Ceynar v. Ceynar

                   IN THE SUPREME COURT
                   STATE OF NORTH DAKOTA

                                  

Sharon Ceynar,                                                Plaintiff and Appellee
      v.
William Ceynar,                                        Defendant and Appellant



                                  No. 20240194

Appeal from the District Court of McKenzie County, Northwest Judicial District,
the Honorable Daniel S. El-Dweek, Judge.

AFFIRMED.

Opinion of the Court by McEvers, Justice.

Jennifer M. Stanley, Minot, ND, for plaintiff and appellee.

H. Malcolm Pippin, Williston, ND, for defendant and appellant.
                                 Ceynar v. Ceynar
                                   No. 20240194

McEvers, Justice.

[¶1] William Ceynar appeals from a divorce judgment dividing the marital
estate. We affirm, concluding the district court did not err in dividing the parties’
property and ordering the sale of the ranch.

                                         I

[¶2] In 2021, Sharon Ceynar commenced this divorce action. After a bench trial,
the district court issued its memorandum decision granting the divorce and
dividing the marital estate. The court divided the parties’ personal property and
debts outright with Sharon Ceynar receiving $1,218,903.90 and William Ceynar
receiving $681,827.35 in net assets prior to inclusion of the sale proceeds of the
parties’ real property and mineral interests. The court ordered the sale of real
estate and minerals at public auction with 55% of the sale proceeds to be awarded
to William Ceynar and 45% awarded to Sharon Ceynar. The court entered
judgment.

                                         II

[¶3] William Ceynar argues the district court erred in dividing the marital
estate. Our standard of review for property distributions is well-established:

             This Court will not reverse the district court’s decision related
      to property distribution unless the findings are clearly erroneous. A
      finding of fact is clearly erroneous only if it is induced by an
      erroneous view of the law, if there is no evidence to support a
      finding, or if, although there is some evidence to support it, on the
      entire evidence, we are left with a firm conviction a mistake has been
      made. This Court views the evidence in the light most favorable to
      the findings, and the district court’s findings of fact are
      presumptively correct. A district court’s choice between two
      permissible views of the weight of the evidence is not clearly
      erroneous, and this Court will not reverse simply because it may
      have viewed the evidence differently. On appeal, we do not reweigh



                                         1
      conflicts in the evidence, and we give due regard to the trial court’s
      opportunity to judge the credibility of the witnesses.

Swanson v. Swanson, 

, 

 (cleaned up).

                                       III

[¶4] William Ceynar argues the district court erred in dividing the marital
estate, especially given his large inheritance.

[¶5] “When a divorce is granted, the court shall make an equitable distribution
of the property and debts of the parties.” N.D.C.C. § 14-05-24(1). “In making an
equitable distribution of marital property, a court must consider all of the
parties’ assets.” Swanson, 

. The district court must consider the
Ruff–Fischer guidelines in dividing the property:

      [T]he respective ages of the parties, their earning ability, the
      duration of the marriage and conduct of the parties during the
      marriage, their station in life, the circumstances and necessities of
      each, their health and physical condition, their financial
      circumstances as shown by the property owned at the time, its value
      at the time, its income-producing capacity, if any, whether
      accumulated before or after the marriage, and such other matters as
      may be material.

 “[A] property division need not be equal to be equitable, but a substantial
disparity must be explained.” Amsbaugh v. Amsbaugh, 

, 

. “In general, a lengthy marriage supports an equal division of all
marital assets.” 

 “We have repeatedly held that separate property, whether
inherited or otherwise, must initially be included in the marital estate, and have
never held that property brought into a marriage or acquired by gift or
inheritance by one spouse, be irrevocably set aside to that spouse.” Swanson, ¶ 9.
“The origin of the property is only one factor to consider under the Ruff–Fischer
guidelines, even if the property was acquired before the marriage or inherited.”
Hitz v. Hitz, 

, 

.

[¶6] The district court considered the Ruff–Fischer guidelines, finding the
marriage of 46 years to be a long-term marriage, which favored an equal


                                        2
distribution. William Ceynar was 66 years old at the time of trial and Sharon
Ceynar was 65. The court found that while both parties can continue to work,
they are at or nearing the typical retirement age, and therefore both are similarly
situated with respect to their need for assets that can generate income to fund
their retirement. The court found that while Sharon Ceynar testified there were
two specific incidents of poor conduct by William Ceynar during the marriage,
the amount of testimony was “de minimis” considering the 46-year marriage,
and therefore given no weight. The court found the parties lived comfortably, at
least towards the end of the marriage, and “appear[ed] to be in fine health”;
much of the disputed real property either is, or has the potential to be, income-producing; the “vast majority, if not all, of the parties’ property was accumulated
during the marriage”; and the parties testified that the land in dispute was
inherited from William Ceynar’s parents.

[¶7] The district court distributed the parties’ personal property and debts
outright with Sharon Ceynar receiving $1,218,903.90 in net assets and William
Ceynar receiving $681,827.35. The parties initially agreed as to the value of the
ranch land, homestead, and buildings, valuing the real estate at $5,722,339.
William Ceynar amended his valuation to $5,720,175. As to their mineral
interests, the parties failed to value some of their interests (such as their oil
rights), and disagreed as to the value of others (scoria rock), assigning
significantly different values. The court ordered the real property, including the
surface and subsurface minerals, to be sold to the highest bidder at public
auction. The court ordered that 55% of the sale proceeds will be awarded to
William Ceynar and 45% to Sharon Ceynar. The court awarded more of the real
property proceeds to William Ceynar because “the land was inherited through
his family.” The court stated it also considered the length of the marriage and
needs of the parties as they enter retirement.

[¶8] William Ceynar argues he is entitled to a larger property distribution
given that he inherited almost six million dollars of real property from his family,
accounting for roughly 75% of the marital estate. He cites Hitz, Swanson, and
Willprecht for support. None of these cases are dispositive. While the district
court in all three cases deviated from a 50/50 equal division, the courts made



                                         3
findings not present here; and ultimately, we must adhere to our standard of
review.

[¶9] In Hitz, the husband was awarded 62% of the marital estate because in
addition to him bringing twice as much property into the marriage, the district
court found the wife committed economic waste or misconduct after separation.

. In Swanson, the husband was awarded 65% of the marital
property; however, the trial court found “no real substantial disparity” in the
division of the property because the husband was “assigned all of the farm’s
debt.” 

, ¶¶ 3, 10. While the trial court in Swanson “considered the fact
that [the husband] inherited the farmland from his mother during the marriage,
it awarded the property to [him] because [it] did not find [the wife] capable of
servicing the farm’s debt.” Id. ¶ 10. In Willprecht, the district court awarded the
husband 63% of the marital estate, explaining, “Taking into account the outright
gift of property from [the husband’s] family to him valued now at $864,273,
discounted land purchases [from his family], other gifts, and the ‘double
counting’ of crop assets, there is no real substantial disparity in the assets
awarded to each party.” Willprecht v. Willprecht, 

, 

. In all three cases, we applied the deferential “clearly erroneous” standard in
affirming the district court’s property distributions. William Ceynar has not
cited a case where we reversed a relatively equal property division in a long-term marriage based solely on a party’s inheritance accounting for a large
percentage of the marital property.

[¶10] Because the district court ordered the real property to be sold at public
auction, it is unclear the exact percentage of the net marital estate the parties will
receive. Taking only William Ceynar’s own valuations of the ranch land,
homestead, buildings, and scoria rock into consideration, he would receive a
higher percentage of the net marital estate than Sharon Ceynar. After amending
his valuations of the ranch land, homestead, and buildings, William Ceynar
valued this real estate at $5,720,175. He valued the scoria rock at $210,000. Based
on these valuations ($5,930,175 total) and a 55% share of the sale proceeds,
William Ceynar would receive $3,261,596.25, less sale expenses. Sharon Ceynar’s
45% would give her $2,668,578.75, less sale expenses. Adding these amounts to
the rest of the marital estate (excluding the oil rights and other mineral rights not

                                          4
valued), William Ceynar would receive $3,943,423.60, and Sharon Ceynar would
receive $3,887,482.65. Therefore, using William Ceynar’s valuations, he would
receive at least $55,940.95 more than Sharon Ceynar (50.36%/49.64% split).1 This
disparity would only increase with the sale of the other mineral interests because
William Ceynar shall similarly receive 55% of those proceeds.

[¶11] William Ceynar’s only argument that he is entitled to a larger distribution
is that the land was received through his inheritance. The origin of the property,
such as inheritance, is only one factor to consider under the Ruff–Fischer
guidelines. Hitz, 

. Because the district court found this to be a
long-term marriage (46 years), the baseline is an equal division. Amsbaugh, 

. Relying on William Ceynar’s own valuations of the real estate and
scoria rock (without including the other mineral interests), William Ceynar is
likely to receive slightly more of the marital estate. Even accounting for sale
expenses, William Ceynar has not shown that Sharon Ceynar would receive
more marital property. To the extent there is unequal division or there will be a
substantial disparity, that breaks in favor of William Ceynar because he will
receive 55% of the remaining mineral interests. The court made the 55%/45% real
property award, in part, for the exact reason William Ceynar is arguing: the land
was inherited through his family. William Ceynar cites no evidence in the record
showing he would receive less than 50% of the net marital estate. We therefore
conclude the court’s property division is equitable and not clearly erroneous.

                                        IV

[¶12] William Ceynar argues the district court erred in ordering the sale of the
real property because neither party requested the sale. He cites no legal authority
preventing the court from ordering the sale of marital real property when the
parties did not request the sale. Rather, we have affirmed property distributions
where the appellant requested the farm, ranch, or farmland be awarded to him



1 These figures do not include sale expenses, such as an auctioneer or broker’s
commission. At oral argument, William Ceynar referred us to his post-trial briefing,
which acknowledges that even with these expenses, he would expect to receive slightly
more of the net marital estate (50.8%) based on a net sale price of $6 million.

                                         5
or her and the district court ordered the property to be sold. See Schoenwald v.
Schoenwald, 

, 

; Christmann v. Christmann,

, 

; Dieterle v. Dieterle, 

,

. This is not a partition action where the court is required to
partition the property unless “a partition cannot be made without great prejudice
to the owners.” N.D.C.C. § 32-16-01. In a divorce action, the court makes “an
equitable distribution of the property.” N.D.C.C. § 14-05-24(1).

[¶13] William Ceynar asserts the district court misapplied the law by using a
partition analysis under N.D.C.C. ch. 32-16 instead of the law governing the
division of marital property. While the court used the word “partition” several
times in its memorandum decision, it did not undertake a partition analysis or
apply the law of partition under N.D.C.C. ch. 32-16. “Partition” was used by the
court for its common meaning: “the action of parting: the state of being parted:
division,” Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary 904 (11th ed. 2005), and in
contrast with a sale of real property. The court stated that it was ordering the
sale of the real property as opposed to dividing it between the parties (i.e.
partition), but that the parties may agree to a division before the public sale. The
court correctly applied the law on the distribution of marital property.

[¶14] William Ceynar argues the ranch is his “legacy and livelihood moving
forward.” He testified that the ranch has been in his family since his
grandmother bought it, and he has lived on the ranch almost his entire life. While
the district court is not required to partition the property, “courts should avoid
a property distribution which will destroy or damage the ability of one of the
parties to earn a livelihood or which will destroy the value of the property.”
Pankow v. Pankow, 

 (N.D. 1985). We have “recognized on
numerous occasions ‘the importance of preserving the viability of a business
operation like a family farm,’ and ‘liquidation of an ongoing farming operation
or business is ordinarily a last resort.’” Swanson, 

. “However,
those decisions have also recognized this laudable purpose is to be achieved only
if it is possible to do so without detriment to the other party.” Marschner v.
Marschner, 

, 

; see also Linrud v. Linrud, 

 (N.D. 1996) (“The goal of preserving a [farming] business, however, does
not call for a windfall for one spouse.”). Sharon Ceynar argues there is no

                                         6
evidence of William Ceynar’s claim that the ranch is required to further his
legacy and livelihood, noting he was no longer ranching, but rather leasing the
land, and based on his tax returns, he is not generating significant income from
the ranch. She notes they only owned eight head of cattle at the time of trial.

[¶15] The district court made relatively sparse findings as to the sale of the real
property, stating that “[g]iven the unique circumstances that the real estate and
surface and subsurface minerals presents to the Court in partition, the Court is
left with no choice but to order the sale of the real property and surface and
subsurface minerals to the highest bidder at public auction.” “We will not
remand for clarification of findings of fact when, through inference or deduction,
we may discern the district court’s rationale.” Williams v. Williams, 

, 

; see also Rothberg v. Rothberg, 

, 

 (“Although findings of fact should be stated to afford a clear understanding
of the court’s decision, findings are adequate if this Court can discern from them
the factual basis for the trial court’s determination.”).

[¶16] Property divisions are “based on the particular circumstances of each
case.” Holden v. Holden, 

, 

. If a farming operation
“is not an economically viable enterprise, it should be sold and the proceeds
divided between the parties.” Marschner, 

. William Ceynar has
failed to cite evidence in the record showing he depends on the ranching
operation for his livelihood. The parties’ joint 8.3 property and debt listing shows
they owned no more than eight head of cattle. We therefore reject any assertion
by William Ceynar that partition is needed to save the ranching operation.

[¶17] As mentioned, the parties failed to value some of their mineral interests in
their property and debt listing, stating the value as “unknown,” and disagreed
by a large margin as to the value of the other mineral interests. Trial did not
supplement or clarify these omissions or gaps in value (other than the frac sand).
William Ceynar requested the oil interests be given to the party awarded the




                                         7
corresponding surface rights.2 He testified, however, the oil rights were in and
under land that is not owned by the parties. He further testified that he was
unaware of how much unmined scoria and frac sand existed, noting the latter
was “potential frac sand,” which he originally valued at $500,000. The district
court found that William Ceynar abandoned his frac sand valuation of $500,000
after he acknowledged it was speculative and should be reduced to $0. Since
William Ceynar proposed awarding the frac sand to Sharon Ceynar, this left an
even larger disparity in his property division proposal. Due to the relatively
unknown location, quantity, or value of the minerals, a public sale to reach an
equitable result was not improper for the court to order.

[¶18] Craig McIvor, William Ceynar’s appraiser, testified to the difficulty in
dividing property in the Badlands, such as this property, stating, “Sometimes it’s
difficult for, you know, for fencing and divid[ing] this stuff down in the
badlands. . . . It’s never going to end up where it’s dollar for dollar. . . .
Somebody’s going to have to write a check back and forth for the difference.”
William Ceynar testified there is “[r]eally no way to fence that—those badlands”
located in Section 19 of the subject property. Sharon Ceynar’s proposed division
of the property contemplated splitting Section 19, which according to William
Ceynar “would have been almost impossible to split that in half and to fence
that.”

[¶19] McIvor and William Ceynar proposed dividing the property along a
county road, which would give William Ceynar the Section 19 property. After
eliminating his $500,000 frac sand valuation, which he originally proposed
should be awarded to Sharon Ceynar, William Ceynar’s proposal would give
Sharon Ceynar $3,520,355 in net assets, and he would receive $4,381,272
(55.45%/44.55% in his favor). William Ceynar has not conceded that Sharon
Ceynar’s proposal—which did not call for the sale of property but more equally
divided the property—is an equitable proposal that should be adopted by the
court. While William Ceynar cites his proposal dividing the real property



2 It appears William Ceynar has since adopted Sharon Ceynar’s proposal that the oil

interests be split 50/50.

                                        8
unequally in his favor, he failed to propose a division of the property, which if
not sold, would award the property equally to the parties. We conclude the court
did not err in rejecting William Ceynar’s disproportionate proposal and
determining a sale of the ranch was equitable under the circumstances.

[¶20] William Ceynar contends the public sale of the real property is “essentially
a fire sale of the land and minerals with a percentage formula that could very
well result in [him] ending up with less than 50% of the marital estate.” We reject
this argument. The district court ordered that “[t]he parties are free to agree to a
partition of the property prior to the date of the sale in lieu of the sale.” At oral
argument, William Ceynar, through counsel, agreed that nothing would prohibit
him from bidding on the land himself at the public auction, preventing a “fire
sale” price. Therefore, even if the parties are unable to agree on a partition,
William Ceynar can still bid on the land.

[¶21] We conclude the district court did not err in ordering the sale of the ranch.

                                         V

[¶22] The judgment is affirmed.

[¶23] Jon J. Jensen, C.J.
      Daniel J. Crothers
      Lisa Fair McEvers
      Jerod E. Tufte
      Douglas A. Bahr




                                         9