[Cite as State v. Watts,
2024-Ohio-635.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT OF OHIO
HAMILTON COUNTY, OHIO
STATE OF OHIO, : APPEAL NO. C-230299
TRIAL NO. C-23TRD-5083
Plaintiff-Appellee, :
vs. :
O P I N I O N.
RHONDA WATTS, :
Defendant-Appellant. :
Criminal Appeal From: Hamilton County Municipal Court
Judgment Appealed From Is: Reversed and Cause Remanded
Date of Judgment Entry on Appeal: February 21, 2024
Melissa A. Powers, Hamilton County Prosecuting Attorney, and Sean M. Donovan,
Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for Plaintiff-Appellee,
Raymond T. Faller, Hamilton County Public Defender, and Sarah E. Nelson, Assistant
Public Defender, for Defendant-Appellant.
OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
WINKLER, Judge.
{¶1} Defendant-appellant Rhonda Watts appeals her conviction for driving
under an OVI suspension. Because we determine that the trial court erred in denying
Watts’s motion to suppress on the ground that Watts failed to meet her initial burden
to demonstrate that the state conducted a warrantless seizure, we reverse.
Background
{¶2} A Springfield Township police officer initiated a traffic stop of a vehicle,
and as a result of that stop, the officer cited Watts for driving under an OVI suspension
in violation of R.C. 4510.14. Watts challenged the charge by filing a motion to
suppress. Watts argued that the officer lacked reasonable suspicion or probable cause
to initiate the traffic stop, because Watts had been driving a vehicle registered to her
daughter, and the officer did not cite Watts with any other violations that day, except
the underlying driving under an OVI suspension. The trial court held a hearing on
Watts’s motion to suppress. At the hearing, the officer who had cited Watts testified,
but he could not provide any reason for the traffic stop. When asked whether he
stopped the vehicle in question that day, the officer testified, “I believe so.” When
asked if he recalled initiating a traffic stop of Watts’s vehicle, he responded, “Vaguely.”
{¶3} At the conclusion of the hearing, Watts’s counsel argued that the officer
had no reasonable suspicion to initiate the traffic stop based on the officer’s inability
to recall the reason for the stop. The state argued that Watts had the initial burden to
prove that the officer conducted a warrantless seizure, and that Watts had failed to
meet that burden. The trial court overruled Watts’s motion to suppress. The matter
proceeded to a bench trial where the trial court found Watts guilty and sentenced her
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OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
to six days in the Community Alternative Sentencing Center, a $250 fine, court costs,
and a one-year driving suspension. Watts appeals.
Defendant’s Initial Burden on a Motion to Suppress
{¶4} In her first assignment of error, Watts argues that the trial court erred
in overruling her motion to suppress.
{¶5} When a defendant files a motion to suppress under Crim.R. 47 on the
ground that the defendant’s Fourth Amendment rights have been violated by an
unreasonable search or seizure, the defendant has the initial burden to demonstrate
that the state lacked a warrant, and to state the grounds upon which the defendant
challenges the warrantless search or seizure. Xenia v. Wallace, 37 Ohio St.3d 216, 218,
524 N.E.2d 889 (1998). Once the defendant satisfies the initial burden under Crim.R.
47, the burden then shifts to the state to prove that it had justification to conduct the
warrantless search or seizure.
Id. The defendant satisfies the initial burden under
Xenia where the defendant’s motion to suppress states the “legal and factual bases
with sufficient particularity to place the prosecutor and court on notice of the issues to
be decided.” State v. Shindler,
70 Ohio St.3d 54, 58,
636 N.E.2d 319 (1994). “Shindler
does not require that a defendant set forth the basis for suppression in excruciating
detail. Instead, the question is whether the language used provides sufficient notice
to the state.” State v. Codeluppi,
139 Ohio St.3d 165,
2014-Ohio-1574,
10 N.E.3d 691,
¶ 13. Whether a motion to suppress satisfies the minimum standards under Crim.R.
47 is a legal question. Id. at ¶ 8.
{¶6} In this case, the trial court overruled Watts’s motion to suppress,
reasoning that Watts had failed to meet her initial burden under Xenia. In doing so,
the trial court relied on State v. Newell, 1st Dist. Hamilton Nos. C-160453, C-160454,
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OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
C-160455 and C-160456, 2017-Ohio-4143, ¶ 13. In Newell, the defendant was charged
with various traffic-related offenses, including OVI. The defendant filed a motion to
suppress, arguing that any statements she made were the product of an
unconstitutional, warrantless search and seizure. The arresting officer failed to appear
for the motion-to-suppress hearing, and the trial granted the defendant’s motion to
suppress. The state appealed. The Newell court reversed the trial court’s decision
granting the motion to suppress, and held that the defendant failed to discharge her
initial burden under Crim.R. 47 to show that her seizure was warrantless, or that her
statements were the result of a custodial interrogation.
{¶7} This case is distinguishable from Newell. Here, Watts filed a detailed
motion to suppress challenging the officer’s basis for the initial traffic stop. In her
motion, Watts argued that the officer lacked reasonable suspicion or probable cause
to initiate the traffic stop, because she had been driving a vehicle registered to her
daughter, and the officer did not cite Watts with any other violations, except driving
under an OVI suspension. Unlike Newell, where no evidence was presented to support
the motion to suppress, here the officer testified at the motion-to-suppress hearing.
The officer could not provide any reason for conducting the traffic stop involving
Watts. Based on the officer’s vague recollection of events and inability to remember
any reason for initiating the traffic stop, we determine that Watts sufficiently satisfied
her initial burden under Xenia to demonstrate that she was the subject of a warrantless
seizure.
No Evidence to Support Warrantless Seizure
{¶8} Because Watts satisfied her initial burden under Crim.R. 47 to show that
the officer conducted a warrantless seizure when he initiated the traffic stop of the
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OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
vehicle, and Watts’s motion to suppress sufficiently placed the state on notice of her
Fourth Amendment challenge, the burden then shifted to the state to show that the
warrantless seizure was justified. See Xenia, 37 Ohio St.3d at 220,
524 N.E.2d 889. A
police officer can initiate a traffic stop of a vehicle when: (1) the officer has reasonable,
articulable suspicion that a motorist has committed a crime, and the officer initiates
an investigatory stop of the vehicle, i.e., a Terry stop, or (2) the officer has a reasonable
belief that a motorist has committed a crime, i.e., probable cause. State v. Oliver,
2023-Ohio-1550,
214 N.E.3d 624, ¶ 45 (10th Dist.). The state did not provide any
evidence to show that the officer had reasonable suspicion or probable cause to initiate
the traffic stop of the vehicle driven by Watts. The officer could not recall initiating
the traffic stop, and the officer did not cite Watts with any other violations, except
driving under an OVI suspension. Therefore, the state failed to meet its burden under
Xenia to prove that it did not violate Watts’s Fourth Amendment rights.
{¶9} We hold that the trial court erred in denying Watts’s motion to suppress,
and we sustain her first assignment of error.
Sufficiency and Manifest Weight
{¶10} In her second assignment of error, Watts argues that her conviction was
based on insufficient evidence and was contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence.
Based on our resolution of Watts’s first assignment of error, this assignment of error
is moot, and we decline to address it.
Conclusion
{¶11} Having sustained Watts’s first assignment of error, we reverse the trial
court’s judgment. We remand the matter to the trial court with instructions to grant
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OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
the motion to suppress, and for further proceedings consistent with the law and this
opinion.
Judgment reversed and cause remanded.
BOCK, P.J., and BERGERON, J., concur.
Please note:
The court has recorded its own entry on the date of the release of this opinion.
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