[Cite as State v. Williams,
2024-Ohio-5999.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
ELEVENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
TRUMBULL COUNTY
STATE OF OHIO, CASE NO. 2024-T-0034
Plaintiff-Appellee,
Criminal Appeal from the
- vs - Court of Common Pleas
TYRELL WILLIAMS,
Trial Court No. 2023 CR 00779
Defendant-Appellant.
OPINION
Decided: December 23, 2024
Judgment: Affirmed
Dennis Watkins, Trumbull County Prosecutor, and Ryan J. Sanders, Assistant
Prosecutor, Administration Building, Fourth Floor, 160 High Street, N.W., Warren, OH
44481 (For Plaintiff-Appellee).
Adam Parker, The Goldberg Law Firm, LLC, 323 West Lakeside Avenue, Suite 450,
Cleveland, OH 44113 (For Defendant-Appellant).
ROBERT J. PATTON, J.
{¶1} Defendant-appellant, Tyrell Williams (“appellant”), appeals from the
judgment of the Trumbull County Court of Common Pleas sentencing appellant to
consecutive prison terms on his convictions of felonious assault and kidnapping. The trial
imposed an aggregate sentence of a minimum of 26 years to a maximum of 31 years plus
fines and costs. Upon review, the trial court complied with the sentencing provisions. The
individual sentences imposed by the trial court were within the statutory range. The trial
court made the consecutive findings as required by R.C. 2929.14. Despite not using the
exact language in R.C. 2929.14(C), the trial court’s observations at sentencing and the
record before us, including appellant’s presentence investigation, support the trial court’s
findings pursuant to R.C. 2929.14(C) and the trial court’s imposition of consecutive
sentences. As such, we affirm the judgment of the Trumbull County Court of Common
Pleas.
{¶2} On October 18, 2023, the Trumbull County Grand Jury returned a nine-
count indictment charging appellant with two counts of domestic violence, third degree
felonies, in violation of R.C. 2919.25(A)&(D)(1)(4) (Counts 1 and 3); two counts of
felonious assault, second degree felonies, in violation of R.C. 2903.11(A)(1)&(D)(1)(a)
(Counts 2 and 4); endangering children, a third-degree felony, in violation of R.C.
2919.22(B)(2)&(E)(3) (Count 5); two counts of kidnapping, first degree felonies, in
violation of R.C. 2905.01(A)(3)&(C)(1) (Counts 6 and 7); and two counts of kidnapping,
first degree felonies, in violation of R.C. 2905.01(B)(2)&(B)(1)(2). Counts 2, 4, 6, 7, 8,
and 9 also had accompanying repeat violent offender specifications pursuant to R.C.
2941.149.
{¶3} On March 19, 2024, appellant appeared with counsel, waived his rights,
and entered a plea of guilty to both counts of felonious assault, second degree felonies
(Counts 2 and 4), endangering children, a third degree felony, (Count 5); and two counts
of kidnapping, first degree felonies (Counts 6 and 7) as charged in the indictment. The
remaining charges and all of the repeat violent offender specifications were dismissed. A
presentence investigation (“PSI”) was ordered.
{¶4} The State offered the following factual basis at the plea hearing:
Had we proceeded to trial, the [S]tate would have proven each
and every element of each and every offense beyond a
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reasonable doubt. Specifically, on or about the date
referenced in the indictment, in Trumbull County, Ohio, this
defendant did, knowingly cause serious physical harm to one
[L.M.], the mother of his child, and … his one-year-old child,
[J.W.].
Furthermore, he restrained them of their liberty and removed
them from the place they were found. He also created a
substantial risk to the health and safety of the minor child.
The [S]tate would have offered the testimony of the victim, law
enforcement officers and provided surveillance footage of the
entire incident to prove its case.
Dkt. 25, T.p. Plea and Sentencing, p. 13-14.
{¶5} A sentencing hearing was held on April 9, 2024. During the hearing, the trial
court watched surveillance footage which captured the assault on appellant’s own child,
a child under the age of 2, and the child’s mother. In the video, appellant repeatedly struck
the female victim. He then kicked his child in the head. Shortly after, appellant kicked the
child again, with such force that the child travelled some distance across the room, before
returning to continue his rampage on the female victim. When the female victim grabbed
their child into her arms, appellant tackled them both to the ground.
{¶6} The trial court determined that Count 2 (felonious assault) and Count 5
(endangering children) merged for purposes of sentencing. The State elected to proceed
on Count 2. The court below sentenced appellant to a prison term seven (7) years on
Count 2; four (4) years of Count 4; an indefinite term of a minimum of 10 years to a
maximum of 15 years on Count 6; and five (5) years on Count 7. The court ordered that
all sentences be served consecutively for an aggregate sentence of a minimum of 26
years to a maximum of 31 years plus fines and costs. Appellant was also informed of his
duty to register as a violent offender.
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{¶7} Appellant timely appeals and raises a single assignment of error: “[t]he trial
court committed plain error in imposing consecutive sentences.” We disagree.
{¶8} R.C. 2953.08(G) governs our review of felony sentences, and provides, in
relevant part, that after an appellate court’s review of the record, it “may increase, reduce,
or otherwise modify a sentence that is appealed under this section or may vacate the
sentence and remand the matter to the sentencing court for resentencing … if it clearly
and convincingly finds … [t]hat the record does not support the sentencing court's
findings under division … (C)(4) of section 2929.14 ….” R.C 2953.08(G)(2)(a). See,
State v. Marcum, 2016-Ohio-1002, ¶ 1.
Ordinarily, appellate courts defer to the broad discretion trial
courts have in making sentencing decisions, and R.C.
2953.08(G) reflects that deference. See [State v.] Gwynne,
2023-Ohio-3851, at ¶ 11 (lead opinion), quoting State v.
Rahab, 2017- Ohio-1401, ¶ 10 (lead opinion). That makes
sense: the trial judge presided over the trial and heard the
witnesses testify, the defendant made his allocution to the
sentencing judge directly, and the trial judge will often have
heard directly from the victims at sentencing. Thus, an
appellate court’s role is not to be a “second-tier sentencing
court.” State v. Ladson, 2016-Ohio-7781, ¶ 9 (8th Dist.); see
also State v. Jones, 2020-Ohio-6729, ¶ 41-42. Appellate
courts possess no inherent right to review a felony sentence.
Indeed, “[e]xcept to the extent specifically directed by statute,
‘it is not the role of an appellate court to substitute its judgment
for that of the sentencing court as to the appropriateness of a
particular sentence.’ ” Williams v. United States, 503 U.S. 193,
205 (1992), quoting Solem v. Helm,
463 U.S. 277, 290, fn. 16
(1983).
State v. Glover, 2024-Ohio-5195, ¶ 39.
{¶9} “A court may order consecutive prison terms if it finds it is ‘necessary to
protect the public from future crime or to punish the offender and that consecutive
sentences are not disproportionate to the seriousness of the offender's conduct and to
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the danger the offender poses to the public,’ and finds any of the R.C. 2929.14(C)(4)(a)-
(c) factors are present.” State v. Campbell, 2023-Ohio-4597, ¶ 11 (11th Dist.). “To impose
consecutive terms, the court ‘is required to make the findings mandated by R.C.
2929.14(C)(4) at the sentencing hearing and incorporate its findings into its sentencing
entry.’ ”
Id., quoting State v. Elliott,
2023-Ohio-412, ¶ 9 (11th Dist.). See also Glover at ¶
38.
{¶10} Like the defendant in Campbell, appellant did not object to the trial court’s
imposition of consecutive sentences at the sentencing hearing. Therefore, appellant has
waived all but plain error. Campbell at ¶ 12, citing State v. Aikens,
2016-Ohio-2795, ¶ 53
(11th Dist.). “When the record demonstrates that the trial court failed to make the findings
required by R.C. 2929.14(C)(4) before imposing consecutive sentences …, the
appellant's sentence … constitutes plain error.” (Citation omitted.) State v. Haworth,
2020-Ohio-1326, ¶ 40 (11th Dist.).
{¶11} Furthermore, appellant, like Campbell, argues that the trial court erred when
it made an incomplete “proportionality finding” when imposing consecutive sentences.
{¶12} At the sentencing hearing, the trial court stated:
The Court has considered the overriding principles and
purposes of felony sentencing, the Court further has
considered all relevant seriousness and recidivism factors.
The Court finds the sentence shall be proportionate to the
defendant’s conduct, as well as consistent with similarly
situated offenders.
The Court makes the following specific findings as they relate
to all counts: The defendant’s conduct is more serious than
the conduct normally constituting the offense. The mental
injury suffered by the victim due to the conduct of the
defendant was exacerbated because of the age of the minor
victim, who was approximately an 18-month-old - - your own
son. The victims have suffered both serious physical and
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psychological harm. The defendant’s relation with the victims
facilitated the offenses. The defendant was a person in
arrangement of loco parentis of the minor victim. The
defendant is highly likely to commit future crimes. The
defendant has shown no genuine remorse for the crimes
committed. The defendant has an extensive criminal history.
And the defendant was on parole when these offenses were
committed.
…
The Court also finds, pursuant to Ohio Revised Code Section
2929.14, that it is necessary to protect the public from future
crime of the defendant, that consecutive sentences are not
disproportionate to the seriousness of the offenses of the
offenders conduct; that one or all of the offenses were
committed while on parole; that due to the conduct of the
defendant, a single prison term would not adequately reflect
the seriousness of the conduct of the defendant; the
defendant’s criminal history clearly demonstrates consecutive
sentences are necessary to protect the public.
Dkt. 25, T.p. Plea and Sentencing, p. 21-22.
{¶13} These findings were further incorporated into the sentencing entry. Dkt. 16,
p. 2-3. In the sentencing entry, the trial court specifically found “that consecutive
sentences are necessary to protect the public from future crime and to punish the
Defendant, and that consecutive sentences are not disproportionate to the seriousness
of the Defendant’s conduct and to the danger the Defendant poses to the public.”
(Emphasis added.)
{¶14} As this Court acknowledged in Campbell:
We agree that R.C. 2929.14(C)(4) requires a complete finding
that ‘consecutive sentences are not disproportionate to the
seriousness of the offender's conduct and to the danger the
offender poses to the public.’ … We also agree that, at the
sentencing hearing, the trial court stated that ‘consecutive
sentences are not disproportionate to the seriousness of the
offender's conduct’ but omitted specific mention of ‘the danger
the offender poses to the public,’ although it did make such
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finding in its sentencing entry. The failure to make a required
consecutive sentencing finding at the sentencing hearing
renders a sentence contrary to law. [State v.] Elliott, [2023-
Ohio-412] at ¶ 12 [(11th Dist.)]. However, ‘[t]he trial court has
no obligation … to engage in a “word-for-word recitation” of
the language in the statute or to set forth its reasons to support
its findings, as long as they are discernible in the record.’
(Citation omitted.) State v. Cozzone, 2018-Ohio-2249, ¶ 27
(11th Dist.).
Campbell, 2023-Ohio-4597, at ¶ 13 (11th Dist.).
{¶15} This Court concluded that “[a]lthough imperfect, the trial court adequately
made the required finding regarding the proportionality of consecutive sentences.” Id., at
¶ 14. See State v. Mack, 2023-Ohio-4374, ¶ 82 (11th Dist.). This is consistent with this
Court’s precedent. See State v. Arcuri,
2016-Ohio-8254, ¶ 90 (11th Dist.) (holding “[t]hat
the court considered the proportionality of Arcuri's sentence with respect to the
seriousness of his conduct is demonstrated by the court's finding of several factors
rendering that conduct more serious”); State v. Carnes,
2015-Ohio-4429, ¶ 15 (11th Dist.)
(“[i]t is clear that, although the trial court did not explicitly mention ‘proportionality,’ it
considered the imposition of sentence in relation to … the danger posed to the public”
where it outlined the facts of the crime and the harm to the victims). See also State v.
Polhamus,
2014-Ohio-145, ¶ 28 (2d Dist.); State v. Moore,
2023-Ohio-3834, ¶ 26 (6th
Dist.).
{¶16} Here, while the trial court did not explicitly state at the sentencing hearing
that consecutive sentences were not disproportionate to the seriousness of the
appellant’s conduct and to the danger the appellant poses to the public, it is clear from
the trial court’s statements during the hearing, that the trial court extensively considered
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appellant’s past and current conduct before concluding that consecutive sentences were
warranted.
{¶17} During the hearing, the trial court noted appellant’s extensive criminal
history which included convictions for failure to comply, possession of cocaine, domestic
violence, felonious assault, and domestic violence. Appellant was also out on parole for
an escape charge when these charges were filed. The trial court stated:
Mr. Williams, your behavior in this case serves as a stark
reminder of the necessity of laws in our society requiring that
violent criminals are incarcerated for long periods of time. You
violated the utmost trust placed in an adult, further
underscoring the severity of your actions. Your calculated
actions in brutally beating and kicking your own child utterly
defies any notion of human decency. The video of you
assaulting your own infant child and your girlfriend speaks
volumes about your character, more than anything this Court
could ever say. In fact, your conduct in this video epitomizes
the profile of a violent criminal.
Dkt. 25, T.p. Plea and Sentencing, p. 23-24.
{¶18} The trial court continued:
[A]s judges, our primary duty is to delicately balance the
severity of the crimes committed with the appropriate
punishment, taking into account the full extent of the harm
caused by your criminal behavior. However, there are certain
offenses that surpass any attempt at justification or
rationalization. Your reprehensible acts demand the highest
scrutiny and condemnation by the judicial system. It is the
intent of this Court to give you a sentence, allowed by law, to
assure you never harm another human being for a significant
duration. (Emphasis added.)
Dkt. 25, T.p. Plea and Sentencing, p. 26.
{¶19} “A trial court's proportionality analysis ‘does not occur in a vacuum, but,
instead, focuses upon the defendant's current conduct and whether this conduct, in
conjunction with the defendant's past conduct, allows a finding that consecutive service
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is not disproportionate [to the danger the defendant poses to the public].’ (Citations
omitted.) State v. Johnson, 2023-Ohio-2008, ¶ 35 (6th Dist.).” Campbell,
2023-Ohio-4597,
at ¶ 15 (11th Dist.). The record, including the video, as well as the observations noted by
the trial court at sentencing support a conclusion that the court considered that the
consecutive sentences were not disproportionate to the danger presented by the
defendant to the public despite not using the exact words in the statute. Instead, the trial
court concluded a prison term was necessary so appellant could “never harm another
human being for a significant duration.” This characterization by the trial court is
synonymous to the proportionality language contained in R.C. 2929.14(C) “that
consecutive sentences are not disproportionate to the seriousness of the offender's
conduct and to the danger the offender poses to the public.”
{¶20} As such, the trial court complied with R.C.2929.14(C). Upon review, the
record in this case does not clearly and convincingly fail to support the trial court's
consecutive-sentence findings. Glover, 2024-Ohio-5195, at ¶ 61. Thus, appellant’s sole
assignment of error is without merit.
{¶21} For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the Trumbull County Court of
Common Pleas is affirmed.
MATT LYNCH, J.,
JOHN J. EKLUND, J.,
concur.
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