Jose Alberto Hernandez, Petitioner and Appellant
v.
State of North Dakota, Respondent and Appellee
No. 20250116
Appeal from the District Court of Walsh County, Northeast Judicial District, the
Honorable Barbara L. Whelan, Judge.
AFFIRMED.
Per Curiam.
Kiara C. Kraus-Parr, Grand Forks, ND, for petitioner and appellant; on brief.
Kelley M.R. Cole, State’s Attorney, Grafton, ND, for respondent and appellee; on
brief.
Hernandez v. State
No. 20250116
Per Curiam.
[¶1] Jose Hernandez appeals from a district court order granting summary
disposition and dismissing his postconviction relief application seeking to
withdraw his guilty pleas. Hernandez argues the court erred in denying his
application before an evidentiary hearing because claims of ineffective assistance
of counsel are generally unsuited to summary disposition. He argues the
statements in the verified application raise a genuine issue of material fact. In
granting summary disposition, the court concluded “the record contains nothing
but bald, conclusory statements made by Hernandez that are unsubstantiated by
affidavit or other competent evidence”; and “[t]he record contains only nonspecific, self-serving assertions made in Hernandez’s petition, and the brief
recitation of law and argument submitted by counsel. There are no affidavits or
other competent evidence within this record to support the conclusory
statements asserted by Hernandez in his application.”
[¶2] While claims of ineffective assistance of counsel are ordinarily unsuited to
summary disposition without an evidentiary hearing, the district court may
grant summary disposition when the State moves for summary disposition and
an applicant fails to provide some competent evidence to support his claims. See
N.D.C.C. § 29-32.1-09.1; Almklov v. State,
. On this record, Hernandez’s verified application and subsequent
“objection” to the State’s summary disposition motion failed to present
competent, admissible evidence which raised a genuine issue of material fact
that his counsels’ representation fell below an objective standard of
reasonableness under prong one of the Strickland test. See Samaniego v. State,
(“Courts need not address both prongs of the
Strickland test, and if a court can resolve the case by addressing only one prong
it is encouraged to do so.”). We conclude the district court properly dismissed
Hernandez’s application under these circumstances. We summarily affirm under
N.D.R.App.P. 35.1(a)(6).
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[¶3] Jon J. Jensen, C.J.
Daniel J. Crothers
Lisa Fair McEvers
Jerod E. Tufte
Douglas A. Bahr
2
