J-A16021-24
2024 PA Super 167
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
v. :
:
:
JAYLAUN COLEMAN :
:
Appellant : No. 49 WDA 2024
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered November 17, 2023
In the Court of Common Pleas of Mercer County Criminal Division at
No(s): CP-43-CR-0001579-2018
BEFORE: KUNSELMAN, J., MURRAY, J., and McLAUGHLIN, J.
OPINION BY MURRAY, J.: FILED: AUGUST 5, 2024
Jaylaun Coleman (Appellant) appeals from the judgment of sentence
entered after resentencing on his guilty pleas to one count each of third-
degree murder, persons not to possess firearms, and firearms not to be
carried without a license, and 12 counts of recklessly endangering another
person (REAP).1 After careful review, we affirm.
In October 2018, the Commonwealth charged Appellant with first-
degree murder,2 persons not to possess firearms, and firearms not to be
carried without a license, in connection with the shooting death of Tyrone
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1 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2502(c), 6105(a)(1), 6106(a)(1), 2705.
2 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2502(a).
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Cornish, Jr.3 Upon Appellant’s request, the trial court severed the persons not
to possess firearms charge from the remaining charges.
On January 9, 2020, Appellant entered an open guilty plea to persons not to
possess firearms. The court deferred sentencing pending disposition of the
remaining charges.
Subsequently, the trial court granted the Commonwealth’s unopposed
motion to amend the first-degree murder charge to a third-degree murder
charge, and to add 12 counts of REAP. On February 26, 2021, Appellant
entered a negotiated guilty plea to one count each of third-degree murder and
firearms not to be carried without a license, and 12 counts of REAP.
On June 23, 2021, the trial court sentenced Appellant, in accordance
with the plea agreement, to consecutive prison terms of 20 to 40 years for his
conviction of third-degree murder, 3½ to 7 years for his conviction of firearms
not to be carried without a license, an aggregate 11½ to 23 years for his
convictions of REAP, and 5 to 10 years for his conviction of persons not to
possess firearms. The court directed the sentences to run concurrently with
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3 The Commonwealth charged three additional individuals, at separate
dockets, in connection with the shooting. Appellant’s co-defendants are not
parties to the instant appeal.
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any other sentence Appellant was serving at that time.4 Appellant did not file
a direct appeal.
On May 9, 2022, Appellant, pro se, filed a timely Post Conviction Relief
Act (PCRA)5 petition asserting ineffective assistance of plea counsel. Following
additional procedure not relevant to this appeal, appointed PCRA counsel filed
an amended PCRA petition on Appellant’s behalf. In the amended PCRA
petition, Appellant argued plea counsel was ineffective in negotiating
Appellant’s guilty plea, which resulted in an illegal sentence. Amended PCRA
Petition, 4/13/23, ¶ 13. In particular, Appellant alleged:
19. At the time of sentencing, [the trial court] imposed the
sentence as agreed to by the parties and noted specifically that
“all counts shall run consecutively to one another pursuant to the
sentence agreement entered into between [Appellant] and the
Commonwealth; however, all counts shall run concurrent to any
other outstanding sentence that [Appellant] is presently serving.”
20. During the pendency of this matter, including at the time of
the entry of [Appellant’s] plea of guilty and his sentencing,
[Appellant] was on state parole for a previous criminal conviction.
21. Pursuant to the Parole Act, 61 Pa.C.S.A. § 6138(a)(5)(i), “if a
new sentence is imposed on the parole offender, the service of the
balance of the term originally imposed by a Pennsylvania court
shall precede the commencement of the new term imposed in the
following cases: (i) if a person is paroled from a State correctional
institution and the new sentence imposed on the person is to be
served in the State correctional institution.”
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4 The trial court entered an amended sentencing order on June 28, 2021, to
grant Appellant credit for time served.
5 See Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546.
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22. In other words, where a state parolee, such as [Appellant],
receives a new state sentence, he must serve his backtime first
before the commencement of the new state sentence.
23. Thus, the sentence imposed upon [Appellant], particularly that
the sentences at all counts were to run concurrent to any
outstanding sentence, constitutes an illegal sentence in that it is
violative of the Parole Act and no statutory authorization exists for
the sentence.
Amended PCRA Petition, 4/13/23, ¶¶ 19-23 (brackets and some citations
omitted).6 Appellant requested the PCRA court order withdrawal of his guilty
plea and vacate the judgment of sentence. Id. (prayer for relief).
The Commonwealth conceded the merits of Appellant’s underlying
sentencing claim. The PCRA court directed the parties to file briefs addressing
the proper remedy. Appellant advocated for withdrawal of his guilty plea to
return the parties to their respective pre-plea positions. The Commonwealth,
on the other hand, argued the court should vacate Appellant’s sentence and
remand for resentencing.
On October 19, 2023, the PCRA court issued the following order:
IT IS THE ORDER OF THE COURT that [Appellant’s] Amended
Petition for Post-Conviction Collateral Relief is GRANTED. The
Sentence Order of June 23, 2021, and the Amended Sentence
Order of June 28, 2021, are vacated. [Appellant] shall be
scheduled for resentencing in accordance with the attached
opinion….
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6 “Because of the guilty plea in this case, the Pennsylvania Board of Parole
revoked [Appellant’s] parole in his robbery case and remanded him to a state
penitentiary to serve the balance of that sentence.” PCRA Court Opinion,
10/19/23, at 2 (unnumbered). The balance of Appellant’s sentence was three
years. N.T., 11/17/23, at 2.
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Opinion and Order, 10/19/23, at 4 (unnumbered); see also id. at 3
(unnumbered) (directing the court on remand to sentence Appellant “to a
minimum of 37 years, which accounts for the three (3) year parole hit he
received.”). On November 17, 2023, the trial court, on remand, sentenced
Appellant to an aggregate prison term of 37 to 80 years.
On December 14, 2023, Appellant timely filed a notice of appeal.
Appellant and the trial court have complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.
Appellant raises the following issue for review:
Whether the trial court erred by vacating and resentencing
[Appellant] after [plea] counsel was found to be ineffective for
negotiating an illegal sentence as part of a plea agreement instead
of permitting [Appellant] to withdraw his guilty plea?
Appellant’s Brief at 4.
Appellant claims he should have been permitted to withdraw his guilty
plea. See id. at 10-18. According to Appellant, plea counsel and the
Commonwealth “began their plea negotiations from the incorrect standpoint
that [Appellant’s] sentence could be served concurrently with his previously
imposed sentence when it was a legal impossibility.” Id. at 12. Appellant
argues he “should be returned to the status quo prior to the entry of his guilty
plea.” Id.
The Commonwealth counters the trial court properly resentenced
Appellant. Commonwealth Brief at 10. The Commonwealth argues that
because the court subtracted three years from Appellant’s original aggregate
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sentence to account for his three-year parole violation sentence, Appellant
received the benefit of his plea bargain. Id. The Commonwealth also points
out that the parties specified during the plea hearing that Appellant agreed to
an aggregate sentence of 40 to 80 years in prison. Id. at 11-12. Therefore,
the Commonwealth asserts, “the obligations set forth in Appellant’s plea
agreement [were] fulfilled upon resentencing.” Id. at 26.
Preliminarily, we observe that the PCRA court, despite stating
Appellant’s PCRA petition was granted, afforded Appellant relief only in the
form of vacating his judgment of sentence and remanding for resentencing.
The PCRA court did not grant Appellant’s requested relief, i.e., withdrawal of
his guilty plea. Appellant did not file an appeal from the PCRA court’s
order or otherwise challenge the implicit denial of his request to
withdraw his guilty plea. We further note that no outstanding petition to
withdraw the guilty plea appears on the record. Thus, to the extent Appellant
attempts to challenge the PCRA court’s partial denial of relief, we lack
jurisdiction to reconsider the PCRA court’s order. See Commonwealth v.
Sepulveda, 144 A.3d 1270, 1279 (Pa. 2016) (“Once the PCRA court renders
a decision on a PCRA petition, … that matter is concluded before the PCRA
court, having been fully adjudicated by that court, and the order generated is
a final order that is appealable by the losing party.”).
Moreover, Appellant cannot now challenge the trial court’s “decision” to
resentence him rather than permit a withdrawal of his plea. Indeed, the trial
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court complied with the PCRA court’s final order; it had no discretion to do
otherwise. Appellant’s claim, which appears to collaterally attack the PCRA
court’s order, is improper.
Thus, at this juncture, our review is limited to a determination of
whether Appellant’s new judgment of sentence is appropriate under plea
bargaining principles.7 Contract interpretation, including in the criminal plea-
bargaining process, is a question of law. See Commonwealth v. Kerns, 220
A.3d 607, 612 (Pa. Super. 2019). Therefore, our standard of review is de
novo, “and to the extent necessary, the scope of our review is plenary.”
Id.
We begin by emphasizing the importance of plea bargains in our criminal
justice system:
With respect to plea bargains, the reality of the criminal
justice system is that nearly all criminal cases are disposed of by
plea bargains: ninety-seven percent of federal convictions and
ninety-four percent of state convictions are the result of guilty
pleas. Plea bargaining is not some adjunct to the criminal justice
system; it is the criminal justice system. Accordingly, it is critical
that plea agreements are enforced, to avoid any possible
perversion of the plea bargaining system. The disposition of
criminal charges by agreement between the prosecutor and the
accused, is an essential component of the administration of
justice. Properly administered, it is to be encouraged. In this
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7 There is no dispute that the plea agreement was breached, as the
Commonwealth’s promise that Appellant’s sentence in this case would run
concurrently with his parole back time could not be fulfilled as a matter of law.
See 61 Pa.C.S.A. § 6138(a)(5)(i) (providing that if a paroled offender commits
a crime while on parole and a new sentence is imposed, “the service of the
balance originally imposed by a Pennsylvania court shall precede the
commencement of the new term[,]” when the offender was paroled from
a State correctional institution and the new sentence is to be served in the
State correctional institution) (emphasis added).
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Commonwealth, the practice of plea bargaining is generally
regarded favorably, and is legitimized and governed by court rule.
A “mutuality of advantage” to defendants and prosecutors flows
from the ratification of the bargain.
Assuming the plea agreement is legally possible to fulfill,
when the parties enter the plea agreement and the court accepts
and approves the plea, then the parties and the court must abide
by the terms of the agreement. Specific enforcement of valid plea
bargains is a matter of fundamental fairness. The terms of plea
agreements are not limited to the withdrawal of charges, or the
length of a sentence. Parties may agree to—and seek
enforcement of—terms that fall outside these areas.
Although a plea agreement occurs in a criminal context, it
remains contractual in nature and is to be analyzed under
contract-law standards. Furthermore, disputes over any
particular term of a plea agreement must be resolved by objective
standards. A determination of exactly what promises constitute
the plea bargain must be based upon the totality of the
surrounding circumstances and involves a case-by-case
adjudication.
… Regarding the Commonwealth’s duty to honor plea
agreements, well-settled Pennsylvania law states:
Our courts have demanded strict compliance with that duty
in order to avoid any possible perversion of the plea
bargaining system, evidencing the concern that a defendant
might be coerced into a bargain or fraudulently induced to
give up the very valued constitutional guarantees attendant
to the right to trial by jury.
Commonwealth v. Snook, 230 A.3d 438, 444 (Pa. Super. 2020) (citation,
brackets, and some ellipses omitted).
Our Supreme Court addressed a negotiated plea agreement’s conflict
with the Parole Act in Commonwealth v. Zuber, 353 A.2d 441 (Pa. 1976).
Therein, the defendant entered a negotiated plea agreement, whereby, in
exchange for his guilty plea, the Commonwealth would request the State
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Board of Parole to run the defendant’s new sentence (7 to 15 years in prison)
concurrently with his parole back time (4½ years). Id. at 443. The defendant
appealed, claiming his plea was induced by the Commonwealth’s promise
concerning back time.
Id. The Commonwealth’s promise could not be fulfilled
as a matter of law, because the Parole Act required the defendant to “serve
his … back time and the new sentence in consecutive order.”
Id. at 443.
Accordingly, our Supreme Court concluded the defendant’s plea was
unknowingly and involuntarily entered.
Id. at 444-45. The Zuber Court
explained, “[I]t is well settled that where a plea bargain has been entered into
and is violated by the Commonwealth, the defendant is entitled at the
least, to the benefit of the bargain.”
Id. at 444 (citation, internal
quotation marks, and some capitalization omitted; emphasis added). The
Supreme Court agreed with the defendant that the appropriate remedy would
be a reduced sentence of 2½ to 15 years in prison.
Id. at 446. The Court
remanded the matter to the trial court to impose the modified sentence,
which, it reasoned, would bestow upon the defendant the benefit of his
bargain. Id.; see also
id. (indicating the defendant would “still serve a prison
sentence commensurate with the term contemplated by all of the parties to
the plea proceedings.”).
Recently, in Commonwealth v. Gillins, 302 A.3d 155 (Pa. Super.
2023), this Court reversed the PCRA court’s conclusion that it could not
consider the defendant’s guilty plea challenge under contract law principles.
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In Gillins, the defendant entered a negotiated guilty plea in exchange for a
10- to 20-year prison sentence, and an agreement that his sentence would
run concurrently with the federal sentence he was then serving. Id. at 157.
However, “unbeknownst to both parties and the trial court[,]” the federal
Bureau of Prisons is not bound by state court orders directing new state
sentences to run concurrently with an existing federal sentence. Id. at 157,
161. The trial court therefore had no authority to direct the defendant’s state
sentence to run concurrently with his federal sentence. Id. at 166; see also
id. (noting that federal inmates may receive credit for a detention that is not
credited against another sentence).
The Gillins Court first clarified that collateral petitions to enforce plea
agreements are addressed outside the ambit of the PCRA. Id. at 160.
Applying contract principles, this Court concluded the defendant had been
deprived of the benefit of the bargain he made during his guilty plea, as he
served a 20-year state sentence without receiving federal credit. Id. at 165.
In considering the appropriate remedy, this Court stated,
Vacatur of [the defendant’s] 20-year sentence, while keeping
intact his underlying state convictions, would serve the dual
purpose of providing [the defendant] an opportunity to receive
federal credit for his state time and otherwise retaining [the
defendant’s] record of conviction. In this way, the
Commonwealth’s plea agreement with [the defendant], as
accepted by the trial court, may be effectuated to provide the
benefit of the bargain struck between the parties.
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Id. at 166. The Gillins Court therefore vacated the PCRA court’s order, and
remanded the case to the trial court to vacate the defendant’s sentence but
retain his underlying conviction. Id.
Relevant case law is clear that we must consider challenges to a plea
agreement under contract law principles. See Snook, supra. It is also clear
that when the Commonwealth breaches a plea agreement by virtue of a legal
inability to fulfill a particular promise, the relief granted must give a defendant
the benefit of his bargain. See Zuber, 353 A.3d at 446; Gillins, 302 A.2d at
166. Cf. Commonwealth v. Lowman,
278 A.3d 361, 368 (Pa. Super. 2022)
(where trial court vacated the appellant’s consecutive sentences as illegal on
merger grounds, vacatur of the guilty plea was improper because the plea
agreement was silent on the issue of sentencing; instead, the court should
correct the sentence and leave the plea undisturbed).
Instantly, the guilty plea transcript reflects that the parties agreed to
negotiated, consecutive sentences for each of the offenses to which Appellant
pled guilty. See N.T., 2/26/21, at 6-7. As “an explicit component” of the plea
agreement, the parties clarified Appellant’s aggregate prison sentence would
be 40 to 80 years. Id. at 7. Accordingly, notwithstanding the parties’ shared
misunderstanding that the trial court could order Appellant’s new sentence to
run concurrently with his back time, the record reflects that Appellant
specifically agreed to serve an aggregate 40 to 80 years’ imprisonment. By
reducing Appellant’s sentence to 37 to 80 years at resentencing, the court
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appropriately accounted for the three years of back time. We therefore
conclude that Appellant received the benefit of his bargain. See Gillins, 302
A.3d at 166; Zuber, 353 A.2d at 446. See also generally
Lowman, supra.
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the November 17, 2023, judgment
of sentence imposed after Appellant’s resentencing.
Judgment of sentence affirmed.
DATE: 8/5/2024
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