In re C.D.

[Cite as In re C.D., 

.]




                            IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
                                SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
                                   SANDUSKY COUNTY

In re C.D.                                       Court of Appeals Nos. S-24-005

                                                 Trial Court Nos. JC22230020


                                                 DECISION AND JUDGMENT

                                                 Decided: December 27, 2024

                                        …
        Christopher M. Marcinko, for appellee.

        Robert P. Soto, for appellant.
                                         …

        {¶ 1} This is an appeal from the judgment by the Sandusky County Court of

Common Pleas, Juvenile Division, which overrode the objections by defendant-appellant

mother, A.D.,1 to the magistrate’s decision granting plaintiff-appellee maternal

grandmother, R.P., companionship time with the minor child, C.D. For the reasons set

forth below, this court reverses the judgment of the juvenile court.




1
 Later in the record mother is referred to as A.S., due to her marriage two weeks after
appellee filed the complaint.
                                      I. Background

       {¶ 2} This matter commenced on January 31, 2022, upon the filing by appellee of

a complaint for grandparent visitation as being in the best interest of C.D. pursuant to

R.C. 3109.12(A), which relevantly states “If a child is born to an unmarried woman, the

parents of the woman . . . may file a complaint requesting the court of common pleas of

the county in which the child resides to grant them reasonable companionship or

visitation rights with the child.” Appellee alleged that appellant was the natural mother of

C.D., both residing in Sandusky County, and that appellee was the maternal grandmother

of C.D. Appellee alleged that appellant was unmarried, and the father of C.D. was

unknown. Appellee further alleged that she provided appellant and C.D. “with a home,

food, and physical and emotional support for the first two years of his life and is a

caregiver and trusted confidant and support for the child.”

       {¶ 3} After mediation and pre-trial negotiations failed, the matter proceeded to

trial before a magistrate on December 2, 2022. The magistrate heard testimony from five

witnesses and admitted 13 exhibits into evidence. Appellant did not challenge the

juvenile court’s subject-matter jurisdiction prior to or at the trial. On December 6, the

magistrate issued a decision with 25 findings of fact and conclusions of law, including a

review of the factors stated in R.C. 3109.051(D)(1)-(16). The magistrate decided: (1) to

grant appellee’s complaint for grandparent visitation with C.D., (2) to set the

companionship for “one weekend per month from Friday at 7:00 PM to Sunday at 8:00

PM,” (3) to order that appellee “shall provide transportation to and from the

companionship,” and (4) to order that appellee “shall pay the costs of this action.”

2.
       {¶ 4} Appellant timely objected, with supplement, to the magistrate’s decision for

three reasons: (1) appellee’s companionship time with C.D. was not in the child’s best

interests, (2) the magistrate’s decision and findings were not supported by the weight of

the evidence of her parental wishes against visitation, and (3) the juvenile court lacked

subject-matter jurisdiction to order the grandparent visitation.

       {¶ 5} Appellee opposed appellant’s objections. Appellee argued the weight of the

evidence favored granting the complaint under R.C. 3109.12. Appellant’s testimony

confirmed the loving relationship C.D. had with appellee and her husband. Appellant

admitted that neither grandparent would harm C.D. and that the grandparents had “too

good of a relationship” with C.D. while appellant worked and was in their care. Appellee

further argued the juvenile court, a division of the Sandusky County Court of Common

Pleas, had subject matter jurisdiction because appellant’s reliance on In re Gibson, 

 (1991) was misplaced as it was decided 10 years before the enactment of

R.C. 3109.12. Appellee further argued that this court has repeatedly upheld a juvenile

court’s jurisdiction to determine grandparent visitations under R.C. 3109.12, citing In re

K.M.-B., 

 (6th Dist.); Wentz v. Wideman, 

 (6th Dist.); In

re A.M., 

 (6th Dist.); and In re A.R., 

 (6th Dist.).

       {¶ 6} On February 12, 2024, the juvenile court filed its judgment entry approving

and adopting the magistrate’s December 6, 2022 decision, after independently

considering the record, including appellant’s objections. The trial court overruled each of

appellant’s objections. As to appellant’s first objection,



3.
               [U]pon the independent review of the Court’s file, transcripts, and
       pleadings, along with all information, evidence, and arguments contained
       therein, the Court, upon the appropriate application of the standards and law,
       comes to the same conclusion as that of the assigned Magistrate. . . being that
       the requested grandparent visitation is in the best interest of the minor child
       in this case.


       {¶ 7} As to appellant’s second objection,

              On the matter of the weight of the evidence. . . A review of the
       decision under scrutiny would show that the Magistrate listed each of the
       relevant factors from Ohio Revised Code section 3109.051(D)(1)(-(16), as
       well as his impressions from the trial that were taken into consideration.


       {¶ 8} As to appellant’s third objection,

              As to the lack of jurisdiction, this Court finds that argument not well
       taken, based upon the various applicable statutes and case law; as also argued
       in the Grandmother’s responsive pleading. This Court clearly has subject
       matter jurisdiction to determine grandparent visitation under the
       circumstances of this case.

       {¶ 9} The trial court then ordered: (1) to grant appellee’s complaint for

grandparent visitation with C.D., (2) to set the companionship for “one weekend per

month from Friday at 7:00 PM to Sunday at 8:00 PM,” (3) to order that appellee “shall

provide transportation to and from the companionship,” and (4) to order that appellee

“shall pay the costs of this action” while also ordering “No costs shall be assessed for this

matter, which is now closed.”

       {¶ 10} Appellant timely appealed the juvenile court’s judgment setting forth two

assignments of error:

       1.     The trial court’s decision was against the manifest weight of the

              evidence.

4.
       2.     The trial court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over this matter.

       {¶ 11} We will first address appellant’s second assignment of error, which is

dispositive of this appeal.

                              II. Subject-Matter Jurisdiction

       {¶ 12} In support of her second assignment of error, appellant argues that where

the juvenile court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to grant appellee grandparent

visitation with C.D., that order is void. Appellant relies on In re Gibson and on In re

C.W., 

 (9th Dist.) to argue the juvenile court’s subject-matter jurisdiction

is limited to the custody of children under R.C. 2151.23(A)(2), which does not include

grandparent visitation of an unwed mother’s child under R.C. 3109.12. R.C.

2151.23(A)(2) states, “The juvenile court has exclusive original jurisdiction under the

Revised Code as follows: . . . (2) subject to [R.C. 2301.03(G), (I), (K), and (M)2], to

determine the custody of any child not a ward of another court of this state.”

       {¶ 13} Appellant also relies on State ex rel. Jones v. Paschke, 

(11th Dist.), aff’d, 

, to argue that “visitation” (and the related concept

“companionship”) under R.C. 3109.12 is a distinct legal concept from “custody” under

R.C. 2151.23(A)(2) such that appellee’s complaint for visitation with C.D. is a domestic-



2
  R.C. 2301.03 concerns the designation of domestic relations, juvenile and probate duties
of the judges in the courts of common pleas for specific counties. R.C. 2301.03(G)
concerns Richland County; R.C. 2301.03(I) concerns Summit County; R.C. 2301.03(K)
concerns Butler County; and R.C. 2301.03(M) concerns Lake County. Sandusky County
is not addressed in R.C. 2301.03 because it does not have a separately-elected domestic
relations judge. State ex rel. Jones v. Paschke, 

 (identifying the
analogous situation in Geauga County).
5.
relations matter under R.C. 3105.11(B)(2). Consequently, R.C. 3109.12 is beyond the

juvenile court’s subject-matter jurisdiction under R.C. 2151.23(A)(2).

       {¶ 14} In response, appellee argues the juvenile court had subject matter

jurisdiction. Appellant’s reliance on In re Gibson was misplaced because R.C. 3109.12

“was not the law at the time of In re Gibson, but addresses a situation in which a child is

born to an unmarried mother and expressly and directly addresses what a court may do

when that scenario occurs.” Appellee was eligible to seek visitation with C.D. under R.C.

3109.12(A)(2) and filed her complaint in the juvenile division of the court of common

pleas of the county in which C.D. resides.

       {¶ 15} The juvenile court, without citing to any specific legal authority, summarily

concluded it had subject-matter jurisdiction over appellee’s complaint for visitation solely

under R.C. 3109.12. We review de novo, as a question of law, the juvenile court’s

determination that it had subject-matter jurisdiction. State v. Hudson, 

; In re C.W., 

 (9th Dtst.)..

       {¶ 16} First, we must clarify that R.C. 3109.12 was the law at the time of the In re

Gibson decision on July 24, 1991, when the Ohio Supreme Court specifically cited the

statute and determined R.C. 3109.12 had no effect on the outcome of the case. In re

Gibson, 

 (“In one departure from the ‘disruptive precipitating event’

principle, R.C. 3109.12 has been added to allow grandparental visitation in the case of ‘a

child . . . born to an unmarried woman.’”). Appellee is mistaken that R.C. 3109.12, which

was first effective on May 31, 1990, only took effect ten years after In re Gibson was

decided in 1991. The last amendment to R.C. 3109.12 was effective on March 22, 2001.

6.
From the beginning, R.C. 3109.12(A) contained the identical statutory language as the

version before the juvenile court in this matter: “If a child is born to an unmarried

woman, the parents of the woman and any relative of the woman may file a complaint

requesting the court of common pleas of the county in which the child resides to grant

them reasonable companionship or visitation rights with the child.”

       {¶ 17} Second, it is undisputed that the sole issue appellee brought to the juvenile

court was maternal grandparent visitation pursuant to R.C. 3109.12(A), and not custody

under R.C. 2151.23(A)(2). It is also undisputed there was no prior custody-related action

before the juvenile court with respect to C.D. at the time grandmother filed her complaint

under R.C. 3109.12. In that situation the Ohio Supreme Court has clearly stated the

juvenile court lacks jurisdiction: “The complaint of a grandparent seeking only visitation

with a grandchild may not be determined by the juvenile court pursuant to its authority to

determine the ‘custody’ of children under R.C. 2151.23(A)(2).” 

, syllabus.

Where a grandparent seeks from the juvenile court a determination of “visitation” and not

“custody,” the court reasoned, “The juvenile court possesses only the jurisdiction that the

General Assembly has expressly conferred upon it. [Appellant] Gilbert has pointed to no

statute that gives the juvenile court jurisdiction to determine his complaint for visitation.

We cannot go beyond the statutes and find jurisdiction on some other basis.” (Citations

omitted.) 

.

       {¶ 18} Simply put, R.C. 3109.12 alone does not confer juvenile court jurisdiction

to determine appellee’s complaint for visitation. The Ninth District Court of Appeals

directly addressed whether the juvenile court of Wayne county possessed “the subject

7.
matter jurisdiction regarding the class of cases which address the determination of an

award of ‘grandparent’ visitation pursuant to R.C. 3109.12(A).” In re R.G., 2021-Ohio-

93, ¶ 13 (9th Dist.). The court concluded the juvenile court lacked subject-matter

jurisdiction where there was no juvenile court case involving the child to implicate

jurisdiction. Id. at ¶ 26. “By its express language, R.C. 2151.23 accords no jurisdiction to

the juvenile court to determine grandparent visitation actions initiated pursuant to R.C.

3109.12,” and the juvenile court’s judgment granting grandparent visitation under R.C.

3109.12(A) was void ab initio. Id.

       {¶ 19} In addition to the In re Gibson reasoning, the Ohio Supreme Court recently

analyzed the juvenile court’s subject-matter jurisdiction, albeit in the context of granting

immunity for a criminal act, that is instructive on this issue.

               While probate courts -- like the courts of common pleas -- are
       provided for in the Ohio Constitution, juvenile courts were established by
       statute. See Article IV, Section 4(C) (“Unless otherwise provided by law,
       there shall be a probate division and such other divisions of the courts of
       common pleas as may be provided by law”). As a statutory creation, a
       juvenile court “possesses only the jurisdiction that the General Assembly has
       expressly conferred upon it.” In re Gibson, 

, 

 (1991). R.C. 2151.07 provides that a “juvenile court is a court
       of record within the court of common pleas” and vests juvenile courts with
       “the powers and jurisdiction conferred in Chapters 2151. and 2152. of the
       Revised Code.” R.C. 2151.23 limits the juvenile court's jurisdiction to certain
       subject matters involving juveniles. Nothing in R.C. 2151.23 -- or R.C.
       Chapters 2151 and 2152 generally -- gives the juvenile court authority to
       grant immunity from prosecution for a criminal act.

State ex rel. Reynolds v. Kirby, 

. We find the reasoning for the lack

of subject-matter jurisdiction applies to a juvenile court’s decision based solely on R.C.

3109.12, which is not provided for in R.C. Chapters 2151 and 2152.


8.
       {¶ 20} The Ohio Supreme Court acknowledges the outcome is different where

there is a pending or related matter that properly invokes the juvenile court’s jurisdiction.

Rowell v. Smith, 

 (while a complaint for custody under R.C.

2151.23(A)(2) does not confer jurisdiction on a juvenile court to determine a

grandparent’s statutory complaint seeking only visitation with a grandchild, a juvenile

court may issue temporary visitation orders that are in the child’s best interest during a

pending case for custody between the parent and nonparent). This court agrees with the

foregoing where the juvenile court’s jurisdiction has been specifically raised on appeal.

In re Sarah V., 

 (6th Dist. Feb. 8, 2002) (R.C. 3109.12 is applicable to

grandparent visitation orders issued by a juvenile court under R.C. 3111 et seq); Lourdes

K. v. Gregory Q., 

, *6 (6th Dist. May 16, 1997) (in child support case,

father of child, as determined under R.C. 3111.13, may request companionship and

visitation under R.C. 3109.12). Other Ohio courts of appeals also agree. Wilkinson v.

Stirr, 

, *3 (4th Dist. Oct. 14, 1992) (grandparent visitation within

juvenile court jurisdiction in the context of a paternity action under R.C. 2151.23(B)(2));

Brunner v. Stark Cty. Dept. of Job & Family Servs., 

 (5th Dist.) (no

prohibition filing R.C. 3109.12 complaint in juvenile court a pending R.C. 2151.353

case); In re A.M.S., 

 (8th Dist.) (no juvenile court jurisdiction over

visitation without pending custody or child support proceeding); In re S.L., 2024-Ohio-

117, ¶ 18-19 (9th Dist.) (juvenile court has jurisdiction over grandparent motion for

companionship as a collateral matter to an ongoing paternity case between mother and

father filed in juvenile court).

9.
       {¶ 21} In response, appellee cites this court’s decision in In re K.M.-B. to support

her argument that we upheld a juvenile court’s subject-matter jurisdiction to determine

grandparent visitation with three grandchildren solely under R.C. 3109.12. We disagree.

       {¶ 22} In that case we held:

              Grandparents have no constitutional right to association with their
       grandchildren. The establishment of a home and the rearing of children is a
       fundamental liberty interest protected by the Fourteenth Amendment to the
       United States Constitution. Parental autonomy entitles the parents the sole
       duty and right to the custody, care and nurture of their child. Grandparents
       also have no common law legal rights of access to their grandchildren.
       However, the state has an interest to protect the welfare of children and may
       infringe upon the parental autonomy liberty interest if the law is limited to
       serve a compelling state interest. (Citations omitted.)

In re K.M.-B., 

 (6th Dist.). Nevertheless, one statute to give

reasonable companionship visitation to a nonparent, if requested and if such an award

would be in the best interest of the child, is R.C. 3109.12(A), where a child is born to an

unmarried woman. Id. at ¶ 21. We determined the Lucas County Court of Common Pleas,

Juvenile Division, lacked jurisdiction under R.C. 3109.11 and 3109.12 to award maternal

grandparent visitation with E.M. because the child was born after the parent’s marriage.

Id. at ¶ 23-25. Here, C.D. was not born after the parent’s marriage. We then determined

R.C. 3109.12(A) was unconstitutional as applied to T.M. because that child’s parents

cohabitated at the time of birth and married soon after. Id. at ¶ 26-40. Here, there is no

evidence appellant’s marriage subsequent to C.D.’s birth, when C.D. was about four

years old, was to C.D.’s father. We then determined the juvenile court abused its

discretion when it granted grandparent visitation with K.M.-B. under R.C. 3109.051 and

3109.12 for failing to consider all of the relevant factors in R.C. 3109.051(D). Id. at ¶ 18,

10.
41-51. The juvenile court’s subject-matter jurisdiction to determine grandparent visitation

with K.M.-B. solely under R.C. 3109.12 was not an issue on appeal and was not

addressed by this court.

       {¶ 23} Appellee next cites this court’s decision in Wentz v. Wideman to support

her argument. We disagree. In that decision, the paternal grandmother and step-

grandfather brought a complaint to establish visitation and companionship rights under

R.C. 3109.11 following the death of the children’s father. Wentz v. Wideman, 2021-Ohio-

2257, at ¶ 2-3 (6th Dist.). The children’s mother and father participated in a “marriage

ceremony” but never legally wed prior to the births of the children. Id. at ¶ 2. We

determined the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion when it granted grandparent

visitation with both grandchildren. Id. at ¶ 23. We further determined that R.C. 3109.11

was not unconstitutional as applied. Id. at ¶ 32. The juvenile court’s subject-matter

jurisdiction to determine grandparent visitation with the children solely under R.C.

3109.12 was not an issue on appeal and was not addressed by this court.

       {¶ 24} Appellee next cites this court’s decision in In re A.M. to support her

argument. Again, we disagree. In that decision, the father and mother of the child were

not married when the father brought in juvenile court a complaint to establish paternity

and to allocate parental rights and responsibilities. In re A.M., 

 (6th

Dist.). Between the age of three and seven, the father and mother entered into a shared

parenting plan until it was terminated by the juvenile court, who then designated father

the residential parent and legal custodian of the child. 

 When the child was eight years

old, the paternal grandmother brought motions to intervene and for R.C. 3109.12(A)

11.
visitation time. Id. at ¶ 4. After granting the motion to intervene, the juvenile court then

denied the paternal grandmother’s motion for visitation time with the grandchild. Id. at ¶

5. The juvenile court’s subject-matter jurisdiction to determine grandparent visitation

with the grandchild, which arose from custody proceedings, was not raised on appeal and

was not addressed by this court. Id. at ¶ 44.

       {¶ 25} Appellee finally cites this court’s decision in In re A.R. to support her

argument. We disagree. In that decision, the paternal grandmother filed in juvenile court

a complaint to obtain full legal custody of the grandchildren. In re A.R., 

 (6th Dist.). When the custody matter proceeded to trial, the grandmother withdrew

the complaint for custody and obtained leave to file a complaint for visitation under R.C.

3109.12. Id. at ¶ 5. The juvenile court subsequently dismissed the paternal grandmother’s

complaint for visitation for lack of standing under R.C. 3109.12(A) where paternity was

not first established as required by that statute. Id. at ¶ 9. We affirmed the paternal

grandmother’s lack of standing and determined the dismissal was without prejudice. Id. at

¶ 28-30. The juvenile court’s subject-matter jurisdiction to determine grandparent

visitation with the children, which originated from custody proceedings, was not raised

on appeal and was not addressed by this court.

       {¶ 26} Here, the juvenile court clearly believed R.C. 3109.12, alone, conferred it

subject-matter jurisdiction to determine appellee’s complaint for visitation with C.D. This

is understandable, given the Ohio Supreme Court acknowledges the plain language of

R.C. 3109.11, “the court of common pleas of the county in which the minor child

resides,” which is substantially identical to R.C. 3109.12, “the court of common pleas of

12.
the county in which the child resides,” does not mandate filing the complaint in any

particular division of the common pleas court. The court explained:

              The statute requires that the complaint be brought in “the court of
       common pleas of the county in which the minor child resides.” [R.C.
       3109.11] It does not specify that the complaint must be brought in a juvenile
       court or any other particular division of the court of common pleas. The
       legislature knows how to specify that a complaint must be brought in juvenile
       court, and many other statutes so require. See, e.g., R.C. 2151.85 (complaint
       of minor seeking to have abortion without parental notification); R.C.
       2152.021 (complaint alleging that child is delinquent); R.C. 3109.76
       (complaint of grandparent seeking custody); R.C. 3321.19(D)(2) (schoolattendance officer's complaint alleging that minor is a habitual truant). It did
       not do so in R.C. 3109.11. (Emphasis added.)

State ex rel. Jones v. Paschke, 

.

       {¶ 27} The specific issue before the Ohio Supreme Court was a writ of prohibition

in the Eleventh District Court of Appeals brought by the father of a minor child, whose

mother died and whose maternal grandmother sought R.C. 3109.11 visitation rights,

against the Geauga County Common Pleas general division judge presented with the

complaint. Id. at ¶ 1-4. This matter does not involve a writ of prohibition against the

juvenile court. Unlike this case, the father argued only the juvenile division had

jurisdiction over the grandmother’s complaint for companionship and visitation. Id. at ¶

5. The general division judge responded it had jurisdiction and filed a motion for

summary judgment, which the Eleventh District granted. Id.

       {¶ 28} However, a closer review reveals material aspects of the Ohio Supreme

Court’s Paschke decision that mirror the appeal before us. The court reviewed the

specific structure of the Geauga County Court of Common Pleas, which has no separate

domestic-relations judge, but has a general division and a combined probate and juvenile

13.
division. Id. at ¶ 2. We take judicial notice that the Sandusky County Court of Common

Pleas also only has a general division (comprised of criminal, civil, and domestic

relations cases) and a combined probate and juvenile division. In the absence of a

separate domestic-relations division, R.C. 3105.011(A) grants the general division

jurisdiction over “domestic relations matters” defined under R.C. 3105.011(B)(2) to

include R.C. Chapter 3109 matters, including R.C. 3109.11 visitation proceedings. Id. at

¶ 9, citing State ex rel. Gray v. Kimbler, 

. The same is true for

R.C. 3109.12. The court held that R.C. 3109.11 “gives general divisions of courts of

common pleas jurisdiction over grandparents’ complaints requesting companionship or

visitation.” Id. at ¶ 10. Here, R.C. 3109.12 gives the general division of the Sandusky

County Court of Common Pleas jurisdiction due to the nearly identical language with

R.C. 3109.11 for the filing of the complaint: in “the court of common pleas of the county

in which the child resides.”

       {¶ 29} Appellant does not argue which division of the Sandusky County Common

Pleas Court has subject-matter jurisdiction over appellee’s complaint for visitation, only

that the juvenile court lacks such exclusive, original jurisdiction. Therefore, the question

remains: how does appellee, a grandparent seeking visitation with a grandchild, who

meets the R.C. 3109.12 statutory requirements for requesting visitation with that child,

properly get her request for visitation heard by “the court of common pleas of the county

in which the minor child resides”? The solution is for the juvenile court judge of the

Sandusky County Court of Common Pleas, without subject-matter jurisdiction, to transfer

the case to the common pleas judge of the general division, which has the necessary

14.
jurisdiction. See State ex rel. Richland Cnty. Children Services v. Richland Cnty. Court of

Common Pleas, 

 (the only recourse of the domestic-relations court

that patently and unambiguously lacked jurisdiction was to transfer the matter to the

juvenile court); Mays v. Mays, 

, *1 (2d Dist. June 14, 1993) (“Any

judge of the Court of Common Pleas may order a case transferred to another judge or

division of the Court, if that judge and division of the court has jurisdiction of the

matter.”). We find no statute plainly deprives the general division of the Sandusky

County Common Pleas Court of subject-matter jurisdiction over appellee’s R.C. 3109.12

complaint for grandparent visitation. State ex rel. Kelleys Island School Dist. Bd. of

Education v. Ohio Dept. of Education, 

 (6th Dist.).

       {¶ 30} Upon de novo review of the record before us, we find the juvenile court of

the Sandusky County Court of Common Pleas erred when it determined to have subject-

matter jurisdiction based solely on appellee’s complaint filed under R.C. 3109.12(A). We

reverse and remand this matter to the juvenile court to transfer it to the general division

for further proceedings.

       {¶ 31} Appellant’s second assignment of error is well-taken. In light of our

decision, appellant’s first assignment of error is moot. App.R. 12(A)(1)(c).

                                       III. Conclusion

       {¶ 32} On consideration whereof, the judgment of the Sandusky County Court of

Common Pleas, Juvenile Division, is reversed and remanded to the juvenile court to




15.
transfer this matter to the general division for further proceedings. Appellee is ordered to

pay the costs of this appeal pursuant to App.R. 24.

                                                                         Judgment reversed
                                                                             and remanded.




       A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to App.R. 27.
See also 6th Dist.Loc.App.R. 4.




Thomas J. Osowik, J.                            ____________________________
                                                          JUDGE
Gene A. Zmuda, J.
                                                ____________________________
Myron C. Duhart, J.                                       JUDGE
CONCUR.
                                                ____________________________
                                                          JUDGE




       This decision is subject to further editing by the Supreme Court of
  Ohio’s Reporter of Decisions. Parties interested in viewing the final reported
       version are advised to visit the Ohio Supreme Court’s web site at:
                http://www.supremecourt.ohio.gov/ROD/docs/.




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