[Cite as State v. Martinez,
2025-Ohio-122.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
LUCAS COUNTY
State of Ohio Court of Appeals No. L-24-1022
Appellee Trial Court No. CR0202302893
v.
Jewel Martinez DECISION AND JUDGMENT
Appellant
Decided: January 17, 2025
…
Julia R. Bates and Brenda J. Majdalani, for appellee.
Joseph Sobecki, for appellant.
…
OSOWIK, J.
{¶ 1} This is an appeal of a January 9, 2024 judgment of the Lucas County Court
of Common Pleas, denying appellant bail upon finding that no condition of release could
reasonably assure public safety, following appellant’s indictment on one count of
aggravated vehicular homicide, in violation of R.C. 2903.06(A)(1), a felony of the first
degree, one count of aggravated vehicular homicide, in violation of R.C. 2903.06(A)(2), a
felony of the second degree, two counts of operating a motor vehicle while under the
influence of alcohol or drugs, in violation of R.C. 4511.19(A)(1), misdemeanors of the
first degree, and one count of driving a motor vehicle while under an OVI suspension, in
violation of R.C. 4510.14(A), a misdemeanor of the first degree.
{¶ 2} Given that this appeal is wholly premised upon R.C. 2937.222 claims, all of
which are non-jurisdictional and were waived as a matter of law upon appellant’s entry of
guilty pleas, and for the reasons set forth more fully below, this court affirms the
judgment of the trial court.
{¶ 3} Appellant, Jewell Martinez, sets forth the following five (5) assignments of
error:
I. R.C.2937.222 VIOLATES THE 14TH AMENDMENT TO THE
UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION BECAUSE IT AUTHORIZES
AUTOMATIC DETENTION WITHOUT ANY DUE PROCESS
SAFEGUARDS.
II. THE TRIAL COURT VIOLATED THE SIXTH AMENDMENT
TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION BY ALLOWING THE
STATE TO MAKE AN ORAL REQUEST FOR HEARING PURSUANT
TO R.C.2937.222 WITHOUT THE DEFENDANT BEING
REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.
III. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY HOLDING A HEARING
PURSUANT TO R.C.2937.222 BEFORE THE STATE MADE A
WRITTEN MOTION.
IV. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY DENYING BOND []
BEFORE HOLDING A HEARING OR MAKING ANY FINDINGS.
2.
V. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY FINDING THAT NO
RELEASE CONDITIONS WILL REASONABLY ASSURE THE
SAFETY OF THE COMMUNITY.
{¶ 4} The following undisputed facts are relevant to this appeal. On September
24, 2023, while under a driver’s license suspension imposed in a prior OVI conviction,
appellant drove her motor vehicle onto the High Level Bridge in Toledo, driving at 82
m.p.h. in a 35 m.p.h. speed zone, driving with a .18 B.A.L., driving in the wrong
direction on the wrong side of the concrete barrier, and struck an approaching vehicle
head-on, instantly killing the 30-year-old driver of the other motor vehicle. Appellant
acknowledged to emergency first responders that she had consumed five (5) shots of
alcohol shortly before the incident.
{¶ 5} On December 11, 2023, following these events, appellant was indicted on
two counts of aggravated vehicular homicide, in violation of R.C. 2903.06, one felony of
the first degree and one felony of the second degree, two counts of operating a motor
vehicle while under the influence of alcohol or drugs, in violation of R.C. 4511.19,
misdemeanors of the first degree, and one count of driving a motor vehicle while under
an OVI suspension, in violation of R.C. 4510.14, a misdemeanor of the first degree.
{¶ 6} On January 4, 2024, appellant made her initial appearance before the trial
court. Counsel for appellant had been retained, notified the court that he was unable to
appear for the initial hearing, and requested a continuance. Accordingly, at the request of
counsel for appellant, and also of appellant herself in response to direct inquiry by the
trial court, the case was continued until January 9, 2024.
3.
{¶ 7} During the January 4, 2024 hearing, the trial court next stated, “[T]he
allegations before the court are that [appellant] was driving under an OVI suspension
[while] intoxicated and [caused] a crash in which someone lost their life. As such, the
court is inclined to deny bail of any kind on the two felonies in this matter and schedule
this for a denial of bail hearing on Tuesday, January 9th at 9:00 a.m.” The trial court then
requested that appellee respond to the trial court’s position, to which appellee stated,
“[W]e would be ready to move forward with that [R.C. 2937.222 denial of bail] hearing
on Tuesday.”
{¶ 8} On January 9, 2024, the trial court conducted the denial of bail hearing. The
trial court set forth in detail the unique, serious circumstances of this case in which
appellant drove the wrong way, while intoxicated, at a high rate of speed, while under an
OVI suspension, across the High Level bridge, causing a head-on collision, instantly
killing the other driver. Faced with this scenario, the trial court then determined by clear
and convincing evidence that these facts and circumstances reflected that no condition of
release could reasonably assure public safety and, therefore, denied bail.
The trial court held, in relevant part,
The court finds by clear and convincing evidence that the accused poses a
substantial risk of serious physical harm to the community due to the nature
of these offenses and particularly the fact that an innocent person lost his
life as the defendant was driving, despite her -- was driving intoxicated
despite her license having been suspended for a previous OVI just seven
months prior … The court finds by clear and convincing evidence that
no release conditions will reasonably ensure the safety of our community.
Her license was suspended once and she continued to drink and drive
4.
[resulting in the death of another]. Therefore, pursuant to R.C. 2937.222,
[appellant] is denied bail.
{¶ 9} We will note that the record before us includes a critical fact that
cannot be ignored in our disposition of this case. On April 25, 2024, appellant
entered guilty pleas to one count of aggravated vehicular homicide, in violation of
R.C. 2903.06(A)(1), a felony of the first degree, one count of operating a motor
vehicle while under the influence of alcohol or drugs, in violation of R.C. 4511.19,
a misdemeanor of the first degree, and one count of driving a motor vehicle while
under an OVI suspension, in violation of R.C. 4510.14, a misdemeanor of the first
degree. In exchange, the remaining charges were dismissed. On May 17, 2024
appellant was sentenced to a nine-to-twelve-year term of incarceration.
{¶ 10} In this case, this appeal is restricted to the January 9, 2024 judgment of the
trial court. Nevertheless, the guilty pleas that occurred subsequent to the filing of this
appeal must be considered in our review. A defendant who enters a guilty plea waives
the right to raise most issues on appeal unless such errors are shown to have precluded
the defendant from voluntarily entering into his or her plea pursuant to the dictates of
Crim.R. 11 and Boykin v. Alabama 395 U.S. 238, 243 (1969). State v. Leasure, 2007-
Ohio-100, ¶ 7 (6th Dist.) The voluntariness of appellant’s guilty plea is not before this
court in this case.
Such waiver includes all non-jurisdictional defects and constitutional
violations that occurred before he entered his guilty plea and that do not stand in
5.
the way of conviction if factual guilt is validly established. State v. Gibson, 2023-
Ohio-1776, ¶ 12 (6th Dist.)
{¶ 11} While a guilty plea does not preclude attack on the constitutionality of a
statute under which defendant was convicted, appellant’s arguments in each of his
assignments of error are wholly premised upon R.C. 2937.222, the statute establishing
bail hearing guidelines in aggravated murder cases, and is, therefore, grounded
exclusively in non-jurisdictional claims. State v. Fitzpatrick, 2004-Ohio-3167, ¶ 76-79.
{¶ 12} In the first assignment of error, appellant argues that R.C. 2937.222 is
unconstitutional in breach of due process considerations.
{¶ 13} R.C. 2937.222(A), establishes in relevant part, “On the motion of the
prosecuting attorney or on the judge’s own motion, the judge shall hold a hearing to
determine whether an accused person charged with aggravated murder … shall be
denied bail.” (Emphasis added).
{¶ 14} In support of the first assignment of error, appellant unilaterally argues that,
“R.C. 2937.222 provides for automatic detention upon motion by the state[,] without any
finding from a judicial officer. There is no safeguard from an overzealous prosecutor
seeking a promotion by impressing her/his superiors … By simply making a motion.”
{¶ 15} While appellant incorrectly claims that appellee initiated the R.C. 2937.222
motion for a denial of bond hearing in this case, the record reflects otherwise. The
transcripts of the trial court proceedings show that the trial court itself, on a sua sponte
basis, as expressly authorized by R.C. 2937.222(A), stated, “The court is inclined to deny
6.
bail of any kind on the two felonies … and schedule this for a denial of bail hearing
… What is the State of Ohio’s position regarding bond?”
{¶ 16} Only in response to the trial court’s announcement of an intent to do so,
and an accompanying request that the state respond, did appellee then state, “Your
Honor, we would be ready to move forward with that hearing on Tuesday [January 9th,
2024].” Accordingly, we find that appellant’s stated premise in support of the first
assignment of error is plainly refuted by the record.
{¶ 17} In the second assignment of error, appellant similarly argues that the trial
court erred in permitting appellee to make an oral request for an R.C. 2937.222 hearing
on January 4, 2024, when counsel for appellant was not present.
{¶ 18} As held in response to appellant’s first assignment of error, the record
clearly shows that appellee did not make an R.C. 2937.222 hearing request, rather, it was
done on the court’s own motion, and thereafter acceded to by appellee. Accordingly, we
find that appellant’s premise in support of the second assignment of error is refuted by
the record.
{¶ 19} In the third assignment of error, appellant next argues that the trial court
erred in conducting the R.C. 2937.222 denial of bail hearing without appellee having first
filed a written motion requesting same, again incorrectly claiming that it was appellee,
rather than the trial court itself, that initiated the R.C. 2937.222 hearing.
7.
{¶ 20} In the fourth assignment of error, appellant argues that the trial court erred
in holding appellant in custody for the two court days between the initial appearance
hearing and the denial of bond hearing.
{¶ 21} Appellant’s position fails to take into account that R.C. 2937.222(A)
expressly authorizes such action, establishing in relevant part that, “Except for good
cause, a continuance on motion of the accused shall not exceed five court days unless the
motion of the accused waives in writing the five-day limit.” As indicated above, counsel
for appellant notified the court that he was unable to appear on January 4, 2024, and
requested a continuance. Appellant herself likewise requested a continuance due to the
unavailability of her counsel. The record shows that the continuance was granted, that it
extended for two court days, and, therefore, it was done in conformity with R.C.
2937.222.
{¶ 22} Lastly, in the fifth assignment of error, appellant argues that the trial court
erred in its finding that no release conditions would reasonably assure the safety of the
community in this case.
{¶ 23} In support of the fifth assignment of error, appellant unilaterally claims
that, “[Appellant] is in a wheelchair and cannot physically walk, much less drive,” in
support of the position that the trial court erred in finding that no release conditions
would reasonably protect the safety of the community were appellant to be released on
bail.
8.
{¶ 24} As stated by appellee in response, “[T]here is nothing in the transcript …
indicating whether or not [appellant] was in a wheelchair. Unless it is indicated in the
record, one cannot say it is so.” We likewise find no evidence in the record in support of
appellant’s claim upon appeal.
{¶ 25} We reiterate that R.C. 2937.222(A) expressly authorizes a hearing to be
held, “[O]n the judge’s own motion,” as the record shows was done in this case. We
further note that Crim.R. 47, cited by appellant in support of the third assignment of
error, also authorizes R.C. 2937.222 denial of bail hearings to be held without a written
motion when, “the court permits it to be made orally,” as the court sua sponte did in this
case.
{¶ 26} In sum, each of appellant’s assignments of error are plainly arguments
concerning a non-jurisdictional defect in an earlier stage of the proceedings that occurred
prior to the guilty plea. State v. Hilderbrand, 2024-Ohio-4765, ¶ 7 (6th Dist.).
Wherefore, we find appellant’s assignments of error not well-taken.
{¶ 27} On consideration whereof, the judgment of the Lucas County Court of
Common Pleas is hereby affirmed. Appellant is ordered to pay the costs of this appeal
pursuant to App.R. 24.
9.
State of Ohio v. Jewel Martinez
Appeals Court No.: L-24-1022
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to App.R. 27.
See, also, 6th Dist.Loc.App.R. 4.
Thomas J. Osowik, J.
JUDGE
Christine E. Mayle, J.
JUDGE
Myron C. Duhart, J.
CONCUR. JUDGE
This decision is subject to further editing by the Supreme Court of
Ohio’s Reporter of Decisions. Parties interested in viewing the final reported
version are advised to visit the Ohio Supreme Court’s web site at:
http://www.supremecourt.ohio.gov/ROD/docs/.
10.
