08/26/2025
DA 24-0716
Case Number: DA 24-0716
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA
2025 MT 192N
LAURYN N. JACKSON,
Petitioner and Appellee,
v.
JAMARV D. JACKSON,
Respondent and Appellant.
APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Twelfth Judicial District,
In and For the County of Chouteau, Cause No. DR-2024-0067
Honorable Kaydee Snipes Ruiz, Presiding Judge
COUNSEL OF RECORD:
For Appellant:
Jamarv D. Jackson, Self-Represented, Fort Benton, Montana
For Appellee:
Lauryn N. Jackson, Self-Represented, Great Falls, Montana
Submitted on Briefs: June 18, 2025
Decided: August 26, 2025
Filed:
__________________________________________
Clerk
Justice Ingrid Gustafson delivered the Opinion of the Court.
¶1 Pursuant to Section I, Paragraph 3(c), Montana Supreme Court Internal Operating
Rules, this case is decided by memorandum opinion and shall not be cited and does not
serve as precedent. Its case title, cause number, and disposition shall be included in this
Court’s quarterly list of noncitable cases published in the Pacific Reporter and Montana
Reports.
¶2 Respondent and Appellant, Jamarv Jackson, appeals from the November 12, 2024
Order of Protection for Petitioner and Order of Protection for Minors through
November 12, 2025, issued by the Twelfth Judicial District Court, Chouteau County.
We affirm.
¶3 Petitioner and Appellee, Lauryn Jackson, filed a petition seeking a temporary and
permanent order of protection for herself and the parties’ three children—S.J. (then age
16), S.J. (then age 11), and C.J. (then age 6). Hearing was held on the petition on
November 12, 2024. Lauryn was present, represented herself pro se, and testified. Jamarv
also appeared and was represented by legal counsel. Upon conclusion of the hearing, the
District Court issued its order of November 12, 2024, granting an order of protection for
Lauryn and the parties’ three minor children extending through November 12, 2025.
¶4 Now representing himself pro se, Jamarv appeals asserting there was insufficient
evidence to support the issuance of an order of protection and that the presiding district
court judge should have recused herself from the cause. The entirety of Jamarv’s argument
from his briefing is:
2
[Jamarv] appeals the decision of the lower court due to no evidence of any
kind to prove the statements made by [Lauryn] under oath. The judge in the
case does have a familial relationship with an Attorney which was handling
a case for [Jamarv] during the time of this court hearing.
¶5 This Court will not overturn a district court’s decision to make permanent an order
of protection absent an abuse of discretion. Schiller v. Schiller, 2002 MT 103, ¶ 24,
309 Mont. 431,
47 P.3d 816. We do not determine whether we would have reached the
same decision as the district court, but whether the trial judge acted arbitrarily without
conscientious judgment or exceeded the bounds of reason. Newman v. Lichfield,
2012 MT
47, ¶ 22,
364 Mont. 243,
272 P.3d 625.
¶6 At the hearing on Lauryn’s petition, she testified regarding an event occurring in
May 2024 resulting in Jamarv being charged with two criminal counts of assault, which in
her briefing advises he was convicted of and faced sentencing scheduled for July 28, 2025.
She also testified she observed Jamarv physically strike one of their children while they
were in a vehicle together; that there were prior multiple restraining orders against Jamarv;
there was a pattern of abuse by Jamarv; and that their children were previously placed in
foster care as a result of Jamarv physically assaulting them. She also testified to observing
Jamarv drive by her home after issuance of the temporary restraining order. To the extent
there was conflicting evidence presented at the November 12, 2024 hearing, it is not our
role to weigh conflicting evidence or determine the strength of such conflicting testimony.
The District Court is in a better position to observe the witnesses and judge their credibility
than this Court. Therefore, “we will not second guess the district court’s determination
regarding the strength and weight of conflicting testimony.” Bonnie M. Combs-Demaio
3
Living Tr. v. Kilby Butte Colony, Inc., 2005 MT 71, ¶ 9,
326 Mont. 334,
109 P.3d 252
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted); see also In re Marriage of Kesler,
2018 MT
231, ¶ 17,
392 Mont. 540,
427 P.3d 77. The District Court clearly based its decision on the
relative credibility of the witnesses and strength of the evidence presented. Such a
determination is well within the trial court’s discretion. In re Marriage of Kesler, ¶ 17;
Bonnie M. Combs-Demaio Living Tr., ¶ 9. The District Court found Lauryn’s evidence to
be more credible and ruled accordingly.1
¶7 Jamarv also contends that the District Court Judge should have recused herself as
an attorney who is a partner at the same firm as her brother, a Montana attorney, previously
represented him in an unrelated cause. Upon review of the record, it is completely devoid
of any objection to Judge Snipes Ruiz presiding over the cause at issue, nor is there any
information or evidence that Judge Snipes Ruiz knew anything about a colleague of her
brother previously representing Jamarv, if such occurred, or that she possessed any
information related to that representation at all. As such, there was no basis for Judge
Snipes Ruiz to recuse herself under the Rules of Professional Conduct.
¶8 We have determined to decide this case pursuant to Section I, Paragraph 3(c) of our
Internal Operating Rules, which provides for memorandum opinions. In the opinion of the
Court, the case presents a question controlled by settled law or by the clear application of
applicable standards of review.
1
Jamarv does not seem to understand that the testimony of Lauryn is evidence which the trial court
could determine to be reliable and credible and there need not be documentary evidence confirming
Lauryn’s oral testimony.
4
¶9 Affirmed.
/S/ INGRID GUSTAFSON
We Concur:
/S/ LAURIE McKINNON
/S/ JAMES JEREMIAH SHEA
/S/ KATHERINE M BIDEGARAY
/S/ JIM RICE
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