[Cite as State v. Thompson,
2024-Ohio-5910.]
COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA
STATE OF OHIO, :
Plaintiff-Appellee, :
No. 113671
:
v.
:
TORRY THOMPSON,
:
Defendant-Appellant.
JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION
JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED
RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: December 19, 2024
Criminal Appeal from the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas
Case No. CR-22-668512-A
Appearances:
Michael C. O’Malley, Cuyahoga County Prosecuting
Attorney, and Mason P. McCarthy, Assistant Prosecuting
Attorney, for appellee.
Mary Elaine Hall, for appellant.
EMANUELLA D. GROVES, J.:
Defendant-appellant, Torry Thompson (“Thompson”), entered a
negotiated plea and was sentenced to eight years in prison on a felonious-assault
count and 12-months on having weapons while under disability (“HWUD”) count,
which were to be served consecutively. The trial court also imposed a prior and
consecutive one-year mandatory prison sentence for a firearm specification
associated with the felonious assault base charge for a total stated definite prison
term of ten years. Thompson now appeals and requests a new trial or modification
of his consecutive sentences. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.
Procedural History and Facts
On May 9, 2022, Thompson was indicted on two counts of felonious
assault, a felony of the second degree, in violation of R.C. 2903.11(A)(1) and (A)(2),
respectively. These counts contained one-year, 18-month, three-year, and 54-
month firearm specifications as well as notices of prior conviction and repeat violent
offender specifications. Additionally, Thompson was indicted on one count of
having weapons while under disability, a felony of the third degree, in violation of
R.C. 2923.13(A)(2). This count carried with it one-year and 18-month firearm
specifications. On January 17, 2024, Thompson pleaded guilty to one count of
felonious assault, a felony of the second degree, in violation of R.C. 2903.11(A)(1),
with a one-year firearm specification pursuant to 2941.141(A); and one count of
having weapons while under disability. The parties agreed to a sentencing range of
five to ten years. The trial court sentenced Thompson to ten years, which included
two, one-year consecutive sentences. The trial court made no mention of the Reagan
Tokes tail and did not impose an indefinite sentence.
On February 27, 2024, Thompson appealed and raised the following
assignments of error.
Assignment of Error No. 1
[Defense counsel] rendered ineffective assistance of counsel to
[Thompson], in violation of the Sixth Amendment, the due process
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and in
violation Article I Section 10 and the due course of law clause of Article
I Section 16 to the Ohio Constitution, when [they] failed to provide
expert testimony and a report on Firearms and Toolmark Testimony.
Assignment of Error No. 2
[Defense counsel] rendered ineffective assistance of counsel to
[Thompson], in violation of the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to
the U.S. Constitution, and in violation of Article I Section 10 to the Ohio
Constitution, when [they] failed to withdraw from the negotiated plea
agreement pursuant to Crim.R. 32.1, before the trial court sentenced
[Thompson] and when they failed to inform him that he was being
sentenced for [felonious assault, a second-degree felony,] and another
felony, HWUD, under the Reagan Tokes Law [pursuant to] R.C.
2929.14(A)(2)(a) and 2929.144, which rendered [Thompson]’s guilty
pleas “unintelligent, unknowing[,] and involuntary.”
Assignment of Error No. 3
The trial court below committed plain error when [it] failed to inform
[Thompson] of the R.C. 2929.19(B)(2)(c) notifications, that he was
being sentenced for [felonious assault, a second-degree felony,] and
HWUD, another felony, under the Reagan Tokes Law [pursuant to]
R.C. 2929.14(A)(2)(a) and 2929.144 at the sentencing hearing before
[it] accepted his guilty pleas, and in the journal entry dated [January
30, 2024], which rendered [Thompson’s] guilty pleas “unintelligent,
unknowing[,] and involuntary.”
Law and Analysis
For ease of discussion, we will address both allegations of ineffective
assistance of counsel jointly. Thompson argues that he was deprived of his
constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel. Thompson contends that his
defense counsel was deficient for failing to (1) secure an expert witness, (2) withdraw
from the negotiated plea agreement, and (3) object or clarify the record during the
sentencing hearing.
“To establish a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, [Thompson]
must demonstrate that (1) his counsel was deficient in some aspect of his
representation and (2) there is a reasonable probability that, were it not for counsel’s
errors, the result of the trial would have been different.” In re S.A., 2019-Ohio-
4782, ¶ 46, citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-688, 694
(1984). Thus, ‘“the failure to make a showing of either deficient performance or
prejudice defeats a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.’”
Id., quoting State v.
Davenport,
2018-Ohio-2933, ¶ 25 (8th Dist.), citing
Strickland at 697.
Courts considering whether an attorney’s performance fell below an
objective standard of reasonableness “must indulge a strong presumption that
counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional
assistance.” Strickland at 689. A defendant establishes prejudice by showing that
“there exists a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s error, the result of the
proceeding would have been different.” State v. Davis,
2020-Ohio-309, ¶ 10.
Trial counsel’s questionable trial strategies do not establish ineffective
assistance of counsel. State v. Butts, 2024-Ohio-665, ¶ 16 (8th Dist.), quoting State
v. Snyder,
2009-Ohio-2473, ¶ 32 (5th Dist.), quoting State v. Hoffner, 2004-Ohio-
3430, ¶ 45. “Trial counsel’s failure to request an expert is a ‘debatable trial tactic,’
and does not amount to ineffective assistance of counsel.”
Id., quoting State v.
Synder,
2009-Ohio-2473. Moreover, ‘“[t]he failure to do a futile act cannot be the
basis for a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, nor could such a failure be
prejudicial.’” State v. Nelson,
2017-Ohio-5568, ¶ 79, quoting State v. Knox, 2013-
Ohio-1662, ¶ 20 (8th Dist.), citing State v. Ford,
2007-Ohio-5722, ¶ 9 (8th Dist.).
Here, Thompson alleges that he received ineffective assistance of
counsel because his attorney failed to provide expert testimony, although defense
counsel did file a motion in limine to exclude the State’s expert witness and report
on firearms and toolmark testimony. Thompson avers that there was a reasonable
probability that an expert would have aided in his defense. However, Thompson did
not proceed to trial; rather, he entered a negotiated plea. Thompson fails to
demonstrate how a defense expert would have changed this outcome.
Thompson also alleges he received ineffective assistance of counsel
because his attorney failed to withdraw his plea, object, or clarify the record when
the trial court did not advise Thompson that he was being sentenced under a
qualifying felony subject to the Reagan Tokes Law. Notably, the trial court did not
impose an indefinite sentence by including a Reagan Tokes tail. Thus, Thompson
again fails to demonstrate how defense counsel’s conduct was deficient and how the
outcome would have been different.
Having failed to demonstrate the requirements to prevail in an
ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim, Thompson’s first and second assignments
of error are overruled.
In Thompson’s third assignment of error, Thompson alleges that the
trial court committed plain error when it failed to provide Reagan Tokes Law
advisements during the sentencing hearing. Thompson claims that this plain error
affected his substantial rights.
The party asserting plain error under Crim.R. 52(B) must show that
(1) an error occurred, (2) the error was plain, and (3) the error affected his
substantial rights. State v. Bond, 2022-Ohio-4150, ¶ 17, citing State v. Wilks, 2018-
Ohio-1562, ¶ 52, and Crim.R. 52(B). The Ohio Supreme Court has interpreted the
third “prejudice” prong of the rule to mean that the trial court’s error must have
affected the outcome of the trial.
Id., citing State v. Barnes,
94 Ohio St.3d 21, 27
(2002). “[C]orrecting a plain error may be done only in ‘exceptional circumstances
to prevent a manifest miscarriage justice.’” Id. at ¶ 18, quoting State v. Long,
53
Ohio St.2d 91 (1978), paragraph three of the syllabus.
Here, Thompson fails to demonstrate that a substantial right was
affected when the trial court failed to provide Reagan Tokes advisements. Nor is
this an exceptional circumstance where correction is required to prevent a manifest
injustice; indeed, the trial court did not impose a Reagan Tokes tail to Thompson’s
sentence. Consequently, Thompson’s third assignment of error is overruled and his
conviction is affirmed.
Judgment affirmed.
It is ordered that appellee recover from appellant costs herein taxed.
The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the
common pleas court to carry this judgment into execution. The defendant’s
conviction having been affirmed, any bail pending appeal is terminated. Case
remanded to the trial court for execution of sentence.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27
of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.
EMANUELLA D. GROVES, JUDGE
MICHELLE J. SHEEHAN, P.J., and
WILLIAM A. KLATT, J.,* CONCUR
(*Sitting by assignment: William A. Klatt, J., retired, of the Tenth District Court of
Appeals.)