20240275 - Filed 02-27-2025
North Dakota Supreme Court
Corrected Opinion Page 6 Filed 3/20/25 by Clerk of the Supreme Court
IN THE SUPREME COURT
STATE OF NORTH DAKOTA
2025 ND 46
State of North Dakota Plaintiff and Appellee
v.
Benjamin Isaiah Williams Defendant and Appellant
No. 20240203
Appeal from the District Court of Burleigh County, South Central Judicial
District, the Honorable Cynthia M. Feland, Judge.
AFFIRMED.
Opinion of the Court by Crothers, Justice.
Julie A. Lawyer, State’s Attorney (argued), and Dennis H. Ingold, Assistant
State’s Attorney (appeared), Bismarck, ND, for plaintiff and appellee.
Alexis L. Madlom (argued) and Stormy Vickers (on brief), Fargo, ND, for
defendant and appellant.
State v. Williams
No. 20240203
Crothers, Justice.
[¶1] Benjamin Williams appeals from the district court’s criminal judgment
after a jury found him guilty of murder and unlawful possession of a firearm.
We affirm the district court’s denial of Williams’s motion to exclude new witness
testimony not disclosed by the State prior to trial, and we reject his claim of
prosecutorial misconduct. We decline to consider Williams’s claim the State
failed to produce a witness’s personnel file because the issue was not preserved
for review.
I
[¶2] In October 2022 officers responded to a shooting in Bismarck, North
Dakota. Christopher Sebastian was found dead in the driver’s seat of a vehicle
with multiple gunshot wounds to his head. On October 13, 2022, Williams was
charged with murder and unlawful possession of a firearm. Evidence collected
by law enforcement at or near the crime scene included a black sweatshirt, face
mask, a black glove, jeans, a .40 caliber pistol, .40 caliber cartridges, and
ammunition magazines. Williams’s trial commenced on April 1, 2024. The
district court heard testimony from multiple witnesses and experts, and after six
days of trial the jury found Williams guilty of both charges. Williams was
sentenced to life without parole on the murder conviction and five years to serve
concurrently on the unlawful possession of a firearm conviction. Williams timely
appealed.
II
[¶3] Williams claims the district court erred by failing to exclude new
information from a State’s witness when the information was known by the State
prior to trial but not disclosed by the State in its initial discovery responses.
Williams argues the State’s failure to provide the new information it had about
the witness’s testimony constituted a Brady violation.
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[¶4] Under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963), “suppression by the
prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused violates due process where the
evidence is material to guilt or punishment irrespective of the good faith or bad
faith of the prosecution.” See also State v. Kolstad,
2020 ND 97, ¶ 19,
942 N.W.2d
865. This Court’s application of the Brady standard is well established:
“In Brady, the United States Supreme Court held that suppression
by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused violates due
process if the evidence is material to guilt or punishment. To
establish a Brady violation, the defendant must prove: (1) the
government possessed evidence favorable to the defendant; (2) the
defendant did not possess the evidence and could not have obtained
it with reasonable diligence; (3) the prosecution suppressed the
evidence; and (4) a reasonable probability exists that the outcome of
the proceedings would have been different if the evidence had been
disclosed.”
State v. Muhle, 2007 ND 132, ¶ 25,
737 N.W.2d 647 (cleaned up).
[¶5] To prevail on a Brady claim a defendant must satisfy all four prongs or
factors of the legal test. See, e.g., State v. Pederson,
2024 ND 79, ¶ 13, 6 N.W.3d 619
(resolving Brady claim on defendant’s failure to establish prong one). Here, the
district court focused on prong two, which we determine is dispositive.
[¶6] On October 5, 2022, the witness was interviewed by law enforcement and
a report of the interview was provided to Williams. The witness’s original
statement did not include that he saw the shooting. The State re-interviewed the
witness in preparation for trial. By asking questions during the pre-trial
preparation that law enforcement did not ask in the original interview, the State
learned the witness saw one of the gunshots “blew out some of the glass” in the
victim’s car. The State did not inform Williams of this new information, but
during opening statements stated to the jury, “Well, you’ll also hear from [a
witness]. He was actually outside when the shooting happened. He heard one of
the gunshots, and he turned and he saw another shot that blew out some of the
glass in the white Hyundai.”
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[¶7] After the State’s opening statement, Williams moved for an order
prohibiting the State from eliciting testimony from the witness that was
inconsistent with the officer’s earlier disclosed report of the witness’s testimony.
Williams argued the State’s failure to disclose the additional information prior
to trial was a Brady violation because it could be used for impeachment. The
district court denied Williams’s motion to exclude the undisclosed information
but offered to move the witness testimony to a later day during the trial to allow
Williams more time to prepare. Williams rejected the court’s offer.
[¶8] “The United States Supreme Court has held evidence that can be used to
impeach a witness is subject to disclosure under Brady.” Muhle, 2007 ND 132,
¶ 27 (citing Strickler v. Greene,
527 U.S. 263, 280 (1999)); see also Brady,
373 U.S. at
86-87. The district court recognized potential impeachment evidence was
involved but relied on our holding in State v. Muhle to deny Williams’s motion.
In Muhle, the defendant argued new statements made by a key witness just
before trial were inconsistent with prior statements, and claimed he had “no way
to anticipate this new evidence.” Muhle, ¶ 26. We held that, despite the
inconsistent statements, Muhle “had the opportunity to cross-examine [the
witness] on any inconsistent statements for purposes of impeaching [the
witness’s] credibility before the jury.” Id. ¶ 30. We also determined that Muhle
knew the witness’s identity and had the opportunity to meet and interview the
witness but chose not to. Id. ¶ 29.
[¶9] Here, the State claimed the witness’s testimony did not change; rather the
new information was the result of the witness being asked questions that were
not posed during the initial interview. The State further argued the new
information obtained by the State could have been obtained through Williams’s
own interviews and due diligence. The district court agreed, similar to the court
in Muhle, that Williams was aware of the identity of the witness and had an
opportunity to send an investigator to meet with the witness but chose not to.
Williams claims he had a limited budget to hire an investigator and did not have
reason to believe it was necessary. The court rejected the argument and found
Williams failed to establish a Brady violation because he could have obtained the
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information with reasonable diligence. We agree and conclude the court did not
err in finding no Brady violation occurred.
III
[¶10] Williams argues the State committed a Brady violation when it suppressed
the employment records of Dr. Barrie Miller, who provided opinion testimony
on behalf of the State.
[¶11] Dr. Miller was the State forensic examiner who conducted an autopsy on
the victim, and testified and provided photographs and written exhibits relating
to her findings. Through a discovery request in an unrelated case, but not
provided in this case, Williams’s counsel received a letter regarding Dr. Miller’s
employment suspension and subsequent termination.
[¶12] On February 13, 2024, Dr. Miller was placed on a performance
improvement plan due to “a backlog of autopsy reports and low staff morale and
productivity and professionalism.” The trial in this matter commenced April 1,
2024. Dr. Miller was terminated from her position on April 10, 2024. The State
did not disclose Dr. Miller’s workplace deficiencies during discovery. After trial,
Williams filed a motion for sanctions claiming the failure to disclose the
information violated N.D.R.Crim.P. 16 and the Brady progeny of cases. The
district court denied the motion for sanctions.
[¶13] In the district court, Williams argued as follows:
“Mr. Williams does not seek a finding from this court that the State
committed a Brady violation pursuant to Syverston, Russell, Goulet
and similar cases. Mr. Williams seeks an Order sanctioning the State
for failing to comply with Rule 16 and the Brady progeny of cases.
Without some remedy (sanction), the State has no reason ever to
comply with Brady in any instance other than when it is readily
obvious that the violation would result in a dismissal or not guilty
verdict. Any sanction, even one normally considered de minimis,
serves two functions: 1) a written record is created which assists the
court and future litigants in ensuring there is not systemic
institutional violations, and 2) puts the State on notice that
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violations, even those that do not result in a new trial or suppression
of evidence, are still subject to remedy.”
[¶14] On appeal, Williams argues the failure to disclose the performance
improvement plan was a discovery and a Brady violation. Williams generally
claims he is entitled to a new trial. Yet he acknowledges “[t]he suppression of
the impeachment evidence related to Dr. Miller alone does not result in a
different outcome to the proceedings.” Rather, Williams now argues the
combination of alleged errors “undermines confidence in the verdict.”
[¶15] Williams plainly stated he did not ask the district court for a ruling on
whether the State committed discovery or Brady violations, and instead simply
was seeking a “sanction.” Now, Williams has changed his position and argues
that the State committed discovery and Brady violations, that those violations
undermine the jury’s verdict, and that he is entitled to a new trial.
[¶16] “When an issue is not raised in the trial court, even a constitutional issue,
this Court will not address the issue on appeal unless the alleged error rises to
the level of obvious error.” State v. Chatman, 2015 ND 296, ¶ 26,
872 N.W.2d 595.
Williams does not argue obvious error, and we need not address issues on appeal
that fail to properly argue obvious error. State v. Thomas,
2020 ND 30, ¶ 15,
938
N.W.2d 897 (declining to address the argument when a party did not raise the
issue to the trial court and failed to argue obvious error). Therefore, we decline
to address the merits of whether a discovery or a Brady violation occurred in
relation to the State not providing Williams with Dr. Barrie Miller’s employment
records.
IV
[¶17] Williams claims the State violated his right to due process of law and
denied him a fair trial by making improper closing arguments about the contents
of DNA evidence. He argues that he is entitled to a new trial because the State
incorrectly argued Williams could have been a contributor of DNA to the minor
profiles that were not able to be analyzed.
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[718] “A de novo standard of review applies to whether facts rise to the level of
a constitutional violation, including a claim that prosecutorial misconduct
denied a defendant’s due process right to a fair trial.” State v. Pena Garcia, 2012
ND 11, 16,
812 N.W.2d 328. “We first determine whether the prosecutor’s actions
were misconduct and, if so, we then examine whether the misconduct had
prejudicial effect.” State v. Lyman,
2022 ND 160, { 8, 978 N.W.2d 734 (cleaned up)
“A curative jury instruction generally will remove prejudice caused by improper
statements because the jury is presumed to follow a court’s instruction.” Id
[119] Here, the State’s closing argument included statements that Williams once
had possession of the gun, that Williams was not a contributor of a major profile
of DNA on the gun, that testing of several minor profiles were too small or too
complex to be analyzed by the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and
Explosives forensic science laboratory, and that the victim, whose DNA was on
the gun, did ‘not kill himself due to the number of shots to the victim’s head
Williams argues the State’s closing “was clearly contradicted by the testimony of
the State’s witness ... and was improper and prejudicial as no witness saw Mr
Williams shoot Mr. Sebastian and the State’s ability to connect Mr. Williams to
the gun itself was only after the crime had been committed.”
[120] We agree with the State that its arguments to the jury were not
misstatements of the facts, and instead were fair and reasonable comments on
the evidence. The State did not argue during closing that Williams’s DNA was
on the gun. It also acknowledged that contributors to the minor profiles were
unknown due to the inability to accurately test those samples. In the face of no
DNA evidence, the State presented to the jury its theory of circumstantial
evidence supporting the State’s theory why Williams was guilty of the crimes
The State’s explanation of its theory was not prosecutorial misconduct. We
therefore conclude the State did not engage in prosecutorial misconduct and
Williams was not denied due process of law.
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} Filed
Filed by
by Clerk
Clerk of
of Supreme
Supreme Court
Court 3/20/25
3/20/25
[¶21] Having concluded the State did not engage in prosecutorial misconduct,
we do not need to weigh the prejudicial effect of any misconduct, nor must we
consider the effect of the district court’s curative instruction.
V
[¶22] We affirm the district court’s denial of Williams’s motion to exclude new
witness testimony not disclosed by the State prior to trial, and we reject his claim
of prosecutorial misconduct. We decline to consider Williams’s claim the State
failed to produce a witness’s personnel file because the issue was not preserved
for review.
[¶23] Jon J. Jensen, C.J.
Daniel J. Crothers
Lisa Fair McEvers
Jerod E. Tufte
Gail Hagerty, S.J.
[¶24] The Honorable Gail Hagerty, S.J., sitting in place of Bahr, J., disqualified.
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