[Cite as State v. Edwards,
2024-Ohio-5980.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
ALLEN COUNTY
STATE OF OHIO,
CASE NO. 1-23-74
PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE,
v.
DANIEL EDWARDS, OPINION
DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.
Appeal from Allen County Common Pleas Court
Trial Court No. CR2023 0140
Judgment Affirmed
Date of Decision: December 23, 2024
APPEARANCES:
Chima R. Ekeh for Appellant
John R. Willamowski, Jr. for Appellee
Case No. 1-23-74
WALDICK, J.
{¶1} Defendant-appellant, Daniel Edwards (“Edwards”), appeals the
judgment of conviction and sentence entered against him in the Allen County
Common Pleas Court, following a jury trial that resulted in Edwards being found
guilty of multiple felony offenses. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm.
Procedural History
{¶2} This case originated on June 15, 2023, when an Allen County grand
jury returned a six-count indictment against Edwards, charging him as
follows: Count 1 – Burglary, a second-degree felony in violation of R.C.
2911.12(A)(1); Count 2 – Violating a Protection Order, a third-degree felony in
violation of R.C. 2919.27(A)(1) and (B)(4); Count 3 – Violating a Protection Order,
a third-degree felony in violation of R.C. 2919.27(A)(1) and (B)(4); Count 4 –
Violating a Protection Order, a fifth-degree felony in violation of R.C.
2919.27(A)(1) and (B)(3)(b); Count 5 – Burglary, a second-degree felony in
violation of R.C. 2911.12(A)(1); and Count 6 – Violating a Protection Order, a third-
degree felony in violation of R.C. 2919.27(A)(1) and (B)(4).
{¶3} On June 22, 2023, an arraignment was held and Edwards entered pleas
of not guilty as to all counts of the indictment.
{¶4} On October 20, 2023, a jury trial commenced in the case. During the
two-day trial, the prosecution presented the testimony of six witnesses and
introduced a number of exhibits. After the State rested its case, the defense opted
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to not present evidence. Following closing arguments of counsel and instructions
of law by the trial court, the jury received the case for deliberation on October 31,
2023 at 4:24 p.m. On that same date, at 5:44 p.m., the jury returned verdicts finding
Edwards guilty as charged in all counts of the indictment. The trial court accepted
the verdicts, discharged the jury, and ordered an updated presentence investigation.
{¶5} On November 21, 2023, a sentencing hearing was held. As a
preliminary matter, the trial court found that Counts 1 and 2 and Counts 1 and 3
merged for purposes of sentencing, and the prosecution elected to proceed to
sentencing on Count 1. Edwards was then sentenced on Counts 1, 4, 5, and 6 to an
aggregate sentence of a minimum of six years and six months in prison up to a
potential maximum of nine years in prison.
{¶6} On November 29, 2023, Edwards filed the instant appeal.
Relevant Facts
{¶7} This case stemmed from two incidents that took place on April 20,
2023, at 561 Prospect in Lima, where Edwards’ mother, Patricia Wilkerson
(“Patricia”), lived with two of her other sons, Dale Edwards (“Dale”) and Charles
Wilkerson (“Charles”). The first incident occurred at around 2:00 a.m. and the
second incident occurred around 12:30 p.m. On both of those occasions, Edwards
showed up, unwelcome, at the house on Prospect, where Patricia and Charles were
present. Approximately a month prior, Patricia and Charles had each petitioned for
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and obtained a domestic violence civil protection order relating to Edwards in the
Allen County Court of Common Pleas, pursuant to R.C. 3113.31.
{¶8} Patricia and Charles both testified at trial in this case about the two
incidents on April 20, 2023, as did the Lima Police Department officers who
responded to 561 Prospect as a result of those incidents, and the detective who was
assigned to conduct a follow-up investigation.
{¶9} The evidence presented at trial reflected that on April 20, 2023, at
approximately 2:00 a.m., Patricia and Charles were resting in the first-floor living
room of Patricia’s home on Prospect. At that time, they first heard a loud noise and
they then heard Edwards on the screened-in front porch of the house. Following
that, Edwards cracked open the front door leading from the porch to the living room
and spoke to his mother through the cracked door. Edwards asked for a phone
charger, his mother told him no, and then Edwards left the premises. As a result,
Charles called the Lima Police Department. Patrolman Jalen Bagley responded to
561 Prospect but could not locate Edwards in the area. Bagley took a report and
photographed damage to the door of the screened porch, where the screen had been
pushed in.
{¶10} Later that same date, at approximately 12:30 p.m., Edwards returned
to 561 Prospect. On that occasion, Edwards pushed open the wood door leading
from the screened porch to the living room, breaking the door chain in the process.
Edwards entered the living room, where Patricia and Charles were still located, with
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Patricia in a recliner and Charles on the couch. Edwards said something about his
phone being stolen, grabbed Patricia’s cell phone off the dining room table, took the
phone without permission, and left the house. Patricia then called the Lima Police
Department. Patrol officers Kylie Archer and Roger Lybarger responded to 561
Prospect. Lybarger took a report from Patricia and photographed damage to the
front door frame where the chain had been pulled off the frame of the door. Archer
checked the area in her patrol cruiser and located Edwards walking in a nearby alley.
Edwards failed to heed Patrolman Archer’s command to stop, and took off running.
Following a brief foot pursuit, Archer lost sight of Edwards. Patrolman Lybarger
then assisted Patrolman Archer in searching for Edwards. Shortly thereafter,
Lybarger located Edwards near the house and took Edwards into custody. Edwards
had Patricia’s cell phone in his possession, which was returned to Patricia at that
time.
{¶11} At trial, Charles identified State’s Exhibit 2 as being a copy of the
protection order that he had obtained against Edwards. Similarly, Patricia identified
State’s Exhibit 6 as a copy of the protection order that she had obtained against
Edwards. Finally, the parties stipulated, relative to Count 4, that Edwards had
previously been convicted of two violations of R.C. 2903.22 that involved Charles
Wilkerson.
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Claims on Appeal
{¶12} In this appeal, Edwards raises four assignments of error for our review.
First Assignment of Error
Appellant’s convictions for Count II, III, IV, and VI were against
the manifest weight of the evidence.
Second Assignment of Error
Appellant’s convictions for Count II, III, IV and VI were not
supported by sufficient evidence.
Third Assignment of Error
The trial court erred by allowing a modification of the original
return of service and admission of the same into evidence.
Fourth Assignment of Error
Appellant’s conviction for Count I was against the manifest
weight of the evidence.
{¶13} For purposes of analytical clarity, we elect to address the assignments
of error out of the order in which they are raised.
Third Assignment of Error
{¶14} In the third assignment of error, Edwards asserts that the trial court
abused its discretion by allowing the Allen County Clerk of Courts to amend the
returns of service relating to the prior service on Edwards of the two protection
orders that were elemental in the crimes with which Edwards was charged and
convicted. While not directly asserted in the argument made in support of that
assignment of error, Edwards appears to also suggest that the trial court erred in
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admitting into evidence State’s Exhibits 35 and 36, being the amended returns of
service about which Edwards complains.
{¶15} By way of relevant background, the record reflects the following with
regard to the two civil protection orders at issue in this case.
{¶16} During the first day of trial, prosecution witness Charles Wilkerson
identified State’s Exhibit 2 as being a copy of the protection order that he obtained
on April 4, 2023 against Edwards. Similarly, prosecution witness Patricia
Wilkerson identified State’s Exhibit 6 as a copy of the protection order that she
obtained on April 4, 2023 against Edwards. Both of those protection orders had
been issued by the Allen County Common Pleas Court.
{¶17} At the start of the second day of trial and prior to the jury being brought
into the courtroom, defense counsel raised a partial objection to State’s Exhibits 2
and 6, noting that the second pages of those exhibits contained findings of fact made
by the court and upon which the protection orders were based. Defense counsel
requested that the portion of each of exhibit reciting the findings of fact be redacted
before those exhibits were published to the jury.
{¶18} As the court and counsel were discussing that objection and the
potential redaction to be made, the prosecutor noted that he intended to display the
second pages of State’s Exhibits 2 and 6 with an upcoming witness because
information on those pages related to State’s Exhibits 33 and 34, which had not yet
been identified, but which the prosecutor indicated were the returns of service
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relating to Exhibits 2 and 6. The prosecutor explained that Edwards had not been
served with the protection orders until after the full hearings on the protection orders
in April, but that the second pages of State’s Exhibits 2 and 6 referenced the fact
that an ex parte order of protection had been issued in each case in March. The trial
court asked to see State’s Exhibits 33 and 34 and, after a quick review, noted that
there appeared to be an error in the dates on those returns of service, as Exhibits 33
and 34 indicated that the sheriff’s office had served the full protection orders on
Edwards on April 5, 2023 after receiving the full protection orders for service on
March 22, 2023. The trial court noted that while the sheriff’s office had likely
received the ex parte orders for service on March 22nd, it would have been
impossible for the sheriff’s office to have received the final and full protection
orders (State’s Exhibits 2 and 6) on March 22nd, as the hearing that resulted in those
orders being issued did not take place until April 4th.
{¶19} Defense counsel then noted that his objection as to State’s Exhibits 2
and 6 was primarily focused on the specific findings of fact contained in those
exhibits, and so the trial court ordered that the sections containing the findings of
fact be redacted in State’s Exhibits 2 and 6. Upon further inquiry by the trial court,
defense counsel indicated that the proposed redaction would satisfy the defense’s
request.
{¶20} The jury was then brought into the courtroom and the presentation of
evidence resumed, with the prosecution calling Lima Police Department Detective
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Matt Boss to the stand. During his testimony, Detective Boss identified State’s
Exhibits 2 and 6 as copies of the protection orders he had gathered as potential
evidence, after being assigned the case for investigation and being made aware that
Charles Wilkerson and Patricia Wilkerson each had an active protection order on
file against Edwards. Detective Boss was then asked whether he had determined if
Edwards had been served with those protection orders, and Boss identified State’s
Exhibits 33 and 34 as being certified copies of the returns of service relating to
State’s Exhibits 2 and 6, respectively. Boss noted that the returns of service
reflected that Edwards had been personally served with the two protection orders on
April 5, 2023.
{¶21} On cross-examination, Boss was asked about the apparent discrepancy
in the dates set forth on State’s Exhibits 33 and 34, with defense counsel noting that
the returns of service indicated the sheriff’s office had received the protection orders
for service on March 22, 2023, but that the protection orders had not actually been
issued until April 4, 2023. In response, Boss noted that there had been ex parte
protection orders issued by the court on March 22, 2023. Before Boss could further
address the question posed about the dates on the returns of service, the trial court
asked counsel to approach and an off-record discussion was held at the bench. Upon
resuming cross-examination of Detective Boss, defense counsel moved on to a
different line of questioning about the case.
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{¶22} At the conclusion of that cross-examination, the jury was excused for
a lunch break. After the jury left the courtroom, the trial court stated that it wanted
the record to reflect what had occurred during the sidebar. At that time, the trial
court noted that it was clear, based on all of the docketed information in the Clerk
of Court’s files relating to the two protection order cases, that the clerk’s office
computer system had erroneously auto-generated the date of March 22, 2023 on the
returns of service for the full protection orders. The court noted that the records
reflected that March 22, 2023 was the date that the sheriff’s office received the
initial ex parte orders to be served on Edwards, and that the same date was then
erroneously inserted into the returns of service relating to the second protection
orders that were issued after a full hearing on April 4, 2023. The court noted that
the parties would have been hampered in discovering that information because it
was not accessible on the clerk’s document website and because of the original ex
parte nature of the protection order cases. The court then offered counsel time to
visit the Clerk of Court’s office to review the files in person, and adjourned the
matter until after the extended lunch break.
{¶23} After the lunch recess, the court went back on record with counsel
outside the presence of the jury. At that time, the prosecutor indicated that he had
obtained certified copies of the initial ex parte protection orders in the cases
involving Charles Wilkerson and Patricia Wilkerson, along with certified copies of
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the returns of service for those ex parte orders, and that copies of those documents
had just been provided to defense counsel.
{¶24} Defense counsel then stated that his cross-examination of Detective
Boss about the returns of service was based on a belief that perhaps Edwards had
been served with the ex parte orders but had not been served with the full orders.
Defense counsel indicated that he terminated that line of questioning once he
became aware that it was factually inaccurate. Defense counsel did lodge an
objection to the newly obtained documents relating to the ex parte orders on the
basis that they had not been provided in discovery prior to trial, asserting that
Edwards’ decision to go to trial would have perhaps been different had the defense
had all of the paperwork.
{¶25} In response, the trial court noted that the documents relating to the ex
parte orders were not something that the prosecution had previously had in its
possession, although the information could have been obtained by the State. The
trial court found that the discovery violation was not a willful one and ruled that, as
a less-restrictive sanction, the court would permit a continuance for the defense to
review the documents. At that time, defense counsel stated that he had reviewed
the documents and that, after discussing the matter with co-counsel and with
Edwards, the defense was comfortable with moving forward with the trial without
a continuance. After the trial court reviewed with counsel several other legal and
procedural matters unrelated to State’s Exhibits 33 and 34, another recess was taken.
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{¶26} After that recess, the trial court went back on record with counsel,
again outside the presence of the jury. At that time, the trial court noted that revised
jury instructions had been emailed to counsel and then stated:
But I also wanted to note that to make the record accurate the Clerk
of Courts was contacted about what the problem was and she has now
and when I say she I’m talking about the elected Clerk of Courts,
Jennifer McBride, she has been in contact with the sheriff’s office and
she now has a filed a docketed amended return of service order orders
in both DV2023 0045 and DV2023 0049. The 45 relating to Patricia
Wilkerson, the 49 relating to Charles Wilkerson to accurately reflect
that those civil protection orders were received on April 4th
respectively. The different times are noted and when they were then
served on Mr. Edwards. So now the accurate reflection from the court
as to when those things were served, but they are file stamped with
todays [sic] date and they are docketed. They both happen to be
number seven, docket numbers in those cases and my understanding
is she provided certified copies to both parties, correct [assistant
prosecutor] Mr. Thines?
(Tr., 314).
{¶27} Upon inquiry by the trial court, both counsel for the State of Ohio and
counsel for the defense indicated that they had been provided with certified copies
of the amended returns of service referenced by the court.
{¶28} The following exchange then occurred:
Mr. Sturgill [defense counsel]: Just for the record, identical objection
under Criminal Rule 16 to this that again as of eight a.m. yesterday
morning the evidence provided had no proof of service. We received
that. Since then we have gotten all of this new information and now
an amended filed thing that was literally amended today and that has
had a great change in the State’s strength of their case and I respect
the courts [sic] earlier ruling. I just wanted to make sure this was
included in that and if the question is do I need more time to review
this then it should also know if the court is inclined to allow the State
to use it.
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The Court: Okay. Mr. Sturgill, I just want to make clear for the record
and I’m not asking your client to testify or make any statements. Are
you taking issue with the accuracy of what the Clerk of Courts is
providing for service?
Mr. Sturgill: No, your honor.
The Court: Or just the timing of it?
Mr. Sturgill: Just the timing of the stuff and its effect on the way this
is proceeding.
The Court: On your case, absolutely. Okay. I understand that, but
again, in light of the other explanations this is now the clerical fixing
of those explanations. So with that anything further Mr. Sturgill?
Mr. Sturgill: No, your honor, thank you.
(Tr., 315-316).
{¶29} The jury was then brought into the courtroom and the presentation of
evidence resumed with redirect-examination of Detective Boss by the State of Ohio.
During that redirect-examination, Detective Boss again identified State’s Exhibits
33 and 34 as the original returns of service of the two full civil protection orders at
issue. Boss then identified State’s Exhibits 35 and 36 as being amended returns of
service, with Exhibit 35 serving to amend Exhibit 33 and Exhibit 36 serving to
amend Exhibit 34. Boss testified that there had been some sort of clerical error in
the original returns of service as to the date that the protections orders had been
received to be served, and that the amended returns had been corrected to reflect
that it had been April 4, 2023 when the sheriff’s office had received the protection
orders for service, which was then accomplished on April 5th, as had been reflected
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in the original returns. During recross-examination, Detective Boss acknowledged
that the amended returns of service, being State’s Exhibits 35 and 36, had just been
filed on that date, after Detective Boss had been asked about the dates reflected in
State’s Exhibits 33 and 34 during his initial cross-examination.
{¶30} Following the conclusion of Detective Boss’s testimony, the State of
Ohio indicated it had no further witnesses. The jury was excused from the
courtroom and the prosecution moved for admission of its various exhibits,
including State’s Exhibits 35 and 36. The defense objected to State’s Exhibits 35
and 36 on the basis of a discovery violation. The trial court ruled that State’s
Exhibits 35 and 36 would be admitted over that objection. The State then rested its
case.
{¶31} On appeal, as noted above, Edwards argues that the trial court erred in
permitting the returns of service to be amended by the Clerk of Courts and in then
allowing those amended returns, State’s Exhibits 35 and 36, to be admitted into
evidence.
{¶32} As Edwards correctly notes in his merit brief, “‘[a] trial court has
broad discretion in the admission and exclusion of evidence. Unless the trial court
has clearly abused its discretion, an appellate court should not interfere in its
determination.’” State v. Thomas, 2024-Ohio-1534, ¶ 26 (3d Dist.), quoting State v.
Apanovitch,
33 Ohio St.3d 19, 25 (1987). An abuse of discretion implies that the
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trial court’s attitude was unreasonable, arbitrary or unconscionable. Blakemore v.
Blakemore, 5 Ohio St.3d 217, 219 (1983).
{¶33} However, beyond noting that standard of review with regard to the
third assignment of error, Edwards’ merit brief contains no analysis of his claim of
error concerning State’s Exhibits 35 and 36, and Edwards cites no legal authority in
support of his claim.
{¶34} It is the duty of the appellant to demonstrate assigned error through an
argument supported by citations to legal authority and facts in the record. In State
v. Welling, 2023-Ohio-3214, this Court elaborated on that requirement as follows:
“‘[A] defendant has the burden of affirmatively demonstrating the
error of the trial court on appeal.’” State v. Costell, 3d Dist. Union No.
14–15–11, 2016-Ohio-3386, ¶ 86, quoting State v. Stelzer, 9th Dist.
Summit No. 23174, 2006-Ohio-6912, ¶ 7. If an argument exists that
can support an assignment of error, it is not this Court’s duty to root
it out. State v. Shanklin, 3d Dist. Union No. 14–13–23, 2014-Ohio-
5624, ¶ 31, citing State v. Raber,189 Ohio App.3d 396, 2010-Ohio-
4066, ¶ 30 (9th Dist.).
App.R. 12(A)(2) provides that an appellate court “may disregard an
assignment of error presented for review if the party raising it fails to
identify in the record the error on which the assignment of error is
based or fails to argue the assignment separately in the brief, as
required under App.R. 16(A).” App.R. 16(A)(7) requires that an
appellant’s brief include “[a]n argument containing the contentions of
the appellant with respect to each assignment of error presented for
review and the reasons in support of the contentions, with citations to
the authorities, statutes, and parts of the record on which appellant
relies.”
Id., at ¶¶ 6-7.
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{¶35} Pursuant to the appellate rules cited above, since we are not required
to address arguments that have not been sufficiently presented for review or
supported by proper authority, we will not conduct a detailed legal analysis of
Edwards’ unsupported claim in the third assignment of error.
{¶36} However, we do note that, contrary to Edwards’ assertion that it was
the trial court who contacted the Clerk of Courts about the error in the original
returns of service, the record does not reflect who brought the matter to the attention
of the clerk’s office. While State’s Exhibits 35 and 36 were generated and filed by
the Clerk of Courts during the trial, those documents were promptly provided to the
defense immediately after the documents were docketed. More importantly, the
accuracy of the information in the amended returns of service, being the exhibits
about which Edwards now complains, was not contested by Edwards at the trial
level, nor does Edwards suggest on appeal that the amendment of those returns was
not an accurate reflection of the dates involved in the service of the protection orders
at issue. Accordingly, we fail to see how material prejudice resulted to Edwards as
a result of State’s Exhibits 35 and 36 having been created and filed during the trial
and then introduced into evidence, and the trial court did not abuse its discretion in
the admission of Exhibits 35 and 36.
{¶37} For all of the reasons stated, the third assignment of error is overruled.
First and Second Assignments of Error
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{¶38} In the first and second assignments of error, which we shall jointly
address, Edwards challenges the evidentiary basis for the jury’s findings that he was
guilty of the charges in Counts 2, 3, 4, and 6. In the first assignment of error,
Edwards argues that his convictions on Counts 2, 3, 4, and 6 were against the
manifest weight of the evidence. In the second assignment of error, Edwards
contends that the State presented insufficient evidence in support of the crimes
charged in Counts 2, 3, 4, and 6.
{¶39} “An appellate court’s function when reviewing the sufficiency of the
evidence to support a criminal conviction is to examine the evidence admitted at
trial to determine whether such evidence, if believed, would convince the average
mind of the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” State v. Jenks, 61 Ohio
St. 3d 259 (1991), paragraph two of the syllabus. Consequently, “[t]he relevant
inquiry is whether, after viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the
prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the
crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt.”
Id. “In deciding if the evidence was
sufficient, we neither resolve evidentiary conflicts nor assess the credibility of
witnesses, as both are functions reserved for the trier of fact.” State v. Jones, 2013-
Ohio-4775, ¶ 33 (1st Dist.).
{¶40} By contrast, when reviewing whether a verdict was against the
manifest weight of the evidence, the appellate court sits as a “thirteenth juror” and
examines the conflicting testimony. State v. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380, 387
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(1997). In doing so, this court must review the entire record, weigh the evidence
and all of the reasonable inferences, consider the credibility of witnesses and
determine whether in resolving conflicts in the evidence, the factfinder “clearly lost
its way and created such a manifest miscarriage of justice that the conviction must
be reversed and a new trial ordered.” Id. When applying the manifest-weight
standard, “[o]nly in exceptional cases, where the evidence ‘weighs heavily against
the conviction,’ should an appellate court overturn the trial court’s judgment.” State
v. Haller,
2012-Ohio-5233, ¶ 9 (3d Dist.), quoting State v. Hunter,
2011-Ohio-6524,
¶ 119.
{¶41} As an initial matter, we note that we need not consider Edwards’
claims with regard to Counts 2 and 3. “‘[W]hen counts in an indictment are allied
offenses, and there is sufficient evidence to support the offense on which the state
elects to have the defendant sentenced, the appellate court need not consider the
sufficiency [or weight] of the evidence on the count that is subject to merger because
any error would be harmless’ beyond a reasonable doubt.” State v. Sheldon, 2019-
Ohio-4123, ¶ 11 (3d Dist.), quoting State v. Ramos, 2016-Ohio-7685, ¶ 14 (8th
Dist). While Edwards was found guilty on all six counts of the indictment, the trial
court found prior to sentencing that Counts 1 and 2 and Counts 1 and 3 were allied
offenses and therefore merged for purposes of sentencing. As a result, the
prosecution elected to proceed to sentencing on Count 1 and Edwards was then
sentenced only on Counts 1, 4, 5, and 6. Accordingly, Edwards was not ultimately
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“convicted” of the offenses charged in Counts 2 and 3 because the trial court merged
those offenses with Count 1 for sentencing purposes. Sheldon, supra, at ¶ 12,
quoting Ramos at ¶ 16 (“a ‘conviction’ requires both a finding of guilt and a
sentence.”). Accordingly, we shall address Edwards manifest weight claims and
sufficiency of the evidence claims here only as to Counts 4 and 6.
{¶42} In Count 4 of the indictment, Edwards was charged with Violating a
Protection Order in violation of R.C. 2919.27(A)(1) and (B)(3)(b). R.C.
2919.27(A)(1) provides in relevant part that “[n]o person shall recklessly violate the
terms of … [a] protection ordered issued … pursuant to section 2919.26 or
3113.31 of the Revised Code[.]” Pursuant to R.C. 2919.27(B)(3)(b), as was further
alleged in Count 4, “violating a protection order is a felony of the fifth degree if the
offender previously has been convicted of, pleaded guilty to, or been adjudicated a
delinquent child for … two or more violations of section 2903.21, 2903.211,
2903.22, or 2911.211 of the Revised Code, or any combination of those offenses”
involving the same person who is the subject of the protection order at issue.
{¶43} Count 6 of the indictment charged Edwards with Violating a
Protection Order in violation of R.C. 2919.27(A)(1) and (B)(4). Again, R.C.
2919.27(A)(1) provides in relevant part that “[n]o person shall recklessly violate the
terms of … [a] protection ordered issued … pursuant to section 2919.26 or
3113.31 of the Revised Code[.]” Pursuant to R.C. 2919.27(B)(4), as was further
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alleged in Count 6, Violating a Protection Order is a felony of the third degree “[i]f
the offender violates a protection order … while committing a felony offense.”
{¶44} In State v. Smith, 2013-Ohio-1698, the Supreme Court of Ohio held
that to sustain a conviction for a violation of a protection order pursuant to R.C.
2919.27, the State must establish, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the defendant had
been served with the order prior to the alleged violation. Then, in 2017, R.C.
2919.27 was amended to provide:
(D) In a prosecution for a violation of this section, it is not necessary
for the prosecution to prove that the protection order or consent
agreement was served on the defendant if the prosecution proves that
the defendant was shown the protection order or consent agreement
or a copy of either or a judge, magistrate, or law enforcement officer
informed the defendant that a protection order or consent agreement
had been issued, and proves that the defendant recklessly violated the
terms of the order or agreement.
In the instant appeal, Edwards’ manifest weight and sufficiency of the
evidence claims regarding Counts 4 and 6 focus strictly on the evidence relating to
whether he had been served with, or otherwise shown or informed about, the
protection orders at issue in those counts. Edwards contends that the prosecution
failed to prove that he was served with the final civil protection orders or that he
was provided notice of those orders via one of the methods set forth in R.C.
2919.27(D).
{¶45} However, Edwards’ arguments as to the evidence establishing service
and/or notice of the protection orders completely disregard State’s Exhibits 35 and
36, the amended returns of service discussed in the third assignment of error, supra.
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Contrary to Edwards’ claims in the first and second assignments of error, the
prosecution at trial presented evidence of both protection orders at issue. Then,
through State’s Exhibits 33, 34, 35, and 36, the State of Ohio presented certified
copies of the court documents that, when considered together, more than adequately
established under the legal standards of review set forth above that Edwards had
been served with the protection orders on April 5, 2023 and, therefore, such service
had been perfected prior to the offenses at issue in this case, which occurred on April
20, 2023.
{¶46} The first and second assignments of error are overruled.
Fourth Assignment of Error
{¶47} In the fourth assignment of error, Edwards asserts that his conviction
on Count 1 was against the manifest weight of the evidence.
{¶48} The standard of review applicable to manifest-weight challenges was
set forth above in the analysis of the first and second assignments of error and is
incorporated here by reference.
{¶49} In Count 1, Edwards was charged with, and found guilty of, Burglary
in violation of R.C. 2911.12(A)(1). R.C. 2911.12(A)(1) provides that “[n]o person,
by force, stealth, or deception, shall … [t]respass in an occupied structure or in a
separately secured or separately occupied portion of an occupied structure, when
another person other than an accomplice of the offender is present, with purpose to
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commit in the structure or in the separately secured or separately occupied portion
of the structure any criminal offense.”
{¶50} As presented to the jury at trial, Count 1 related to Edwards’ trespass
at his mother’s home in the early morning hours of April 20, 2023. With regard to
that incident, the evidence introduced at trial reflected that on April 20, 2023, at
approximately 2:00 a.m., Edwards’ mother, Patricia, and his brother Charles were
both in the first-floor living room of Patricia’s home at 561 Prospect. At that time,
Charles and Patricia heard a noise and realized that Edwards had entered the
screened-in front porch of the house. Edwards then cracked open the front door
leading from the screened porch to the living room and spoke to his mother through
the cracked door. Edwards asked for a phone charger, his mother refused his
request, and Edwards left the premises.
{¶51} On appeal, Edwards takes issue only with the evidence presented in
support of the required element that his trespass took place in a separately secured
portion of the occupied structure, to-wit: the screened-in front porch of his mother’s
residence. Edwards argues that because neither his mother or brother actually saw
him inside of the screened porch, but were only relying on what they could hear, the
evidence proved only that he was somewhere near the home and that he could have
been on the exterior stairs of the screened porch without actually having entered the
porch. We disagree.
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{¶52} At trial, Charles and Patricia testified that Edwards came over to the
house that first time while Charles and his mother were resting in the living room.
The house has an enclosed porch on the front of it, which is accessed from the
outside through a screen door. Charles testified that he heard a noise and then could
hear Edwards’ voice coming from the screened-in porch. Charles testified that
Edwards then cracked open the wooden door that leads from the screened porch into
the living room, and that Edwards then spoke to his mother through the cracked
open front door, which clearly placed Edwards inside of the screened-in porch.
Patricia also testified that Edwards cracked open the door to the living room from
the porch and spoke to her through that opened door. That, again, placed Edwards
in the screened-in porch, not outside of it. The testimony of Charles and Patricia,
along with that of Patrolman Bagley who responded afterwards, also served to
establish that damage had occurred to the exterior door of the screened porch, where
a screen “window” had been pushed in. Causing such damage would have provided
Edwards with a means to reach inside and open the latched exterior door to the
porch, which further corroborates the fact that Edwards actually entered the
screened porch area, as opposed to just standing outside of the porch on the front
exterior steps.
{¶53} The above evidence, viewed as a whole, more than adequately
established that Edwards trespassed in the screened-in porch area, particularly in the
absence of any evidence to the contrary. After reviewing the entire record, weighing
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the evidence, and considering the credibility of the witnesses, we are not persuaded
that the jury lost its way and created such a miscarriage of justice that Edwards’
conviction on the Burglary charged in Count 1 must be reversed.
{¶54} The fourth assignment of error is overruled.
Conclusion
{¶55} Having found no error prejudicial to the defendant-appellant in the
particulars assigned and argued, the judgment of conviction and sentence entered in
the Allen County Court of Common Pleas is affirmed.
Judgment affirmed
ZIMMERMAN and MILLER, J.J., concur.
/jlm
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