State v. Solomon

                   IN THE SUPREME COURT
                   STATE OF NORTH DAKOTA

                                  

State of North Dakota,                                     Plaintiff and Appellee
      v.
Nataneil Tekie Solomon,                                Defendant and Appellant

                                  No. 20250021

Appeal from the District Court of Cass County, East Central Judicial District, the
Honorable Stephannie N. Stiel, Judge.

AFFIRMED.

Opinion of the Court by Jensen, Chief Justice.

Nicholas S. Samuelson (argued) and Renata J. Selzer (on brief), Assistant State’s
Attorneys, Fargo, ND, for plaintiff and appellee.

Kiara C. Kraus-Parr, Grand Forks, ND, for defendant and appellant.
                                 State v. Solomon
                                   No. 20250021

Jensen, Chief Justice.

[¶1] Nataneil Tekie Solomon appeals from a criminal judgment convicting him
of gross sexual imposition and contributing to the deprivation or delinquency of
a minor. Solomon argues the district court erred in denying his motion to dismiss
for violation of his statutory right to a speedy trial. We affirm the criminal
judgment.

                                         I

[¶2] In February 2024, Solomon was charged with gross sexual imposition, a
class A felony, and contributing to the deprivation or delinquency of a minor, a
class A misdemeanor. In March 2024, a preliminary hearing and arraignment
were held, during which Solomon pleaded not guilty and requested a speedy
trial. The parties attempted to schedule the trial date at the hearing, but struggled
to find a date without a prior scheduling conflict. Solomon’s counsel requested
that the trial be a “date certain.” The district court acknowledged that a later date
would be more than 90 days after Solomon’s invocation of his speedy trial right
but found good cause to extend because of the “schedules of the parties.”

[¶3] The district court’s next available “date certain” for a trial was July 30,
2024. The parties anticipated the trial would take three or four days and agreed
that the July dates worked for both parties’ schedules. The court set a pretrial
conference for July 29, 2024, with trial to begin on July 30, 2024.

[¶4] In May 2024, during a status conference, Solomon’s counsel withdrew
from representation of Solomon. Solomon was appointed new counsel shortly
after the withdrawal of his counsel.

[¶5] At the beginning of the trial in July 2024, Solomon’s counsel moved to
dismiss the case for violation of his right to a speedy trial under N.D.C.C. § 29-
19-02. The district court noted that the parties had agreed upon the trial date at
the March 2024 arraignment and explained the following:



                                         1
             [THE COURT:] So there were a lot of discussions. Mr. Dusek
     requested May 14th and 15th. Ms. Selzer was already in a murder
     trial. I offered to set it as a back-up; however, the parties continued
     discussing other dates. I offered June. Mr. Dusek had a murder trial
     that day, so we discussed—I also discussed we could set it on that
     day, but I had a shorter trial week that day, and already had a AA
     felony lead-off trial set on my docket that day. So we discussed I
     would have a lead-off in July. The parties agreed to set it on that date
     in July, so that’s this date that we have today.
             So I—multiple things were offered. The dates that were
     ultimately set were July dates. We did have another conference on
     this, a status conference on May 1st. Nobody asked for me to look at
     my calendar again, for—to see if that—those May dates were open.
     Nobody asked, again, to push it onto the June calendar. I confirmed
     with the parties on that date, that the July date is what we’ll leave it
     set at, even though Mr. Dusek, at that hearing, had indicated that he
     might have a conflict. That he received 2,000 pages of discovery. So
     that was the May 1st status conference. Nobody raised an issue with
     the dates of the trial that day.
             I had actually found good cause, on the record, to extend it at
     that preliminary hearing date in March. And so due to the Court
     docket, the party’s conflicts, and making a lead-off available for the
     parties, and also accommodating not only the Court’s schedule but
     the attorney’s schedules, we set it on for that July date. Mr. Dusek
     did ultimately have to withdraw from the case, so had we even set
     it in that—on the May dates, you would have been assigned after
     those trial dates. They were the 14th and 15th. So that would have
     left June, which I had a AA felony trial on my docket, and so that
     left, again, the July dates available.
             Again, good cause was found to set it in July. The attorneys
     could have raised it again in May. Nobody objected when the Court
     specifically brought up the speedy trial request again, on May 1st,
     reiterated the dates of trial, and nobody requested an earlier date at
     that time. And so based on all those things, I do find there was good
     cause to go beyond the 90 days in this case, and that I’m going to
     deny the motion. . . .

[¶6] The jury convicted Solomon on both counts: (1) gross sexual imposition
and (2) contributing to the deprivation or delinquency of a minor.




                                        2
                                        II

[¶7] “When an appellant raises a speedy trial issue, we review the district
court’s findings of fact under a clearly erroneous standard; we review its speedy
trial determination de novo.” City of Grand Forks v. Gale, 

, 

. “A finding of fact is clearly erroneous if it is induced by an
erroneous view of the law, if it is not supported by any evidence, or if, although
there is some evidence to support the finding, a reviewing court is left with a
definite and firm conviction a mistake has been made.” Belyeu v. State, 

, 

 (quoting Abdi v. State, 

, 

).

                                        III

[¶8] Solomon argues the district court erred in denying his motion to dismiss
for violation of his statutory right to a speedy trial because the State failed to
demonstrate “good cause” for the delay. He raises four issues in support of his
argument: (1) the prosecutor’s statement regarding a conflicting scheduling
commitment was “uncertain” and “unverified,” (2) the prosecutor knew of a
potential scheduling conflict in the other conflicting trial, (3) the prosecutor was
not the lead counsel in the other conflicting trial, and (4) the court failed to
address the Barker factors.

[¶9] “A defendant in a criminal matter has the right to a speedy trial under
Article 1, Section 12, of the North Dakota Constitution, N.D.C.C. § 29-19-02, and
the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution.” Koenig v. State, 

, 

. In addition to the constitutional speedy trial
protections, section 29-19-02, N.D.C.C., states:

      In a criminal prosecution, the state and the defendant each shall
      have the right to a speedy trial. The right to a speedy trial in a
      criminal case in which the charging instrument contains a charge of
      a felony offense under section 19-03.1-23 or under chapter 12.1-20 is
      for the trial to begin within ninety days of the date the party elects
      this right. The prosecution and the defendant shall elect this right
      within fourteen days following the arraignment. The court may
      allow the trial to begin later than ninety days of the arraignment for
      good cause.


                                         3
[¶10] Solomon was charged under N.D.C.C. § 12.1-20-03(1)(d) for gross sexual
imposition and elected to exercise his right to a speedy trial at his arraignment
on March 21, 2024. Applying the statutory 90-day window, the trial was required
to begin no later than June 19, 2024, unless “good cause” was found by the
district court. See State v. Watson, 

, 

 (“Under
N.D.C.C. § 29-19-02, the district court must find good cause for the delay if it
allows the trial to begin later than 90 days after a timely speedy trial request.”).

[¶11] “Four factors are considered in determining whether the [district] court
had good cause to grant a continuance under N.D.C.C. § 29-19-02: ‘(1) length of
delay; (2) reason for delay; (3) defendant’s assertion of his right; and (4) prejudice
to the defendant.’” Watson, 

 (quoting Everett v. State, 

, 

). “Whether a delay is too long depends on the
circumstances of the case, but the allowable delay for a minor offense is less than
that allowed for a more serious and complex offense.” Id. ¶ 30. “No factor is
controlling, but a lack of prejudice substantially weakens a claim.” Id. ¶ 28
(cleaned up). “As utilized by the courts, however, the causal factor actually
encompasses two issues: (1) who caused the delay, and (2) the motives or reasons
for the delay.” N.D.R.Crim.P. 48, Explanatory Note.

[¶12] In finding “good cause” to schedule the trial on July 30, 2024, 41 days
outside of the statutory 90-day window, the district court relied on the
scheduling conflicts of both parties, the court’s docket, the lack of request by
either party for an earlier trial date when the opportunity to do so presented
itself, and Solomon’s counsel agreement to the July 30, 2024 date.

[¶13] In State v. Mondragon, 

, 

, we addressed the
issue of a delayed trial date by referencing State v. Fulks, 

, 

 (“While Fulks does not discuss the same statutory right to a speedy
trial that Mondragon has elected, it does discuss a 90 day statutory right to a
speedy trial under N.D.C.C. § 29-33-03, the Uniform Mandatory Disposition of
Detainers Act.”). In State v. Fulks, we explained:

            The 90-day period under the Detainers Act is not a strict
      statute of limitations, but rather a conditional right, which can be
      extended by stipulation or acquiescence of the parties or by the court

                                          4
      for good cause shown. See State v. Carlson, 

 (N.D.
      1977). Delays or continuances primarily resulting from the conduct
      of the defendant or his attorney cannot be charged against the State
      in a claim of failure to bring a case to trial within 90 days. State v.
      Kania, 

 (N.D. 1983).
             ....
             When a defendant, through his own actions or the actions of
      his attorney, substantially contributes to the State not bringing
      charges to trial within the 90-day period required by the Detainers
      Act, the defendant cannot merely rely upon expiration of the 90-day
      period to have the charges dismissed against him. Carlson, 

. A defendant cannot have the benefit of delay and
      then “turn about and charge the State with such delay.” 

.

.

[¶14] Solomon argues that the district court’s denial of his motion to dismiss was
erroneous because, when finding “good cause” and denying Solomon’s motion
to dismiss, the court failed to explicitly address all of the Barker factors. “While
we would prefer the court address the four factors, failure of the court to address
the factors will not be reversed if we are able to analyze the factors based on the
record.” Mondragon, 

.

[¶15] In regard to the first three Barker factors, the record reflects the following:
(1) the length of delay was 41 days, (2) the reason for the delay was the conflicting
schedules of both the State and Solomon’s counsel, and (3) Solomon exercised
his right to a speedy trial at his arraignment on March 21, 2024. The fourth Barker
factor focuses on prejudice to the defendant as the result of the delay. “Prejudice
can take three forms: ‘oppressive pretrial incarceration, anxiety and concern
caused by the delay, and an impaired defense.’” Watson, 

(quoting Everett, 

). The only prejudice Solomon alleges to have
suffered as a result of the delay is “prolonged pretrial incarceration” and
“anxiety of awaiting trial on serious charges.” No specific argument has been
made in Solomon’s brief linking the pretrial incarceration and anxiety to his
claim of prejudice. See State v. Hall, 

, 

 (“To
establish actual prejudice, a defendant must factually link [their] loss of liberty
with any specific prejudice to [their] right to a fair trial.” (cleaned up)). As


                                         5
previously indicated, a claim is substantially weakened when prejudice is
lacking. See Watson, ¶ 28.

[¶16] The schedules of both parties contributed to the delay, Solomon’s counsel
agreed to a trial date outside of the 90 days, and the State did not deliberately
cause the delay to obstruct the defense. “While the district court did not
explicitly apply the speedy trial factors, we will not set aside a correct result if
the result would be the same applying the factors.” Mondragon, 

.
We conclude the district court did not err in finding “good cause,” nor did it err
in denying Solomon’s motion to dismiss.

[¶17] Solomon challenges the accuracy of the record in this case with regard to
whether counsel for the State had a conflict requiring the trial to be scheduled
beyond the 90-day window. Specifically, Solomon alleges the following: (1) the
prosecutor’s statement regarding a conflicting scheduling commitment was
“uncertain” and “unverified,” (2) the prosecutor knew of a potential scheduling
conflict in the other conflicting trial, and (3) the prosecutor was not the lead
counsel in the other conflicting trial. Solomon offers only allegations, without
any support for the allegations based on the record in this case. Regardless, the
State responds that the allegations can be easily refuted by taking judicial notice
of the record in the separate record of the case that counsel for the State asserted
created the conflict. See N.D.R.App.P. 10(a). The State asks this Court to take
judicial notice of the district court record, State of North Dakota v. Spencer Jay Moen
(see file no. 09-2023-CR-03726), outside of this appeal. We decline the State’s
invitation to go beyond the record of this case and take judicial notice of
proceedings in another case. Here, Solomon has made allegations contrary to the
existing record on appeal. If there is information outside of the current record to
support Solomon’s allegations, he could have requested supplementation of the
record either through judicial notice or otherwise. We conclude it is unnecessary
for the State to seek judicial notice of matters outside of the record to rebut
allegations contrary to the existing record.

[¶18] We conclude the district court did not err in finding good cause existed to
schedule Solomon’s trial outside of the statutory 90-day speedy trial window.
The judgment is affirmed.


                                          6
[¶19] Jon J. Jensen, C.J.
      Daniel J. Crothers
      Lisa Fair McEvers
      Jerod E. Tufte
      Douglas A. Bahr




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