[Cite as State v. McRae,
2024-Ohio-922.]
COURT OF APPEALS
RICHLAND COUNTY, OHIO
FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
STATE OF OHIO : JUDGES:
: Hon. William B. Hoffman, P.J.
Plaintiff-Appellee : Hon. Craig R. Baldwin, J.
: Hon. Andrew J. King, J.
-vs- :
:
CHARLES MCRAE : Case No. 2023-CA-0039
:
Defendant-Appellant : OPINION
CHARACTER OF PROCEEDING: Appeal from the Court of Common
Pleas, Case No. 2022CR0800
JUDGMENT: Vacated and Remanded
DATE OF JUDGMENT: March 12, 2024
APPEARANCES:
For Plaintiff-Appellee For Defendant-Appellant
JODY SCHUMACHER RANDALL E. FRY
38 South Park Street 90 Darby Drive
Mansfield, OH 44907 Lexington, OH 44904
Richland County, Case No. 2023-CA-0039 2
King, J.
{¶ 1} Defendant-Appellant Charles McRae appeals the June 30, 2023 judgment
of conviction and sentence of the Richland County Court of Common Pleas. Plaintiff-
Appellee is the state of Ohio. We remand the matter for resentencing.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
{¶ 2} On November 19, 2022, McRae forced his way into his sister's home and
savagely assaulted her. The assault left McRae's sister with a broken arm and fractures
which required surgery, plates and screws to repair. The assault was captured on the
home's Ring cameras.
{¶ 3} On January 5, 2023, the Richland County Grand Jury returned an
indictment charging McRae with one count of aggravated burglary, a felony of the first
degree, two counts of kidnapping, felonies of the first degree, and felonious assault, a
felony of the second degree. Each of these counts carried a repeat violent offender
specification. McRae was additionally charged with domestic violence, a misdemeanor of
the first degree, criminal damaging or endangering, a misdemeanor of the first degree,
and criminal mischief, a misdemeanor of the first degree.
{¶ 4} On March 19, 2023, McRae entered pleas of guilty to each count of the
indictment. The trial court ordered a presentence investigation and set the matter over for
sentencing.
{¶ 5} McRae appeared for sentencing on June 22, 2023. After the trial court
merged several counts, the state elected to proceed to sentencing on counts 1, 2, and 4,
aggravated burglary, kidnapping, and felonious assault, respectively. McRae was
sentenced to 10-15 years for aggravated burglary, 3 years for kidnapping, and 5 years
Richland County, Case No. 2023-CA-0039 3
for felonious assault. The trial court additionally imposed a 2-year term for the repeat
violent offender specification for an aggregate total of 20 to 25 years incarceration.
{¶ 6} McRae filed an appeal and the matter is now before this court for
consideration.1 He raises two assignments of error as follow:
I
{¶ 7} "THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DESIGNATING THE APPELLANT A
REPEAT VIOLENT OFFENDER."
II
{¶ 8} "THE APPELLANT WAS DENIED HIS RIGHTS TO EFFECTIVE
ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL GUARANTEED BY ARTICLE 1, SECTION 10 OF THE
OHIO CONSTITUTION AND THE SIXTH AND FOURTEENTH AMENDMENTS TO THE
UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION."
{¶ 9} In his first assignment of error, McRae argues the trial court's sentence for
the repeat violent offender (“RVO”) specification was contrary to law. Specifically, McRae
contends the only evidence presented at the sentencing hearing to support the RVO
designation was that fact that he has a 1993 conviction for felonious assault and that no
details of that conviction are contained in the record. He therefore argues the trial court
could not have made the necessary analysis to support its RVO designation. While we
disagree with McRae's argument, we nonetheless remand the matter for resentencing.
Applicable Law
{¶ 10} R.C. 2929.01 defines a repeat violent offender in relevant part as:
1
The state did not file a response brief.
Richland County, Case No. 2023-CA-0039 4
(CC) "Repeat violent offender" means a person about whom both of
the following apply:
(1) The person is being sentenced for committing or for complicity in
committing any of the following:
(a) Aggravated murder, murder, any felony of the first or second
degree that is an offense of violence, or an attempt to commit any of
these offenses if the attempt is a felony of the first or second degree;
…
(2) The person previously was convicted of or pleaded guilty to an
offense described in division (CC)(1)(a) or (b) of this section.
{¶ 11} The trial court imposed a discretionary sentence for the RVO specification
pursuant to R.C. 2929.14(B)(2)(a). That section states:
(2)(a) If division (B)(2)(b) of this section does not apply, the court may
impose on an offender, in addition to the longest prison term
authorized or required for the offense or, for offenses for which
division (A)(1)(a) or (2)(a) of this section applies, in addition to the
longest minimum prison term authorized or required for the offense,
an additional definite prison term of one, two, three, four, five, six,
seven, eight, nine, or ten years if all of the following criteria are met:
Richland County, Case No. 2023-CA-0039 5
(i) The offender is convicted of or pleads guilty to a specification of
the type described in section 2941.149 of the Revised Code that the
offender is a repeat violent offender.
(ii) The offense of which the offender currently is convicted or to
which the offender currently pleads guilty is aggravated murder and
the court does not impose a sentence of death or life imprisonment
without parole, murder, terrorism and the court does not impose a
sentence of life imprisonment without parole, any felony of the first
degree that is an offense of violence and the court does not impose
a sentence of life imprisonment without parole, or any felony of the
second degree that is an offense of violence and the trier of fact finds
that the offense involved an attempt to cause or a threat to cause
serious physical harm to a person or resulted in serious physical
harm to a person.
(iii) The court imposes the longest prison term for the offense or the
longest minimum prison term for the offense, whichever is applicable,
that is not life imprisonment without parole.
(iv) The court finds that the prison terms imposed pursuant to division
(B)(2)(a)(iii) of this section and, if applicable, division (B)(1) or (3) of
this section are inadequate to punish the offender and protect the
public from future crime, because the applicable factors under
section 2929.12 of the Revised Code indicating a greater likelihood
Richland County, Case No. 2023-CA-0039 6
of recidivism outweigh the applicable factors under that section
indicating a lesser likelihood of recidivism.
(v) The court finds that the prison terms imposed pursuant to division
(B)(2)(a)(iii) of this section and, if applicable, division (B)(1) or (3) of
this section are demeaning to the seriousness of the offense,
because one or more of the factors under section 2929.12 of the
Revised Code indicating that the offender's conduct is more serious
than conduct normally constituting the offense are present, and they
outweigh the applicable factors under that section indicating that the
offender's conduct is less serious than conduct normally constituting
the offense.
{¶ 12} An "offense of violence" is defined in R.C. 2901.01(9)(a) and includes
felonious assault as proscribed by R.C. 2903.11.
McRae's Argument
{¶ 13} McRae never disputed he has a 1993 conviction for felonious assault. He
argues here on appeal, however, that the record contains no details regarding that
conviction, nor does it indicate the sentence he received. He asserts, therefore, that the
"trial court could not possibly have made an analysis that the record contains evidence to
support the finding of an RVO designation." Appellant's brief at 8. McRae does not
indicate what analysis the trial court was supposed to make. The only requirements
placed upon a trial court before imposing sentence for a discretionary RVO are contained
Richland County, Case No. 2023-CA-0039 7
in R.C. 2929.14(B)(2)(a) as set forth above. In determining a trial court's compliance with
the same, this court has recently quoted the Eighth District Court of Appeals:
Similar to the conclusion that “talismanic” words are not required
when imposing consecutive sentences under 2929.14(C)(4), there
are no magic words that must be recited by the trial court when
making the RVO findings under 2929.14(B)(2)(a). As long as the
reviewing court can discern from the record that the trial court
engaged in the correct analysis and can determine that the record
contains evidence to support the findings, the sentence on the RVO
specification should be upheld.
{¶ 14} State v. Shaffer, 5th Dist. Muskingum No. CT2021-0023, 2022-Ohio-2006
¶ 24, citing State v. Watts, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 104269,
2017-Ohio-532 ¶ 11.
{¶ 15} However, all of the conditions listed in R.C. 2929.14(B)(2)(a) must be
satisfied before the trial court may impose sentence on an RVO specification. Here, the
trial court failed to comply with R.C. 2929.14(B)(2)(a)(iii) when it imposed less than the
longest minimum prison term for aggravated burglary. The trial court imposed a minimum
prison term of 10 years. The longest minimum prison term for a first-degree felony is 11
years. R.C. 2929.14(A)(1)(a). We therefore vacate McRae's sentence and remand the
matter for resentencing.
II
Richland County, Case No. 2023-CA-0039 8
{¶ 16} In his second assignment of error, McRae argues his trial counsel rendered
ineffective assistance by failing to challenge the RVO finding. Given our resolution of
McRae's first assignment of error, McRae's second assignment of error is moot.
{¶ 17} The judgment of sentence of the Richland County Court of Common Pleas
is vacated and the matter is remanded for resentencing.
By King, J.,
Hoffman, P.J. and
Baldwin, J. concur.
