[Cite as State v. Hall,
2024-Ohio-835.]
COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA
STATE OF OHIO, :
Plaintiff-Appellee, :
No. 112865
v. :
ENOCH HALL, :
Defendant-Appellant. :
JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION
JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED
RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: March 7, 2024
Criminal Appeal from the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas
Case No. CR-21-664990-A
Appearances:
Michael C. O’Malley, Cuyahoga County Prosecuting
Attorney, and Carla B. Neuhauser, Assistant Prosecuting
Attorney, for appellee.
Joseph V. Pagano, for appellant.
SEAN C. GALLAGHER, J.:
Appellant Enoch Hall (“appellant”) appeals his convictions in this
case. Upon review, we affirm.
On December 15, 2021, appellant was indicted on charges for
trafficking in violation of R.C. 2925.03(A)(2), drug possession in violation of
R.C. 2925.11(A), and possession of criminal tools in violation of R.C. 2923.24(A),
each a felony of the fifth degree and each with forfeiture specifications. Appellant
filed a motion to suppress that was denied by the trial court following a hearing that
was held prior to the start of trial.
The charges arose from an incident that occurred on October 15,
2021, when Cleveland Metroparks police officers found appellant sleeping in the
driver’s seat of a vehicle parked in Edgewater Park at 12:30 a.m., which is after
closing hours when people are not permitted in the park. Upon approaching the
vehicle, Officers Kara Ditch and Kevin Huff both smelled the odor of raw marijuana
coming from the vehicle and also observed a suspected marijuana blunt in plain view
on the center console. When a police sergeant arrived at the scene, appellant
stepped out of the vehicle and was handcuffed for officer safety, searched, and
placed in the back of a police cruiser. The officers searched appellant’s vehicle and
found the suspected marijuana blunt, a plastic bag of suspected raw marijuana, a
grocery bag containing a white powder that tested positive for cocaine, two scales,
$3,018, three cell phones, a box of sandwich bags, and baking powder. The
suspected marijuana was never tested. Other testimony and evidence were
presented.
During trial, the trial court denied appellant’s motions for acquittal.
The jury found appellant guilty on all counts and specifications. On May 17, 2023,
the trial court sentenced appellant to a jail term of 14 days on each count.
Appellant timely filed this appeal. He raises three assignments of
error for review.
Under his first assignment of error, appellant claims the trial court
erred by denying his motion to suppress. Appellant argues the officers lacked
probable cause to search him or his vehicle.
“Appellate review of a ruling on a motion to suppress presents a
mixed question of law and fact.” State v. Toran, Slip Opinion No. 2023-Ohio-3564,
¶ 14, citing State v. Burnside,
100 Ohio St.3d 152,
2003-Ohio-5372,
797 N.E.2d 71,
¶ 8. “An appellate court must accept the trial court’s findings of fact if they are
supported by competent, credible evidence.”
Id., citing State v. Fanning,
1 Ohio
St.3d 19, 20,
437 N.E.2d 583 (1982). “But the appellate court must decide the legal
questions independently, without deference to the trial court’s decision.”
Id., citing
Burnside at ¶ 8.
For a search or seizure to be reasonable under the Fourth
Amendment, it must be based upon probable cause and executed pursuant to a
warrant, unless an exception to the warrant requirement applies. State v. Moore,
90 Ohio St.3d 47, 49,
734 N.E.2d 804 (2000), citing Katz v. United States,
389 U.S.
347, 357,
88 S.Ct. 507,
19 L.Ed.2d 576 (1967); State v. Brown,
63 Ohio St.3d 349,
350,
588 N.E.2d 113 (1992). As the Supreme Court of Ohio has recognized, “the
smell of marijuana, alone, by a person qualified to recognize the odor, is sufficient
to establish probable cause to search a motor vehicle, pursuant to the automobile
exception to the warrant requirement.” Id. at 48. “There need be no other tangible
evidence to justify a warrantless search of a vehicle.” Id.
In this case, both officers testified to being employed as police officers
by the Cleveland Metroparks Police Department and to having received training
relative to their employment. Officer Ditch testified to her training for identifying
marijuana, including being trained in how it looks and how it smells. She testified
that when she approached the vehicle and as appellant rolled down the window, she
smelled the distinct odor of raw marijuana. She also observed a suspected
marijuana blunt in plain view in the vehicle’s center console. Officer Huff testified
that he also smelled the distinct odor of raw marijuana as he approached the vehicle
and observed a suspected marijuana cigarette in plain view. He testified he went to
the police academy and has been trained to recognize controlled substances,
including how to identify the smell of raw marijuana. He testified that he has
smelled and observed both raw and burnt marijuana hundreds of times.
We are not persuaded by appellant’s arguments regarding the lack of
testimony that the police officers were licensed, the lack of any contraband found on
his person, the lack of testing of the suspected marijuana, or other challenges
presented. The circumstances established that the Cleveland Metroparks officers
were qualified to recognize the odor of marijuana. No additional factors were
necessary to corroborate the suspicion of the presence of marijuana. See id. at 50.
The officers had probable cause to search appellant’s vehicle for contraband.
Further, it was reasonable for them to examine bags or containers found in
appellant’s vehicle. See State v. Vega, 154 Ohio St.3d 569,
2018-Ohio-4002,
116
N.E.3d 1262, ¶ 13-16, citing United States v. Ross,
456 U.S. 798, 825,
102 S.Ct. 2157,
72 L.Ed.2d 572 (1982); Wyoming v. Houghton,
526 U.S. 295, 302,
119 S.Ct. 1297,
143 L.Ed.2d 408 (1999).
Upon our review, we find the trial court did not err in denying
appellant’s motion to suppress. Appellant’s first assignment of error is overruled.
Under his second assignment of error, appellant claims that his
convictions are not supported by sufficient evidence and that the trial court erred by
denying his motions for acquittal.
“‘A motion for acquittal under Crim.R. 29(A) is governed by the same
standard as the one for determining whether a verdict is supported by sufficient
evidence.’” State v. Spaulding, 151 Ohio St.3d 378,
2016-Ohio-8126,
89 N.E.3d 554,
¶ 164, quoting State v. Tenace,
109 Ohio St.3d 255,
2006-Ohio-2417,
847 N.E.2d
386, ¶ 37. “‘The relevant inquiry is whether, after viewing the evidence in a light
most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the
essential elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt.’”
Id., quoting
State v. Jenks,
61 Ohio St.3d 259,
574 N.E.2d 492 (1991), paragraph two of the
syllabus. When evaluating the sufficiency of the evidence, a reviewing court
considers “whether the evidence, ‘if believed, would convince the average mind of
the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.’” State v. Pountney,
152 Ohio St.3d
474,
2018-Ohio-22,
97 N.E.3d 478, ¶ 19, quoting Jenks at paragraph two of the
syllabus.
Appellant challenges the lack of investigation in this case to connect
him to any of the contraband found in the car, to the phones found in the car, or to
the car itself. The record demonstrates that appellant was found sleeping in the
driver’s seat of the vehicle at 12:30 a.m., which was after the park was closed. He
rented the vehicle, he had the keys to the vehicle, and he was the sole occupant in
the vehicle. The police found in the center console of the vehicle the suspected
marijuana blunt, a plastic bag of suspected raw marijuana, a scale, and baking soda.
In the driver’s door was a grocery bag containing cocaine and cocaine base and a
scale with cocaine residue on it. The total amount of cocaine was established to be
less than five grams. In the glove box was a large amount of cash. In the back seat
was a box of baggies. Three cell phones were also found in the vehicle.
Upon a thorough review of the record, we find that the direct and
circumstantial evidence in this case and the reasonable inferences that can be drawn
therefrom were more than sufficient for any rational trier of fact to have found the
essential elements of the crimes of trafficking under R.C. 2925.03(A)(2), drug
possession under R.C. 2925.11(A), and possession of criminal tools under R.C.
2923.24(A), as well as the forfeiture specifications, proven beyond a reasonable
doubt. We are not persuaded by appellant’s arguments otherwise. The second
assignment of error is overruled.
Under his third assignment of error, appellant claims his convictions
were against the manifest weight of the evidence. He incorporates the same
challenges raised under his sufficiency argument.
When evaluating a claim that a verdict is against the manifest weight
of the evidence, “we review the entire record, weigh the evidence and all reasonable
inferences, consider the credibility of witnesses, and determine whether in resolving
conflicts in the evidence, the [trier of fact] clearly lost its way and created such a
manifest miscarriage of justice that we must reverse the conviction and order a new
trial.” State v. Wilks, 154 Ohio St.3d 359,
2018-Ohio-1562,
114 N.E.3d 1092, ¶ 168,
citing State v. Thompkins,
78 Ohio St.3d 380, 387,
678 N.E.2d 541 (1997).
Reversing a conviction based upon the weight of the evidence should occur “‘only in
the exceptional case in which the evidence weighs heavily against the conviction.’”
Thompkins at 387, quoting State v. Martin,
20 Ohio App.3d 172, 175,
485 N.E.2d
717 (1st Dist.1983).
After reviewing the entire record, weighing the evidence and all
reasonable inferences, and considering the credibility of the witnesses, we do not
find the trial court clearly lost its way and created such a manifest miscarriage of
justice that the adjudication must be reversed. Although appellant challenges the
testimony and evidence that was provided, this is not the exceptional case in which
the evidence weighs heavily against the conviction. The third assignment of error is
overruled.
Judgment affirmed.
It is ordered that appellee recover from appellant costs herein taxed.
The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the
common pleas court to carry this judgment into execution. The defendant’s
conviction having been affirmed, any bail pending appeal is terminated. Case
remanded to the trial court for execution of sentence.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27
of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.
SEAN C. GALLAGHER, JUDGE
LISA B. FORBES, P.J., and
EMANUELLA D. GROVES, J., CONCUR
