Walden v. Walden

                    IN THE SUPREME COURT
                    STATE OF NORTH DAKOTA

                                  

Kristine Gail Walden,                                    Plaintiff and Appellee
      v.
Shay Alan Walden,                                     Defendant and Appellant



                                 No. 20240131

Appeal from the District Court of Richland County, Southeast Judicial District,
the Honorable Bradley A. Cruff, Judge.

AFFIRMED.

Opinion of the Court by McEvers, Justice.

Tracey R. Lindberg, Pelican Rapids, MN, for plaintiff and appellee.

Erica L. Chisholm, Wahpeton, ND, for defendant and appellant.
                               Walden v. Walden
                                 No. 20240131

McEvers, Justice.

[¶1] Shay Walden appeals from a district court’s findings of fact, conclusions
of law, and order for judgment, and judgment and decree. Shay Walden argues
the court erred in awarding spousal support, distributing the marital property
and debt, and awarding attorney’s fees. We affirm.

                                        I

[¶2] Shay Walden and Kristine Walden were married on April 14, 2016. The
parties physically separated in June 2020. Kristine Walden initiated the divorce
in September 2022. The parties have no joint children. Trial was held in
December 2023. At the time of trial, Kristine Walden was 54 years old, and Shay
Walden was 53 years old. Shay Walden works full-time, is self-employed,
owning Shay Walden Construction, and provides independent contracting
services to another business. Kristine Walden works part-time for a holding
company of a magazine that she founded and previously owned but sold to her
children in 2018.

[¶3] At trial, the district court heard testimony from both parties regarding
assets, debts, and the conduct leading to the breakdown of their marriage.
Domestic violence perpetrated by Shay Walden against Kristine Walden left her
with a permanent eye injury. After the trial, the court divided the marital
property and debt, and ordered Shay Walden to pay Kristine Walden spousal
support of $1,000 per month for seven years, property payments of $8,587 and
$35,000, and attorney’s fees of $8,350. The court also assigned debt of $35,433.66
to Shay Walden, which he incurred after the commencement of the proceeding.
Shay Walden timely appealed.

                                       II

[¶4] Shay Walden argues the district court clearly erred in awarding spousal
support because there was no showing of need and an ability to pay spousal
support. Shay Walden further argues the court deviated beyond the statutory


                                        1
limit for spousal support under N.D.C.C. § 14-05-24.1 and attempted to equalize
the incomes of the parties.

                                          A

[¶5] District courts may award spousal support under N.D.C.C. § 14-05-24.1.
The court must consider the Ruff-Fischer guidelines, the needs of the spouse
seeking support, and the ability of the other spouse to pay when determining
whether to award spousal support. Quamme v. Quamme, 

, 

. The Ruff-Fischer guidelines include:

      The respective ages of the parties, their earning ability, the duration
      of the marriage and conduct of the parties during the marriage, their
      station in life, the circumstances and necessities of each, their health
      and physical condition, their financial circumstances as shown by
      the property owned at the time, its value at the time, its incomeproducing capacity, if any, whether accumulated before or after the
      marriage, and such other matters as may be material.

 Although the court need not make specific findings on each Ruff-Fischer factor,
we must be able to determine the reasons for the court’s decision. 

 “The district
court is not required to provide a complete calculation of each parties’ assets,
debts, and expenses, but a clear description of the financial situation of each
party is helpful for this Court in understanding the court’s rationale in awarding
spousal support.” Ritter v. Ritter, 

, 

 (cleaned up).
Decisions on spousal support are findings of fact reviewed under the clearly
erroneous standard of review. 

 “A finding of fact is clearly erroneous when it
is induced by an erroneous view of the law, there is no evidence to support it,
or, after reviewing the entire record, this Court is left with a definite and firm
conviction a mistake has been made.” Id. ¶ 8. “The district court must adequately
explain the basis for its decision, but we will not reverse a district court’s decision
when valid reasons are fairly discernable, either by deduction or by inference.”
Id. ¶ 24. A spousal support award based on need will be upheld when it falls
within the range of the evidence presented. Kaspari v. Kaspari, 

, ¶ 11,

.




                                          2
[¶6] The district court analyzed the Ruff-Fischer guidelines. The court
considered the parties’ ages and earning abilities, finding that: at the time of trial,
Kristine Walden was 54 and Shay Walden was 53; Kristine Walden was not self-supporting as her gross monthly earnings were $2,400 and her living expenses
were $6,400; Kristine Walden was unlikely to substantially increase her income
prior to reaching retirement age due to her health issues and limited education;
and Shay Walden was, and will continue to be, self-supporting based on his
gross monthly earnings of approximately $12,500 and on being in good health.

[¶7] The district court found the marriage to be short-term and “an unhealthy
and toxic relationship . . . marred by a series of domestic violence incidents
perpetrated by Shay.” The court found several instances of domestic abuse
occurred during the marriage, including an instance when Shay Walden
contacted Kristine Walden’s face and eye causing permanent damage. The court
found Kristine Walden left the marriage with “a permanent injury to her left eye
that cannot be corrected with lenses,” making it difficult for her to see out of that
eye, further impacting her employability.

[¶8] During the marriage, Kristine Walden was diagnosed with multiple
sclerosis, which the district court found limits her ability to walk significant
distances, causes numbness in her lower legs, causes tingling in her arms, and
impacts her face when it flares up. The court found Kristine Walden’s multiple
sclerosis “limits the time she can work, as well as the nature of the work she can
do,” and that her permanent eye injury caused by Shay Walden striking her also
limits her work hours because the reduced vision in her left eye causes her right
eye to compensate and become strained. Despite his claims of health issues at
trial, the court noted that in his interrogatory Shay Walden denied he had any
health problems that could limit his present or future employability.

[¶9] Given the district court findings that Kristine Walden’s monthly living
expenses were approximately $6,400 and her monthly gross income was $2,400,
even with the spousal support award, Kristine Walden is left with a deficit to
meet her needs. Shay Walden argues Kristine Walden inflated her monthly
expenses by over half and certain inflated expenses should have been subtracted
by the court when finding Kristine Walden was not self-supporting. Shay


                                          3
Walden’s argument appears to ask this Court to reweigh the evidence, which we
will not do. See Ritter, 

 (“We will not reweigh the evidence or
reassess the credibility of witnesses under the clearly erroneous standard and we
will not substitute our judgment for that of the district court, even if we may
have come to a different result.”). There is evidence supporting the court’s
findings that Kristine Walden’s living expenses were roughly $6,400. She
submitted a summary of her monthly expenses as an exhibit at trial, testified
about the expenses, and was subject to cross-examination regarding her monthly
expenses. We conclude the court did not clearly err in finding Kristine Walden’s
monthly expenses were $6,400 and that she was in need of spousal support.

[¶10] The district court indicated it was unsure of Shay Walden’s ability to pay
spousal support without undue hardship because he did not provide evidence
of his net income. However, the court found Shay Walden earned approximately
$12,500 per month in gross income. From the court’s findings, it is discernable
how Shay Walden has the ability to pay $1,000 per month in spousal support.
The court found Shay Walden’s monthly expenses to be $5,017. The court noted
Shay Walden’s expensive derby hobby and recent purchase of an $86,000 pickup,
and found that by making reasonable adjustments to his purchases and lifestyle,
the spousal support award would not cause Shay Walden undue financial
hardship. Although the court did not provide a mathematical calculation of Shay
Walden’s ability to pay spousal support, his gross monthly income of $12,500
less his monthly expenses, leaves him $7,483 per month. Shay Walden failed to
provide the court with evidence of his net income and now claims on appeal that
the court erred in awarding spousal support due to a lack of showing an ability
to pay. A party who fails to provide evidence of net income waives any argument
that he or she did not have the ability to pay spousal support. The court did not
clearly err in concluding Shay Walden had the ability to pay spousal support
without undue hardship.

                                       B

[¶11] Shay Walden argues the district court deviated beyond the statutory limit
for spousal support under N.D.C.C. § 14-05-24.1.



                                       4
[¶12] Under the current version of N.D.C.C. § 14-05-24.1, spousal support is
limited in duration to certain percentages based on the number of years the
parties were married unless the court makes written findings why a deviation in
the length of the term of spousal support is necessary. It appears the district court
applied the amended version of N.D.C.C. § 14-05-24.1 by calculating the length
spousal support is to be paid based on the duration of the parties’ marriage. The
statute was amended in 2023 and took effect August 1, 2023. The amended
version “applies to actions for divorce or legal separation filed on or after August
1, 2023.” 2023 N.D. Sess. Laws ch. 143, § 2 (emphasis added).

[¶13] Kristine Walden initiated the divorce action in September 2022; therefore,
the 2015 version of N.D.C.C. § 14-05-24.1 should have been applied by the district
court. Under the applicable version of the statute, the court must specify a time
period for spousal support. Shay Walden’s argument is without merit under the
previous version of the statute, as the court set a specific time period for the
spousal support. Kristine Walden did not cross-appeal on this error and argues
neither party objected in the district court to the application of the August 2023
amended version of N.D.C.C. § 14-05-24.1 or that it affected their substantial
rights. We conclude that any error in the application of the August 2023 amended
version of N.D.C.C. § 14-05-24.1 was harmless. See N.D.R.Civ.P. 61 (“At every
stage of the proceeding, the court must disregard all errors and defects that do
not affect any party’s substantial rights.”); see also Ritter, 

, ¶ 32 n.1.

[¶14] We conclude the evidence in the record supports the district court’s
decision to award spousal support, including the duration and amount of
spousal support awarded. The court analyzed the Ruff-Fischer factors, considered
Kristine Walden’s need for spousal support and Shay Walden’s ability to pay
without an undue financial burden, and adequately explained how it arrived at
its calculation of spousal support. Based on the evidence presented, we conclude
the court did not clearly err in awarding Kristine Walden $1,000 per month in
spousal support for seven years.




                                         5
                                       III

[¶15] Shay Walden argues the district court erred in its property and debt
distribution by ordering him to pay Kristine Walden the amounts of $8,587—
representing a portion of the marital home’s equity—and an additional $35,000—
representing approximately one-half of Kristine Walden’s medical debt. Shay
Walden further argues the court erred by attributing to him a debt of $35,433.66
in “unaccounted funds” taken out of the marital estate after commencement of
the divorce proceeding.

[¶16] When granting a divorce, a district court must value the parties’ property
and debts and “make an equitable distribution.” N.D.C.C. § 14-05-24(1). Our
standard for reviewing a court’s marital property distribution is wellestablished:

      This Court reviews a district court’s distribution of marital property
      as a finding of fact, and will not reverse unless the findings are
      clearly erroneous. A finding of fact is clearly erroneous if it is
      induced by an erroneous view of the law, if there is no evidence to
      support it, or if, after reviewing all the evidence, we are left with a
      definite and firm conviction a mistake has been made. We view the
      evidence in the light most favorable to the findings, and the district
      court’s factual findings are presumptively correct. Valuations of
      marital property within the range of the evidence presented are not
      clearly erroneous. A choice between two permissible views of the
      evidence is not clearly erroneous if the district court’s findings are
      based either on physical or documentary evidence, or inferences
      from other facts, or on credibility determinations.

Senger v. Senger, 

, 

.

[¶17] A district court considers the Ruff-Fischer factors when distributing marital
property. Senger, 

. Although the court need not make specific
findings on each Ruff-Fischer factor, we must be able to determine the reasons for
the court’s decision. 

 The court must consider the length of a marriage in
determining an equitable division of the marital estate under the Ruff-Fischer
guidelines. Hollingsworth v. Hollingsworth, 

, --- N.W.3d ---. “No
bright-line rule exists to determine whether a marriage is short or long term.” 

                                        6
“In a short-term marriage, the district court may distribute property based on
what each party brought into the marriage.” 

[¶18] All property held jointly or individually by either party is considered
marital property. Langwald v. Langwald, 

, 

. A set
method for dividing marital property is not required—the division is based on
the particular circumstances of each case. Id. ¶ 11. “A property division need not
be equal to be equitable, but a substantial disparity must be explained.” Id.

[¶19] Shay Walden argues the district court’s debt distribution was not equitable
based on the short length of the marriage and the spousal support awarded. The
court found:

             The net property and debt distribution is notably lopsided in
      favor of Shay. It is important to note that it is a short-term marriage
      to which Kristine had a negative net worth when she entered the
      marriage. She brought little in assets as her business was only worth
      $10,000, and she had a significant tax debt. Shay brought assets with
      equity which include the homestead, business equipment, personal
      property, and some debt. A short-term marriage with considerable
      disparity regarding what each brought to the union does not
      warrant an equal distribution and the Court is not striving to
      accomplish that. The Court is required to provide an equitable
      distribution and believes this order does so.

The court considered all of the parties’ marital assets and debts. Shay Walden
was awarded a positive net distribution of $46,975, while Kristine Walden was
awarded a $52,729 negative net distribution.

[¶20] Shay Walden argues the district court erred in requiring him to pay $8,587
to Kristine Walden for her contributions to the marital home that he brought into
the marriage. Shay Walden does not dispute the valuation of the marital home
on appeal, merely that the court ordered him to pay a portion of the home’s
equity to Kristine Walden. The court considered Kristine Walden’s financial
contributions to the home, finding:

      The Court arrived at this valuation on the basis that Shay has owned
      the home for approximately 24 years and the parties were married

                                        7
      for 6 of those years. The home is valued at $68,700, one-fourth of the
      value of the home is $17,175. With both contributing to the value by
      paying on the mortgage and for improvements, the value is divided
      by two to arrive at the sum of $8,587.

The court found both parties paid on a mortgage to the property and contributed
to new additions to the house. This finding is supported by the evidence. Kristine
Walden testified that she paid $27,927 to remodel the house and asked to be
reimbursed for the money she put into the house. While Shay Walden disputed
these contributions, testifying that Kristine Walden helped “a few times” with
the mortgage, we will not reweigh the evidence on appeal. The court did not
clearly err in ordering Shay Walden to pay Kristine Walden $8,587 as part of the
property distribution.

[¶21] Shay Walden also disputes the district court ordering him to pay Kristine
Walden $35,000 for approximately one-half of her medical debt incurred during
the marriage. Medical debt is a marital debt subject to an equitable distribution
under N.D.C.C. § 14-05-24(1). See Schiff v. Schiff, 

, 

 (concluding the district court erred in finding a medical debt incurred during
the marriage was not a marital debt). The court found that Kristine Walden
incurred $69,305 in medical debt for her multiple sclerosis diagnosis and
treatment that occurred during the marriage. Shay Walden does not dispute the
amount of Kristine Walden’s medical debt. He argues he should not be
responsible for this debt because it was a short-term marriage. In a short-term
marriage, the court may return to the parties what they brought into the
marriage, but the division of property and debt must be equitable. See Lill v. Lill,

 (N.D. 1994); N.D.C.C. § 14-05-24(1). While the court had
discretion to return the parties to their premarital economic status, it also had
discretion to equitably divide the marital debt. Shay Walden has not
demonstrated the court clearly erred in ordering him to pay approximately one-half of Kristine Walden’s medical debt incurred during the marriage.

[¶22] Shay Walden’s argument that the district court erred in assigning him
$35,433.66 of debt he incurred after the divorce was commenced is not supported
by adequate briefing regarding why the court erred, and we will not further
address it. The district court’s findings regarding its property and debt

                                         8
distribution are within the range of evidence presented. We conclude the court’s
property division was not clearly erroneous.

                                         IV

[¶23] Shay Walden argues the district court erred in awarding Kristine Walden
$8,350 in attorney’s fees because he had already been sanctioned for delaying the
proceeding. He argues the court abused its discretion by ordering him to pay
additional attorney’s fees and in light of the property distribution in a short-term
marriage.

[¶24] A district court has considerable discretion in awarding attorney’s fees,
and its decision will not be overturned on appeal unless the court abused its
discretion. Bladow v. Bladow, 

, 

. “A district court
abuses its discretion when it acts in an arbitrary, unconscionable, or
unreasonable manner, or when its decision is not the product of a rational mental
process leading to a reasoned determination.” Sanders v. Bott, 

,

. In a divorce case, a district court may award either party
attorney’s fees under N.D.C.C. § 14-05-23. The guiding principle for an award of
attorney’s fees is one party’s need and the other party’s ability to pay. Bladow, ¶
15. The court may also consider whether a party’s actions have unreasonably
increased the time and efforts spent on the dispute. Id. Generally, an award of
attorney’s fees must be supported by evidence on which the court can determine
the requested fees are reasonable and legitimate. Orwig v. Orwig, 

, 

.

[¶25] In awarding attorney’s fees, the district court found:

      In this case, Shay’s failure to cooperate led to Kristine having to
      bring a motion to extend deadlines . . . ; then a motion to compel . . . ;
      a motion to change the pretrial to a scheduling conference; a motion
      for contempt . . . ; and finally the documents to issue a warrant of
      arrest due to his continued failure to comply. Shay was verbally
      ordered to pay Kristine $625 in attorney’s fees at the March 27, 2023
      hearing which he has failed to do. . . . Given Shay’s unnecessary
      increase in the costs of this proceeding and the apparent disparity of



                                          9
      the parties’ incomes, Kristine should be awarded $8,350 in
      attorney’s fees.

There is evidence in the record to support the court’s findings that Shay Walden’s
actions required Kristine Walden to incur additional attorney’s fees in this
proceeding. Shay Walden was verbally ordered to pay Kristine Walden $625 in
attorney’s fees, but he did not pay. Shay Walden did, however, pay $1,500 in
attorney’s fees after being ordered to do so. The order requiring him to pay
$1,500 in attorney’s fees included the $625 in attorney’s fees verbally ordered.
Kristine Walden submitted invoices outlining her attorney’s fees as an exhibit at
trial, and the award of $8,350 does not exceed the total reflected in the invoices.
Considering Kristine Walden’s need, Shay Walden’s ability to pay, and his
actions causing an increase in the costs of the proceeding, we conclude the court
did not abuse its discretion in ordering Shay Walden to pay Kristine Walden
attorney’s fees.

                                        V

[¶26] We do not address the other issues raised because they are either
inadequately briefed, unnecessary to the decision, or are without merit. We
affirm the district court’s judgment.

[¶27] Jon J. Jensen, C.J.
      Daniel J. Crothers
      Lisa Fair McEvers
      Jerod E. Tufte
      Douglas A. Bahr




                                        10