[Cite as State v. Taylor,
2024-Ohio-5956.]
COURT OF APPEALS
RICHLAND COUNTY, OHIO
FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
STATE OF OHIO JUDGES:
Hon. William B. Hoffman, P.J.
Plaintiff-Appellee Hon. Craig R. Baldwin, J.
Hon. Andrew J. King, J.
-vsCase No. 2024 CA 0040
MICHAEL TAYLOR
Defendant-Appellant OPINION
CHARACTER OF PROCEEDINGS: Appeal from the Mansfield Municipal
Court, Case No. 2024TRD05142
JUDGMENT: Affirmed
DATE OF JUDGMENT ENTRY: December 20, 2024
APPEARANCES:
For Plaintiff-Appellee For Defendant-Appellant
DAVID HOMER MICHAEL TAYLOR
Mansfield Law Director’s Office 5383 Bloominggrove Road
30 North Diamond Street Galion, Ohio 44833
Mansfield, Ohio 4492
Richland County, Case No. 2024 CA 0040 2
Hoffman, P.J.
{¶1} Defendant-appellant Michael Taylor appeals the judgment entered by the
Mansfield Municipal Court convicting him following a bench trial of operating a motor
vehicle while using an electronic wireless communication device (R.C. 4511.204) and
fining him $25.00. Plaintiff-appellee is the State of Ohio.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS AND CASE
{¶2} On June 17, 2024, around 9:30 a.m., Trooper J. Beck of the Ohio State
Patrol was on patrol on U.S. 42 in Richland County. Appellant drove a white van past the
Trooper’s parked vehicle. As Appellant drove by, the Trooper was able to see inside the
vehicle and observed Appellant with his cell phone in his hand, using his thumbs to make
entries into the phone while he was operating the vehicle. The Trooper stopped the
vehicle and issued Appellant a citation for operating a motor vehicle while using an
electronic wireless communication device in violation of R.C. 4511.204.
{¶3} The case proceeded to bench trial in the Mansfield Municipal Court, at
which Appellant represented himself. Appellant did not deny he was texting while driving,
but argued R.C. 4511.204 is unconstitutional in violation of the Equal Protection Clause
of the United States Constitution because first responders and utility workers are exempt
from its application. The trial court found the constitutionality of the statute was for a
higher court to determine. The trial court found Appellant guilty of violating R.C. 2411.204,
and fined him $25.00. It is from the July 9, 2024 judgment of the trial court Appellant
prosecutes his appeal, assigning as error:
Richland County, Case No. 2024 CA 0040 3
WHEREAS, MANSFIELD MUNICIPAL COURT REFUSED TO
RULE ON THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF ORC 4511.204, I MICHAEL
TAYLOR AM HUMBLY ASKING THE FIFTH CIRCUIT COURT OF
APPEALS TO REVIEW THIS CASE.
{¶4} In his sole assignment of error, Appellant argues R.C. 4511.204 is
unconstitutional because it violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment to the United States Constitution because first responders and utility workers
are excluded from its operation while in the performance of their duties.
{¶5} R.C. 4511.204 provides in pertinent part:
(A) No person shall operate a motor vehicle, trackless trolley, or
streetcar on any street, highway, or property open to the public for vehicular
traffic while using, holding, or physically supporting with any part of the
person's body an electronic wireless communications device.
(B) Division (A) of this section does not apply to any of the following:
(1) A person using an electronic wireless communications device to
make contact, for emergency purposes, with a law enforcement agency,
hospital or health care provider, fire department, or other similar emergency
agency or entity;
(2) A person driving a public safety vehicle while using an electronic
wireless communications device in the course of the person's duties;
Richland County, Case No. 2024 CA 0040 4
(3) A person using an electronic wireless communications device
when the person's motor vehicle is in a stationary position and is outside a
lane of travel, at a traffic control signal that is currently directing traffic to
stop, or parked on a road or highway due to an emergency or road closure;
(4) A person using and holding an electronic wireless
communications device directly near the person's ear for the purpose of
making, receiving, or conducting a telephone call, provided that the person
does not manually enter letters, numbers, or symbols into the device;
(5) A person receiving wireless messages on an electronic wireless
communications device regarding the operation or navigation of a motor
vehicle; safety-related information, including emergency, traffic, or weather
alerts; or data used primarily by the motor vehicle, provided that the person
does not hold or support the device with any part of the person's body;
(6) A person using the speaker phone function of the electronic
wireless communications device, provided that the person does not hold or
support the device with any part of the person's body;
(7) A person using an electronic wireless communications device for
navigation purposes, provided that the person does not do either of the
following during the use:
(a) Manually enter letters, numbers, or symbols into the device;
(b) Hold or support the device with any part of the person's body.
Richland County, Case No. 2024 CA 0040 5
(8) A person using a feature or function of the electronic wireless
communications device with a single touch or single swipe, provided that
the person does not do either of the following during the use:
(a) Manually enter letters, numbers, or symbols into the device;
(b) Hold or support the device with any part of the person's body.
(9) A person operating a commercial truck while using a mobile data
terminal that transmits and receives data;
(10) A person operating a utility service vehicle or a vehicle for or on
behalf of a utility, if the person is acting in response to an emergency, power
outage, or circumstance that affects the health or safety of individuals;
(11) A person using an electronic wireless communications device in
conjunction with a voice-operated or hands-free feature or function of the
vehicle or of the device without the use of either hand except to activate,
deactivate, or initiate the feature or function with a single touch or swipe,
provided the person does not hold or support the device with any part of the
person's body;
(12) A person using technology that physically or electronically
integrates the device into the motor vehicle, provided that the person does
not do either of the following during the use:
(a) Manually enter letters, numbers, or symbols into the device;
(b) Hold or support the device with any part of the person's body.
(13) A person storing an electronic wireless communications device
in a holster, harness, or article of clothing on the person's body.
Richland County, Case No. 2024 CA 0040 6
{¶6} This Court has held the “exemptions” set forth in subsection (B) statute are
not exemptions which the State must disprove in order to obtain a conviction; rather, they
are affirmative defenses. State v. Havens, 2024-Ohio-2204, ¶ 18 (5th Dist.). As such,
the statute does not create a separate class of people – i.e., first responders and utility
workers in the course of their duties – who are exempt from application of the statute.
Rather, the offense can be negated by an excuse or justification, including first
responders and utility workers under certain circumstances. Id. at ¶18. Thus, all drivers
are treated equally under the definition of the offense; the statute simply provides thirteen
affirmative defenses to its violation. Further, while the statute does set forth affirmative
defenses for a person driving a public safety vehicle and using a phone in the course of
their duties, and for a utility worker acting in response to an emergency situation, the
statute also creates an affirmative defense for any driver using the phone to obtain help
in an emergency. We therefore find the statute does not implicate the Equal Protection
Clause because it does not distinguish between certain classes of people, but rather
provides affirmative defenses for emergency use.
{¶7} However, assuming arguendo R.C. 4511.204(B)(2) and (10) do create a
separate class of people who are treated differently under the statute, we find the statute
does not violate Equal Protection.
{¶8} The Ohio Supreme Court has set forth our standard of review of an Equal
Protection challenge as follows:
The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the
United States Constitution provides, “No State shall … deny to any person
Richland County, Case No. 2024 CA 0040 7
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.” Ohio's Equal
Protection Clause, Section 2, Article I of the Ohio Constitution, states, “All
political power is inherent in the people. Government is instituted for their
equal protection and benefit ….” “ ‘The Equal Protection Clause[s] [do] not
forbid classifications. [They] simply keep governmental decisionmakers
from treating differently persons who are in all relevant respects alike.’ ”
Burnett v. Motorists Mut. Ins. Co., 118 Ohio St.3d 493,
2008-Ohio-2751,
890 N.E.2d 307, ¶ 30, quoting Nordlinger v. Hahn (1992),
505 U.S. 1, 10,
112 S.Ct. 2326,
120 L.Ed.2d 1.
The federal and Ohio equal-protection provisions are “functionally
equivalent,” State v. Williams, 126 Ohio St.3d 65,
2010-Ohio-2453,
930
N.E.2d 770, ¶ 38, citing Eppley v. Tri–Valley Local School Dist. Bd. of Edn.,
122 Ohio St.3d 56,
2009-Ohio-1970,
908 N.E.2d 401, ¶ 11, and State v.
Thompson, 95 Ohio St.3d 264,
2002-Ohio-2124,
767 N.E.2d 251, ¶ 11, and
“are to be construed and analyzed identically,” Am. Assn. of Univ.
Professors, Cent. State Univ. Chapter v. Cent. State Univ. (1999), 87 Ohio
St.3d 55, 60,
717 N.E.2d 286.
Courts apply varying levels of scrutiny to equal-protection challenges
depending on the rights at issue and the purportedly discriminatory
classifications created by the law. “[A] statute that does not implicate a
fundamental right or a suspect classification does not violate equal-
protection principles if it is rationally related to a legitimate government
interest.” Williams, 126 Ohio St.3d 65,
2010-Ohio-2453,
930 N.E.2d 770, ¶
Richland County, Case No. 2024 CA 0040 8
39, citing Eppley, 122 Ohio St.3d 56,
2009-Ohio-1970,
908 N.E.2d 401, ¶
15. The parties do not dispute that this case does not involve a fundamental
right or suspect classification and that rational-basis review applies.
“The rational-basis test involves a two-step analysis. We must first
identify a valid state interest. Second, we must determine whether the
method or means by which the state has chosen to advance that interest is
rational.” McCrone v. Bank One Corp., 107 Ohio St.3d 272, 2005-Ohio-
6505, 839 N.E.2d 1, ¶ 9, citing Buchman v. Wayne Trace Local School Dist.
Bd. of Edn. (1995), 73 Ohio St.3d 260, 267,
652 N.E.2d 952.
“Under the rational-basis standard, a state has no obligation to
produce evidence to sustain the rationality of a statutory classification.”
Columbia Gas Transm. Corp. v. Levin, 117 Ohio St.3d 122,
2008-Ohio-511,
882 N.E.2d 400, ¶ 91, citing Am. Assn. of Univ. Professors, Cent. State
Univ. Chapter, 87 Ohio St.3d at 58, 60,
717 N.E.2d 286. “[S]tatutes are
presumed to be constitutional and … courts have a duty to liberally
construe statutes in order to save them from constitutional infirmities.”
Eppley, 122 Ohio St.3d 56,
2009-Ohio-1970,
908 N.E.2d 401, ¶ 12, citing
Desenco, Inc. v. Akron (1999), 84 Ohio St.3d 535, 538,
706 N.E.2d 323.
The party challenging the constitutionality of a statute “bears the burden to
negate every conceivable basis that might support the legislation.”
Columbia Gas Transm. Corp. at ¶ 91, citing Lyons v. Limbach (1988), 40
Ohio St.3d 92, 94,
532 N.E.2d 106.
Richland County, Case No. 2024 CA 0040 9
{¶9} Pickaway Cty. Skilled Gaming, L.L.C. v. Cordray, 2010-Ohio-4908, ¶¶ 16-
20.
{¶10} We find the instant case does not involve a fundamental right or suspect
classification. “Drivers who are not first responders or utility workers” is not a suspect
class. Further, driving is a privilege and not a constitutional right. State v. Ossege, 2014-
Ohio-3186, ¶63 (12th Dist.), citing State v. Tanner, 15 Ohio St.3d 1, 3 (1984). By
extension, using a cell phone while driving is not a fundamental right. Therefore, we need
only find the statute has a rational basis.
{¶11} Under the rational basis test, we first must identify a valid state interest. In
the instant case, we find the State has an interest in preventing accidents caused by
drivers who are distracted by use of their cell phones. Second, we must determine
whether the means by which the State has chosen to advance its interest is rational. We
find the affirmative defenses set forth for drivers of public safety vehicles in the course of
their duties and for utility service workers responding to an emergency which threatens
the health or safety of individuals are a rational way to advance the interest by recognizing
in emergency situations, the needs of first responders and utility workers to respond to
an imminent threat exceed the general interest of the State in preventing distracted
driving. In addition, R.C. 4511.204(B)(1) recognizes the need of civilian drivers in
emergency situations to use the cell phone may take precedence over the State’s general
interest of preventing accidents caused by distracted driving. We find Appellant has not
overcome the presumption the statute is constitutional, and the statute does not violate
the Equal Protection Clause.
Richland County, Case No. 2024 CA 0040 10
{¶12} The assignment of error is overruled. The judgment of the Mansfield
Municipal Court is affirmed.
By: Hoffman, P.J.
Baldwin, J. and
King, J. concur
