly suppressed evidence because law
       enforcement does not need probable cause or reasonable
       suspicion to perform a canine search.

                           Second Assignment of Error

       The trial court improperly suppressed evidence because law
       enforcement had reasonable suspicion to perform a second pat-down of the Defendant and the contraband was evident under a
       plain error standard.

                           Third Assignment of Error

       The trial court improperly suppressed evidence because law
       enforcement would have inevitably discovered the evidence
       through a search incident to a lawful arrest.

We will consider the arguments raised in the second and third assignments of error

before proceeding to those raised in the first assignment of error.

                            Second Assignment of Error

       {¶10} The State of Ohio argues that Patrolman Risner had reasonable

suspicion to search Barnes’s pockets after Officer Yoder had already conducted a

pat-down of Barnes’s outer clothing for weapons.

                                Standard of Review

       {¶11} On appeal, “motions to suppress present ‘mixed questions of law and

fact.’” State v. Kerr, 

 (3d Dist.), quoting State v. Yeaples,

 (3d Dist.).

       At a suppression hearing, the trial court assumes the role of trier of
       fact and, as such, is in the best position to evaluate the evidence and

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       the credibility of witnesses. [State v. Burnside, 

, ¶ 8].
       … When reviewing a ruling on a motion to suppress, deference is
       given to the trial court’s findings of fact so long as they are supported
       by competent, credible evidence. Burnside at ¶ 8 ….

(Citations omitted.) State v. Harpel, 

 (3d Dist.), quoting State

v. Sidney, 

 (3d Dist.). “Accepting [the trial court’s findings of]

fact[] as true, the appellate court must then independently determine, without

deference to the conclusion of the trial court, whether the facts satisfy the applicable

legal standard.” (Bracketed text in original.) State v. Ferguson, 

 (3d Dist.), quoting 

.

                                   Legal Standard

       {¶12} The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees

“[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,

against unreasonable searches and seizures ….” U.S. Const., Amend. IV. “The

Ohio Constitution offers a parallel provision to the Fourth Amendment … that

has been held to afford the same level of protection as the United States

Constitution.” 

. “The Fourth Amendment does not proscribe all state-

initiated searches and seizures; it merely proscribes those which are unreasonable.”

Florida v. Jimeno, 

 (1991). “Thus, ‘[t]he touchstone of the Fourth

Amendment is reasonableness.’” 

, quoting 

.

       {¶13} A search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment “occurs when

there is a ‘physical intrusion of a constitutionally protected area’” or “an official


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Case No. 6-24-03


intrusion into a sphere in which there exists a reasonable expectation of privacy …

*.” State v. Jackson, 

, quoting United States v. Knotts, 

 (1983). A warrantless search by law enforcement is unreasonable

unless a well-delineated exception to this general rule is applicable. State v.

Burroughs, 

. The Ohio Supreme Court has recognized seven

exceptions to the general rule requiring search warrants:

       (a) a search incident to a lawful arrest;

       (b) consent signifying waiver of constitutional rights;

       (c) the stop-and-frisk doctrine;

       (d) hot pursuit;

       (e) probable cause to search, and the presence of exigent
       circumstances;

       (f) the plain view doctrine; and

       (g) administrative search

State v. Urdiales, 

 (3d Dist.), quoting State v. City of Stow, 

 (1992).

       {¶14} The “stop-and-frisk doctrine” originates in Terry v. Ohio, 

(1968). This exception “permits a police officer to ‘stop or detain an individual

without probable cause when the officer has a reasonable suspicion … that

criminal activity is afoot.’” State v. Pinckney, 

 (10th Dist.),

quoting State v. Jones, 

, ¶ 16 (10th Dist.). In this process, the police


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Case No. 6-24-03


officer may “conduct a carefully limited search of the outer clothing” of the stopped

individual “in an attempt to discover weapons.” 

. However,

       a limited protective search of the detainee’s person for concealed
       weapons is justified only when the officer has reasonably concluded
       that ‘the individual whose suspicious behavior he is investigating at
       close range is armed and presently dangerous to the officer or to others
       ….’ [

.] … ‘Where a police officer, during an
       investigative stop, has a reasonable suspicion that an individual is
       armed based on the totality of the circumstances, the officer may
       initiate a protective search for the safety of himself and others.’ State
       v. Bobo, 

, 

 (1988), paragraph two of
       the syllabus.

(Brackets sic.) State v. Walker, 

 (1st Dist.), quoting State v.

Evans, 

, 

 (1993).

       “Reasonable suspicion entails some minimal level of objective
       justification … that is, something more than an inchoate and
       unparticularized suspicion or ‘hunch,’ but less than the level of
       suspicion required for probable cause.”

Harpel, 

, quoting State v. Jones, 

, 556-

557 (2d Dist. 1990). As a general matter, a police “officer’s right to frisk an

individual is virtually automatic when the person is suspected of a crime, such as

drug trafficking, where the individual is likely to be armed.” State v. Minyoung,

 (3d Dist.), citing 

.

       {¶15} Importantly, “[t]he purpose of this [type of] limited search is not to

discover evidence of crime, but to allow the officer to pursue his investigation

without fear of violence ….” Adams v. Williams, 

 (1972). For

this reason, “a Terry search must ‘be confined in scope to an intrusion reasonably

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designed to discover guns, knives, clubs, or other hidden instruments for the assault

of the police officer.’” State v. Nolen, 

 (4th Dist.), quoting

.

       {¶16} However, if a police officer is conducting a lawful weapons pat down

and detects an object that has features making its criminal character “immediately

apparent,” the contraband may be seized without a warrant pursuant to the plain feel

doctrine. Minnesota v. Dickerson, 

 (1993).           The rationale

underlying this doctrine is that the detection of such contraband involved “no

invasion of the suspect’s privacy beyond that already authorized by the officer’s

search for weapons ….” 

       {¶17} “A second-pat down search has been found to be justified when the

officer who conducted the second pat-down search did not observe the first pat down

or was concerned with the adequacy of the first pat down.” State v. Garrett, 2018-

Ohio-4530, ¶ 56 (2d Dist.). “The rationale for a protective search, however,

becomes attenuated with successive searches.” State v. Hackett, 

 (6th Dist.). “Police are not entitled to ‘unlimited bites of the apple.’” 

quoting United States v. Davis, 

 (6th Cir. 2005). “When the use

of multiple protective searches exceeds the rationale behind a Terry-type

investigation, it becomes unreasonable.” 

.

       {¶18} “To deter Fourth Amendment violations, the Supreme Court of the

United States has adopted an exclusionary rule under which ‘any evidence that is

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Case No. 6-24-03


obtained during an unlawful search or seizure will be excluded from being used

against the defendant.’” 

, quoting State v. Steinbrunner, 2012-Ohio-

2358, ¶ 12 (3d Dist.). “At a suppression hearing, the State bears the burden of

establishing that a warrantless search and seizure falls within one of the exceptions

to the warrant requirement, and that it meets Fourth Amendment standards of

reasonableness.” Steinbrunner at ¶ 12. Where a “protective search goes beyond

what is necessary to determine if the suspect is armed, it is no longer valid under

Terry and its fruits will be suppressed.” Dickerson, 

.

                                   Legal Analysis

       {¶19} The State argues that trial court erred in concluding that Patrolman

Risner did not have sufficient legal justification to search Barnes’s pockets after

Officer Yoder had already conducted a pat-down search of Barnes’s outer clothing.

In this case, Officer Yoder testified that he conducted a limited, pat-down search for

the purpose of determining whether Barnes was armed. Officer Yoder stated he did

not detect any item “large enough to be a significant danger” and affirmed that he

was “satisfied that he [Barnes] was not packing a gun or other weapon.” (Tr. 53,

69).

       {¶20} After this limited, pat-down search, Barnes moved towards the area

where Wilcox was standing next to the police cruiser. Patrolman Risner testified

that, as he was talking to Williams, he could see Wilcox and Barnes in his peripheral

vision and “thought that there was a possibility that they could have handed

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Case No. 6-24-03


something off to one another.” (Emphasis added.) (Tr. 116-117). However, in its

judgment entry, the trial court noted that, in this timeframe, “Mr. Wilcox was visible

on his [Patrolman Risner’s] body cam off and on and clearly was not near the

defendant most of the time.” (Doc. 46).

       {¶21} On cross-examination, Patrolman Risner admitted that the body

camera footage contained no indication that any type of exchange occurred but

stated that he “felt as if something could have taken place.” (Emphasis added.) (Tr.

136). The following exchange then occurred:

       [Defense Counsel:] At no time do we see from the body cam any type
       of exchange occur, do we?

       [Patrolman Risner:] We don’t see the exchange, no.

       [Defense Counsel:] And you didn’t either, did you?

       [Patrolman Risner:] Out of my peripheral I felt as if something could
       have taken place.

       [Defense Counsel:] But you didn’t see anything, did you?

       [Patrolman Risner:] No, I didn’t see a handoff, no.

       [Defense Counsel:] Now why on the body cam, then, did you tell Mr.
       Barnes that you saw him put that in his pocket?

       [Patrolman Risner:] Because I believed that I did.

       [Defense Counsel:] Okay. But you didn’t, did you?

       [Patrolman Risner:] No.

       …


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       [Defense Counsel:] I mean, how do you believe you see something
       from what we just saw [on the body camera footage]?

       [Patrolman Risner:] I can’t explain to you how I felt at that moment.
       I was busy dealing with her [Williams]. Out of my peripheral, it
       looked like something could have been potentially handed off so I
       investigated further and I was right.

(Emphasis added.) (Tr. 136-137). Patrolman Risner then went over Barnes and

“asked him if he had already been patted down because [he] didn’t know at that time

if [Barnes] had been or not.” (Tr. 117). He described Barnes’s actions in response

as follows:

       So his [Barnes’s] behavior, you could tell in his voice that there was—
       he was kind of stuttering or whatnot, which led me to believe that
       there was some deceptive behavior behind that. He was fidgeting with
       his hands, still fidgeting with his pockets, pacing around, getting close
       to Charles [Wilcox], walking away. Just all over the place.

(Tr. 119-120). Patrolman Risner told Barnes that he was going to “double-check

him.” (Tr. 117, Ex. 5). In response, Barnes “got defensive.” (Tr. 117). Patrolman

Risner testified that he “made the decision to go in his [Barnes’s] pocket” “based on

his demeanor ….” (Tr. 117).

       {¶22} On appeal, the State argues that the stop-and-frisk exception applies

to Patrolman Risner’s search of Barnes’s pockets. However, even if Patrolman

Risner had been unaware of the prior pat-down of Barnes’s person, he never

mentioned any safety concerns as a reason for reaching into Barnes’s pockets at the

suppression hearing or on the recording from his body camera. State v. Howard,



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Case No. 6-24-03

 (5th Dist.); Toledo v. Powell, 

 (6th

Dist.).

          {¶23} Rather, Patrolman Risner testified that he believed that a canine alert

at a vehicle provided grounds to search the passengers1 and that the exigent

circumstances exception applied to the search of Barnes’s person. This testimony

is an indication that the search of Barnes’s pockets was undertaken for the purpose

of locating evidence rather than to ensure officer safety. In contrast, Officer Yoder’s

testimony regarding the earlier pat-down of Barnes’s person clearly explained that

he was searching for weapons to ensure officer safety before they proceeded to

examine the vehicle.

          {¶24} In evaluating this testimony, the trial court noted that Patrolman Risner

mentioned a “possibility” of a handoff before “admit[ing] he did not see Mr. Wilcox

hand anything to the defendant, but just had a feeling …” that he “c[ould]n’t

explain.” (Doc. 46, quoting Tr. 117, 137). The trial court then noted that

          Officer Risner admitted that he did not see the defendant actually do
          anything, he just suspected it or ‘had a feeling’ that he could not
          explain. Based upon this feeling, which the Court would call an
          inarticulable hunch, he engaged in a second pat-down which produced
          a cell phone, pocketknife and small canister containing suspected
          methamphetamine.


1
  In the body camera footage, Patrolman Risner appeared to act consistently with this assertion in his
interactions with Williams and Barnes. He ordered Williams to empty her pockets immediately after she
exited the vehicle rather than perform a limited pat-down search of her person for weapons. He then told her
to “shake out …[her] bra” because “[i]t is very common for women to hide contraband in their bra.” (Ex.
5, Tr. 115). This testimony indicates that his examination of Williams was motivated by evidentiary
considerations rather than safety concerns. After no contraband fell from Williams’s pockets or bra,
Patrolman Risner then walked over to Barnes and reached into his pockets.

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Case No. 6-24-03


(Doc. 46). Further, the trial court noted that Patrolman Risner did not testify “that

he was fearful at the time of the second pat down …,” and no other evidence in

the record suggested he was conducting a protective search by reaching into

Barnes’s pockets. (Doc. 46). State v. Peeks, 

 (10th Dist.).

       {¶25} Based on these observations, the trial court found that there was no

“solid evidence of a ‘particularized suspicion’” in this case and that “[o]fficer safety

was not a consideration in the second pat-down/frisk.” (Doc. 46). For these reasons,

the trial court correctly concluded that “the stop and frisk doctrine … does not

apply because the defendant had already been frisked and there was no evidence

subsequent to that which would call into question officer safety.” (Id.).

       {¶26} Additionally, we also note that Patrolman Risner did not appear to be

engaging in a limited pat-down search of Barnes’s outer clothing in the body camera

footage. Rather, he testified that he “made the decision to go in his [Barnes’s]

pocket.” (Tr. 117). In the video footage, Patrolman Risner reached directly into

Barnes’s pockets almost immediately after approaching him. State v. Debrossard,

, ¶ 32 (4th Dist.).

       {¶27} In summary, the State did not provide evidence that suggests that a

concern for officer safety motivated the search of Barnes’s pocket. Thus, we

conclude that the State failed to establish that the stop-and-frisk doctrine was




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Case No. 6-24-03


applicable to the search of Barnes’s pockets.2 Having examined the facts in the

record before us, we conclude that the State has failed to demonstrate that the trial

court erred in granting Barnes’s motion to suppress with this argument.

Accordingly, the second assignment of error is overruled.

                                     Third Assignment of Error

         {¶28} The State of Ohio argues that, even if Patrolman Risner’s search of

Barnes’s pockets was not constitutionally permissible, the contraband would have

been inevitably discovered as the result of the lawful search of the vehicle.

                                            Legal Standard

         {¶29} “A warrantless search of an automobile, where police officers have

probable cause to believe such vehicle contains contraband, is one of the well-

recognized exceptions to the constitutional requirement of a search warrant.” State

v. Holmes, 

 (3d Dist.), quoting State v. James, 2016-Ohio-

7660, ¶ 23 (5th Dist.). “If a trained canine alerts to the odor of drugs from a lawfully

stopped and detained vehicle, an officer has probable cause to search the vehicle for

contraband.” State v. Jennings, 

, ¶ 10 (2d Dist.).

         {¶30} Further, under the inevitable-discovery doctrine, evidence that is

obtained inconsistently with the requirements of the Fourth Amendment can still be



2
  In its response to the motion to suppress, the State argued that the exigent circumstances exception to the
warrant requirement was applicable in addition to the stop-and-frisk doctrine. However, since the State only
raised arguments based upon the stop-and-frisk doctrine on appeal, we need not consider the applicability of
other exceptions to the warrant requirement.

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Case No. 6-24-03


admissible if “the state establishes that the evidence would inevitably have been

discovered in the course of a lawful investigation.” State v. Banks-Harvey, 2018-

Ohio-201, ¶ 27. “The rule permits the State to remove the taint from ill-gotten

evidence by establishing that the unlawful act from which the evidence resulted was

‘not a sine qua non of its discovery.’” State v. Barnes, 

 (3d

Dist.), quoting U.S. v. Griffin, 

 (6th Cir. 1974).

       {¶31} For this exception to the exclusionary rule to apply, the State must

establish “(1) that the police possessed the leads making the discovery inevitable at

the time of the misconduct and (2) that the police were actively pursuing an

alternative line of investigation prior to the misconduct.” Barnes at ¶ 12, quoting

State v. Keith, 

 (2d Dist.). Thus, the State must demonstrate

a “reasonable probability” exists “that the evidence would have been discovered

apart from the unlawful conduct” by a preponderance of the evidence. Banks-

Harvey at ¶ 27.

       {¶32} Importantly, “[t]he state must prove not simply that the government

could have found the evidence without the constitutional violation, but affirmatively

would have found it.” (Emphasis added.) State v. Alihassan, 

, ¶ 29

(10th Dist.). “Proof of inevitable discovery ‘involves no speculative elements but

focuses on demonstrated historical facts capable of ready verification or

impeachment.’” Toledo v. Powell, 

 (6th Dist.), quoting Nix v.

Williams, 

 (1984).

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                                   Legal Analysis

       {¶33} The State argues that, notwithstanding Patrolman Risner’s search of

Barnes’s pockets, the illegal drugs would still have been inevitably discovered

through a lawful line of investigation. The State points out that, after the canine

alert gave the police probable cause to search the vehicle, Officer Yoder had begun

a lawful search of the vehicle that was interrupted when Patrolman Risner

discovered the contraband in Barnes’s pocket. 

. This evidence does

indicate that law enforcement was engaged in an alternative line of investigation

prior to the misconduct. 

.

       {¶34} The State then traces this alternative line of investigation through three

main steps that would have purportedly led to the inevitable discovery of the

methamphetamines: (1) if Barnes’s pockets had not been prematurely searched, the

police would have continued searching the vehicle and discovered the drug

paraphernalia; (2) on finding this evidence of a crime, the police would have arrested

Barnes; and (3) the police would have discovered the illegal drugs in Barnes’s

pockets during a permissible search incident to this arrest.

       {¶35} The first step is substantiated by the evidence before us: when the

police returned to searching the vehicle, they located the drug paraphernalia.

However, the second step is at odds with the “demonstrated historical facts” in the

record because Barnes was never arrested. Nix, 

. The

State asserts that, in the alternative line of investigation, the police would have

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Case No. 6-24-03


arrested Barnes for the misdemeanor offense of possession of drug paraphernalia

after the drug pipes were discovered in the center console of the vehicle.

       {¶36} But in this case, the police did locate the drug paraphernalia in the

center console of the vehicle and did not arrest Barnes after its discovery. See also

State v. Coan, 

, *4 (11th Dist. Dec. 3, 1999) (The State conceded

that the police would not have inevitably discovered contraband in a vehicle during

the course of an inventory search because the vehicle was never impounded.).

Further, at the time the drug pipes were found, the police had reason to believe that

Barnes had committed the felony offense of possession of drugs in addition to the

misdemeanor offense of possession of drug paraphernalia. Yet the police still chose

not to arrest Barnes. The State cannot persuasively argue that the police would have

taken the opportunity to arrest Barnes for a misdemeanor offense in an alternative

line of investigation when the police did not take the opportunity to arrest Barnes

for a misdemeanor and a felony.

       {¶37} Since the State has failed to establish that the police would have

arrested Barnes for possession of drug paraphernalia, a search incident to an arrest

would not have been an applicable exception to the warrant requirement in this

alternative line of investigation. For these reasons, we conclude that the State has

failed to establish that a reasonable probability exists that the contraband in Barnes’s

pockets would have been inevitably discovered apart from the unlawful conduct

with this argument. Accordingly, the third assignment of error is overruled.

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                             First Assignment of Error

       {¶38} The State argues that the trial court erred in concluding that Patrolman

Risner needed a reasonable suspicion to summon the canine unit and in concluding

that the traffic stop was prolonged to accommodate the arrival of the canine unit.

                                   Legal Standard

       {¶39} Pursuant to App.R. 12(A)(1)(c), courts of appeals are to render a

decision on each assignment of error raised “unless an assignment of error is made

moot by a ruling on another assignment of error ….” “An assignment of error is

moot when it cannot have ‘any practical legal effect upon a then-existing

controversy.’” State v. Gideon, 

, quoting Ex parte Steele, 

 (N.D.Ala. 1908). “Put differently, an assignment of error is moot when

an appellant presents issues that are no longer live as a result of some other decision

rendered by the appellate court.” 

.

                                   Legal Analysis

       {¶40} In the prior two assignments of error, we have already concluded (1)

that the trial court did not err in determining that Patrolman Risner did not have

reasonable suspicion or probable cause to search Barnes’s pockets after Officer

Yoder had performed a protective pat-down search of his person and (2) that the

State failed to establish that the methamphetamines would have been inevitably

discovered. These grounds provided a sufficient basis for the trial court to grant the

motion to suppress.     Accordingly, whether the traffic stop was prolonged to

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Case No. 6-24-03


accommodate the arrival of the canine unit is of no consequence to the disposition

of this appeal. Since the resolution of the second and third assignments of error

renders the issues in the first assignment of error moot, we decline to address the

arguments raised herein pursuant to App.R. 12(A)(1)(c).

                                   Conclusion

       {¶41} Having found no error prejudicial to the appellant in the particulars

assigned and argued, the judgment of the Hardin County Court of Common Pleas is

affirmed.

                                                              Judgment Affirmed

WALDICK and MILLER, J.J., concur.

/hls




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