J-A27031-24
2024 PA Super 317
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
v. :
:
JEREMY TODD BRASHEAR :
:
Appellant : No. 429 MDA 2024
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered February 28, 2024
In the Court of Common Pleas of Dauphin County Criminal Division at
No(s): CP-22-CR-0000661-2020
BEFORE: LAZARUS, P.J., KUNSELMAN, J., and McLAUGHLIN, J.
OPINION BY KUNSELMAN, J.: FILED: DECEMBER 31, 2024
Jeremy Todd Brashear appeals from the judgment of sentence, imposing
nine to 18 months of time served, after a jury convicted him of not registering
his “residence,” pursuant to Subchapter I of the Sex Offender Registration and
Notification Act (“SORNA”).1 Because Brashear provided his “residence” as a
matter of law, we vacate the conviction.
On April 15, 2014, the United States District Court for the Middle District
of Pennsylvania convicted Brashear of possessing child pornography, which
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1 See 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9799.51-9799.75. On February 21, 2018, in the wake
of Commonwealth v. Muniz, 164 A.3d 1189 (Pa. 2017) (barring ex post
facto application of SORNA’s registration requirements), the General Assembly
divided SORNA into Subchapters H and I. Subchapter H, 42 Pa.C.S.A §§
9799.10-9799.42, covers individuals to whom Muniz does not apply, because
they committed their offense after December 20, 2012, when SORNA went
into effect. “Subchapter I, an entirely new subchapter, was applied to sexual
offenders who committed their offenses prior to December 20, 2012, and
whose registration obligations were potentially affected by Muniz.”
Commonwealth v. Torsilieri,
316 A.3d 77, 81 (Pa. 2024). Brashear’s
underlying offense occurred in December of 2010. See United States v.
Brashear, No. 4:11-CR-0062,
2012 WL 4867402 (M.D. Pa. 2012). As such,
his SORNA-registration requirements are in Subchapter I.
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subjected him to ten years of SORNA registration with the Pennsylvania State
Police (“PSP”). At his November 2019 registration, Brashear provided various
information in response to a corrections officer’s questions. The corrections
officer typed Brashear’s responses into the PSP Form for SORNA registrants.
Block 53 of the PSP Form was headed “Street address 1,” while Block
54 was headed “Street Address 2-Include Apartment/Room #.” Trial Court
Opinion, 6/12/24, at 2. In Block 53, the corrections officer entered “19 S 4th
Street,” and, in Block 54, he entered “Harrisburg.” Id. The officer did not
enter an apartment or room number, because Brashear did not provide one.
Brashear received a copy of the Form, had an opportunity to make any
changes, and signed the Form to signify his agreement with the entered
information.
Brashear’s PSP Form made its way to a detective in the Harrisburg Police
Department. She immediately recognized 19 S 4th Street as a hotel known as
The Alva, which has “at least 27 rooms in that building.” See N.T., 8/16/23,
at 83. In the detective’s opinion, a registrant may report that he “live[s] at
The Alva, that’s fine, but your room number has to be on [the PSP Form] as
well, so that people are aware of what room you’re living in.” Id. at 84.
The detective went to The Alva to investigate Brashear’s whereabouts.
She met with the hotel’s owner who informed her that Brashear was in Room
109. The detective went to Room 109, found Brashear, and told him that “he
was technically out of compliance with [SORNA], because he never listed a
room number.” Id. at 85. She allowed Brashear a week to return to the
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registration center to update his PSP Form. Brashear neglected to do so, and
on January 10, 2020, the detective arrested him for violating 18 Pa.C.S.A. §
4915.1(a)(2).
Two-and-a-half years later, on the morning before the jury trial, the
Commonwealth realized that the detective had mistakenly charged Brashear
under 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 4915.1(a)(2). The prosecutor moved to amend the
charge to an alleged violation of 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 4915.2(a)(2). The parties
agreed that Section 4915.1 governs Subchapter H registrants, while Section
4915.2 governs Subchapter I registrants. Brashear conceded that “he’s a
Subchapter I registrant,” and the trial court granted the motion to amend the
information. N.T., 8/16/23, at 5.
Members of law enforcement testified for the Commonwealth. At the
close of its case-in-chief, Brashear moved for judgment of acquittal, because
he was “required to update a ‘residence,’ not an apartment number.” Id. at
97. “If the legislature wished for the specific address to be the thing a
registrant must register, they would specify that.” Id.
Noting that this was a case of first impression under Subchapter I, the
trial court denied the motion. It opined, “in the absence of specific case law
that would negate an apartment number or a room number from being
factually compliant with the statute, I’m not inclined to grant” judgment of
acquittal. Id. at 110. In the court’s view, “it’s up to the jury to decide [if
Brashear] knowingly failed to register pursuant to that” statutory provision.
Id. But the trial court acknowledged, “this case has a lot of potential to clarify
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that legal issue on whether or not the General Assembly was diligent in setting
a clear-cut definition for what ‘residence’ is in the statute.” Id. at 110-111.
Finding ambiguity in “the fact that ‘residence’ can be interpreted differently –
I don’t have a case to the contrary – and the fact that the [PSP Forms]
themselves provide for an apartment number and a room number, and in this
case factually that was communicated to [Brashear] prior to him being
charged, I think the matter is in front of the jury.” Id. at 111.
The jury convicted Brashear of failing to register pursuant to Subchapter
I of SORNA, and the trial court sentenced him as described above. This timely
appeal followed.
Brashear asks, “Whether the Commonwealth produced insufficient
evidence that [he] failed to register when [he] provided the address of his
general housing location [but not] the specific room number?” Brashear’s
Brief at 4.
A challenge to the legal sufficiency of the Commonwealth’s evidence
“presents a question of law, for which our standard of review is de novo, and
our scope of review is plenary.” Commonwealth v. Peters, 320 A.3d 1231,
1236 (Pa. Super. 2024). This Court views “the record in the light most
favorable to the [Commonwealth], giving the prosecution the benefit of all
reasonable inferences to be drawn from the evidence.” Id. “Evidence will be
deemed sufficient to support the verdict when it establishes each material
element of the crime charged and the commission thereof by the accused,
beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id.
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Brashear argues, as he did in his motion for judgment of acquittal, that
the term “residence” in SORNA and 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 4915.2(a)(2) is clear and
unambiguous, and it is not synonymous with one’s full mailing “address.” He
claims that, if the legislature had used the word “address” in Subchapter I and
Section 4915.2(a)(2), then that word would have required him to provide his
room number at registration, but the word “residence” did not demand the
same level of specificity that “address” would have. Moreover, if there is any
ambiguity in “residence,” then Brashear relies upon the rule of lenity. He
suggests that, under that doctrine of statutory construction, this Court must
resolve any ambiguity in this criminal statute in his favor and strictly construe
it against the Commonwealth.
In response, the Commonwealth presents a meandering argument that
largely disregards the statutory text. It contends that “one can divine that
‘residence’ is the term that imposes the requirement for [Brashear] to provide
his complete address.” Commonwealth’s Brief at 10. Although the legislature
wrote “residence,” the Commonwealth believes it actually meant “complete
address.” In the Commonwealth’s view, providing the street address without
a room number implied that Brashear resided in the entire hotel. Thus, it
asserts that he knowingly failed to provide his specific “residence” therein.
To support its claim, the Commonwealth initially points to the PSP “Form
which stated [Brashear] was required to input both the street address and the
apartment/room number in order to verify his complete address . . . .” Id. at
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11. It also relies on the United States Post Office.2 See id. at 14. In addition,
the Commonwealth cites two cases from the Commonwealth Court regarding
the Election Code and the Zoning Ordinance of New Hope Borough,
respectively. See id. at 15, 19 (citing In re Nomination Papers of
Creighton, 899 A.2d 1166 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2006), and Eichlin v. Zoning
Hearing Board of New Hope Borough,
671 A.2d 1173 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1996)).
Furthermore, the Commonwealth claims that, in Commonwealth v. Wilgus,
40 A.3d 1201 (Pa. 2012), the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania “concluded that
residence and address are used interchangeably in” a pre-SORNA statute,
known as Megan’s Law II. Id. at 15-16.
Finally, the Commonwealth makes a policy argument. It claims that,
when a SORNA registrant resides in an apartment building or hotel, “there is
no way that anyone could find [a registrant’s] room without having to inquire
further, which defeats the purposes of the statute in being able to easily find
out where the individual resides.” Id. at 18. “Policy demands that . . . SORNA
registrants must be easily found if the need arises and without a room or
apartment number being included this cannot be accomplished.” Id. The
Commonwealth’s contentions disregard the plain language of SORNA and are,
therefore, not determinative.
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2 Specifically, the Commonwealth references the Post Office’s website on “How
to Send a Letter or Postcard,” available at https://usps.com/ship/letters.htm
(last visited 11/19/23) (instructing citizens to address envelopes with “the
following on separate lines: [(1)] Recipient’s full name or company name,
[(2)] Apartment or suite number, [(3)] Full street address, [and [(4)] City,
State, and ZIP+4 Code.”).
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The salient facts of this case are undisputed. Brashear was required to
register his “residence” under Subchapter I of SORNA. He identified the place
where he resided by its street address but did not provide his room number
within that building. Thus, the question is one of statutory interpretation: did
the General Assembly require Subchapter I registrants to provide apartment
or room numbers when they verify their residence?
“As this case requires us to engage in statutory interpretation, we are
mindful of our paramount objective to give effect to the intent of our General
Assembly in enacting the particular statute under review.” Commonwealth
v. Jacobs, 39 A.3d 977, 982 (Pa. 2012) (citing 1 Pa.C.S.A. § 1921(a)). “When
the words of a statute are clear and free from all ambiguity, the letter of it is
not to be disregarded under the pretext of pursuing its spirit.” 1 Pa.S.C.A. §
1921(b).
As mentioned, the arresting detective originally charged Brashear with
failure to register under 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 4915.1(a)(2). But, because Brashear
is a Subchapter I registrant, the Commonwealth had to amend the information
to charge him under 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 4915.2(a)(2). The difference between
those two sections controls the outcome of this case.
In Section 4915.1 (i.e., the statute under which Brashear was originally
and erroneously charged), the legislature commanded, “An individual who is
subject to registration under [Subchapter H of SORNA] commits an offense if
he knowingly fails to . . . (2) verify his address . . . .” 18 Pa.C.S.A §
4915.1(a)(2) (emphasis added). By contrast, in Section 4915.2 (i.e., the
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statute under Bashear was convicted), the legislature commanded, “An
individual who is subject to registration under [Subchapter I of SORNA]
commits an offense if the individual knowingly fails to . . . (2) verify the
individual’s residence . . . .” 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 4915.2(a)(2) (emphasis added).
The Supreme Court has long held that “A statute must be construed, if
possible, to give effect to all of its provisions. It is presumed that every word,
sentence, or provision of a statute is intended for some purpose and
accordingly must be given effect.” Commonwealth v. Lobiondo, 462 A.2d
662, 664 (Pa. 1983) (some punctuation omitted). “Thus, when the legislature
uses two different words, we must . . . presume that it must have meant for
the words to have separate meanings.” Commonwealth v. Elliott,
50 A.3d
1284, 1290 (Pa. 2012) (some punctuation).
In drafting Sections 4915.1(a)(2) and 4915.2(a)(2), the legislature used
two different words; it used “address” in the former and “residence” in the
latter. The Commonwealth would have us interpret the word “residence” to
mean “complete address.” If we adopted that interpretation, the distinction
that the General Assembly intended by using the word “address” in one section
and “residence” in another section would be negated.3 The Commonwealth’s
interpretation would not effectuate every word in the statute, as the General
Assembly has drafted it, in contravention of Lobiondo and Elliott, supra.
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3 If the legislature wants Subchapter I registrants to provide their addresses,
including room or unit numbers, it may amend 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 4915.2(a)(2)
and 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9799.51-9799.75.
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Presumably, the legislature knew the difference between “address” and
“residence” when it authored SORNA’s distinct subchapters and their related,
failure-to-register criminal provisions. An obligation to provide one’s complete
mailing address – including room or apartment number – clearly arises under
Subchapter H and 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 4915.1(a)(2), because, in those provisions,
the legislature commanded registrants to verify their “address.” By contrast,
in Subchapter I and 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 4915.2(a)(2), the legislature imposed a
less stringent standard. There, the legislature only compelled registrants to
verify their “residence.” Id.
In drafting Subchapter I, the General Assembly defined “residence” as
“A location where an individual resides . . . The term includes a residence
which is mobile, including a houseboat, mobile home, trailer or recreational
vehicle.” 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9799.12 (emphasis added). We hold that, where, as
here, a registrant resides in a building, the operable “location,” is the building
itself. This reading gives “residence” its common meaning in plain English.
The list of “locations” that the legislature used as examples buttresses our
interpretation. Everything in that list is a complete structure. Nothing in that
list indicates that the drafters intended “residence” to mean a specific room
within a larger building, as the Commonwealth contends.
In fact, if someone asked a person living in an apartment complex or a
condominium where she resides, her most likely answer would be the name
of the apartment or condominium, not her specific room or unit. Also, this
plain-language interpretation of “residence” reduces the burden of Subchapter
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I registrants from the more specific and onerous requirement of a complete
mailing address under Subchapter H. A reduced burden on Subchapter I
registrants comports with the legislative purpose for adopting Subchapter I:
namely, eliminating the penal nature of SORNA that caused it to run afoul of
the ex post facto clause in the first place. See Commonwealth v. Muniz,
164 A.3d 1189 (Pa. 2017). Hence, the legislature demanded that Subchapter
I registrants verify only the buildings in which they reside, while retaining the
heightened, pre-Muniz obligation of Subchapter H registrants to verify their
complete mailing addresses.
In sum, the trial court erred, as a matter of law, because it committed
this pure question of statutory construction to the jury, when no material facts
were in dispute. Section 4915.2(a)(2) does not require a Subchapter I
registrant to verify the specific room or apartment in which he resides. As
such, Brashear was under no obligation to provide that information when he
registered his new residence in November of 2019. In addition, the detective
was mistaken in her interpretation of the statute; Block 54 on the PSP Form
(i.e., apartment/room number) is irrelevant to a Subchapter I registrant.
Under the plain language of the statute, the Commonwealth presented
overwhelming evidence of Brashear’s innocence. He verified his “residence”
to the corrections officer as the legislature intended that word in Subchapter
I of SORNA and 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 4915.2(a)(2). Accordingly, Brashear is entitled
to full appellate relief, and we reverse the order denying judgment of acquittal.
Judgment of sentence vacated. Defendant discharged.
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Judgment Entered.
Benjamin D. Kohler, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 12/31/2024
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