08/26/2025
DA 23-0430
Case Number: DA 23-0430
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA
2025 MT 189
STATE OF MONTANA,
Plaintiff and Appellee,
v.
JEFFREY SCOTT ANDERSON,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Eighth Judicial District,
In and For the County of Cascade, Cause No. CDC-22-346
Honorable John A. Kutzman, Presiding Judge
COUNSEL OF RECORD:
For Appellant:
James M. Siegman, Attorney at Law, Jackson, Mississippi
For Appellee:
Austin Knudsen, Montana Attorney General, Katie F. Schulz,
Assistant Attorney General, Helena, Montana
Joshua A. Racki, Cascade County Attorney, Amanda Lofink, Deputy
County Attorney, Great Falls, Montana
Submitted on Briefs: March 5, 2025
Decided: August 26, 2025
Filed:
__________________________________________
Clerk
Justice Jim Rice delivered the Opinion of the Court.
¶1 Jeffrey Scott Anderson (Anderson) appeals the judgment entered by the Eighth
Judicial District Court, Cascade County, wherein the District Court rejected Anderson’s
argument that the State’s Persistent Felony Offender (PFO) notice was untimely, and
imposed a PFO sentence. Anderson also asks this Court to exercise plain error review over
the District Court’s omnibus hearing procedure.
¶2 We consider:
1. Whether the District Court abused its discretion by determining the State’s PFO
notice was proper and by sentencing Anderson as a Persistent Felony Offender.
2. Whether plain error review should be conducted of the District Court’s omnibus
hearing procedure.
¶3 We affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
¶4 This case involves criminal charges arising out of Anderson’s numerous violations
of orders of protection prohibiting him from contacting his estranged wife, A.B., who
separated from Anderson in the spring of 2022. In May 2022, A.B. obtained a temporary
order of protection (TOP) which prohibited Anderson from calling, contacting, or having
any other communication with A.B., and from being within 1,500 feet of A.B.’s home.
Anderson quickly disregarded the TOP, initiating numerous communications with A.B,
leading the State to charge him with multiple misdemeanor and felony violations of the
TOP and to issue an arrest warrant. On June 9, 2022, because A.B. was late to the hearing
to consider making the order permanent, the District Court dismissed the TOP. Very upset,
A.B. immediately initiated an application for another TOP. However, Anderson followed
2
A.B. out of the Courthouse and, despite her request to leave her alone, continued his
communications with her, sending 130 texts in a 5-hour period. Further charges would be
added for these incidents. Officers located and arrested Anderson later that day on the
outstanding warrant.
¶5 On June 10, 2022, Anderson appeared before the District Court, and pled not guilty
to the charges. The District Court scheduled a jury trial for October 24, 2022. That same
day, in accordance with the local rules of the Eighth Judicial District, the District Court
ordered the parties to complete and forward to the court an electronic omnibus
memorandum “on or before Wednesday, August 31, 2022 at 5:00 p.m.”1 The order further
provided that “[n]otice of all pre-trial motions must be given in the omnibus order. Pre-
trial motions not noticed in the omnibus order will be allowed only for good cause shown.
In the omnibus order the State shall comply with Section 46-13-108, MCA, (Notice-
Persistent Felony Offender).”
¶6 On August 31, 2022, at 4:52 p.m., the State emailed defense counsel, with the
omnibus form as an attachment, stating, “I’m sorry this is so late. I was in trial and
somehow missed this on my calendar. PFO notice is being done also as I type.” At
1
In the Sentencing Order and Judgment, which included extensive findings regarding its PFO
ruling, the District Court stated:
This Court no longer conducts in-person omnibus hearings. Instead, the trial scheduling
order issued at Mr. Anderson’s June 30, 2022 Arraignment provided:
Omnibus Orders will be emailed from the Prosecutor to Defense Counsel to be
completed and then emailed to chambers [] on or before Wednesday, August
31, 2022 at 5:00 p.m.
CR14 (bolding in original, italics added here).
3
5:02 p.m., the State emailed two documents to defense counsel and the District Court, both
titled Notice of Intent to Seek Treatment of Defendant as a Persistent Felony Offender.
One document contained a brief notice of the State’s intent to treat Anderson as a PFO
(Simple Notice), while the other included further statutory language and details of the prior
convictions the State intended to utilize to establish Anderson’s PFO status (Detailed
Notice).
¶7 The next day, September 1, the State filed the Simple Notice with the District Court
with a certificate of service that stated the Simple Notice had been mailed to Anderson’s
counsel on August 31, 2022.2 The same day, the Omnibus Hearing Memorandum and
Order was docketed, which stated that “[t]he State will seek treatment of the defendant as
a persistent felony offender. . . . The State provides [written notice specifying the alleged
prior convictions which support such treatment] in Addendum A to this Order.” However,
Addendum A was not attached to the order. On September 6, 2022, the State filed the
Detailed Notice it had previously emailed to the District Court, which included the list of
Anderson’s prior convictions, and included a certificate of service that stated a copy thereof
had been hand-delivered to Anderson on September 2, 2022. Later in September, after
reviewing videos from A.B.’s security system that showed Anderson jumping over A.B.’s
backyard gate and disturbing the siding on her house, the State again amended the
Information to add another felony charge of violating the order of protection.
2
The Certificate of Service certified service on Anderson’s counsel “by placing in the box at the
Cascade County Courthouse.”
4
¶8 The parties engaged in negotiations that eventually produced a Plea Agreement.
Anderson acknowledged therein he had been charged with 16 felonies and
3 misdemeanors; the maximum penalties that he could receive for the offenses; that the
State had filed notice of its intention to designate him as a PFO and the maximum penalties
he could receive with that designation; and that in exchange for entering guilty pleas to
eight of the charged offenses, the State had agreed to dismiss the remaining charges and,
at sentencing, “not [] seek to sentence Defendant as a Persistent Felony Offender pursuant
to M.C.A. §§ 46-18-5013 and 46-18-502.” Lastly, the Plea Agreement specified that “the
forgoing sentencing recommendation is contingent upon the defendant not being arrested
for, being charged with, or there being probable cause to believe he committed any
additional crime(s) . . . not violating his bail conditions. . . . In the event the defendant
violates this paragraph, the State may make any sentencing recommendation allowed by
law.”
¶9 On November 1, 2022, Anderson entered guilty pleas to the charges as specified in
the Plea Agreement. Near the end of the hearing, Anderson moved to be released on his
own recognizance (OR). The District Court granted the motion, explaining later that it had
then mistakenly understood the Plea Agreement to recommend only suspended sentences,
3
See State v. Maggi, 2024 MT 90, ¶ 13, n. 3,
416 Mont. 333,
547 P.3d 1245 (“The legislature has
since amended the persistent felony offender statutes in 2017, which repealed § 46-18-501, MCA
(2015), and incorporated a new definition of ‘persistent felony offender’ by reference to
§ 46-1-202(18), MCA. However, the 2017 amendment did not alter the pertinent language
defining a persistent felony offender as an offender who has previously been convicted of a felony
and who is presently being sentenced for a subsequent felony committed on a different occasion
than the first. Rather, the 2017 amendment specified that the offender must be being sentenced
for a third, rather than a second, felony and that at least one of the three felonies must be a sexual
or violent offense.”).
5
but, in doing so, admonished Anderson: “They [the State] are not kidding about you not
contacting [A.B.]. And neither am I. Do not contact her again.”
¶10 Prior to the sentencing hearing, the State petitioned to revoke Anderson’s bond and
OR release, alleging Anderson had continued to contact A.B. in violation of release
conditions, including by using another person’s online profile. At the sentencing hearing,
the State argued it was entitled under the Plea Agreement, in light of Anderson’s conduct,
to deviate from its agreed sentencing recommendation and pursue designation of Anderson
as a PFO. The District Court continued the sentencing hearing, ordered briefing on whether
Anderson had breached the Plea Agreement and whether the State’s PFO designation
notice had been timely, and received oral argument. Anderson did not dispute that he had
breached the agreement or committed the prior felony convictions, but argued the State’s
PFO notice was inadequate, contending that the notice was 2 minutes late and that defense
counsel “leav[es] at 5,” and that, in any event, the statute requires the notice to be docketed
with the court before the time of the omnibus hearing, not merely provided to the defendant.
¶11 The District Court rejected Anderson’s argument that the notice must be docketed
to comply with the statute, noting that § 46-13-108, MCA,4 requires only that the notice be
“given” at or before the omnibus hearing. It further reasoned that:
It was and is undisputed that the State emailed a notice that complied with
the PFO statute at 5:02 p.m. on the day such notice was due. . . . [T]he
scheduling order required that notice to be emailed by 5:00 p.m. The issue
4
Anderson’s offenses occurred in 2022, and thus references to the Montana Code Annotated are
to the 2021 versions of the applicable statutes. See Dexter v. Shields, 2004 MT 159, ¶ 13,
322 Mont. 6,
92 P.3d 1208 (“It is axiomatic that when deciding a case involving the commission
of a crime or sentencing for a crime, we use the criminal statutes in effect at the time of the
commission.”).
6
was accordingly whether emailing it two minutes late on August 31
foreclosed the State’s resurrection of its PFO notice [after Anderson’s breach
of the Plea Agreement]. . . . The Court concluded it did not. Transmitting
the detailed notice (including the underlying PFO offenses) two minutes late
inflicted no actual prejudice in terms of preparing for trial or ultimately
negotiating the plea agreement. It is not as if the evening of August 31 was
the defense team’s last chance to consider a response to the State’s PFO
strategy. They could have done this any time between August 31 and the
execution of a plea agreement six weeks later. (Emphasis in original.)
The District Court thus allowed the State to proceed to sentencing upon its PFO request,
and the District Court sentenced Anderson accordingly.
¶12 Anderson appeals.
STANDARDS OF REVIEW
¶13 This Court reviews a defendant’s sentence to more than one year of actual
incarceration for legality. State v. Gardner, 2024 MT 283, ¶ 10,
419 Mont. 188,
559 P.3d 1241. Upon such review, we consider “whether the sentencing court had
statutory authority to impose the sentence, whether the sentence falls within the parameters
set by the applicable sentencing statutes, and whether the court adhered to the affirmative
mandates of the applicable sentencing statutes,” a determination which presents a question
of law reviewed de novo. Gardner, ¶ 10 (internal citation omitted).
¶14 Regarding PFO notices, “[w]e review a district court’s finding of good cause or
prejudice for abuse of discretion.” Gardner, ¶ 11 (citation omitted). “A court abuses its
discretion if it acts arbitrarily without the employment of conscientious judgment or
exceeds the bounds of reason, resulting in substantial injustice.” State v. Passmore,
2010 MT 34, ¶ 51,
355 Mont. 187,
225 P.3d 1229 (internal citation omitted).
7
DISCUSSION
¶15 1. Whether the District Court abused its discretion by determining the State’s PFO
notice was proper and by sentencing Anderson as a Persistent Felony Offender.
¶16 As a preliminary matter, the State contends Anderson waived the issue of the
validity of the State’s original PFO notice, arguing that “[o]nce he pled guilty, Anderson
waived the opportunity to challenge a procedural event that occurred prior to the court
accepting his plea.” The problem is that, at the time of entering his pleas on November 1,
2022, there was no need to challenge the PFO notice because, at that time, the State had
agreed not to pursue a PFO designation in exchange for Anderson’s guilty pleas, and thus,
it was not then “on the table” as a sentencing issue. It was not until the sentencing hearing,
on April 11, 2023, that the State expressed its intention to depart from the Plea Agreement
because of Anderson’s breaches of the Agreement, and again pursue a PFO designation.
As the District Court later explained in its Sentencing Order and Judgment, this changed
the course of the sentencing process:
As anticipated, the State argued that Mr. Anderson’s recent communications
with [A.B.] violated release conditions and justified the State deviating from
the plea agreement. What the Court had not anticipated was this taking the
form of the State resurrecting its previous PFO notice. The State said this
would strip the Court of its discretion to impose less than five years of
incarceration. It changed the entire legal landscape of the sentencing.
This . . . resulted in the Court continuing Mr. Anderson’s April 11 sentencing
so both sides could brief the PFO issue. (Italics in original; underlining
added).
Thus, Anderson’s sentencing was continued to permit the parties to submit briefing and
make oral arguments on the issue of the PFO notice. While “[a] voluntary and intelligent
guilty plea constitutes a waiver of nonjurisdictional defects and defenses,” State v. Claus,
8
2023 MT 203, ¶ 9,
413 Mont. 520,
538 P.3d 14, we cannot conclude that the procedure
here produced a “voluntary and intelligent” plea regarding an issue that had expressly been
withdrawn, and which was not raised again until the sentencing hearing, when the District
Court continued the hearing and permitted the parties to offer briefing and argument.
Indeed, even the District Court indicated it did not anticipate the “resurrection” of the issue.
This case is thus distinguished from Claus, and we conclude the issue was not here waived.
¶17 Anderson argues that the State’s initial notice efforts were insufficient under the
statute. He offers that the State’s email at 4:52 p.m. on August 31, 2022, with the attached
omnibus form indicating the State would pursue a PFO designation, was invalid because it
failed to specify Anderson’s prior convictions. Anderson largely ignores the State’s email
with attached Detailed Notice sent to Anderson’s counsel and the District Court 10 minutes
later at 5:02 p.m., which identified Anderson’s prior crimes, the State’s filing of the Simple
Notice with the court on September 1, with service by mail, and the State’s hand-delivered
service of the Detailed Notice on September 2. Instead, Anderson skips to the conclusion
that the filing of the Detailed Notice on September 6 was invalid because it was six days
beyond the deadline. The implication of his argument that “46-13-108 does not mention
the State can give a defendant notice of its intent to have a defendant treated under the PFO
statutes by email before the Omnibus or by having a sheriff’s deputy simply deliver it” is
that the notice must be filed with the court to comply with the statute. Anderson’s appellate
arguments thus partially alter his position before the District Court that the 5:02 p.m. email
was compliant with the statute but two minutes late, arguing instead that the September 6
notice was the first compliant notice, but six days late. The State answers that the statute
9
does not provide that a notice is valid only upon filing, that its notice was sufficient and
timely served, and that the District Court correctly interpreted the statute by so concluding.
Alternatively, the State argues that, even if notice was untimely given, Anderson was not
prejudiced by the minimal delay.
¶18 Section 46-13-108, MCA (2021), provides:
46-13-108. Notice by prosecutor seeking persistent felony offender
status.
(1) Except for good cause shown, if the prosecution seeks treatment of the
accused as a persistent felony offender, notice of that fact must be given at
or before the omnibus hearing pursuant to 46-13-110.
(2) The notice must specify the alleged prior convictions and may not be
made known to the jury before the verdict is returned except as allowed by
the Montana Rules of Evidence.
(3) If the defendant objects to the allegations contained in the notice, the
judge shall conduct a hearing to determine if the allegations in the notice are
true.
(4) The hearing must be held before the judge alone. If the judge finds any
allegations of the prior convictions are true, the accused must be sentenced
as provided by law.
(5) The notice must be filed and sealed until the time of trial or until a plea
of guilty or nolo contendere is given by the defendant.
(Emphasis added.) In addition to giving a defendant opportunity to object to a predicate
offense sought to be utilized in a PFO designation, “the requirement that notice be given
to a defendant prior to the omnibus hearing ensures that a defendant knows the maximum
penalties that could be imposed prior to making decisions about his defense.” Gardner,
¶ 16.
¶19 Anderson urges us to read the language, “notice must be given at or before the
omnibus hearing,” § 46-13-108(1), MCA, to mean that the notice must be filed with the
District Court to be compliant. However, as the District Court reasoned, “[t]he statute does
10
not say this notice must be ‘filed.’ Neither does it say the notice must be ‘served.’ It only
says that ‘notice of that fact must be given’ without further specifying the form of the notice
or the means of transmitting it.” Consistent with that plain reading is the orderly process
set forth by the statute as a whole. If the prosecution intends to seek PFO treatment, it must
give notice at or before the omnibus hearing (subsection 1). That notice “must specify the
alleged prior convictions” and, procedurally, “may not be made known to the jury before
a verdict is returned” except as allowed by the Rules of Evidence (subsection 2). If the
defendant objects to the allegations in the notice, the court shall conduct a hearing and
determine if the allegations are correct; if so, the defendant would be sentenced accordingly
(subsection 3 and 4); see also § 46-18-502, MCA (enhanced penalties for PFO status).
After the court’s determination concerning the allegations, the notice “must be filed and
sealed until the time of trial or until a plea” is entered (subsection 5). Clearly, the
prosecution is to give notice, allowing the defendant the opportunity to object, and leading
to a hearing and determination about the notice’s allegations by the court. At that point,
the notice is “filed and sealed” pending trial or entry of a plea. Section 46-13-108(4),
MCA.
¶20 Consequently, the Detailed Notice provided with the State’s email at 5:02 p.m. on
August 31, 2022, was compliant with the statute. It “specif[ied] the alleged prior
convictions,” § 46-13-108(2), MCA, on which the State was basing the PFO designation.
Unfortunately, it was provided two minutes after the deadline of 5:00 p.m., August 31,
2022, provided in the District Court’s order, which raises the question of whether the notice
was nonetheless valid.
11
¶21 In Gardner, the State filed notice of its intention to seek PFO treatment of the
defendant 8 months after the omnibus hearing, and a mere two weeks before trial. Gardner,
¶ 4. Gardner objected, citing the untimeliness of the notice, no showing of good cause, and
his need for “ample time to object to the designation.” Gardner, ¶ 5. The State
acknowledged the tardy notice was an “oversight more than anything,” and the district
court found that good cause was “very questionable.” See § 46-13-108(1), MCA (“Except
for good cause shown,” notice must be given at or before the omnibus hearing.). The
district court nonetheless allowed the State’s PFO designation, reasoning that “the
appropriate inquiry is whether the defendant had ample time to object to his PFO
designation,” and that Gardner had not articulated any prejudice from the late filing.
Gardner, ¶ 8. We reversed, holding that the only basis upon which an untimely notice
could be accepted by a court is the State’s showing of good cause, which the State failed
to demonstrate. Gardner, ¶ 17. We held that the court had abused its discretion as “no
good cause for the delay legally or factually existed,” and that “[a] ‘busy caseload’ is not
good cause.” Gardner, ¶ 18 (citing State v. Greywater, 282 Mont. 28, 37,
939 P.2d 975,
980 (1996)). The Court held that the district court’s analysis of prejudice was misplaced,
as that analysis becomes relevant only upon appeal, and under the statute is not the
defendant’s burden before the trial court. Gardner, ¶ 21.
¶22 In State v. Shults,
2006 MT 100,
332 Mont. 130,
136 P.3d 507, this Court reaffirmed
its holding in State v. McQuiston,
277 Mont. 397,
922 P.2d 519 (1996), that “if a defendant
had ample opportunity to object to PFO treatment, including the underlying charge on
which the statute is based, and [the] defendant was not prejudiced by the timing of the
12
filing, we will not overturn a district court’s decision to impose a sentence with a PFO
designation.” Shults, ¶ 22. There, the State indicated on an omnibus form its intentions to
possibly seek PFO treatment. Shults, ¶ 20. Then, at a change of plea hearing, after the
statutory deadline for PFO notice, the State provided a written notice of the prior
convictions to be utilized for the PFO designation. Shults argued that the compliant notice
was untimely and invalid. Shults, ¶ 21. The Court upheld the designation, noting that
Shults “learned of the predicate offense when he pled guilty in November 2004 and the
court sentenced him in March 2005,” giving him “four months to file an objection to the
alleged prior offense . . . before the court imposed sentence.” Shults, ¶ 23.
¶23 In State. v. Ramsey, 2007 MT 31,
336 Mont. 44,
152 P.3d 710, the State noted on
the omnibus form that it may seek a PFO designation, without listing any prior convictions.
Ramsey, ¶ 19. At the omnibus hearing, the court ordered the State to file its prior
convictions supporting a PFO designation by June 16, but the State was 5 days late in doing
so, filing the list of convictions on June 22. Ramsey, ¶ 9. Five months later, at the
sentencing hearing, Ramsey first objected to the untimeliness of the detailed notice.
Ramsey, ¶ 19. We affirmed the PFO designation, restating the principles of McQuiston
and Shults, and concluding that Ramsey was not prejudiced by the late filing because he
had 5 months to file an objection to the alleged prior offenses. Ramsey, ¶ 20.
¶24 Contrary to Gardner, and with greater effort by the State here to comply with the
statute than in Shults and Ramsey, no prejudice inured to Anderson from the State’s
2-minute late email delivery of the Detailed Notice, nor from the 2-day late hand-delivered
service of the Detailed Notice, nor from the 6-day late filing of the Detailed Notice. Plea
13
negotiations did not take place until October, and it was not until November 1, 2022, two
months after the State first sent the Detailed Notice to Anderson, that Anderson pled guilty,
acknowledging in his Plea Agreement that the State intended to seek PFO treatment.
Anderson “had ample opportunity to object to PFO treatment, including the underlying
charge[s].” Shults, ¶ 22. The timeline of this case establishes that Anderson had
knowledge of “the maximum penalties that could be imposed prior to making decisions
about his defense.” Gardner, ¶ 16.
¶25 “A cause [affecting the convicted person’s substantial rights] may not be reversed
by reason of any error committed by the trial court against the convicted person unless the
record shows that the error was prejudicial.” Section 46-20-701(1), MCA; Gardner, ¶ 21.
“[I]f a defendant had ample opportunity to object to PFO treatment, including the
underlying charge on which the statute is based, and that defendant was not prejudiced by
the timing of the filing, we will not overturn a district court’s decision to impose a sentence
with a PFO designation.” Shults, ¶ 22. While the District Court referenced the lack of
prejudice to Anderson, we agree upon our analysis that Anderson suffered no harm from
the manner in which the State provided the PFO notice.
¶26 2. Whether plain error review should be conducted of the District Court’s omnibus
hearing procedure.
¶27 Anderson argues the District Court erred by not conducting an in-person omnibus
hearing. He notes that § 46-13-110(1), MCA, provides that “[t]he court shall hold an
omnibus hearing,” (emphasis added) and, as noted above, the District Court stated in its
written order addressing the PFO issue that “[t]his Court no longer conducts in-person
14
omnibus hearings,” in accordance with local rule. Anderson acknowledges that no
objection was made in the District Court to the lack of an in-person hearing, and thus he
asks that the Court exercise plain error review of the issue, arguing that the failure to
conduct an in-person hearing implicates his right to due process. The State answers that
the omnibus hearing statute does not require a defendant’s attendance, unless ordered by
the court, § 46-13-110(3), MCA,5 and that the ministerial nature of an omnibus hearing
does not generally compel a defendant’s presence or participation. Here, the parties
exchanged their respective disclosures based upon a schedule ordered by the District Court,
and submitted the joint Omnibus Hearing Memorandum and Order without further court
involvement. Further, the State argues that Anderson was not deprived of due process, and
thus does not establish a basis for plain error review, because he was not deprived of the
opportunity to be heard on any issue, and he did not request the District Court to schedule
an omnibus hearing as permitted by the local rules.
¶28 We “may review unpreserved errors that implicate fundamental rights where failure
to review them ‘may result in a manifest miscarriage of justice, may leave unsettled the
question of the fundamental fairness of the trial or proceedings, or may compromise the
integrity of the judicial process.’” State v. Marfuta, 2024 MT 245, ¶ 21,
418 Mont. 353,
557 P.3d 1260 (quoting State v. Deveraux,
2022 MT 130, ¶ 21,
409 Mont. 177,
512 P.3d
1198). This doctrine is applied “sparingly, on a case-by-case basis, considering the totality
of the circumstances of each case.” Marfuta, ¶ 21 (citing State v. George,
2020 MT 56,
5
As quoted above, the PFO statute, § 46-13-108, MCA, cross-references the omnibus hearing
statute, § 46-13-110, MCA.
15
¶ 5, 399 Mont. 173,
459 P.3d 854). “The party requesting reversal because of plain error
bears the burden of firmly convincing this Court that the claimed error implicates a
fundamental right and that such review is necessary. . . .” George, ¶ 5.
¶29 The reasoning for the rule—that “it is fundamentally unfair to fault the trial court
for failing to rule on an issue it was never given the opportunity to consider,” Smith v. State,
2024 MT 225, ¶ 21,
418 Mont. 210, 557 P.3d 55—is particularly apt in this case, where
the District Court, already addressing the local rules, would have been well positioned to
also consider Anderson’s due process and statutory concerns about the omnibus process as
conducted thereunder. We have already concluded that Anderson was not prejudiced by
the PFO process followed in this case, and we further conclude that he has not firmly
convinced this Court that review of the claimed error is necessary to preserve the
fundamental fairness of the proceeding or the integrity of the judicial process.
¶30 Affirmed.
/S/ JIM RICE
We Concur:
/S/ LAURIE McKINNON
/S/ JAMES JEREMIAH SHEA
/S/ BETH BAKER
/S/ INGRID GUSTAFSON
16
