[Cite as State v. Pennock,
2024-Ohio-6117.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
ELEVENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
TRUMBULL COUNTY
STATE OF OHIO, CASE NO. 2024-T-0021
Plaintiff-Appellee,
Criminal Appeal from the
- vs - Court of Common Pleas
KENYANA M. PENNOCK,
Trial Court No. 2022 CR 00892
Defendant-Appellant.
OPINION
Decided: December 31, 2024
Judgment: Affirmed
Dennis Watkins, Trumbull County Prosecutor, and Ryan J. Sanders, Assistant
Prosecutor, Administration Building, Fourth Floor, 160 High Street, N.W., Warren, OH
44481 (For Plaintiff-Appellee).
Eric D. Hall, P.O. Box 232, Medina, OH 44258 (For Defendant-Appellant).
ROBERT J. PATTON, J.
{¶1} Defendant-appellant, Kenyana Pennock (“Pennock”), appeals the order of
the Trumbull County Court of Common Pleas convicting her of Murder, a first-degree
felony, Felonious Assault, a second-degree felony, and Reckless Homicide, a third-
degree felony. For the following reasons, we affirm.
{¶2} This case stems from an incident that occurred on November 6, 2022. After
witnessing her brother beaten and left unconscious outside of a bar, Pennock drove her
vehicle with one of the assailants, Jesaree Harris (“Harris”), on the hood of her car at a
speed of 50 miles per hour. After a series of speeding up and slowing down, Harris fell
from the hood of Pennock’s car and onto the pavement. Harris later died from injuries
caused by that fall.
{¶3} A trial was held on January 16, 2024. Sergeant Trevor Sumption (“Sgt.
Sumption”), Detective Nicole Smith, Detective Eric Laprocina, Katrina Artis (“Artis”),
Alison Krywanczyk, M.D., Darryl Pennock (“Darryl”), and Pennock testified.
{¶4} Pennock described the night of the incident. Pennock testified that earlier in
the evening she went to a birthday party with co-workers and had a single “cooler” while
she was there. Pennock testified that afterwards, she came home and went to bed.
Sometime between 10:00 p.m. and 11:00 p.m., Pennock’s brother, Darryl, called her and
asked her to come out to the bar with him and their cousin. Pennock met Darryl at the
bar, ParkPlace Tavern, in Warren.
{¶5} Darryl had recently been paid and had around $5,000 in cash on him that
night. Pennock testified that when she arrived at the bar, Artis and a cousin named
Chardonnay were there, along with other people Pennock and Darryl knew. Pennock said
that Darryl was buying drinks for their cousins at the bar, when she noticed some of her
other cousins staring at Darryl. During the night at the bar, Artis danced with Darryl, and
a woman approached her and said “B, get off my man.” A fight ensued between Artis,
and two other women, Mika and Tasha. Artis then asked Pennock to go outside to talk.
Pennock testified that before this interaction, she did not know Artis.
{¶6} Darryl and Pennock exited the bar. Pennock testified that someone named
Marchell, Kvionna, and Kvionna’s boyfriend, along with a friend of Kvionna’s boyfriend, a
woman named Tamaralyn (“Lyn”), and Harris all came outside. Artis testified that Lyn was
Harris’s sister. Pennock testified that Kvionna told her she’s “the op.” Pennock explained
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that “the op” means an enemy. Pennock said that Lyn and Harris were angry because
they believed Darryl killed Kvionna’s father, Kevin Daniels.
{¶7} A brawl broke out outside the bar, and Darryl was attacked by multiple
assailants. Harris and others were beating Darryl, yelling “Kill that N . . . r.” Artis testified
that around ten people were involved, all fighting Darryl. Pennock opened her trunk to get
the attention of the people beating Darryl, but it did not deter them. Pennock saw Darryl
on the ground, bleeding and unconscious. She attempted to carry him away, but he was
too heavy. The fight ended, and Pennock testified that Harris walked within a few feet of
her but made no attempt to attack her.
{¶8} Pennock testified that she believed Lyn, who was still in the parking lot
sitting in her car, had a weapon, so Pennock drove her car into Lyn’s car to “get her out
of there.” After making a U-turn either in the road or a neighboring parking lot, Pennock
testified that Harris hopped onto the hood of her car. Pennock testified that she told the
police she saw Harris run into the street and block traffic. Pennock said, “Jesaree, I don’t
know where she came from, was right there. I hit my brakes for me not to hit her.”
{¶9} Pennock testified that she drove the car then slowed down multiple times to
attempt to get Harris off the hood of her car. Pennock said that she was chased by two
cars during the incident. Pennock said that she drove up the street, with Harris on the
hood, and intended to take Harris to the police station. Pennock admitted to lying to police
officers when they interviewed her. Pennock had at first told them that she stopped the
vehicle and Harris got off the car. Pennock further testified, “when I was driving, she did,
like, slide off.”
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{¶10} Dr. Alison Krywanczyk, M.D. (“Dr. Krywanczyk”) of the Cuyahoga County
Medical Examiner’s Office, performed Harris’s autopsy and testified to Harris’s autopsy
photos. At the hospital, before Harris’s death, doctors removed a portion of her skull to
relieve pressure from the buildup of blood around her brain (called a subdural hematoma).
Dr. Krywanczyk explained that subdural hematomas “are almost always caused by
trauma and blunt force injuries.” Dr. Krywanczyk testified that the injuries Harris displayed
were consistent with injuries she would expect someone to obtain if they were thrown
from a vehicle traveling in excess of 50 miles per hour and then striking the pavement.
{¶11} Dr. Krywanczyk also testified to other injuries Harris had, namely bruising
on Harris’s right leg. Dr. Krywanczyk explained that Harris had a fracture of her tibia under
the bruising. Dr. Krywanczyk stated, “So Ms. Harris had a very distinctive type of tibia
fracture. It’s sometimes called a butterfly fracture or a wedge fracture. And it’s a type of
injury that we see almost exclusively in pedestrians who are struck by motor vehicles
when they are standing.”
{¶12} Sgt. Sumption’s body cam, Pennock’s police statement, Pennock’s 911 call,
security footage from ParkPlace Tavern, Warren police street cam footage, crime scene
photos, autopsy photos, and a vehicle speed analysis were all admitted into evidence.
Video from ParkPlace Tavern was played for the jury showing the fight that broke out with
patrons at the bar and Darryl. Footage was also shown of Harris’s body colliding with
Pennock’s red Dodge Dart vehicle, and then of Harris on top of the hood of Pennock’s
car as Pennock accelerated her speed and drove away from the bar. Pennock was
convicted of murder and sentenced to 15 years to life in prison.
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Assignments of Error
{¶13} [1.] “The trial court erred and abused its discretion by failing or refusing to
give defendant-appellant’s requested jury instruction on self-defense, and/or defense of
others, at trial.”
{¶14} [2.] “The evidence was insufficient to support the jury’s verdicts of ‘guilty’
with respect to the charged offenses of murder, felonious assault nd (sic) reckless
homicide. Where the state failed to establish the required mens rea elements of those
offenses.”
{¶15} [3.] “Defendant- appellant’s convictions as to all counts were against the
manifest weight of the evidence, where the state failed to establish the required mens rea
elements of those offenses.”
Self-Defense Jury Instruction
{¶16} An appellate court reviews the trial court’s decision to give or not give a jury
instruction under an abuse of discretion standard. State v. Jordan, 2009-Ohio-6152, ¶ 30
(11th Dist.), citing State v. Kidd
2007-Ohio-6562, ¶ 42.
{¶17} “A self-defense claim includes the following elements: ‘(1) that the
defendant was not at fault in creating the situation giving rise to the affray; (2) that the
defendant had a bona fide belief that he [or she] was in imminent danger of death or great
bodily harm and that his [or her] only means of escape from such danger was in the use
of such force; and (3) that the defendant did not violate any duty to retreat or avoid the
danger.’” State v. Cunningham, 2024-Ohio-888, ¶ 30 (11th Dist.), quoting State v.
Messenger,
2022-Ohio-4562, ¶ 14.
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{¶18} To receive a requested jury instruction, the defendant must introduce
evidence that if believed, would cause reasonable minds to question the existence of the
defense. “If a requested instruction in a criminal case is legally correct and pertinent to
evidence in the record, the trial judge must include it, or the substance of it, in the jury
charge. State v. Rivers (1977), 50 Ohio App.2d 129. The standard to be applied in
determining whether the defendant has successfully raised an affirmative defense is
whether or not he has introduced sufficient evidence, which, if believed, would raise a
question in the minds of reasonable men concerning the existence of such an affirmative
defense. State v. Melchoir (1978),
56 Ohio St.2d 15.” State v. Gunther,
1987 WL 8231,
at *1 (11th Dist. March 20, 1987).
{¶19} To raise such a defense here, Pennock bore the burden of producing legally
sufficient evidence that her use of force against Harris was in self-defense. “‘[A] defendant
charged with an offense involving the use of force has the burden of producing legally
sufficient evidence that the defendant’s use of force was in self-defense,’ i.e., ‘if the
defendant’s evidence and any reasonable inferences about that evidence would allow a
rational trier of fact to find all the elements of a self-defense claim when viewed in the
light most favorable to the defendant, then the defendant has satisfied the burden.” State
v. Csehi, 2024-Ohio-779, ¶ 22 (11th Dist.), quoting State v. Messenger,
2022-Ohio-4562,
¶ 25.
{¶20} Further, the defendant must show that their belief of imminent death or great
bodily harm was objectively reasonable under the circumstances. “The second element
of self-defense requires a defendant to show that the defendant had a bona fide belief
that he was in imminent danger of death or great bodily harm and that his only means of
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escape was the use of deadly force. . . . The person’s belief must be objectively
reasonable under the circumstances and he must subjectively believe he needed to resort
to force to defend himself.” State v. Bundy, 2012-Ohio-3934, ¶ 54, citing State v. Thomas,
77 Ohio St.3d 323, 330-331. (Emphasis added.)
{¶21} Pennock argues that recent changes to Ohio’s Castle Doctrine eliminating
a duty to retreat are applicable. R.C. 2901.09(B) states, “*[A] person has no duty to retreat
before using self-defense, defense of another, or defense of that person’s residence if
that person is in a place in which the person lawfully has a right to be.”
{¶22} R.C. 2901.05(B)(2) provides:
[A] person is presumed to have acted in self-defense or
defense of another when using defensive force that is
intended or likely to cause death or great bodily harm to
another if the person against whom the defensive force is
used in the process of unlawfully and without privilege to do
so entering, or has unlawfully and without privilege to do so
entered, the residence or vehicle occupied by the person
using the defensive force.
{¶23} The conduct and location of the victim must be considered at the time the
defendant claims to have acted in self-defense. “In order for a defendant to receive the
benefit of a jury instruction on the presumption contained in R.C. 2901.05(B)(2), the trial
court must focus on the conduct and location of the victim at the time the defendant claims
to be acting in self-defense.” State v. Estelle, 2021-Ohio-2636, ¶ 16 (3rd Dist.).
{¶24} Here, the fight that ensued outside of the tavern was not with Pennock.
Harris had been fighting with Darryl, who was on the ground, unconscious. The fight had
concluded when Pennock left the parking lot, turned around, and returned. Harris was
walking in front of Pennock’s car, Harris struck Pennock, and then Pennock accelerated
in speed with Harris on top of the car. The video and testimony do not show that Harris
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attempted to enter Pennock’s vehicle. There is no indication that Harris was targeting
Pennock to further engage. The fight with Darryl had subsided, and none of the testimony
indicated that any of those individuals were attempting to further engage in a fight with
Pennock. The target of the fight was Darryl. “An actor is legally justified in using force only
when the person he is aiding would have been justified in using force to defend
themselves.” State v. Kovacic, 2012-Ohio-219, ¶ 16 (11th Dist.), citing State v. Wilson,
2009-Ohio-525, ¶ 38 (2nd Dist.). The evidence in the record shows Pennock was at fault
for creating the circumstances that led to Harris’s death and that Pennock was not
protecting Darryl at that point. When Pennock hit Harris, she testified that she had already
seen her brother lying on the ground injured, that the fight was over, and people were
leaving. Further, nothing in the evidence suggests that Pennock was protecting herself or
others when she sped down the road with Harris on top of her vehicle. Pennock did not
testify that Harris made any attempt to enter the vehicle.
{¶25} Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by not giving a jury
instruction on self-defense.
{¶26} Pennock’s first assignment of error is without merit.
Manifest Weight and Sufficiency
{¶27} Sufficiency of the evidence and manifest weight are interrelated, yet
distinguishable, and accordingly will be analyzed together.
{¶28} “‘“Sufficiency” is a term of art meaning that legal standard which is applied
to determine whether the case may go to the jury or whether the evidence is legally
sufficient to support the jury verdict as a matter of law.’” State v. Thompkins, 1997-Ohio-
52, ¶ 23, quoting Black’s Law Dictionary 1433 (6th Ed. 1990). “An appellate court’s
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function when reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to support a criminal conviction
is to examine the evidence admitted at trial to determine whether such evidence, if
believed, would convince the average mind of the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt.” State v. Jenks, 61 Ohio St.3d 259, (1991), superseded by constitutional
amendment on other grounds as stated by State v. Smith,
80 Ohio St.3d 89 (1997), fn. 4,
paragraph two of the syllabus. “The relevant inquiry is whether, after viewing the evidence
in a light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the
essential elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt.”
Id.
{¶29} “[W]eight of the evidence addresses the evidence’s effect of inducing
belief.” State v. Wilson, 2007-Ohio-2202, ¶ 25, citing State v. Thompkins,
1997-Ohio-52,
at ¶ 24. An appellate court must consider all the evidence in the record, the reasonable
inferences, the credibility of witnesses, and whether, “in resolving conflicts in the
evidence, the jury clearly lost its way and created such a manifest miscarriage of justice
that the conviction must be reversed and a new trial ordered.”
Thompkins at ¶ 25, quoting
State v. Martin, 20 App.3d 172, 175 (1st Dist. 1983). “When a court of appeals reverses
a judgment of a trial court on the basis that the verdict is against the weight of the
evidence, the appellate court sits as the ‘thirteenth juror’ and disagrees with the
factfinder’s resolution of the conflicting testimony.”
Thompkins at ¶ 25, quoting Tibbs v.
Florida,
457 U.S. 31, 42 (1982).
{¶30} Pennock contends that the evidence was insufficient to meet the mens rea
elements of murder, felonious assault, and reckless homicide.
{¶31} Pennock was found guilty of murder, in violation of R.C. 2903.02(B) and (D),
which provides:
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(B) No person shall cause the death of another as a proximate
result of the offender’s committing or attempting to commit an
offense of violence that is a felony of the first or second degree
. . ..
(D) Whoever violates this section is guilty of murder . . ..
{¶32} To be found guilty of murder under R.C. 2903.02(B) it must be found that
Pennock caused the death of another proximately while committing or attempting to
commit a violent first or second-degree felony. Harris died due to injuries she sustained
from the fall brought on by Pennock driving her vehicle with Harris on top of it. Pennock
was found guilty of felonious assault, a second-degree felony, and a violation of 2903.11
(A)(2) and (D)(1)(a), which provides:
(A) No person shall knowingly do either of the following:
...
(2) Cause or attempt to cause physical harm to another or to
another’s unborn baby by means of a deadly weapon or
dangerous ordnance.
(D)(1)(a) Whoever violates this section is guilty of felonious
assault.
{¶33} Pennock testified that she sped up and hit her brakes repeatedly in an
attempt to get Harris off the hood of her car. The ParkPlace Tavern security footage
showed Pennock driving her vehicle, Harris walking in front of Pennock’s vehicle,
Pennock hitting Harris, and Harris landing or moving on top of Pennock’s hood. At no time
did Pennock stop. Pennock slowed down, but when Harris appeared to mount Pennock’s
hood, it is unclear if she was pushed atop by the force of Pennock making contract with
the vehicle or if Harris jumped on top or a combination of both. However, at the point that
Harris is on top of Pennock’s vehicle, Pennock accelerated the speed and drove off.
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{¶34} R.C.2903.11(A)(2) prohibits someone from knowingly causing or attempting
to cause physical harm by means of a deadly weapon or dangerous ordinance. R.C.
2923.11(A) provides:
(A) “Deadly weapon” means any instrument, device, or thing
capable of inflicting death, and designed or specially adapted
for use as a weapon, or possessed, carried, or used as a
weapon.
{¶35} “Ohio caselaw is replete with examples of vehicles being considered deadly
weapons. See State v. Morrow, 2d Dist. Clark No. 2002-CA-37, 2002-Ohio-6527; State
v. Evans, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 01-AP-1112,
2002-Ohio-3322, ¶ 22 (‘an automobile may
be classified as a deadly weapon because it is capable of inflicting death[.]’); State v.
Bauman, 7th Dist. Columbiana No.
17 CO 0016,
2018-Ohio-4913 ¶ 28 (‘[A] vehicle is a
deadly weapon when the offender uses it in a manner likely to produce death or grave
bodily harm.’); State v. Sepeda, 6th Dist. Lucas No. L-21-1123,
2022-Ohio-1889, ¶ 42 (a
motor vehicle deliberately used to strike an individual is a deadly weapon).” State v.
Walker,
2023-Ohio-4690, ¶ 21 (2nd Dist.).
{¶36} R.C. 2901.22(B) defines knowingly:
(B) A person acts knowingly, regardless of purpose, when the
person is aware the person’s conduct will probably cause a
certain result or will probably be of a certain nature. A person
has knowledge of circumstances when the person is aware
that such circumstances probably exist. When knowledge of
the existence of a particular fact is an element of an offense,
such knowledge is established if a person subjectively
believes that there is a high probability of its existence and
fails to make inquiry or acts with a conscious purpose to avoid
learning the fact.
{¶37} To meet the elements of felonious assault it must be shown that the
defendant acted knowingly to attempt to cause physical harm with a deadly weapon. Dr.
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Krywanczyk testified that Harris’s injuries were consistent with those found almost
exclusively with individuals struck by motor vehicles. The State played surveillance video
for the jury showing Pennock drive away from the tavern, turn around, and then come
back to the tavern’s parking lot. When Pennock returned, Harris could be seen on the
video walking in front of Pennock’s moving car. Pennock’s car slowed but did not stop
when it made impact with Harris. Instead, when Pennock hit Harris, Harris went onto the
hood, and Pennock accelerated in speed, reaching at least 50 miles per hour. Pennock
testified, and it could be seen on video played for the jury, that Pennock slowed down and
sped up multiple times while Harris was on top of the hood. Blood was found on Pennock’s
vehicle, before the fall, indicating that Harris had injuries from the impact of Pennock’s
vehicle hitting her. The testimony, combined with the video, was enough to establish the
knowingly element of felonious assault.
{¶38} Pennock was also found guilty of Reckless Homicide, a violation of R.C.
2903.041(A) and (B) which provides:
(A) No person shall recklessly cause the death of another or
the unlawful termination of another’s pregnancy.
(B) Whoever violates this section is guilty of reckless homicide
….
{¶39} R.C. 2901.22(C) provides:
(C) A person acts recklessly when, with heedless indifference
to the consequences, the person disregards a substantial and
unjustifiable risk that the person’s conduct is likely to cause a
certain result or is likely to be of a certain nature. A person is
reckless with respect to circumstances when, with heedless
indifference to the consequences, the person disregards a
substantial and unjustifiable risk that such circumstances are
likely to exist.
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{¶40} Surveillance video from outside of the tavern showed Pennock driving up to
and hitting Harris. Pennock did not stop her vehicle. Instead, she drove down the road
with Harris on top of her hood, braking and accelerating at a speed of 50 miles per hour.
Harris died as result of the injuries she sustained falling from Pennock’s vehicle. Once
Harris was on top of Pennock’s hood, she had any number of options other than to
accelerate in speed and try to throw her off. Pennock’s own testimony indicated it was
her intention to try and get Harris off of the hood of her car. When Harris did come off the
car, she fell to the pavement causing injuries so severe that she ultimately died from them.
{¶41} There was sufficient evidence for the jury to conclude that Pennock acted
recklessly and that her actions ultimately lead to the death of Harris. Further, there was
sufficient evidence to fulfill the mens rea requirements of her convictions.
{¶42} Based on the overwhelming evidence presented at trial, described above,
the testimony of Dr. Krywanczyk, Pennock, Artis, and Darryl, as well as the videos of both
the fight, Pennock hitting Harris in the parking lot, and Harris falling form Pennock’s
vehicle onto the pavement, there was enough that a jury could reasonably conclude
Pennock’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Accordingly, it cannot be said that the jury
clearly lost its way.
{¶43} Pennock’s second and third assignments of error are without merit.
{¶44} For the foregoing reasons, the decision of the Trumbull County Court of
Common Pleas is affirmed.
MARY JANE TRAPP, J.,
JOHN J. EKLUND, J.,
concur.
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