IN THE SUPREME COURT
STATE OF NORTH DAKOTA
2025 ND 178
State of North Dakota, Plaintiff and Appellee
v.
David Chambers, Jr., Defendant and Appellant
No. 20250108
Appeal from the District Court of McKenzie County, Northwest Judicial District,
the Honorable Robin A. Schmidt, Judge.
AFFIRMED.
Opinion of the Court by Jensen, Chief Justice.
Ariston E. Johnson (argued) and Aaron Weber (on brief), Assistant State’s
Attorneys, Watford City, ND, for plaintiff and appellee.
Jamie L. Schaible, Fargo, ND, for defendant and appellant.
State v. Chambers
No. 20250108
Jensen, Chief Justice.
[¶1] David Chambers appeals from a judgment following guilty pleas to one
count of attempted murder under N.D.C.C. § 12.1-16-01(1)(a) and two counts of
reckless endangerment under N.D.C.C. § 12.1-17-03. Chambers seeks to
withdraw his guilty plea to the attempted murder charge and asserts it was an
obvious error to accept his guilty plea because: (1) the factual basis established
at the plea hearing was inadequate for the attempted intentional murder charge;
(2) he was allowed to enter a guilty plea to the non-cognizable offense of attempt
to commit knowing murder; and (3) the district court failed to comply with the
notice requirements of N.D.R.Crim.P. 11(c)(3)(B). We affirm the judgment.
I
[¶2] On October 2, 2023, Chambers entered the lobby of the Tumbleweed Inn
in Alexander, ND, and fired one shot from a .22 caliber rifle in the direction of
two females, one of whom had been in an intimate relationship with Chambers
(“Jane Doe 1”) and the other a close family member of the first (“Jane Doe 2”).
The bullet narrowly missed Jane Doe 1’s head. Chambers was intoxicated at the
time. The Inn’s security camera caught most of the incident. While the video itself
is not part of the record, the affidavit of probable cause contains a detailed
description of the conduct depicted in the video.
[¶3] Chambers was charged with two counts of attempted murder—intentional
or knowing, one count of reckless endangerment, one count of unlawful
possession of a firearm, and one count of domestic violence assault. The
attempted murder counts allege Chambers “intentionally or knowingly engaged
in conduct which, in fact, constituted a substantial step towards intentionally or
knowingly causing the death of Jane Doe 1 . . . .”
[¶4] Chambers pleaded guilty through a “capped open plea” to the attempted
murder charge under Count I and amended charges of reckless endangerment
under Counts II and III. Under the “capped open plea,” the attorneys explained
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the State would be “asking for [a] 20 [year sentence],” and the defense attorney
“can ask for whatever [he] wants.”
[¶5] When providing a factual basis for the plea, the State referenced both the
intentional and knowingly allegations from the information as follows:
On or about October 2nd, 2023, here in McKenzie County, Mr.
Chambers intends to knowingly engage in [conduct], which in fact
constituted a substantial step towards intentionally, knowingly
causing the death of Jane Doe [1] by shooting a [.]22 caliber long rifle
at her, nearly missing her head. There was also, in regards to the
reckless endangerment, Jane Doe 2 was right next to Jane Doe 1, who
was nearly shot by the round as well. And he discharged that rifle
inside a hotel where other guests and occupants resided,
endangering them and exhibiting a significant indifference for
human life.
[¶6] When the district court asked Chambers to confirm the factual basis for his
guilty plea, he responded: “I honestly, honestly don’t even remember. I was so
intoxicated, I couldn’t even give you a hundred percent honest answer.” After a
short recess, the court told Chambers the case would have to go to trial if he
could not agree to a factual basis for the three charges to which he would be
pleading guilty. In response to the court’s indication the case would have to
proceed to trial, Chambers’ defense attorney replied: “We have a workaround.
He was just trying to be forthright with the Court. He has watched the video
surveillance of it, and we thought of that after you left. He’s watched the video
surveillance and can confirm that the video shows the factual basis, as the State
alleges.” Chambers, after additional questioning, stated: “Yes. I [have] seen the
video[,]” after which the court was satisfied with the factual basis for the guilty
plea and accepted it.
II
[¶7] Chambers concedes his appeal is governed by the obvious error standard
under N.D.R.Crim.P. 52(b) because he did not object in district court. See State v.
Littleghost, 2025 ND 65, ¶ 5,
18 N.W.3d 858. To satisfy the obvious error standard,
Chambers must show “(1) error, (2) that is plain, and (3) the error affects
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substantial rights.” Id. (quoting State v. Miller,
2001 ND 132, ¶ 25,
631 N.W.2d
587). An error only affects substantial rights when it is “prejudicial, or affected
the outcome of the proceeding.” State v. Erickstad,
2000 ND 202, ¶ 22,
620 N.W.2d
136. Chambers has the burden of showing an alleged error is prejudicial.
Id.
III
[¶8] Chambers challenges the sufficiency of the factual basis for his guilty plea.
He argues that the State’s reference to both the cognizable offense of attempted
intentional murder and the non-cognizable offense of attempted knowing
murder when discussing the factual basis for the plea creates a possibility that
he pled guilty to a non-cognizable offense. See, e.g., Pemberton v. State, 2021 ND
85, ¶¶ 13-14,
959 N.W.2d 891 (explaining that attempted knowing murder is a
non-cognizable offense and that the State must prove an actual intent to kill for
an attempted murder charge). Chambers asserts that his affirmation of his
conduct after watching the hotel video was only acknowledging a factual basis
for the non-cognizable offense of attempted knowing murder rather than the
cognizable offense of attempted intentional murder.
[¶9] We previously addressed a similar ambiguity by concluding it simply
meant a defendant had pleaded guilty “to both a cognizable and a
non-cognizable offense.” Byrd v. State,
2025 ND 55, ¶ 15,
18 N.W.3d 836. In Byrd,
we considered whether there was a sufficient factual basis to support the guilty
plea to the cognizable offense and determined that, if there was a sufficient
factual basis for the cognizable offense, a guilty plea to the non-cognizable
offense would be harmless error.
Id. We concluded that the error in Byrd was
harmless,
id., and therefore the defendant had failed to show the error had
affected his substantial rights.
[¶10] The video evidence provides detailed evidence of Chambers’s intentional
conduct before, during, and after he fired the shot at Jane Doe 1. While
intoxication may be relevant to whether a person committed the cognizable
offense of attempted intentional murder, intoxication is not in and of itself a
defense that negates the intent element. See N.D.C.C. § 12.1-04-02(1); see also
Erickstad,
2000 ND 202, ¶ 25 (“Although voluntary intoxication is not
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exculpatory in itself, where an offense requires proof of a specific intent,
intoxication may be considered in determining whether such intent existed.”).
There is a sufficient factual basis to support a guilty plea to the cognizable
offense of attempted intentional murder, and Chambers did not meet his burden
of showing his substantial rights were prejudiced under the obvious error
standard of review.
IV
[¶11] Chambers also argues the district court failed to advise him of the right to
withdraw his guilty plea in accordance with N.D.R.Crim.P. 11(c)(3)(B).
Subdivision (c) provides the format for the acceptance of a plea agreement and
applies when the parties present a joint recommendation to the court on a
proposed sentence. During the hearing, the State clearly indicated it was seeking
a 20-year sentence and that Chambers was free to argue for a different sentence.
Chambers entered an open plea, without the benefit of an agreement with the
prosecutor to recommend any particular sentence. We conclude that Rule
11(c)(3)(B) does not apply in the absence of a plea agreement.
V
[¶12] Chambers did not satisfy his burden of showing that any alleged errors in
the district court’s factual basis inquiry were prejudicial. Additionally, because
Chambers entered an open plea, without a plea agreement, the requirements of
Rule 11(c)(3)(B) did not apply. We affirm the judgment.
[¶13] Jon J. Jensen, C.J.
Daniel J. Crothers
Lisa Fair McEvers
Jerod E. Tufte
Douglas A. Bahr
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