Slip opinions decided 2025 — Ohio Public Domain Citations

On certified entry of felony conviction.

R.C. 2903.11; menacing by stalking; knowingly; manifest weight; sufficiency; mental distress; pattern of conduct. Appellant's conviction of menacing by stalking is affirmed. The record contains evidence indicating that appellant acted knowingly and engaged in a pattern of conduct that caused the victim to experience mental distress. Particularly, numerous witnesses testified that they saw appellant's vehicle driving past the victim's home on numerous occasions, including two neighbors who did not know the victim or appellant. This activity occurred after the victim expressly conveyed to appellant that she wanted to be left alone. Therefore, appellant's sole conviction of menacing by stalking is not against the manifest weight of the evidence nor based on insufficient evidence.

Class action; certification; abuse of discretion; Civ.R. 23; class definition; adequacy; typicality; commonality; numerosity; predominance; superiority. Judgment affirmed. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in granting appellee's motion for class certification. The class definition was not overly broad or unascertainable and the Civ.R. 23(A) prerequisites of adequacy, typicality, commonality, and numerosity were established. Moreover, common issues predominate the lawsuit and class action is the superior method of resolution.

Motion for partial summary judgment; punitive damages; actual damages; attorney fees; motion for leave; nominal damages; App.R. 16(7). The trial court did not err in granting the appellee's motion for partial summary judgment regarding punitive damages and attorney fees because it was previously held by this court that the appellant was not entitled to punitive damages or attorney fees. The trial court did not err in denying any motions regarding actual damages because the appellant did not demonstrate a showing of actual damages. The appellant did not comply with App.R. 16(7) regarding its argument pertaining to nominal damages.

R.C. 3105.171; Cuyahoga C.P., Dom.Rel.Div., Loc.R. 14; financial disclosure statement; motion for new trial; new evidence; abuse of discretion; notice of appeal; determination of marital property. Husband, pro se, filed a complaint for divorce. Wife, pro se, filed an answer and counterclaim. Pursuant to Cuyahoga C.P., Dom.Rel.Div., Loc.R. 14, the court issued an order requiring financial disclosure statements to be filed. Wife filed statement; husband did not. Parties appeared for trial and proceeded pro se. After trial and divorce decree issued, counsel for wife appeared and issued subpoenas. Counsel then filed a motion for new trial. After the court denied the motion for new trial, counsel filed a notice of appeal from the divorce decree and the denial of the motion. Counsel also filed a motion for relief from judgment. Counsel sought and was granted a remand from appellate court for the court to rule upon the motion for relief from judgment. After the court denied the motion, no notice of appeal of the denial was filed. The domestic relations court did not commit an error of law by proceeding to trial where husband had not filed a financial disclosure statement. Neither R.C. 3105.71 nor Cuyahoga C.P., Dom.Rel.Div., Loc.R. 14 prohibits trial where disclosures are not made. Further, wife did not seek discovery prior to trial. The domestic relations court did not abuse its discretion by denying wife's motion for new trial where that motion was based on evidence that could have been reasonably obtained before trial. The appellate court did not have jurisdiction to review the court's denial of the motion for relief from judgment where no notice of appeal was taken of that judgment. The court's resolution of the evidence at trial to determine whether a condominium was marital property was not unreasonable, arbitrary, or capricious where the wife's testimony regarding the purchase of the condominium was inconsistent.

CONSTITUTIONAL/CRIMINAL — WEAPONS UNDER A DISABILITY — ROBBERY INDICTMENT — R.C. 2923.13 – SECOND AMENDMENT – FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT – DANGEROUSNESS: Defendant's weapons-under-a-disability charge was properly dismissed for being unconstitutional as applied to him because (1) the State failed to provide evidence that disarming an indictee under R.C. 2923.13(A)(2) is consistent with the Nation's history and tradition of firearm regulation and (2) there was no finding of his dangerousness by the trial court. [But see DISSENT: The cause should be remanded to the trial court for further consideration in light of, and consistent with, United States v. Rahimi, 602 U.S. 680 (2024).]

The trial court did not err in failing to merge the offenses of assault and obstruction of official business for purposes of sentencing; the offenses were not committed by a single act but rather were separate actions resulting in separate, identifiable harm. Judgment affirmed.

Appellant's conviction for attempted abduction was not against the manifest weight of the evidence. The trial court properly designated appellant a Tier I sex offender/child-victim offender. Judgment affirmed.

Appellant failed to demonstrate ineffective assistance of trial counsel at sentencing. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in imposing a jail term as part of appellant's sentence for two misdemeanor convictions. Judgments affirmed.

The trial court abused its discretion in permitting the admission of substantial evidence at trial related to a patient's informed consent to a surgical procedure, when the patient's claim sounded in negligence only. The trial court also erred in admitting cumulative evidence when it permitted a defense expert to testify to the same opinions to which another defense expert had testified. Judgment reversed and remanded. (Tucker, J., dissenting.)

The jury's rejection of appellant's not guilty by reason of insanity defense was not against the manifest weight of the evidence. Both sides presented expert testimony, and the jury credited the State's expert over appellant's. Further, appellant's conviction for felonious assault was supported by the evidence; the victim's broken jaw and torn mouth skin constituted serious physical harm. The trial court did not abuse its discretion when it permitted testimony that appellant had stopped taking his medications before the incidents. Judgment affirmed.

The trial court did not abuse its discretion in ordering appellant to pay restitution after appellant agreed to pay restitution, the trial court explicitly considered his present and future ability to pay, and the record supported the trial court's decision. Judgment affirmed.

Because clear and convincing evidence existed to support the juvenile court's findings under R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(a)—that the child could not, or should not, be placed with the mother within a reasonable time—the court's determination was not against the manifest weight of the evidence and therefore was affirmed.

Resentencing. Failure to demonstrate trial court's consecutive sentence findings under R.C. 2929.14(C) are clearly and convincingly not supported by the record. Judgment affirmed.

Summary judgment on electric surcharge affirmed; summary judgment on unjust enrichment claim reversed

Telecommunications Harassment - Duplicity in Complaint - Manifest Weight/Sufficiency of Evidence - Jury Instructions - Other Acts Evidence

Aggravated Burglary - Assault - Violation of a Protection Order - Allied Offenses - Plain Error

On application for reinstatement.

Civil stalking protection order

Trial court's journal entry granting in part and denying in part defendants' Civ.R. 12(B)(6) motions to dismiss and denying defendants' motions pursuant to Civ.R. 12(B)(7) and 19(A) did not grant or deny a provisional remedy and was not a final order under R.C. 2505.02(B)(4). Appeal dismissed for lack of jurisdiction, based on the lack of a final, appealable order.

Appeal dismissed. Trial court's agreed judgment entry adopting the parties' settlement agreement was not a final appealable order.

R.C. 2151.414, permanent custody, best interest, reasonable efforts, ICWA not raised below, first extension of temporary custody, R.C. 2151.415(D)(1)

sufficiency – Crim.R. 29(C) – manifest weight – Domestic Violence Civil Protection Order ("DVCPO") – R.C. 2919.27 – indirect contact – Facebook Messenger

domestic violence – guilty plea – consecutive sentences – Anders

Separate/marital real estate property; tracing of assets

Right to self-representation; ineffective assistance of counsel; plain error; manifest weight of the evidence. Appellant's convictions were not against the manifest weight of the evidence. The record reflects appellant waived his right to self-representation. Counsel was not ineffective for failing to object to police testimony that appellant contends was prejudicial because appellant failed to demonstrate plain error.

Civ.R. 3(A); R.C. 2107.73; motion to dismiss; jurisdiction. The trial court properly granted the appellee's motion to dismiss because the appellant failed to perfect service as required by Civ.R. 3(A). The trial court properly granted the appellee's motion to dismiss because the appellant failed to join necessary parties, pursuant to R.C. 2107.73, to the case within the time required by Civ.R. 3(A). The trial court properly granted the appellee's motion to dismiss because it lacked jurisdiction over the appellee.

Doctrine of res judicata; abuse of discretion; motion to suppress; lack of probable cause; illegal stop; community-control-sanction-violation hearing; probation officer testimony; due process violation. Defendant-appellant's first assignment of error is barred by the doctrine of res judicata because the appeal had to be brought within thirty days of the trial court's denial of his motion to suppress, which he did not do. Defendant-appellant did not object to and the trial court did not err or abuse its discretion by hearing evidence from the probation officer during the community-control-sanction-violation hearing. Similarly, defendant-appellant's failure to object to anything in the community-control-sanction-violation hearing waived all but plain error on review. Upon review we find defendant-appellant's due process rights were not violated and no plain error occurred during his probation violation hearing. The defendant-appellant's remaining assignments of error were properly overruled.

Menacing by stalking; R.C. 2903.211(A)(1); pattern; mental distress; sufficiency; manifest weight; Crim.R. 3; complaint. Judgment affirmed. There was sufficient evidence of a pattern of conduct and that appellant caused the victim mental distress. Appellant's conviction for menacing by stalking was not against the manifest weight. The complaint was sufficient to notify the appellant of the charges against him.

Remote witness testimony; Sixth Amendment confrontation clause; harmless error; having a weapon while under disability; sufficiency of the evidence; manifest weight of the evidence. Defendant's conviction for having weapons while under disability is affirmed. Two judges would reverse the conviction for being unsupported by the manifest weight of the evidence, but because one judge dissented, and there is not unanimous agreement to reverse on a manifest weight theory, the conviction must be affirmed.

Motion for leave to file motion for new trial; res judicata. In 1997, defendant was convicted of aggravated murder, aggravated burglary, and aggravated robbery. His convictions were affirmed on direct appeal. In 2001 and 2006, defendant filed motions for new trial alleging witnesses recanted or changed their testimony. Those motions were denied, and appeals of those motions were dismissed. In 2018, defendant filed several motions seeking a determination that the State withheld evidence. The trial court denied those motions, and defendant failed to appeal those motions. In 2024, defendant filed a motion for leave to file a motion for new trial arguing the State withheld evidence and trial witnesses recanted or changed their testimony. The trial court denied the motion for leave. Because the doctrine of res judicata bars all subsequent new trial motions that are based on claims that were brought or could have been brought on direct appeal or in prior motions filed under Crim.R. 33, the court affirmed the trial court's denial of the motion for leave.

Motion to seal; expungement; restitution; final discharge; cognovit note; client security fund; hearing. Trial court's decision granting applicant's motion to seal reversed where the record does not reveal whether the applicant fully satisfied his restitution obligation. Case remanded for a hearing to determine whether the applicant achieved final discharge to qualify as an eligible offender.

Administrative law suspension appeal; R.C. 4511.197(a); timeliness of appeal; pro se motions; discretion of court to manage its docket; ineffective assistance of counsel; no contest plea; double jeopardy. Defendant appealed his conviction for operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated after entering a no contest plea. Defendant was arraigned in January 2023. Defendant's counsel filed several motions, including an appeal of his administrative license suspension. Defendant also filed several pretrial motions. The trial court scheduled regular pretrial hearings, but defendant, his counsel, or both failed to appear at numerous pretrials throughout the pendency of the case. Further, defendant was sentenced to a six-month probation violation in another case. After his release, the court scheduled the case for trial and defendant's counsel sought two continuances. On the day before trial, defendant entered a no contest plea. On appeal, defendant argued the trial court erred by failing to hold a hearing on his administrative license appeal. However, the appeal was untimely filed and the trial court did not have jurisdiction over the appeal. Defendant argued that the trial court erred by not deciding his pro se motions, but a trial court may not entertain a pro se criminal defendant's motion when that defendant was represented by counsel. Defendant argued that the trial court abused its discretion in the scheduling of the case while he was serving his probation violation sentence. However, the trial court has discretion to manage its docket and did not abuse that discretion by continuing to schedule the case for pretrials and trial in light of defendant's and his counsel's absences. Defendant alleged his counsel was ineffective for failing to appear, failing to file motions at his request, and for seeking continuances. Defendant did not show that he would have otherwise not entered his no contest plea despite the alleged deficiencies by trial counsel. Finally, Brisbane's conviction in this case did not violate the prohibition against double jeopardy where his probation in another case was violated after he was charged in this case.

Summary judgment; foreclosure; notice. Summary judgment in favor of the bank is affirmed in this foreclosure case. The plaintiff, who was a subsequent buyer of the property at issue, argued that the bank was required to send the notice of pending foreclosure to him in addition to the former property owner, who signed the mortgage. However, in this case, the plaintiff did not sign the mortgage, was not a borrower under the terms of the documents, and was not a successor interest to the former owner. Therefore, the bank was not required to send him notice.

Loc.App.R. 16(B); conceded error; jurisdiction; final order. In this conceded error case, the trial court did not have the authority to enter an order imposing financial sanctions on appellant when it had already entered an order terminating probation and recalling the capias issued for the appellant. The order terminating appellant's probation and recalling the capias was a final order.

application for reconsideration; no obvious error; App.R. 26(A)(1).

Judgment of the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas, Division of Domestic Relations and Juvenile Branch is affirmed. Appellant did not file objections to the magistrate's decision in the trial court and failed to argue plain-error on appeal.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW/CRIMINAL – PREINDICTMENT DELAY – DUE PROCESS – DUE COURSE OF LAW – ABUSE OF DISCRETION – DE NOVO – STANDARD OF REVIEW – ACTUAL PREJUDICE – MOTION TO DISMISS: The appellate court does not review the trial court's dismissal of an indictment based on preindictment delay for an abuse of discretion, but should instead defer to the trial court's factual determinations and inferences where supported by competent, credible evidence, while reviewing de novo its legal conclusions and application of the relevant legal standard to the facts. Defendant did not meet her burden of showing actual prejudice from the State's preindictment delay, where defendant failed to demonstrate how particular lost evidence and unavailable witnesses could have minimized the impact of the State's evidence or otherwise bolstered her defense.

JURY INSTRUCTIONS — VERDICT FORMS — PLAIN ERROR — ENDANGERING CHILDREN — DOUBLE JEOPARDY: Where defendant was charged with multiple counts of the same offense against the same victim, the jury demonstrated confusion as to which conduct on the part of defendant applied to each count, and defendant was convicted of some counts and acquitted of others, the trial court committed plain error when it failed to provide the jury with final instructions and/or verdict forms that specified which conduct was the basis of each count. Where it is unclear which acts were included in the jury's verdicts of acquittal, and it is not possible to eliminate the possibility that defendant would be retried for an offense upon which she has already been acquitted, the trial court's judgment convicting defendant of various counts of child endangering must be reversed and defendant discharged. [But see DISSENT: Because Ohio law does not require a trial court to include a defendant's alleged conduct in the jury instructions or in the verdict forms in order to differentiate counts of the indictment, and because the State's closing argument included a count-by-count reiteration of defendant's conduct for the jury, the trial court did not commit plain error in failing to include defendant's alleged conduct in the jury instructions or the verdict forms.]

Monetary Interest on Restitution Order

The jury's rejection of appellant's claim of self-defense was not against the manifest weight of the evidence. The trial court did not err in refusing to instruct the jury on the stand-your-ground law because appellant's offenses were committed before the enactment of the law, which the Ohio Supreme Court held should not be applied retroactively. The trial court erred by incorrectly calculating the amount of jail-time credit and by not considering appellant's current and future ability to pay before ordering him to pay restitution. The trial court's imposition of consecutive sentences was not clearly and convincingly unsupported by the record. Judgment affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for resentencing.

Appellant's rape conviction was supported by legally sufficient evidence and was not against the manifest weight of the evidence. The record does not portray ineffective assistance of trial counsel. Judgment affirmed.

Deputies observed a stolen automobile on appellant's property using a drone on public property and adjoining private property. Without obtaining a warrant, deputies then entered appellant's property to arrest him and seize the vehicle, at which time they found other stolen property on the premises. The trial court found that the warrantless entry had violated the Fourth Amendment and suppressed evidence of the stolen property discovered after the deputies' entry. But based on the independent source doctrine, the trial court concluded that the seizure of the stolen automobile had not been unconstitutional and that use of a drone flying over adjacent property had not violated the Fourth Amendment. The trial court correctly concluded that probable cause to seize the automobile had been obtained through a source (the drone surveillance) that was independent from the illegal entry and that suppression of the automobile was not warranted. Judgment affirmed.

Appellant's 18-month sentence for attempted endangering children, an offense of violence, was within the statutory range and not contrary to law. Judgment affirmed.

Res judicata barred appellant's claims in her petition for post-conviction relief, and she was not entitled to a hearing on her petition. Judgment affirmed.

Defendant appeals consecutive sentences for multiple counts of cruelty to companion animals. Trial court's factual findings supported the imposition of consecutive sentences. Defendant's heartless, egregious conduct established that she posed a danger to the public and consecutive sentences were not disproportionate to the seriousness of her conduct.

Defendant on community control for felony theft appeals trial court's decision to revoke community control and impose prison sentence. Trial court did not abuse discretion by imposing prison term for failure to pay restitution. Evidence supported finding that defendant's failure to pay was willful and intentional rather than an inability to pay.

R.C. 309.06(A), which empowered common pleas court judges to "fix" the aggregate amount of compensation that prosecutor could pay to his assistants was discretionary. Fact that judges had not fixed any amount did not limit county commissioners' ability to appropriate funds for the prosecutor's assistants.

Civ. R. 6(A), Civ. R. 9(B), Civ. R. 10(D), motion to dismiss, fraud, Civ. R. 12(B)(6), burden on appeal

homeowners' insurance, summary judgment, Civ.R. 56(C), denial of coverage, oral representation, breach of contract, fraud, bad faith dealing

aggravated possession of drugs, knowingly, sufficiency, manifest weight, constructive possession

Court of appeals' judgment affirmed on the authority of State v. Glover.

Manifest Weight of the Evidence; Motion for Permanent Custody; Reasonable Case Planning. Decision to terminate parental rights was not against the manifest weight of the evidence when the Agency showed that father's mental health issues were interfering with his ability to complete the case plan and would not likely change. Agency proved by clear and convincing evidence that termination of parental rights was in the best interests of the children. Agency presented evidence that it had offered services to help Father reunify with the children and despite its reasonable efforts, father did not utilize the services offered to make reunification possible.

Sufficient Evidence; Manifest Weight; Operating a Vehicle under the Influence of Alcohol; Motion to Suppress; Traffic Stop; Traffic Infraction; 4511.43(A). A police officer may initiate a traffic stop after observing a traffic violation. The failure to stop a vehicle before crossing the stop bar next to a stop sign is a traffic violation under R.C. 4511.43(A). In reviewing a decision on a motion to suppress, appellate courts defer to the factual findings of the trial court.

Sufficiency of the Evidence. Evidence supported drug possession convictions where drugs were found in garage defendant used for his business and defendant specifically stated drugs were his.

Post Release Control, Notification Requirements. Trial court did not fail to properly impose post release control ("PRC") when it failed to orally advise him that the Adult Probation Authority ("APA") would be supervising his PRC because the statute does not require it to do so and the judgment entry contained the notification.

Summary Judgment; Partition Fence; R.C. 971.03. Chapter 971 of the Ohio Revised Code does not apply to properties outside of municipal corporations that have been laid out into lots. While a property can be laid out into lots through the creation of a housing subdivision in compliance with the requirements of R.C. 711.001, et seq., the creation of a housing subdivision is not the only way for property to be laid out into lots within the meaning of R.C. 971.03(B).

In camera interview; abuse of discretion. Trial court did not abuse its discretion by interviewing child in camera after it was requested by child's father.

Manifest weight of the evidence; Denial of continuance; Motion to quash subpoena; Harmless error. The defendant-appellant's convictions were not against the manifest weight of the evidence, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying a mid-trial motion for a continuance, and while the trial court did err in granting the state's motion to quash a defense subpoena, such error was harmless.

DIVORCE; PARENTAL RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES; BEST INTEREST; SHARED PARENTING; R.C. 3109.04; CHILD SUPPORT; R.C. 3119.01; SELF-EMPLOYED PARENT; ALLOCATION OF ASSETS; FINANCIAL MISCONDUCT; R.C. 3105.171. The trial court did not abuse its discretion by designating plaintiff-appellee as the residential parent and legal custodian of the parties' minor child. The trial court did not abuse its discretion by calculating defendant-appellant's income at $55,000.00 per year for child support purposes. The trial court did not abuse its discretion by ordering defendant-appellant to pay plaintiff-appellee $3,888.50 to equalize distribution of marital property.

Land Installment Contract; Partial Performance; Equity. Trial court correctly determined that there was no land installment contract when the agreement did not comply with the statutory requirements. There was partial performance when no reasonable alternatives were presented as to why a $65,600 down payment was made and why all parties acted as if there was a purchase agreement in place.

CIVIL - vexatious litigator; R.C. 2323.52; leave to continue; dismissed.

CIVIL - vexatious litigator; R.C. 2323.52; leave to continue; dismissed.

ORIGINAL ACTION - mandamus; R.C. 2969.25; mandatory compliance; affidavit; prior civil actions; petition dismissed.

Zmuda, J., writing for the majority, affirms trial court's declaratory judgment that the insurance company had no duty to defend or indemnify the claims in this case.

Trial court's decision to grant adoption petition was not unreasonable, arbitrary, or unconscionable. Judgment affirmed.

Appellant's convictions were supported by a sufficiency of the evidence. Trial court did not err in merging the drug offenses, as allied offenses, but not merging the assault and abduction offenses, as separate offenses, for sentencing purposes. Judgment affirmed.

REOPENING – App.R. 26(B); untimely pro se application to reopen direct appeal; Appellant fails to establish good cause for the delay; even assuming that Appellant had complied with the requirements of App.R. 26(B)(1) and (2)(b), he fails to meet the standard for reopening this appeal pursuant to Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984); Appellant fails to establish that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel on appeal; application denied.

CIVIL – confirmation of judicial foreclosure sale; R.C. 2329.31; abuse of discretion standard of review; commercial property; R.C. 2329.211(B); Appellant's unilateral mistake prevented it from submitting a legally sufficient bid; Intervenor/Appellee's submitted bid, along with her deposit, complied with the Belmont County Foreclosure Sale Procedures; judgments affirmed.

Shared parenting; R.C. 3109.04(E)(1)(a); Civ. R. 75(F); final judgment; guardian ad litem; right to cross-examine guardian ad litem; motion for contempt; sanctions; no final order on contempt unless sanction imposed; lack of final appealable order; abuse of discretion

Judgment of the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas is affirmed. The state presented sufficient evidence for a jury to convict appellant of the various counts. Appellant failed to show on appeal that his conviction was against the manifest weight of the evidence.

The trial court did not err in awarding appellant only $200 for her claim against appellee relating to a construction project at her home. Appellant failed to demonstrate the trial court denied her due process by not giving her a meaningful opportunity to present her case against appellee. Judgment affirmed.

OPERATING A MOTOR VEHICLE UNDER THE INFLUENCE – PROBABLE CAUSE – MOTION TO SUPPRESS: The trial court did not err in granting defendant's motion to suppress evidence collected prior to her warrantless arrest for operating a motor vehicle while under the influence for lack of probable cause where the trial court made extensive factual findings indicating that the arresting officer's in-court testimony was contradicted by cruiser camera footage of field sobriety testing, where one field sobriety test was not conducted in substantial compliance with the relevant standards, and where the State did not challenge the trial court's factual findings on appeal.

Attorneys at law—Resignation with disciplinary action pending—Gov.Bar R. VI(11)(C).

restitution hearing – magistrate's decision – economic loss – indigency

manifest weight, domestic violence, credibility

Permanent custody; case plan; failure to remedy; 12 out of 22 months; substance abuse; mental health; sufficiency of the evidence; manifest weight of the evidence; best interest. Judgment affirmed. The trial court did not err in denying appellant's motion to continue. Appellant requested the trial court to continue the permanent custody hearing because the guardian ad litem's report was untimely filed. Because the guardian ad litem was available for cross-examination and the report did not raise any new or surprising information, appellant was unable to show that she was prejudiced by the denial. The trial court did not err when it granted permanent custody of the child to CCDCFS; its decision was supported by sufficient evidence and was not against the manifest weight of the evidence. The child had been in custody for more that 12 out of 22 months and a grant of permanent custody was in the best interest of the child. Appellant completed portions of her case plan, which included housing, employment, mental health, substance abuse, and anger management but did not benefit from some of the services she received.

Political subdivision immunity; negligence; R.C. 2744.02. Trial court properly denied appellant's motion for summary judgment based on political subdivision immunity when appellee met her burden of establishing that there remained a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether appellant breached a duty of care.

Small claims; landlord; tenant; utility bill; security deposit; deduction; affirmative defense; offset; damages; civil rules; R.C. Ch. 1925; R.C. 1925.16; Civ.R. 1(C)(4); R.C. 5321.16(B). The lower court did not err in determining the defendant-tenant was entitled to an offset against the damages awarded to the plaintiff-landlord for an unpaid utility bill from an amount that was improperly withheld from a security deposit. R.C. Ch. 1925 does not contemplate the filing of an answer, and an offset defense could be asserted at trial. The amount owed for the utility bill should have been applied as a deduction from the security deposit in accordance with R.C. 5321.16(B).

Action on an account; credit card; balance due; unauthorized transactions; summary judgment; burden of proof. - Trial court properly granted summary judgment in favor of the bank on its action on an account for an unpaid balance on a credit card account. Bank satisfied its burden of demonstrating that no genuine issue of material fact. Appellant failed to satisfy her reciprocal burden of identifying specific facts in the record demonstrating a material issue of fact for trial, i.e., what transactions were unauthorized, dispute of those transactions with the bank, or a report that her credit card was lost, stolen, or used by an unauthorized individual.

Aggravated murder; guilty plea; ineffective assistance of counsel; conflict of interest. Affirmed. The defendant's guilty plea to aggravated murder for causing the death of her infant daughter was not entered based on ineffective assistance of one of the two retained counsel representing her during the criminal proceedings.

Manifest weight of the evidence; statements against self-incrimination; Evid.R. 403(B) evidence; lay person testimony; sentencing errors. The appellant's convictions were not against the manifest weight of the evidence. The trial court did not permit self-incriminating statements against the appellant during trial. The trial court did not err in permitting testimony concerning appellant's acts at trial. The trial court did not err in permitting the case worker's testimony about her personal experience during trial. The trial court did not consider uncharged acts by the appellant for the purposes of sentencing.

Self-defense; R.C. 2901.05(B)(1); manifest weight; firearm specifications; merger; State v. Bollar, 2022-Ohio-4370. Judgment affirmed. The jury's rejection of Williams' self-defense claim is not against the manifest weight of the evidence; a jury could properly conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that Williams did not act in self-defense. Moreover, Williams' firearm specifications did not merge for sentencing purposes pursuant to binding precedent set forth in State v. Bollar, 2022-Ohio-4370.

Sufficiency; manifest weight; circumstantial evidence; inference stacking; aiding and abetting; complicity; R.C. 2923.03(A)(2); felony murder; R.C. 2903.02(B); mens rea; hearsay; Evid.R. 803(3); abuse of discretion; nontestimonial statements; Confrontation Clause; Crim.R. 52(A), harmless error; Crim.R. 52(B); plain error; ineffective assistance of counsel; cumulative error; consecutive sentences; R.C. 2929.14(C)(4), findings. Judgment affirmed. There was sufficient evidence that appellant aided and abetted in the drive-by shooting that resulted in the death of a 13-year-old child. Cell phone data, traffic cameras, license plate readers, and photographs all tied appellant to the crimes. His convictions were not against the manifest weight of the evidence, there was no cumulative error, and his attorney was not ineffective for failing to object to unrecorded sidebar conferences. The court considered appellant's young age in sentencing. The trial court made all the requisite findings to support consecutive sentences.

Sufficiency, manifest weight, circumstantial evidence, inference stacking, aiding and abetting, complicity, R.C. 2923.03(A)(2), felony murder, R.C. 2903.02(B), mens rea, knowingly, R.C. 2901.22(B), motive, hearsay, Evid.R. 803(3), abuse of discretion, testimonial, nontestimonial, Confrontation Clause, "objective witness" test, Crim.R. 52(A), harmless error, Crim.R. 52(B), plain error, ineffective assistance of counsel, jury instructions, Crim.R. 30, waiver, Bruton, cumulative error, consecutive sentences, R.C. 2929.14(C)(4), findings. Judgment affirmed. There was sufficient evidence that appellant aided and abetted in the drive-by shooting that resulted in the death of a 13-year-old child, and appellant's convictions were not against the manifest weight of the evidence. Circumstantial evidence carries the same weight as direct evidence. The Ring doorbell camera, as well as cell phone data, traffic cameras, and license plate readers established that the appellant and the codefendant were together at the time and location of the murder. The jury instructions were proper. Trial counsel was not ineffective, and the trial court made sufficient findings to impose consecutive sentences.

Plea; no-contact order, felony sentencing; invited error. Imposition of both a no-contact order and a prison term for the same offense did not rise to the level of plain error where the defendant received benefits from a plea agreement in which he agreed to the hybrid sentences.

Motion to stay proceedings; compel arbitration; assignment of rights; waiver. The trial court did not err when it granted the appellee's motion to stay proceedings and compel arbitration because the appellant and appellee agreed to arbitration in their contract. The appellee did not waive its right to arbitrate because it did not extensively participate in the litigation of the case before filing its motion.

The evidence is sufficient to support the jury's verdict of guilty for the murder of Lake, and guilty for the rape, murder, and aggravated murder of Dawson. Further, the verdict was not against the manifest weight of the evidence. Judgment affirmed.

Initial tax assessment study/Ripeness

Finding children could not or should not be returned to mother was not against the manifest weight or sufficiency of the evidence - Finding P.C. to agency was in best interest of the children was not against manifest weight or sufficiency of the evidence - Trial Court properly found the agency made reasonable efforts

sufficiency of the evidence, manifest weight of the evidence, aggravated murder, prior calculation and design, abuse of a corpse, failure to comply, visible or audible signal, theft of a motor vehicle, consent, purpose to deprive, robbery, motion to suppress; Fourth Amendment standing, Miranda, Crim.R. 14, severance, motion in limine, Crim.R. 12(D), ineffective assistance of counsel; prosecutorial misconduct

Appellant, a contractor for a dam repair project, appealed from the trial court's grant of summary judgment to the conservancy district on the contractor's claims for additional payment on four payment items, as well as the conservancy district's claim for delay damages. The trial court properly granted summary judgment regarding the contractor's claim for additional payment for concrete patching and the conservancy district's delay claim. As to the remaining three payment items, genuine issues of material fact existed regarding the compensable amount of concrete. Judgment affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.

Mother's challenge to the trial court's determination that she waived her right to counsel at a hearing on a children service's motion for interim protective supervision is moot because the children are no longer under protective supervision. Appeal dismissed.

The trial court's decision granting permanent custody of appellant's child to a public children services agency was supported by clear and convincing evidence. Judgment affirmed.

The trial court did not err in its award of jail-time credit. Appellant's other arguments regarding double jeopardy, allied offenses, speedy trial, juror partiality, and a "Blakely violation" are precluded by res judicata as they could have been raised in a direct appeal from appellant's 2021 conviction on three counts of unlawful sexual conduct with a minor. Judgment affirmed.

Manifest weight and suffiicency--child endangering

Post-conviction relief

Appellant's pleas of guilty to aggravated vehicular homicide, operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol, and driving while under an OVI suspension, waived the non-jurisdictional, R.C. 2937.222 claims underlying this appeal. Judgment affirmed.

Because there was no error of law by lower court's affirmation of a decision by board of zoning appeals to deny application for area variance, the judgment was affirmed.

summary judgment – Civ.R. 56(C) – complaint – nonmoving party – Civ.R. 12(B)(6)

insufficiency of the evidence, manifest weight of the evidence, exclusion of confidential records, separation of witnesses, confrontation clause, necessity of remote testimony

Trial court erred in resorting to extrinsic evidence to find "exclusive occupancy" agreement granted tenants a life estate. The tenants' right of exclusive occupancy was not measured by their lives, but rather by meeting other conditions. The agreement was a rental agreement subject to R.C. Chapter 5321.

Defendant failed to establish violation of double jeopardy. Destruction of defendant's alleged property was accomplished through a separate civil forfeiture proceeding and was not a second penalty for the same offense.

motion for leave for new trial, Crim.R. 33(B), unavoidable delay, res judicata, exculpatory, impeachment

legal custody, best interest, factors are weighed, no one factor controls

The imposition of the jail term was not plain error or otherwise improper. However, there is a clerical error that should be resolved with the municipal court issuing a nunc pro tunc entry.

Municipal court erred in dismissing landlord's forcible entry and detainer action against tenant who was served contemporaneously with two separate notices, a three-day notice to vacate the premises and a 30-day notice to cure quiet and peaceful enjoyment violations.

The trial court did not err when it denied appellant's motion to dismiss based upon the state's preindictment delay of 16 years after the victim's death, because appellant was unable to demonstrate actual prejudice from the unavailability of witnesses or documentary evidence and the value of any unavailable evidence was merely speculative.

The trial court did not err in admitting the deputy's testimony and body camera recording where neither the testimony nor recording contained out-of-court statements used to prove the truth of the matter asserted.

Appellant's conviction for failing to disclose his personal information in violation of Middletown Cod.Ord. 606.30(a)(1) was supported by sufficient evidence and not against the manifest weight of the evidence where the arresting officer who requested appellant's personal information had a reasonable suspicion that appellant had committed, was committing, or was about to commit a crime by remaining outside a woman's house with his vehicle's headlights turned off after the woman refused his advances and requests to "come here, come here."

Summary judgment in favor of hospital affirmed. First, no abuse of discretion occurred in denying a motion to amend a complaint filed over nine years after the original complaint to assert negligence by a hospital in maintaining its computer systems and equipment after only previously alleging medical malpractice. Second, even if an abuse of discretion occurred in also denying a motion to compel and a Civ.R. 56(F) motion for discovery, such error was harmless when summary judgment was granted on purely legal conclusions and undisputed facts. Finally, res judicata prevents the plaintiffs from re-litigating the issue of informed consent against the hospital and nursing staff after a jury returned a verdict in favor of named physicians.

The trial court did not abuse its discretion by granting appellee's combined motion to enforce settlement, or, alternatively, judgment on its claim on the bond securing the lien amount owed to it by appellant where the terms of the settlement were established by clear and convincing evidence.

sexual imposition, R.C. 2907.06(A)(4), sufficiency of the evidence, manifest weight of the evidence, sexual contact, jury selection, R.C. 2313.17, for-cause challenges

SUPPRESSION; PENALTY ENHANCEMENT; R.C. 4511.19(G)(1)(d); CRIM.R. 32(C); WAIVER OF COUNSEL; PETTY OFFENSE; RES JUDICATA; MANIFEST WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE, SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE. The trial court did not err by denying defendant-appellant's motion to suppress his prior operating-a motor-vehicle-while-under-the-influence-of-alcohol-or-drugs-of-abuse ("OVI") conviction from being used to enhance the degree of his OVI conviction in this case. Because the trial court did not err by denying the defendant-appellant's motion to suppress his prior OVI conviction, the defendant-appellant's OVI conviction is not based on insufficient evidence or against the manifest weight of the evidence.

FOURTH AMENDMENT; MOTION TO SUPPRESS EVIDENCE; RANDOM LICENCE PLATE CHECK; FICTITIOUS LICENSE PLATES (R.C. 4549.08); TRAFFIC STOP. The trial court did not err by denying defendant-appellant's motion to suppress evidence because, at the time of the traffic stop, the officer had a reasonable, articulable suspicion of criminal activity—fictitious license plates in violation of R.C. 4549.08. An officer does not need a reasonable, articulable suspicion of criminal activity to conduct a license plate check.

Administrative Appeal; Subject Matter Jurisdiction. Trial court did not err by dismissing administrative appeal where appeal was not perfected within 30 days of final order.

POSTCONVICTION RELIEF - aggravated murder; death sentence; successive petition; R.C. 2953.21; Atkins claim; ineffective assistance of counsel; new and retroactive rights; unavoidably prevented from the discovery of facts; reasonable diligence; discernible in the record; new legal defense; res judicata; constitutional as applied.

CIVIL - complaint; motion to dismiss; state law claims; statute of limitations; savings statute; federal claims; bankruptcy case; trustee's statutory powers.

CIVIL - bench trial; township zoning resolution; fire code; consent order; motion to show cause; civil contempt; agritourism; R.C. 901.80; res judicata; collateral estoppel; new material issues; members of the general public; activity; injunctive relief; purge conditions.

Judgment of the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas is reversed and cause remanded. Trial court erred in granting appellee's motion to dismiss, as the allegations in appellant's complaint, in a light most favorable to appellant, do not appear to be conclusively time barred under the relevant statute of limitations. Accordingly the trial court was not in a position to grant a dismissal under Civ.R. 12(B)(6).

On appeal by successor executor of probate court judgment declining to approve an application for certificate of transfer of real property and order to initiate land sale proceeding. Testamentary trust was not self-executing and could not come into being until acceptance of the trust property by the trustee after the death of the settlor. Probate court correctly concluded that decedent's residence was an asset of the estate, not an asset of the testamentary trust and could therefore be used to satisfy debts of the estate; the court therefore did not abuse its discretion by declining to approve certificate of transfer, rejecting representation of estate insolvency, or ordering successor executor to initiate a land sale proceeding. Assignments of error overruled, and judgment affirmed.

CRIM.R. 11 – GUILTY PLEAS – CONSECUTIVE SENTENCES – PREJUDICE – DRIVER'S LICENSE SUSPENSION Defendant's guilty pleas were not involuntary under Crim.R. 11 where the trial court erred by failing to inform defendant that he faced a mandatory consecutive sentence on one charge, but where the trial court did explain the maximum number of months defendant could serve on each charge, where defendant offered no evidence of prejudice, and where the record contained evidence that defendant had actual knowledge of the mandatory consecutive sentence prior to the colloquy. Defendant's guilty pleas were not involuntary under Crim.R. 11 where the trial court erred by misinforming defendant regarding the duration of the driver's license suspension he faced and by failing to inform defendant that suspension was mandatory, but where the trial court did inform him that a license suspension was part of the maximum sentence and then did not impose the mandatory license suspension.

Manifest weight and sufficiency of evidence

Property sale/reclaimed mine - summary judgment on fraudulent misrepresentation

Statute of frauds/Plain error

Mandamus, dismissal, Civ.R. 12(B)(6), court not sui juris.

Sufficient Evidence; Manifest Weight.

Permanent custody of 4; Mother's appeal.

Community control; res judicata; Crim.R. 36; Cleveland Cod.Ord. 367.12(a). Judgment affirmed. St. Anthony Church ("SAC") is a fictitious name and there is no legal distinction between Albert Thrower and SAC. Accordingly, Thrower was a party to the underlying proceedings. SAC's arguments challenging the blanket effect of the housing court's community-control order established in judgments prior to the appealed community-control violation and nunc pro tunc entries are barred by res judicata. Moreover, the housing court's nunc pro tunc entry complied with Crim.R. 36. Finally, the housing court did not err in finding that SAC violated community control for its failure to comply with Cleveland Cod.Ord. 367.12(a), amongst other reasons.

Motion to bifurcate; compensatory and punitive damages; breach of fiduciary claim; unfair-competition claim. The trial court did not err when it denied the appellants' motion to bifurcate the compensatory and punitive damages portions of the breach-of-fiduciary claims. The trial court did not err when it denied the appellants' motion to bifurcate the compensatory and punitive damages portions of the unfair-competition claims and decided to hold one hearing.

Manifest weight; sufficiency; self-defense. State met its burden of production refuting appellant's claim of self-defense where the evidence established that appellant instigated the situation that led to the assaults. Appellant's conviction for attempted felonious assault was supported by sufficient evidence where the record established that he knowingly hit the victim and the harm she sustained was reasonably foreseeable. Appellant's convictions for assault and attempted felonious assault were supported by the weight of the evidence where it was undisputed that appellant hit both victims and that the second victim lost consciousness after being hit.

Mandatory bindover; R.C. 2512.10; R.C. 2512.12. Juvenile court erred when it denied the State's request for mandatory bindover where the State established probable cause that appellee was 16 years old at the time of the offenses, had committed aggravated robbery, and did so with a firearm on or about his person and used the firearm in the commission of the offense.

Manifest weight; self-defense. Judgment affirmed. The State proved beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant was at fault in creating the affray and did not have reasonable grounds to believe or an honest belief that he was in imminent danger of bodily harm. Therefore, appellant did not act in self-defense. Accordingly, appellant's convictions for felony-murder, felonious assault, and discharging a firearm on or near prohibited premises were not against the manifest weight of the evidence.

Slip and fall; premises liability; open and obvious; unnatural accumulation; black ice; summary judgment; actual or constructive notice. The judgment of the trial court, granting summary judgment in favor of defendant-appellee Apple Ohio LLC, is affirmed. The undisputed facts in the record indicate that the icy patch that plaintiff-appellant Madaras slipped on was an open-and-obvious condition that did not constitute an unnatural accumulation. Moreover, the record does not indicate that the patch of ice was "substantially more dangerous" than Madaras should have reasonably anticipated, and even so, Applebee's did not have actual or constructive notice of such condition.

Contract; impossibility; summary judgment; record. University School was entitled to summary judgment on the debt owed under the enrollment contracts. The record showed there was a valid contract, M.F. breached the contract, and M.F. did not show any genuine issues of material fact remained where the record did not support M.F.'s defense of impossibility where she did not show an unforeseen event occurred prior to the date she had to cancel the contracts.

Allocation of parental rights and responsibilities; guardian ad litem report. - Juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in allocating parental rights and responsibilities; the court considered all relevant factors in determining the best interest of the children for parenting time with each parent. For everyone's best interests, a guardian ad litem should submit their written report in accordance with the rules of court.

Irregular motion; petition for postconviction relief; untimely; void; voidable; limited remand; appellate court mandate; res judicata. Judgments affirmed. The trial court properly treated the defendant's motion, made years after his direct appeal, as a petition for postconviction relief. The petition was untimely and not subject to the timeliness exception under R.C. 2953.23(A)(1). The trial court's resentencing judgment was not void. Further, because the trial court had jurisdiction over the case and the defendant, any potential sentencing error. would be deemed voidable, and a challenge to a voidable sentence via a postconviction petition is impermissible. The trial court complied with the appellate court's mandate for the limited remand. The mandate was not for a de novo resentencing hearing; rather, it was for the limited purpose of resentencing the defendant as to each of the firearm specifications. The defendant's assignments of error alleging various trial errors have no relation to the judgments appealed from and in any event are barred under the doctrine of res judicata.

Motion to vacate; default judgment; service; void; abuse of discretion. - Because service of process was never completed on defendant, the default judgment granted against the defendant was void, and the trial court did not abuse its discretion in granting defendant's motion to vacate the void judgment.

Motion to continue; Juv.R. 23; Juv.R. 35; motion for continuance made on day of hearing; abuse of discretion; good cause; child-support obligation; failure to appear; waive right to present evidence; imputation of income; voluntarily unemployed or underemployed; R.C. 3119.01; evidence need not be presented for each factor; upward deviation; R.C. 3119.23; special and unusual needs of child. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Father's oral motion for continuance on the day of the hearing or in basing its ruling solely on Mother's testimony when Father failed to appear and present evidence. The trial court also did not abuse its discretion by imputing income to Father because it found that he was voluntarily unemployed or underemployed or by upwardly deviating from the child support worksheet based upon the cost of certain speech-therapy needs of the child.

ANDERS - Operating a Vehicle While Impaired ("OVI") - Suppression - Consensual Encounter with Police

Civil R. 60(B); Attorney fees

Motion to vacate judgment

Complaint for Declaratory Judgment was Petition for Post-Conviction Relief and Barred by Res Judicata

Motion for Leave to File Delayed Motion for New Trial - Crim.R. 33 - Appellant Failed to Establish Unavoidably Prevented from Discovery of Evidence

Crim.R. 32(B)(2) - Failure to Notify Defendant of Right to Appeal

Writ of mandamus denied. The magistrate's decision recommending dismissal of relator's complaint for writ of mandamus is adopted. Some evidence supported the Industrial Commission's finding that relator had engaged in fraud by engaging in work while receiving temporary total disability payments and its decision to order repayment under R.C. 4123.511(K).

Trial court did not err in granting summary judgment in favor of appellee and dismissing appellant's complaint for declaratory judgment and injunctive relief.

Judgment affirmed. Because defendants did not respond to plaintiffs' requests for admissions, the trial court appropriately relied on the defaulted admissions to grant plaintiffs summary judgment on their claims for negligence and imputed negligence. The trial court could have construed defendants' response to plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment as an implicit motion to withdraw the defaulted admissions, but the trial court did not abuse its discretion by failing to so construe the response. The trial court's ruling on plaintiffs' claims for negligence and imputed negligence rendered plaintiffs' claim for negligent entrustment moot.

Trial court did not err in overruling appellant's objections to magistrate's decision granting appellees' motion to enforce settlement.

On application for reinstatement.

The trial court did not err in entering summary judgment against appellant on her complaint alleging fraud, breach of warranty, and negligent construction/unworkmanlike performance in connection with her purchase of a home from appellees. Judgment affirmed.

The trial court did not err in overruling Father's motion to dismiss, his objections to the child support agency's enforcement actions, and his notices of denial of rights under color of law. Father's challenges to the 2014 child support order, which was not appealed, were barred by res judicata. Judgment affirmed.

Because it was undisputed that plaintiff-credit card holder gave permission to another person to charge a furniture purchase on her credit card, the credit card holder was responsible for the charges. The municipal court erred in entering judgment in favor of the credit card holder and against the furniture store for the amount charged. Judgment reversed and remanded.

The trial court did not err in overruling appellant's motion for a new trial. There were no Brady violations or grounds to grant a new trial based on Crim.R. 33. Judgment affirmed.

The trial court did not err when it overruled appellant's motion to suppress evidence stemming from a traffic stop. At the very least, the State substantially complied with Adm.Code 3701-53-02(B)(1), and the trial court did not err when it did not read Adm.Code 3701-53-06 and 3701-53-07 to require the State to keep documentation concerning the source and reliability of blood vials. The court also did not err when it allowed the results of appellant's blood tests to be admitted into evidence or when it gave a jury instruction that differed from appellant's preferred one, as the instruction given nearly mirrored the language of the statute. Judgment affirmed.

Appellant's conviction of felonious assault was based on sufficient evidence and was not against the manifest weight of the evidence. Further, the record does not support appellant's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. Judgment affirmed.

The trial court did not abuse its discretion in overruling appellant's post-sentence motion to withdraw his guilty plea. Appellant failed to demonstrate a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's alleged errors in failing to advise him of the immigration consequences of his plea, he would have insisted on going to trial. Appellant demonstrated proficiency in English and did not request an interpreter, and the trial court properly addressed appellant's alleged inability to understand the proceedings. Judgment affirmed.

human trafficking task force advertised online as mother-daughter escort pair; defendant arrived for "incall" after requesting a half hour of "full service" with "yall" and after being informed juvenile was 15 and would require a "raincoat"; sufficient evidence of compelling prostitution, attempted unlawful sexual conduct with a minor, engaging in prostitution, and possession of criminal tools intended for use in a felony.

motion for reconsideration; motion for en banc review; motion to certify a conflict

Contract; plain language; summary judgment; Civ. R. 56; "time is of the essence" contract; specific performance; anticipatory repudiation; reasonable assurance of other's contract performance; unequivocal refusal to perform; minor alterations in contract; plain terms of agreement; court will not rewrite terms of contract; abuse of discretion.

CIVIL – The trial court properly applied the best interest standard when terminating a shared parenting plan. Trial court did not abuse its discretion in terminating the shared parenting plan and designating Father the residential and custodial parent where Mother persisted in her belief that children were being molested by paternal relatives despite four investigations by independent agencies finding the allegations were unsubstantiated, denied Father's parenting time, and violated the shared parenting plan.

reversing the denial of summary judgment motion filed by political subdivision and employees, who were immune from liability; no evidence of negligence as required for the immunity exceptions involving the operation of a motor vehicle or the performance of a proprietary function; no duty; no recklessness as required to defeat primary assumption of the risk doctrine; employees' performance was not manifestly outside scope of employment or reckless.

felonious assault; direct evidence; circumstantial evidence; conviction not against the manifest weight of the evidence; Evid.R. 615(A); counsel not ineffective for failing to move to separate the witnesses prior to trial

DOMESTIC RELATIONS – VISITATION – termination of visitation rights; abuse of discretion standard of review; the trial court reviewed the factors in R.C. 3109.051(D) and concluded it was in the minor child's best interest to terminate Appellant's visitation; however, the court did not make the required initial finding that there was clear and convincing evidence of extraordinary circumstances that would justify such termination; R.C. 3109.051(C); recorded statement should not have been accepted or considered; in camera interview; reversed and remanded.

Sufficiency of the evidence; manifest weight of the evidence; gross sexual imposition, R.C. 2907.05(A); sexual contact, R.C. 2907.01(B); felony sentencing, R.C. 2929.11; consecutive sentencing, R.C. 2929.14.

Involuntary Manslaughter - Jointly Recommended Sentence - ANDERS

Withdrawal of no contest plea prior to sentencing

Declaratory action; insurance coverage; garage operations

aggravated possession of drugs; guilty plea; agreed-upon sentence; plea entered knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently

MUNICIPAL COURT – small claims; hearing; magistrate's decisions adopted; $3,000.00 judgment; verbal agreement; song recordings; Civ.R. 60(A); service perfected under Civ.R. 3(A); continuance; R.C. 1925.10(B); counterclaim; breach of contract; manifest weight of the evidence; judgments affirmed.

complaint dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted; Ohio Consumer Sales Protection Act ("CSPA"); Civ.R. 4.1; no authority for appellate court to consider recusal or disqualification of judge

The trial court's decision granting a dating violence civil protection order to appellee against appellant was dismissed where appellant failed to file an objection to the magistrate's decision granting the civil protection order to appellee as initially required to file an appeal pursuant to Civ.R. 65.1(G).

The defendant's conviction for violating a protection order is affirmed. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying defendant's motion for a continuance on the day of trial where the trial had previously been continued, and the defendant was able to present copies of documents prepared by the defendant despite them containing handwriting. While each side may have been able to more thoroughly demonstrate their respective positions, the defendant's conviction was not against the manifest weight of the evidence simply because trial court believed the testimony and evidence presented by the State.

immunity, summary judgment, deputy, officer, willful, wanton or reckless conduct, R.C. 2744.02

summary judgment – Civ.R. 56(C) – reply briefs – weighing evidence

R.C. 2152.18(B), confined, confinement, secured, facility, credit, time served, department of youth services, delinquent

child support, R.C. 3119.02, worksheet

R.C. 3319.16, good and just cause for termination, remedies for wrongful termination

summary judgment – respondeat superior- coming and going rule – special benefit exception – special hazard exception – traveling employee

motion to suppress – field sobriety tests – Horizontal Gaze Nystagmus ("HGN") test – substantial compliance

R.C. 2506.01(A) – jurisdiction – timeliness – reply briefs – political subdivision

Sentencing appeal; R.C. 2953.08; Standard of review in an appeal of sentence. The maximum sentence in this case is not clearly and convincingly contrary to law.

Permanent Custody; Reasonable Efforts; Contempt. Trial court's permanent custody decision was supported by clear and convincing evidence. Agency engaged in reasonable efforts to support reunification.

MANIFEST WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE; INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL; ABUSE OF DISCRETION; SEPARATION OF WITNESSES; DENIAL OF MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL; MERGER. The defendant-appellant's rape convictions are not against the manifest weight of the evidence. The defendant-appellant cannot prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel because he is unable to show that his trial counsel's performance was deficient or unreasonable under the circumstances. The trial court did not abuse its discretion by allowing the State's sole rebuttal witness to testify even though the rebuttal witness was present in the courtroom during portions of the State's case in chief. The trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying the defendant-appellant's motion for a new trial since he was neither prejudiced nor prevented from having a fair trial. The trial court did not err by failing to merge the defendant-appellant's two rape convictions.

Motion to preserve evidence

Writ of Habeas Corpus

APPELLATE REVIEW - Separate and distinct entry needed; magistrate's decision alone is insufficient; interlocutory appeal; only judges not magistrates may terminate actions through a judgment.

EXTRAORDINARY WRITS - mandamus; public records request; vexatious litigator; certified mail; R.C. 2323.52(F)(2); request for leave to proceed in court of appeals.

petition for postconviction relief; res judicata; ineffective assistance; findings of fact and conclusions of law

right to jury trial; Crim.R. 11(C); voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently; guilty plea; consecutive sentences; R.C. 2929.14(C); ineffective assistance of counsel; bill of particulars; strangulation; R.C. 2903.18

Judgment of the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas, Division of Domestic Relations, Juvenile Branch is affirmed. Trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying appellant's request for a continuance.

The jury's verdict convicting appellant on one count of theft under R.C. 2913.02, elevated to a first-degree felony under R.C. 2913.02(B)(2) based on the amount of money stolen and the victim's status as a protected person, was not against the manifest weight of the evidence, nor was the evidence legally insufficient to support the verdict, where appellant admitted to withdrawing over $450,000 from his elderly aunt's bank accounts and spent it on gambling at casinos. Although the bank had made him joint account holder, the state's evidence rebutted any presumption that appellant shared equally in ownership of the account funds, and the evidence showed that he did not have the victim's consent to take the funds. The record does not support appellant's assertion that the trial court's denial of his motion to sever the single theft account charge into three different ones violated the requirement of jury unanimity under Crim.R. 31(A).

INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL — DISCRETIONARY BINDOVER — AMENABILITY: Trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to seek a second opinion on defendant's amenability to rehabilitation within the juvenile system where defendant could not demonstrate that the result of the amenability proceeding was unreliable. The juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in determining that defendant was not amenable to rehabilitation in the juvenile system where the court properly weighed the relevant factors under R.C. 2152.12(D) and (E).

Piercing Corporate Veil; Unjust Enrichment; Trial Court Did Not Abuse Discretion in Overruling Objects by Non-Party to Settlement Agreement

Denial of postconviction relief

Habeas corpus; adequate remedy at law

objections to magistrate's decision, Civ.R. 53(D)(3)(b), plain error, abuse of discretion, duties tenant owes to landlord

dependent – R.C. 2151.28(L) – R.C. 2151.04(D) – prospective dependency – manifest weight of the evidence

permanent custody – manifest weight of the evidence – best interest of the child

shareholder agreement, breach of contract, remittitur, jury interrogatory, prevailing party, pre-judgment interest, R.C. 1343.03

JNOV, CSPA, motor vehicle, Lester v. FCA US LLC

administrative appeal, R.C. 2506.01, R.C. 5717.01, R.C. 5717.05

notice, Civ.R. 53, supplemental objections

CIVIL – 2013 judgment entry finding abandonment of mineral interest in 280-acre property is void in part, where intervening complaints, which asserted new claims and additional damages, as well as the same claim (abandonment) as the properly-served original complaint (10 acres) but related to additional 270 acres, were not served on defaulting defendants. Neither actual notice of claims in intervening complaints by defaulting defendants nor equitable doctrines revive the 2013 void judgment based on lack of jurisdiction.

De novo review; Civ. R. 56, summary judgment; insurance contract; interpretation against the drafter; undefined words in insurance contract; ambiguity; common and plain meaning; "non-owned" auto; recreational vehicle

Application for DNA Testing

Judge Duhart. Permanent custody. Substance abuse. Housing issues. Best interest

Summary judgment in favor of defendant hospital on slip and fall claim is upheld where there is no genuine issue of material fact that the hospital did not create the hazard, have actual knowledge of the hazard, or have constructive knowledge of the hazard.

Trial counsel's decision to not request a self-defense jury instruction was tactical and, therefore, it did not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel. Judgment affirmed.

Sulek - Trial court errs when it fails to consider restitution to the victim of a juvenile offender's delinquent acts. The victim did not assign as error and lacks standing to argue that her parents are also "victims" entitled to restitution under Marsy's Law. The victim's claim of restitution and her parents' claim of restitution are not so dependent and interwoven that reversal of the judgment pertaining to her also constitutes a reversal of the judgment as to her parents.

Per Mayle, J., correct standards of review for civil protection order cases are manifest-weight-of-the-evidence for challenges to the issuance of a Civil Protection Order ("CPO") and abuse-of-discretion for challenges to the scope or terms of a CPO. Appellant's disagreement with trial court's interpretation of the evidence did not make court's decision against the weight of the evidence. Trial court abused its discretion by including deadly-weapons restrictions in CPO because there was no nexus between guns and appellant's conduct.

Appellant's felony convictions resulting from the fatal shooting, robbery, and partial dismemberment of the victim, whom appellant had invited to his home on the night of the incident, were not against the manifest weight of the evidence. Judgment affirmed.

Judge Duhart. Ineffective assistance of counsel. Expert. Vouching. Rape.

Judge Duhart, motion for return of property, res judicata

Zmuda, writing for the majority, affirms the judgment finding no abuse of discretion in determining the administrative appeal regarding a conditional use permit, as the judgment was supported by substantial, reliable, and probative evidence in the record; rejected appellants' unsupported argument regarding mootness, in the alternative, failure to commence construction.

Judge Duhart, Wrongful Imprisonment, Lesser-Included Offenses

Civ.R. 60(B); meritorious claim; excusable neglect. Reversed and remanded. After the plaintiff's counsel made a calendaring mistake, his brief in opposition to the defendant's motion for summary judgment was filed one business day late and prior to the trial court's granting of summary judgment. The trial court did not consider the facts or arguments set forth in Favorite's untimely brief when it granted summary judgment, noting that the defendant's motion was "unopposed." After reviewing the record in this matter, we find that the plaintiff established all three requirements to be entitled to relief from judgment and the trial court abused its discretion in denying his Civ.R. 60(B) motion. Under this set of facts, the trial court should have considered the plaintiff's untimely brief in opposition and determined whether summary judgment was appropriate based on the arguments presented by both parties.

Murder charges; juvenile delinquent; discretionary transfer; bindover, R.C. 2152.12(B), (D) and (E); plea was not knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently entered; violation of Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(a); postrelease control sanctions; probable cause waived; abuse of discretion; amenability hearing; the Reagan Tokes Law. Juvenile delinquent pled guilty to murder charges. On appeal juvenile argues that his plea was not knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently entered, because the trial court did not fully comply with Crim.R.11 (C)(2)(a) regarding the mandatory postrelease control sanctions he was pleading guilty too. The record indicates however, that the trial court did fully discuss the sanctions and made the juvenile aware that he was going to subject to mandatory postrelease control, the duration of the sanctions and what would happen if he violated them. As such we find no error here and his first assignment of error is properly overruled. For his second assignment of error the juvenile then argues the trial court abused its discretion by finding that he was not amenable to rehabilitation within the juvenile justice system. Our review of the record demonstrates that the trial court did properly consider the factors for and against transfer before finding the juvenile was not amenable and ordering the transfer. The court did not abuse its discretion and juvenile's assignment of error is properly overruled. For his third assignment of error juvenile alleges his sentence pursuant to Reagan Tokes is unconstitutional violating the juvenile's constitutional right to trial by a jury and his right to due process. Juvenile also argues the law violates the separation of powers clause. Based on this court's precedent this assignment of error is overruled.

Civ.R. 56; motion for summary judgment; tortious interference with a contract; fraud; collusion; conspiracy; motion to strike; motion to disqualify; abuse of discretion. The trial court properly entered summary judgment for all defendants where there were no genuine issues of material fact and defendants were entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in striking a motion to disqualify counsel from the record.

Concealment of estate assets; R.C. 2109.50; objections to the magistrate's decision; timeliness of filing; plain error; partial transcript; failure to comply with App.R. 12 and 16. Sisters filed claims/cross-claims against each other for concealment of their mother's estate assets in probate court. The court found in favor of each sister in part. One sister filed an untimely objection to the magistrate's decision, therefore we review for plain error. We affirm in part and reverse in part. The evidence in the record supports the court's findings on all but one of the concealment of "estate assets." One of the sisters paid off the balance of her mother's car and took her mother to have title of the car transferred to this sister. The probate court found that this was a concealment of estate assets. The evidence in the record does not support the finding that this car was an estate asset due to the timing of the title transfer. The record also does not support the probate court's finding regarding the value of the car because there was no evidence in the partial transcript that was part of the record on appeal about the value of the car.

Not guilty by reason of insanity plea; ineffective assistance of counsel; failure to file written plea; plain error; Crim.R. 11; R.C. 2943.03; manifest weight of the evidence; affirmative defense; preponderance of the evidence; R.C. 2901.01; conflicting expert witness testimony; credibility; sentencing; Reagan Tokes Law; indefinite sentence; mandatory sentence; attempted aggravated murder of a peace officer; R.C. 2903.01(E)(2); R.C. 2923.02; required statutory advisements; R.C. 2929.19(B)(2)(c). Appellant failed to demonstrate that his counsel was ineffective for failing to file a written plea of not guilty by reason of insanity, and the court did not commit plain error by considering his not guilty by reason of insanity defense. Appellant's convictions were not against the manifest weight of the evidence, and the court properly imposed an indefinite sentence under the Reagan Tokes Law. However, the court failed to provide the required statutory advisements regarding the indefinite sentence, and the matter is remanded for stating the proper notifications.

Motion for leave; motion for new trial; exculpatory evidence; newly discovered evidence; unavoidably prevented; public records request. - Trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying appellant leave to move for a new trial or denying his petition for postconviction relief because appellant failed to demonstrate that (1) he was unavoidably prevented from discovering the evidence he relied on it support of his motion; (2) how the supporting documentation qualified as Brady material; and (3) the State suppressed the evidence supporting his motion. Appellant failed to demonstrate that he complied with R.C. 149.43 in his attempt to obtain public records to support his "unavoidably prevented" burden.

Jury interrogatories; inconsistent; waiver; reconcilable; noneconomic damages; unconstitutional; as applied; due course of law. Trial court properly denied appellants' motion for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict ("JNOV") or for a new trial because they failed to object to alleged inconsistency between special jury interrogatories and the general verdict and because the inconsistency was easily reconcilable. Trial court's finding that cap on noneconomic damages provided in R.C. 2323.42(A)(3) is unconstitutional as applied to appellee was proper because the cap on damages arbitrarily and unreasonably deprived appellee of his due-course-of-law rights guaranteed by the Ohio Constitution.

Close corporation; shareholder derivative action; Civ.R. 23.1; standing. Affirmed. The trial court correctly granted defendant's partial summary judgment upon all claims asserted by plaintiff in her individual capacity because the plaintiff's claims, based on a minority shareholder asserting claims against another minority shareholder, must be asserted in compliance with Civ.R. 23.1, which includes the requirement to verify the complaint and allege with particularity the efforts made to obtain the desired relief stymied by the controlling shareholders.

Restitution; motion to modify; R.C. 2929.18; restitution to third parties; evidence. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying defendant's motion to modify restitution. At the time restitution was imposed, the relevant statute permitted restitution to third parties such as insurance companies. Ohio Supreme Court precedent indicates that courts must look to the version of the restitution statute as it existed at the time of a defendant's sentencing, i.e., whether the person or entity was statutorily eligible for restitution at the time of sentencing. In addition, restitution is not merely to benefit the victim, but is an integral part of an offender's sentence for both punishment and retribution. Defendant did not provide evidence that he had satisfied his restitution obligations. Finally, defendant failed to offer any evidence that the victim had been compensated in whole or in part by an insurance carrier or other third party. Representations by counsel do not constitute evidence.

Arbitration; stay of proceedings; contract. Trial court did not err when it granted appellee's motion to stay proceedings pending submission to arbitration, where it found that the parties had agreed to the arbitration agreement and that the subject of the claim was covered under that agreement.

Entrapment; affirmative defense; jury instruction; predisposition; cell phone records; cell phone site location information ("CSLI"); plain error; Crim.R. 30; subpoena; effective assistance of counsel; Strickland test; sufficiency of the evidence; bribery, R.C. 2921.02(A); R.C. 2921.02(B); forgery; R.C. 2913.31(A)(1); R.C. 2913.31(A)(2); insurance fraud; R.C. 2913.47(B)(2); manifest weight of the evidence. The State introduced sufficient evidence at trial to support the convictions of bribery, forgery, and insurance fraud. Weighing all of the evidence, we cannot say this is one of the rare cases in which the trier of fact lost its way and, thus, the bribery, forgery, and insurance fraud convictions were not against the manifest weight of the evidence. The trial court did not abuse its discretion when it declined to instruct the jury on the affirmative defense of entrapment where the evidence demonstrated the defendant's predisposition to commit the charged offenses. Because the defendant held no privacy right in his mobile phone records, the trial court did not commit plain error when it admitted the records at trial. Defendant's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel failed where he was unable to show his counsel's performance was deficient or that the alleged deficient performance prejudiced him so as to deprive him of a fair trial.

Defendant's convictions for purposeful and felony murder with firearm specifications were supported by the manifest weight of the evidence. State proved beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant was not acting in self-defense when he fatally shot victim. Trial court properly included jury instruction on "unreasonable force."

WORKERS' COMPENSATION – R.C. 4123.52 – R.C. 4123.57(B): Industrial Commission did not abuse its discretion by declining to exercise its continuing jurisdiction to reverse order of Bureau of Workers' Compensation finding injured worker sustained a partial (but not total) loss of vision in his right eye where injured worker did not seek to invoke, based on a clear mistake of law, the commission's continuing jurisdiction under R.C. 4123.52 in the injured worker's C-86 motion that is the subject of his mandamus complaint. Writ of mandamus denied.

In this permanent custody case, the trial court did not plainly err in considering the testimony and report of the guardian ad litem where the guardian ad litem's lack of contact with mother was attributable to mother's own conduct as opposed to any deficiency on the part of the guardian ad litem. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying mother's request on the day of trial for a continuance to work toward completing her case plan objectives after the matter had already been continued four times. Additionally, the manifest weight of the evidence supports the trial court's determination that awarding permanent custody to Franklin County Children Services ("FCCS") is in the child's best interest. Despite father's more recent engagement in the case, father did not demonstrate he had ameliorated the concerns that led to the child's removal. Judgment affirmed.

AUTOMOBILES – LEMON LAW – SUMMARY JUDGMENT – CIV.R. 56 – MAGNUSSON-MOSS WARRANTY ACT – CONSUMER SALES PRACTICES ACT – SUBSTANTIAL IMPAIRMENT – WARRANTIES The belated repair of plaintiff's vehicle by defendant automobile manufacturer's authorized dealer is no defense to an otherwise-valid Lemon Law claim.

COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL – MOTION TO DISMISS – CIV.R. 12(B)(7) – JOINDER – CIV.R. 19 – DECLARATORY JUDGMENT – R.C. 2721.12 – NECESSARY PARTIES – CONTRACTS – BREACH OF CONTRACT – SUBSTANTIAL PERFORMANCE – EXCUSE – SECURITY SEWAGE – IMPOSSIBILITY – REGULATORY IMPOSSIBILITY – GOOD FAITH – REMEDIES – DAMAGES: A prior determination by a federal court that a county regulation was not so "arbitrary and capricious" as to defy the Due Process Clause of the Federal Constitution did not collaterally estop plaintiff from litigating the entirely distinct issue of whether the county's application of the same regulation was "arbitrary" and therefore unforeseeable, so as to excuse plaintiff's contractual performance, regardless of similarities in terminology.

Defendant's constitutional rights were not of sufficient magnitude to outweigh the victim's statutory and constitutional rights. Under a due process analysis, defendant's stated reasons for the medical records did not show that the records were material to his defense.

App.R. 26(B); untimely filing; lack of good cause

CIVIL – Judgment entry setting aside default judgment on pro se fraud claims entered without an evidentiary hearing is affirmed pursuant to Civ. R. 60(B)(5). Complaint alleged former wife intentionally misrepresented the paternity of children born during her marriage to Appellant. Trial court awarded almost one-and-a-half million dollars in damages, despite no evidence of damages in the record, and likelihood that the paternity of the children had been established in their divorce decree. Trial court should have held a hearing before finding excusable neglect under Civ. R. 60(B)(1) based on Appellee's self-serving affidavit. Civ. R. 60(B)(4) must be based on event subsequent to the entry of default judgment.

Crim.R. 33 motion for new trial; motion for leave to file Crim.R. 33 motion; trial court must rule on motion for leave to file Crim.R. 33 motion first; guilty plea bars Crim.R. 33 motion; App.R. 12(B); trial court correct judgment, but incorrect rationale

CIVIL – The residuary clause of a recorded will constitutes a recorded title transaction for the purposes of the Marketable Title Act, and prevents extinguishment of a pre-root royalty interest. The recorded will of a royalty interest owner using a different first name than the transaction creating her interest is a recorded title transaction, where the woman's identity can be confirmed through public records. The preservation of one fractional royalty interest does not preserve a separate and distinct fractional interest transferred to a different person albeit in the same sale of royalty.

Appellant's agreed sentence is not reviewable on appeal because appellant was sentenced pursuant to a plea agreement, which was authorized by law, had been jointly recommended by appellant and the prosecutor, and was imposed by the trial judge. Judgment affirmed.

The trial court did not err in failing to consider an affidavit that was not filed in the trial court, and we also will not consider it because it is not part of the record on appeal. Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994), did not apply to extend the statutes of limitations for appellant's causes of action. Appellees met their burden to demonstrate that no material issues of fact existed related to appellant's claims, and summary judgment was properly granted to all appellees. Judgment affirmed.

The trial court did not err in imposing financial sanctions under R.C. 2743.70. The court reasonably concluded that appellant would have the ability to pay $120 in costs to the state reparations fund, notwithstanding its appointment of counsel for appellant based on his indigency. Judgments affirmed.

The trial court did not err in granting appellee's motion for summary judgment in a foreclosure action where there was no genuine issue of material fact that appellee was a party entitled to enforce the note. Appellants failed to present evidence in support of their affirmative defense that appellee had not complied with certain loss mitigation steps. Judgment affirmed.

The trial court did not err by overruling appellant's motion to dismiss based on a violation of his statutory right to a speedy trial. Due to several tolling events, appellant pled no contest before the expiration of the speedy trial time. Judgment affirmed.

The trial court did not err in dismissing appellant's claim for wrongful termination in violation of public policy, because the facts alleged by appellant failed as a matter of law to establish the clarity element of her claim. The trial court also did not err in dismissing appellant's declaratory judgment claim where it and the wrongful termination claim were indistinguishable. Judgment affirmed.

Appellee was involved in a traffic collision which resulted in the death of a pedestrian and serious injuries to appellee. A few days later, while appellee was still in the hospital, he was questioned by an officer investigating the collision. After appellee was charged with vehicular homicide, the trial court granted appellee's motion to suppress the statements. The trial court erred in suppressing this evidence, because appellee was not in police custody during the hospital interview, his waiver of his Miranda rights was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary, and appellee did not clearly and unambiguously invoke his right to counsel. Judgment reversed and remanded.

The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying appellant's application for postconviction DNA testing after the prosecutor filed a report with the trial court explaining that the biological evidence that still existed did not include the three items appellant had listed in his application. Judgment affirmed.

The trial court did not err in denying appellant's untimely petitions for postconviction relief or, alternatively, motions for leave to file a motion for new trial. Appellant did not present evidence that he had been unavoidably prevented from discovering evidence or that a Brady violation had occurred. The trial court did not err in overruling the petitions/motions without holding an evidentiary hearing. Judgment affirmed.

The trial court did not commit plain error when it failed to refer to one of appellant's felonious assault counts in the self-defense jury instruction. The jury's rejection of appellant's self-defense claim for his convicted offenses was not against the manifest weight of the evidence. The trial court did not err by failing to merge a felonious assault count with other felonious assault counts and appellant's felony murder conviction, as appellant had committed that felonious assault separately from the other felonious assaults. Also, the record of the sentencing hearing establishes that the trial court engaged in the correct analysis for imposing consecutive sentences and that the trial court's consecutive-sentence findings were supported by the record. Judgment affirmed.

The trial court did not abuse its discretion when it gave a "consciousness of guilt" jury instruction, as there was evidence appellant fled the scene after trying to use a fake $100 bill. The trial court also did not abuse its discretion when it allowed alleged hearsay testimony, as the statements were not offered for the truth of the matter asserted. Finally, there were no constitutional violations. The witness's non-verbal statements were not testimonial in nature, and defense counsel was not ineffective. Judgment affirmed.

Appellant appealed from an order granting summary judgment to appellee on appellee's breach of contract claims but failed to articulate an assignment of error as required by App.R. 16(A)(3) and asked for a payment plan. Appellant had not raised any error for the appellate court to address. Judgment affirmed.

Telecommunications Harassment - Sufficiency of Evidence - First Amendment

Sulek, J. Inconsistencies between the defendant's sentencing hearing and judgment entries, were correctable by nunc pro tunc entries. R.C. 2929.141(A)(1).

Per Mayle, J., trial court erred in granting summary judgment against county and township on statutory immunity defense. Factual disputes exist as to all elements of common-law dedication, thus whether path is "public road" under R.C. 2744.02(B)(3) immunity exception (and all other elements of exception) present fact questions.

Zmuda, J., writing for the majority, affirms the court's imposition of jointly recommended sentence.

Zmuda, J., writing for the majority, affirms the judgment, holding that appellant's request for consideration of both self-defense and lesser-included offense aggravated assault permitted trier of fact to reject self-defense and find provocation, and appellant's challenge to sufficiency of the evidence for remaining convictions was not supported by the record.

Zmuda, J., writing for the majority, finds that trial counsel's failure to file notice of self-defense as required by Crim.R. 12.2 constituted ineffective assistance of counsel resulting in prejudice to appellants, as conceded by the state. Appellants remaining assignments of error are moot

Jury conviction and sentence for mandatory sex-offender registration affirmed. Sufficiency of Evidence. Manifest weight. Self-Representation. Osowik

Sulek, J. Sufficient evidence supports parent's child endangering conviction where parent failed to promptly seek medical treatment for child. R.C. 2919.22.

Zmuda, J., writing for the majority, affirms the court's imposition of consecutive sentences.

Habeas Corpus, R.C. 2969.25(A)

Former city manager appeals from decision granting summary judgment in favor of employer and dismissing city manager's claims for age, sex, and race discrimination, and retaliation under R.C. Chapter 4112. City manager failed to establish prima facie case of discrimination or retaliation. City manager failed to establish cat's paw theory of discrimination and retaliation. Reverse race discrimination claim rejected.

The trial court did not err by dismissing appellant's complaint for eviction and money damages brought against appellant's now former tenant, appellee, where appellant accepted a partial payment of rent for the same month in which it was attempting to evict its tenant for non-payment of rent. WITH DISSENTING OPINION.

Appellant's appeal challenging a domestic relation court's decision denying her emergency motion to stay the issuance of a passport to her and appellee's minor son was frivolous where, at a hearing, appellant expressly consented to having a passport issued to the minor so that he could travel out of the country with appellee for a fishing trip to Canada, thereby entitling appellee to reasonable attorney fees in accordance with the appellate court's local rules.

A juvenile court's decision adjudicating appellant a delinquent child was not a final appealable order where no dispositional decision had been entered prior to appellant filing his appeal challenging that adjudication.

CRIMINAL-FINAL APPEALABLE ORDER-HANGING CHARGE-LACK OF JURISDICTION - A criminal charge for which there is no recorded disposition is a "hanging charge" that prevents the conviction from being a final order; if a court's order is not final and appealable, we have no jurisdiction to review the matter and must dismiss the appeal; jurisdictional issues must be raised by the court sua sponte even if not raised by the parties.

SUMMARY JUDGMENT; BREACH OF CONTRACT; EMPLOYMENT TERMINATION; JUST CAUSE. The trial court did not err by granting (partial) summary judgment in favor of defendants-appellees as to the plaintiffs-appellant's breach-of-contract claim because there is no genuine issue of material fact that plaintiff-appellant's employment was terminated for just cause.

Ineffective Assistance of Counsel; Motion for Acquittal; Crim.R. 29(A); Trespass in a Habitation; R.C. 2911.12(B); Force. Defendant-appellant did not show that a Crim.R. 29 motion for acquittal made at the close of the State's case would have had a reasonable probability of success and, accordingly, did not establish ineffective assistance of counsel due to his counsel's failure to make such a motion at that time.

Voluntary Plea, Criminal Rule 11, Right to Compel Witnesses. Trial court did not err by advising defendant "he could call [his] own witnesses and present [his] own evidence" as that is sufficient to notify a defendant he or she is waiving the right to compel witnesses to appear and testify. Mere fact that the defendant did not like his options did not make his decision to accept the plea agreement involuntary.

Motion to Dismiss; Plea Agreement; Crim.R. 48(B); Mailbox Rule. Agreements between the State and a defendant to resolve a criminal proceeding are subject to the general standards of contract law. A defendant has a right to hold the State to the promises that it made to induce him or her into an agreement. On finding that a plea agreement has been breached, the trial court has the discretion to choose an appropriate remedy, including specific performance.

Consecutive Sentences; No Contest Plea; Sentencing Factors; Crim.R. 11. A no contest plea is not an admission of guilt but is an admission of the truth of the facts alleged in the indictment. If the language in the indictment contains sufficient allegations to state a felony offense, the trial court must find the defendant guilty if he or she enters a no contest plea. R.C. 2953.08(G)(2) does not permit an appellate court to reverse or modify a sentence based on a determination that the record does not support the trial court's findings under R.C. 2929.12. To impose consecutive sentences, the trial court must make the findings required under R.C. 2929.14(C)(4) at sentencing and incorporate these findings into its judgment entry of sentencing.

Verdict Forms; Remand; R.C. 2945.75(A)(2). Applying the Supreme Court of Ohio's holding in State v. Mays, appellant was unable to demonstrate plain error here regarding verdict forms.

Motion to Withdraw a Plea; Merger; Aggravated Robbery; Burglary; R.C. 2941.25; Allied Offenses. Appellate courts review a trial court's decision to deny a motion to withdraw a guilty plea under an abuse of discretion standard. A mere change of heart does not provide a defendant with a reasonable and legitimate basis to withdraw his or her plea. A defendant can commit the offense of burglary by trespassing an occupied structure by force with an intent to commit a criminal offense. To perpetrate the offense of burglary, the defendant need not succeed at committing the intended offense after impermissibly trespassing into an occupied structure. Thus, an offense committed once inside the occupied structure is distinct from crime of burglary and is not subject to merger.

Delinquency; Rape. Adjudication of delinquency for multiple counts of rape against multiple victims was supported by the evidence.

Civ.R. 54; Presumption of regularity. Judgment reversed due to concerns regarding the completeness and propriety of the judgment entry.

Postconviction relief; R.C. 2953.21; trial court not required to wait for response to the state's motion to dismiss petition; trial court may rule on meritless petition at any time; trial court has discretion to deny motion to amend petition filed nine years after the petition was filed and nine years after petition was denied; denial of petition for postconviction relief is a final appealable order even if court fails to timely file findings of fact and conclusions of law; judgment affirmed.

CIVIL – Small claims court; wrongful dominion over property; R.C. 2307.60; R.C. 2307.61; landlord failed to restore personal property after eviction; trial court did not err in judgment awarding compensatory damages for personal property; small claims court does not have jurisdiction to order replevin; R.C. 1925.02; small claims court did not err in considering an inventory of property; Evid.R. 101(D)(8); weight of the evidence.

CRIMINAL LAW - purposes of felony sentencing; R.C. 2929.11; seriousness and recidivism factors; R.C. 2929.12; clearly and convincingly contrary to law; express consideration.

CRIMINAL – Felony conviction; Crim.R. 11(C); Crim.R. 11(B)(1); complete failure to advise defendant of the effect of a guilty plea; no showing of prejudice required.

CIVIL - vexatious litigator; R.C. 2323.52; leave to continue; dismissed.

CRIMINAL - Burglary; weight of the evidence; sufficiency of the evidence; credibility an issue for trier of fact; "likely to be present"; occupants were in and out of the residence; admissibility of evidence; hearsay; relevance; lack of prejudice

CIVIL - breach of contract; declaratory judgment; injunctive relief; summary judgment; condominium association; amendment of condominium bylaws; R.C. 1702.25(A); notice of amendment; terms of contract clear and unambiguous; plain meaning; purchaser; attorney fees; unclean hands

Zmuda, writing for the majority affirmed the judgment of the juvenile court which found appellant's deceased child was an abused and neglected child, and found appellant's second child an abused, neglected, and dependent child and granted permanent custody of second child to the agency.

Petition for post conviction release/Res judicata

Withdrawal of guilty plea

Self defense; rebuttal presumption under 2901.05(B)(2)

The trial court did not err when it failed to allow appellant to introduce evidence of the victim's generalized threat to harm future cellmates and trial counsel did not provide ineffective assistance of counsel.

Trial court properly denied motion to suppress results of field sobriety tests; cause remanded for resentencing to comply with Reagan Tokes sentencing requirements.

On remand from Ohio Supreme Court to consider unresolved assignments of error. Trial court did not abuse its discretion testimony of police officer regarding the general process of extracting Snapchat data from a phone, where defense counsel acquiesced to admission of documents extracted and explicitly waived any objection to the court's limiting instruction. Any possible prejudice from prosecutor's rebuttal argument was appropriately contained by interjections from trial court and instructions to jury. Because defendant's confession was not otherwise involuntary, trial court's instruction to the jury that deception was "part of the interrogation process" was not prejudicial. Defendant's trial counsel was not ineffective in cross-examination or in failing to request a specific limiting instruction regarding testimony of jailhouse informants. Cumulative harmless error did not apply to multiple instances of alleged deficient performance by trial counsel. Defendant's convictions were supported by sufficient evidence and were not against the manifest weight of evidence presented at trial. Defendant's sentence did not violate the Ninth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Assignments of error overruled and trial court judgment affirmed.

In case No. 22AP-711, appellant's challenge to his conviction on Count 15 is barred by res judicata, as appellant challenged his conviction in previous appeals and postconviction motions. Appellant was not entitled to credit for more than 30 months against his sentence on Count 15. He was entitled to credit for the 30 months he served under Count 17, for conduct that was alleged under Count 15, as previously ordered by this court. Judgment affirmed in case No. 22AP-722. In case No. 23-570, the trial court did not lack jurisdiction to enter a nunc pro tunc clarification of the sentence it imposed on appellant on November 8, 2022. The corrected amended judgment entry, filed in September 2023, did not change the substance of appellant's sentence but merely instructed the Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Correction how to implement the 30-month credit ordered by this court and incorporated into appellant's sentence by the trial court. As the September 2023 amended judgment entry did not substantively alter the November 8, 2022 amended judgment entry, however, it was not a new final order from which an appeal may be taken. Case No. 23AP-570 is dismissed for lack of a final, appealable order.

VIOLATION OF CIVIL PROTECTION ORDER - R.C. 2919.27 - STATUTORY SPEEDY TRIAL - R.C. 2945.71 - CHARGING COMPLAINT - SUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE - APP.R. 9: Although misdemeanor trial far exceeded the 90-day speedy trial time period prescribed by R.C. 2945.71(B)(2), defendant's failure to timely file a motion to dismiss based on a speedy-trial violation or otherwise raise issue in the trial court precludes her from raising it, for the first time, on appeal since the state had no reason or opportunity to argue and present evidence supporting the tolling or extending of the statutory speedy trial period. Defendant presents claims about accuracy of information contained in the officer's complaint charging her with violating a civil protection order, but she did not challenge the validity of the complaint in the trial court, does not argue the complaint failed to meet the requirements of Crim.R. 3 on appeal, has not raised a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence supporting her conviction, and failed to submit a transcript of the jury trial and exhibits presented at her trial for appellate review. As such, we presume the regularity of the proceedings and the validity of the judgment in the trial court. Judgment affirmed.

PERMANENT CUSTODY - Because the agency presented substantial clear and convincing evidence that placing the child in the permanent custody of the agency would serve the child's best interests, the judgment of the trial court is not against the manifest weight of the evidence.

CRIM.R. 11 — GUILTY PLEA: The trial court complied with Crim.R. 11 in accepting defendant's guilty pleas where the record shows that the court informed defendant of each of the constitutional rights listed under the rule that defendant waived by pleading guilty.

Operating Agreement, Piercing the Corporate Veil, Lis Pendens

Suppression; search; dog sniff; ineffective assistance

FINAL APPEALABLE ORDER – APPELLATE REVIEW/CIVIL – APPELLATE JURISDICTION – DECLARATORY JUDGMENTS – MOOTNESS – CIV.R. 54(B): Where trial court granted summary judgment for defendants on plaintiff's breach-of-contract claim without explanation, and where the trial court failed to resolve or dismiss plaintiff's outstanding declaratory-judgment request concerning the same contract, and where resolution of the former would require resolving issues subsumed by the latter, the claims were inextricably intertwined, rendering the trial court's Civ.R. 54(B) certification improper, the trial court's order nonfinal, and the court of appeals without jurisdiction.

R.C. 2953.21, postconviction relief, affidavit, Not Guilty by Reason of Insanity ("NGRI") evaluation, ineffective assistance of counsel, findings of fact and conclusions of law

postconviction relief; R.C. 2953.21; standard of review; abuse of discretion; ineffective assistance of trial counsel; hearing; prejudice

Divorce; abuse of discretion; financial misconduct; R.C. 3105.171(E); credibility; hidden or nondisclosed income; sale of personal residence; purchase of residence by spouse; attorney's fees; Dom.Rel.LocR. 21; plain error; admission of exhibits; time restrictions on cross-examination; marital property; manifest weight of the evidence; distributive award; spousal support; and R.C. 3105.18. The trial court did not abuse its discretion when it found plaintiff-appellant's hidden income constituted financial misconduct. The trial court did not abuse its discretion when it ordered the immediate sale of a personal residence when the house to be sold was encumbered with a mortgage, home equity line of credit, and foreclosure proceedings and both parties had alternate residences. Where two homes situated next door to each other were owned by the defendant-appellee, the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it ordered the sale of one home rather than awarding it to plaintiff-appellant which would have resulted in her continued residence side-by-side with her ex-husband, his girlfriend, and their child. The trial court committed plain error by admitting into evidence an exhibit that was not presented at trial. The trial court abused its discretion when it awarded attorney's fees based upon an exhibit that was not part of the court record. Where defendant-appellee did not identify the evidence he was prevented from introducing due to the court's time limitations on cross-examination, defendant-appellee did not establish the trial court's time limitations amounted to an abuse of discretion. The trial court's findings were not against the manifest weight of the evidence where the evidence established real estate holdings, vehicles, and businesses were not marital property subject to division. Subject to R.C. 3105.171(E)(4), defendant-appellee was entitled to a greater division of marital property or a distributive award but not both awards. Consideration of the R.C. 3105.18(C) factors supported the trial court's denial of defendant-appellee's motion for spousal support.

Modification of spousal award; substantial change in financial circumstances; investment income; sale of business; abuse of discretion. Judgment affirmed. The trial court did not abuse its discretion by sustaining appellee's objections to the magistrate's decision. The trial court is the ultimate finder of fact. The magistrate's decision did not turn on a credibility determination and, therefore, the trial court was able to conduct an independent review of the issues. The trial court's finding that monies from the sale of appellee's business, which happened over two years after the parties' divorce, was investment income excluded from being subject to spousal support calculation, was not an abuse of discretion. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding that appellee's income after his retirement constituted a substantial change in his financial circumstances and thus warranted a modification of his spousal support obligation.

Dog bite; failure to control; explanation of circumstances; allied offenses; sentencing; community-control sanctions; waiver; constitutional errors; no-contest pleas. - Appellant Keondra Whitlow's convictions are affirmed. Appellant waived her right to recitation or an explanation of circumstances. Whitlow's attempts to dispute the legality of her sentence, including her community-control sanctions, are without merit. Whitlow waived her right to contest the sufficiency of the evidence, including whether the subject dog was vicious, when she pled no contest. Whitlow's various other assignments of error are overruled pursuant to the waiver doctrine and for failure to raise the errors for the first time in the trial court.

Allied offenses of similar import; merger; ineffective assistance of counsel. The trial court appropriately refused to merge offenses where the conduct established that the crimes were committed separately and with separate animus. Trial court appropriately considered the required factors to impose maximum consecutive sentences. The maximum sentences were within the statutory range and were therefore not contrary to law. Additionally, the trial court made the appropriate findings to impose consecutive sentences. Appellant failed to establish he received ineffective assistance of counsel when counsel failed to request a competency evaluation based on a probate court finding of guardianship. The standard for competency to stand trial is different from competency determinations in probate court. Where there is no evidence in the record that the appellant was incapable of understanding the proceedings or that he could not assist in his defense, counsel did not err in failing to request a competency hearing. Appellant failed to establish he received ineffective assistance of counsel when his new lawyer represented him at a plea hearing without having obtained all of the discovery. Nevertheless, after a guilty plea appellant waived any claim of ineffective assistance unless he established that his counsel's errors rendered his plea infirm. Appellant failed to meet that requirement.

Jail-time credit; separate and unrelated cases. - Trial court erred in awarding jail-time credit to defendant for separate and unrelated cases even though the trial court ordered the defendant to serve those sentences concurrently.

Sufficiency of the evidence; felonious assault; serious physical harm; deadly weapon; scissors; manifest weight of the evidence; credibility. The victim's testimony that the offender often carried a knife or screwdriver in his pocket; the offender stabbed her in the face with either scissors or an object pulled from his pocket; the interaction resulted in an injury that required stitches; the offender made several comments that the victim interpreted as threats upon her life; and the responding police officer's testimony that she observed the victim with a severe injury requiring stitches served as sufficient evidence to show the offender used a deadly weapon to cause serious physical harm and support the offender's felonious-assault convictions. After weighing the evidence and all reasonable inferences and considering the credibility of the witnesses, we find the defendant's convictions of felonious assault were not against the manifest weight of the evidence.

Sentencing; R.C. 2953.08(D)(3); aggravated murder; life without parole; R.C. 2929.03(A)(1); cruel and unusual punishment. Judgment affirmed. Appellant's sentence of life in prison without the possibility of parole for three counts of aggravated murder is within the statutory range and not reviewable on appeal pursuant to R.C. 2953.08(D)(3). Further, appellant's constitutional claims of cruel and unusual punishment lack merit. Life in prison without the possibility of parole for the murder of three individuals is not disproportionate nor excessive.

Postconviction; DNA testing; outcome determinative. Judgment affirmed. The trial court did not abuse its discretion when it rejected Bulger's application for postconviction DNA testing on the basis that exclusion results would not be outcome determinative. In the context of the evidence presented at trial and upon its consideration, we cannot say that there is a strong probability that no reasonable factfinder would have found the defendant guilty of the offenses had exclusion results been presented at trial.

Agreed judgment entry; objections; magistrate's decision; transcript; audio recording. - Appellant did not get leave of court to submit the audio recording in lieu of a written transcript. Because no transcript was submitted to the trial court with appellant's objections to the magistrate's decision, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in summarily overruling the objections. The magistrate and the trial court properly adopted the agreed judgment entry without appellant's signature because the entry conformed with the parties' in-court, on-the-record, agreement of the terms of the parenting plan.

Modifications of shared-parenting plans and decrees; R.C. 3109.04; modification in the designation of the residential parent for school purposes; changes in circumstances; best interest of child. The trial court erred in finding that mother's motion to change a designation of the residential parent for school purposes is governed by R.C. 3109.04(E)(1)(a), which requires a demonstration of a change in circumstances. The trial court's judgment is affirmed, however, because it denied mother's motion on an alternative ground that the modification would not serve the child's best interest, and our review indicates the trial court did not abuse its discretion in its best-interest finding.

Guardian ad litem ("GAL") fees; appellate court costs; App.R. 24; Cuyahoga C.P., Juv.Div., Loc.R. 15(D)(4). The juvenile court did not abuse its discretion when it granted the GAL's motion for fees and declined to award father appellate court costs. The appellate court has exclusive jurisdiction to award appellate court costs.

Motion to vacate default judgment; rebuttable presumption; perfected service; Civ.R. 4.1(A)(1)(a); Civ.R. 4.6(D). The trial court did not abuse its discretion when it denied defendant-appellant's motion to vacate default judgment. Appellant's unsigned affidavit had no evidentiary value; thus, appellant had no evidence to rebut the presumption that service had been perfected.

Civ.R. 12(B)(6); limited liability partnership; R.C. 1776.36; pierce; fraud; Civ.R. 9. - Trial court did not err in granting partners' Civ.R. 12(B)(6) motion to dismiss because the plaintiff's complaint failed to state a claim against the individual partners for obligations incurred by the limited liability partnership. The complaint also did not plead fraud with particularity pursuant to Civ.R. 9.

double jeopardy; merger of allied offenses; R.C. 2941.25; consecutive sentences; R.C. 2929.14(C)(4); findings.

child-victim's friend testimony on what victim told him would be harmless even assuming it was inadmissible hearsay as victim testified at trial; no plain error in allowing expert testimony on victim's psychological diagnoses and self-harm as this was not akin to an opinion on child's veracity; counsel was not ineffective; sufficiency and weight of the evidence on rape and gross sexual imposition.

Motion for relief from judgment; Civ.R. 60(B); right to redeem; interlocutory order; excusable neglect; abuse of discretion.

Land Installment Contract, Laches, Unjust Enrichment

Sufficiency and manifest weight

Contempt of an Agreed Judgment Entry

Ineffective assistance of counsel

NUNC PRO TUNC ENTRY — SUFFICIENCY AND WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE — MURDER — HAVING A WEAPON WHILE UNDER DISABILITY — COMPLICITY — COUNSEL — INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE — CONSECUTIVE SENTENCES — R.C. 2929.14: The trial court's nunc pro tunc entry was invalid where it was used to make a substantive change to the judgment rather than reflect what actually occurred. Defendant's convictions for murder and having a weapon while under disability were supported by the sufficiency and the weight of the evidence where defendant's identity as the perpetrator of the offenses was established by video evidence from surveillance cameras and an officer's body-worn-camera footage and where defendant's own statements placed him at the crime scene. Trial counsel did not render ineffective assistance for failing to engage an expert to conduct an independent examination of the firearms and to enhance the video of the incident. The record did not clearly and convincingly fail to support the trial court's imposition of consecutive sentences under R.C. 2929.14(C)(4).

HABEAS CORPUS — BAIL — OHIO CONSTITUTION, SECTION 9, ARTICLE 1 — R.C. 2937.011 — PUBLIC SAFETY: Pursuant to the Ohio Constitution, Article 1, Section 9 and R.C. 2937.011, a trial court is permitted to consider public safety when determining the appropriate amount of bail to impose. Where the record contains no evidence that petitioner posed any additional risk to public safety, where petitioner has been employed at the same company since 2021 and has ties to the community, and where the trial court ignored petitioner's financial resources and ability to pay, the $1,000,000 bail imposed by the trial court was excessive and the trial court erred in imposing it, and therefore, petitioner's petition for a writ of habeas corpus must be granted.

The trial court did not commit plain error in failing to merge appellant's convictions for identity fraud, forgery, and grand theft. There are insufficient facts in the record to determine whether the offenses were committed with the same conduct, animus and import. Judgment affirmed.

Appellant cannot demonstrate error in the trial court's bench-trial verdict against him without a transcript of the proceeding. In the absence of a transcript, we must presume regularity and affirm the trial court's judgment. Judgment affirmed.

The trial court correctly ruled that appellant's administrative appeal was barred by the doctrine of res judicata. Judgment affirmed.

The trial court did not abuse its discretion in overruling appellant's motion for leave to file a motion for a new trial. The documents submitted in support of his motion for leave did not demonstrate that he had been unavoidably prevented from discovering the evidence on which he relied in the many years since his conviction. Appellant also was not entitled to a hearing on his motion. Judgment affirmed.

motion for sanctions; appeal not frivolous; Seventh Dist.Loc.R. 23(A)

Whitelock v. Gilbane Bldg. Co., 66 Ohio St.3d 594, 596 (1993); App.R. 25; motion to certify a conflict; rule of law.

horizontal well traversing beneath surface plainly qualifies as a well drilled on the property for purposes of deed reserving royalty interest in oil and gas production; landowner's pooling and unitization agreement does not exclude royalty interest from lease royalties but instead agreed a well on any unitized land will have the same effect as if located on the land subject to the lease; thus, even the fourth well, which did not traverse beneath the premises at issue, qualified as a well drilled on the premises to which the royalty interest in oil and gas produced applies.

In this remand from the Supreme Court of Ohio, we conclude that discretionary immunity applies. Accordingly, we remand this matter to the Court of Claims of Ohio with instructions to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. Cause remanded with instructions.

Relator filed no objections to the magistrate's decision concluding that there was sufficient evidence presented by the Ohio Adult Parole Authority in the record, if believed, to support the finding that he knowingly or with reckless disregard had access to a firearm, thereby violating Rule 4 of the terms of his postrelease control. The magistrate explained that as this postrelease control violation was supported by sufficient evidence, and relator did not contest the remaining violations, he failed to establish a clear legal right to the requested relief or that respondent was under a clear legal duty to provide such relief. Because there is no error of law or other defect evident on the face of the magistrate's decision, it is adopted and the request for a writ of mandamus is denied.

The appellant's assignment of error as to whether the trial court erred by denying her request for a month-long continuance was barred under the doctrine of res judicata. The appellant's assignments of error regarding whether her plea was knowing and voluntary, based on the trial court's denial of a month-long continuance and the state's refusal to keep the plea offer open, could have been raised on direct appeal and, thus, were also precluded under res judicata. The trial court's determination that trial counsel was not ineffective was reasonable. Judgment affirmed.

The judgment of the probate court denying attorney fees requested by a trustee is affirmed. A decedent's separation agreement clearly intended the terms of the agreement to be binding on the parties' heirs or assigns, which, according to the terms of the decedent's will, included the trustee. Such terms included the attorney fee provision in the separation agreement. However, the trustee did not enforce a default of the separation agreement in the probate court, which was the only basis for an award of fees under that provision. Furthermore, the probate court did not abuse its discretion when denying an award of attorney fees based on the opposing party's alleged bad faith.

The trial court did not err by granting the appellees' motion for judgment on the pleadings. Judgment affirmed.

Trial court did not err in finding that appellant wrongfully withheld appellee's residential lease security deposit. Trial court properly excluded appellant's photos, for which no foundation for admission was furnished. Judgment affirmed.

Osowik. Reversing trial court's order on the grounds that Civ.R. 60(B) cannot be used as a substitute for a timely appeal. Further, the trial court's order was not void for lack of jurisdiction.

No trial court error for conviction and sentencing. Judgment affirmed. Osowik.

Sulek, J. The defendant's domestic violence and assault convictions were supported by sufficient evidence and were not against the weight of the evidence

School district's plan to bus nonpublic school students using hub and spoke system, while bussing public school students directly, does not violate equal protection where the plan is rationally related to legitimate governmental interests in efficiency and the conservation of resources. No prima facie case that free exercise protections were violated where the bussing plan does not interfere with appellant's exercise of religion because it allows her children to attend religious school on time every day.

Successive post-conviction motion; Res judicata

Precluded by adequate remedy at law

Probable cause stop/Indictment not duplicitous

Appellant's guilty plea to one count of first-degree felony aggravated possession of drugs was knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily entered despite the trial court not advising appellant of his truncated appellate rights because the failure to inform a defendant that a guilty plea waives certain rights on appeal is not one of the specifically enumerated rights the trial court is required to discuss during the Crim.R. 11 colloquy.

The trial court did not abuse its discretion in holding that appellants were precluded from presenting expert testimony due to their failure to disclose any expert reports as required by Civ.R. 26(B)(7) and the trial court's pretrial scheduling order. The "thousands of pages of documents" appellants produced during discovery did not constitute an expert report. Summary judgment was appropriately rendered in appellees' favor on appellant's nuisance, negligence, tortious interference with business relationships, and trespass claims where appellants were precluded from presenting expert opinion to demonstrate to a reasonable degree of scientific probability that appellees steelmaking or slag-processing operations were the proximate cause of the fugitive dust and particulate matter they claimed harmed their businesses.

Rape; gross sexual imposition; minor under the age of 12; force; trial court's sua sponte reconsideration; closed-circuit television testimony; confrontation clause; structural error; abuse of discretion; plain error; waiver; forfeiture; consecutive sentence; allied offenses; double jeopardy; Evid. R. 611; R.C. 2907.01(A); R.C. 2907.01(B); R.C. 2907.02(A)(1)(b); R.C. 2907.05(A)(4); R.C. 2945.25

Civil stalking protection order; preponderance of the evidence; expired protection order; moot

Declaratory judgment; Summary judgment; Insurance coverage; Construction of insurance policy language; Principal and agent; Apparent authority; Attorneys' fees; Negligence of insurance agent; No genuine issue of material fact. The various aspects of the trial court's judgment are affirmed.

Domestic Violence Civil Protection Order, Bias of the Magistrate, Pro Se Representation, Weight of the Evidence. Trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the petition for domestic violence CPO when the evidence failed to show by a preponderance of the evidence that any domestic violence or threat of domestic violence had occurred. The record does not demonstrate a bias against petitioner. The trial court did not deny appellant his due process rights by not instructing the pro se petitioner how to proceed with his case.

Opinion Testimony; Prior Bad Acts; Abuse of Discretion. The decision to admit or exclude evidence is entrusted to the sound discretion of the trial court. The Confrontation Clause is not implicated when the declarant of the challenged out-of-court statement testifies at trial and is cross-examined. A police officer does not improperly engage in witness vouching by noting that the statements of witnesses are consistent. Since an "act" is done or performed, a defendant's prior statements or comments will not generally constitute a prior bad act. A lay witness can testify as to the rate of speed that a vehicle was traveling based on his or her own personal observations.

Crim.R. 33; Motion for a new trial; Juror misconduct. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in overruling defendant-appellant's motion for a new trial on the basis of alleged juror misconduct.

Felony Sentencing; R.C. 2953.08(G)(2); R.C. 2929.11; R.C. 2929.12. Pursuant to R.C. 2953.08(G), there is no basis to vacate or modify defendant-appellant's sentence. An appellate court may not independently weigh the evidence in the record and substitute its judgment for the trial court's judgment concerning the sentence that best reflects compliance with R.C. 2929.11 and R.C. 2929.12.

SUPPRESSION; TRAFFIC STOP; REASONABLE SUSPICION; PROBABLE CAUSE; WINDSHIELD DAMAGE; R.C. 4513.02; MOTION TO DISMISS; GRAND JURY; INDICTMENT; PLAIN ERROR; HEARSAY; R.C. 2925.51(A); CONFRONTATION CLAUSE; INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUSEL. The trial court did not err by denying the defendant-appellant's motion to suppress evidence because there was competent, credible evidence supporting the trial court's determination that the law enforcement officer had reasonable suspicion to stop the defendant-appellant based on a violation of R.C. 4513.02. The defendant-appellant's argument that the indictment was defective because there was insufficient evidence presented to the grand jury is not subject to judicial review since it does not present a fundamental error. The trial court did not abuse its discretion by admitting a laboratory report because it was properly authenticated.

Merger; R.C. 2941.25; Evidence of Other Crime, Wrong, or Act; Evid.R. 404. The trial court erred when it failed to merge certain domestic violence and felonious assault offenses as allied offenses under R.C. 2941.25. The trial court did not err in allowing the State to present evidence of certain prior conduct by defendant-appellant.

Sufficient Evidence; Manifest Weight; Aggravated Possession of Drugs; Failure to Comply with an Order or Signal of a Police Officer; Tampering with Evidence. A sufficiency-of-the-evidence challenge argues that the State did not carry its burden of production at trial. A manifest-weight challenge argues that the State did not carry its burden of persuasion at trial. A jury could find that the defendant knew that an official investigation was likely or about to be instituted where the defendant began making sudden movements as soon as a police officer activated his lights to effectuate a traffic stop before he (the defendant) sped away from the police cruiser.

CIV.R. 12(B)(6) MOTION TO DISMISS; ENFORCEABILITY OF A SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT; CONTRACT INTERPRETATION; DEFENSIVE CROSS ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR; R.C. 2505.22. The trial court erred by considering additional evidence beyond the evidence contained in the amended complaint without converting the Civ.R. 12(B)(6) motion to dismiss to a motion for summary judgment and providing the nonmoving party a sufficient opportunity to respond. The trial court erred by dismissing the conversion claim because the magistrate's order did not render the claim moot or otherwise resolve the claim.

Permanent Custody; Reasonable Efforts. Award of permanent custody was supported by clear and convincing evidence.

Evid.R. 404; Ineffective Assistance; Cumulative Error. Trial court did not err by admitting evidence; defendant did not establish any prejudicial error, let alone cumulative error.

MOTION TO SET ASIDE DEFAULT JUDGMENT; CIV.R. 60(B); ABUSE OF DISCRETION. The trial court abused its discretion by denying defendant-appellant's motion to set aside default judgment without holding an evidentiary. Defendant-appellant's motion and supporting affidavits contain allegations of operative facts that would warrant relief under CiV.R. 60(B) such that the trial court should have held a hearing to verify these facts before ruling on the motion.

Self defense; Sufficiency of Evidence; Manifest weight; Allied Offenses of Similar Import; Merger. Defendant-appellant's felonious assault conviction is supported by sufficient evidence and is not against the manifest weight of the evidence. Defendant-appellant's kidnapping conviction is supported by sufficient evidence and is not against the manifest weight of the evidence. Defendant-appellant's felonious assault and kidnapping convictions are not allied offenses of similar import because they were committed with a separate animus.

SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE. The defendant-appellant's trafficking-in-heroin and engaging-in-a-pattern-of-corrupt-activity convictions are based on sufficient.

CRIMINAL LAW - R.C. 2953.08(G); R.C. 2929.14(C)(4); sentencing; contrary to law; consecutive sentences; trial court made the required findings; overlap between R.C. 2929.14(C) finding and a finding under R.C. 2929.14(C)(4)(b); trial court's findings may be applicable to more than one statutory requirement.

CIVIL LAW – motion to compel arbitration; validity of arbitration clause; R.C. 2711.033(A); motion to compel arbitration without an oral hearing; denial of a request to amend complaint.

CRIMINAL LAW - domestic violence; plain error; protection order; relevance; danger of unfair prejudice; Evid.R. 401, 402, 403; res gestae; credibility; corroborating evidence; prosecutor misconduct; personal opinion; juror sympathy; lay opinion; Evid.R. 701; primary aggressor; ultimate issue; Evid.R. 704; ineffective assistance of counsel; other-acts evidence; Evid.R. 404(B); limiting instruction; cumulative error.

ORIGINAL ACTION - motion for extraordinary relief; failure to invoke original jurisdiction; Civ.R. 3(A); cause dismissed.

JURISDICTION - appeal; judgment filed in April 2023; issue affirmed; trial court remanded matter; separate issue not addressed by the board of zoning appeals; no appeal from April 2023 judgment within 30 days; untimely appeal; dismissed.

CRIMINAL LAW - abuse of discretion; misdemeanor sentencing; R.C. 2929.21; R.C. 2929.22; maximum sentence; presumption trial court considered applicable statutory factors.

CIVIL – Civ.R. 60(B); motion for relief from judgment; timeliness of appeal; denial of postconviction petition; GTE prongs; motion timely filed; Appellant fails to demonstrate a meritorious defense or claim; Appellant is not entitled to relief under Civ.R. 60(B)(1) or (5); judgment affirmed.

Vexatious litigator; R.C. 2323.52(D)(1); cases assigned by the administrative judge; Sup.R. 36; motions filed by counsel used in determining vexatious litigator where the filings are attributable to the party.

CRIMINAL-GROSS SEXUAL IMPOSITION-CRIM.R. 8(A) JOINDER OF OFFENSES-CRIM.R. 14 MOTION TO SEVER TRIALS-CRIM.R. 7(D) MOTION TO AMEND INDICTMENT - Trial court did not commit plain error by failing to grant Appellant's motion to sever trial and failing to order separate trials involving three alleged victims of various sex offenses where evidence of each crime joined at trial is simple and direct; Appellant was not prejudiced and trial court did not abuse its discretion or commit reversible error by allowing amendment to Count Six, Gross Sexual Imposition, from R.C. 2907.05(A)(4), a felony of the third degree requiring that the victim be less than thirteen years of age, to R.C. 2907.05 (A)(1,) a felony of the fourth degree which does not require the victim be less than thirteen years of age but does require proof of force, an essential element, where the grand jury heard evidence pertaining to force or threat of force of the same victim and during the same time period; where Appellant was fully aware of the charge, able to defend himself, and fully aware of the alleged victim's age at all times of the proceedings; and amendment was a benefit to Appellant.

On review of father's appeal from grant of permanent custody to county children services agency, we cannot say that the trial court's conclusions were not clearly and convincingly supported in the evidence. Father's inability to comply with case plan requirements and to ensure that the child would have safe and adequate housing if returned to the father's custody demonstrated that the child could not be placed with father within a reasonable time or should not be placed with father, as required by statute. Judgment affirmed.

Judgment affirmed. The trial court did not err by granting appellee summary judgment on its claim for non-payment on a credit card account. Appellee supported its motion for summary judgment with an affidavit from its authorized representative incorporating by reference two years of credit card statements, the credit card agreement, and documents pertaining to the chain of title. The documents established appellee's ownership of, and appellant's default on, the credit card account. Appellant failed to respond to the motion for summary judgment with evidence demonstrating a genuine issue of material fact for trial. Because appellant did not file an action, the court did not dismiss an action filed by appellant. The trial court did not err by failing to hold an oral hearing on the motion for summary judgment. The record demonstrated appellee responded to appellant's discovery request and that appellant did not file a Civ.R. 56(F) motion for continuance. Appellant waived any objection regarding Civ.R. 10(D)(1) by failing to file a Civ.R. 12(E) motion for a more definite statement.

A special master's report and recommendation to the Court of Claims of Ohio was not a final appealable order and, therefore, appeal dismissed for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.

OBSTRUCTING OFFICIAL BUSINESS — RESISTING ARREST — SUFFICIENCY AND WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE — R.C. 2945.10 — JURY — RIGHT TO BE PRESENT: Where officers had a reasonable suspicion under the totality of the circumstances that defendant may have been armed and were justified in attempting to conduct a limited pat-down search of defendant, and where defendant's resistance to that search was not privileged, defendant's conviction for obstructing official business was supported by the sufficiency and weight of the evidence. Where officers had a reasonable belief that defendant committed the offense of obstructing official business, and where defendant struggled with the officers when they attempted to arrest him for that offense, defendant's conviction for resisting arrest was supported by the sufficiency and weight of the evidence. Where defendant failed to establish that he suffered material prejudice or that the outcome of the proceedings would have been different, the trial court's delay in instructing the jury after closing arguments in violation of R.C. 2945.10 was not reversible error. Where the record does not affirmatively demonstrate that the trial court communicated with the jury outside of defendant's presence, defendant's right to be present at all stages of the proceedings was not violated.

financial misconduct, manifest weight of the evidence, wrongful intent, dissipation of marital assets, distributive award, division of martial debt, spousal support, attorney's fees, abuse of discretion

sufficiency of evidence, manifest weight of the evidence, discharge of a firearm, R.C. 2923.162(A)(3)

Writ of Habeas Corpus

Final appealable order; consolidated cases; civil procedure; dismissed. Appeal dismissed for want of a final appealable order. The consolidated cases remain partially unresolved. Pursuant to Ohio case law, this court does not yet have jurisdiction to consider appellant's appeal.

Summary judgment; fraud; statute of limitations; time barred; R.C. 2305.09(C); R.C. 1707.43(B); sale of stock; estate; unjust enrichment; civil conspiracy; constructive trust. Judgment affirmed. Plaintiffs' fraud claim that their grandfather allegedly schemed to create the illusion of a solicited offer to buy stock under the false premise that their father's trust was insolvent and in dire need of liquidity to pay taxes and expenses, and subject to potential third-party buyers for the sole purpose of redeeming shares at below fair market value, was barred by the four-year statute of limitations set forth in R.C. 2305.09(C) for actions alleging fraud and the five-year statute of limitations for the sale of securities under R.C. 1707.43(B). Plaintiffs failed to demonstrate that they did not discover the fraud until 2018, as they alleged, because plaintiffs were parties in a 2001 counterclaim filed by the executor of their father's trust, where the executor sought a court order to sell the shares of defendant-company's stock held by the trust and a September 2001 letter from plaintiffs' attorney to the trustee stating that plaintiffs had no objection to the redemption of the shares of the stock held in the trust pursuant to the terms of the share pursuant agreement. Furthermore, the trust began receiving distributions in 2001 for the purchase of the Clark-Reliance Corporation ("CRC") stock redemption, which continued annually until the year 2010. Additionally, plaintiffs had access to all trust statements, documents, and correspondence as early as 2009, and one of the plaintiffs was appointed as his sister's guardian in 2006, which granted him the right to full access to documents detailing the assets of the trust on her behalf. Based upon the foregoing, plaintiffs could have discovered, in the exercise of reasonable diligence, any alleged fraud by defendant thereby barring their claim for fraud. Because plaintiffs failed to establish their fraud claim, plaintiffs' civil-conspiracy claim fails as a derivative claim that cannot be maintained without fraud. Likewise, the unjust-enrichment claim fails because plaintiffs failed to establish that the transaction was fraudulent, and plaintiffs' constructive-trust claim fails because they failed to establish the elements of fraud, civil conspiracy, and unjust enrichment.

Divorce; spousal support; modification; change in circumstances; retirement; magistrate's decision; abuse of discretion; contempt; attorney fees; R.C. 3105.18. Judgment affirmed. The trial court did not abuse its discretion when it modified Husband's spousal-support obligation to $1,800 per month. Husband voluntarily retired at the age of 66 years old due to his declining health. This constitutes a substantial change in circumstances that makes the existing award of $4,000 per month unreasonable, given his estimated post-retirement income reduced to $0 from approximately $260,000. The court considered all the R.C. 3105.18 factors and made findings for each, ultimately explaining how they impacted the decision to modify Husband's spousal-support obligation, including the fact that Husband voluntarily elected to not receive any retirement benefits because current wife pays all his expenses. Husband was in contempt of court for deciding to stop paying spousal support and is $60,026.13 in arrears. The court did not abuse its discretion when it denied Wife's motion for attorney fees but awarded Wife $3,000 in fees associated with the contempt finding.

Summary judgment; race discrimination; failure to promote; McDonnell Douglas's burden-shifting framework; prima facie case; legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for an employer's action; pretext. Plaintiff claims he has superior qualifications for the subject position than the Caucasian candidate. Our review of the record indicates plaintiff has presented evidence of his experience and qualifications to establish a prima facie case of failure to promote. Because the City of Lakewood produced evidence demonstrating a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its employment decision, the burden shifts to plaintiff to demonstrate, by a preponderance of evidence, that Lakewood's reason is pretext for discrimination. For relative qualifications to establish triable issues of fact as to pretext, plaintiff must show either (1) plaintiff was a plainly superior candidate, such that no reasonable employer would have chosen the latter applicant over the former, or (2) plaintiff was as qualified, if not better qualified than the successful applicant, and the record contains other probative evidence of discrimination. Having reviewed the record, we cannot conclude plaintiff has created triable issues of fact as to pretext and therefore affirm the trial court's judgment.

Motion to enforce settlement agreement; issue of contract law; breach of settlement agreement; performance by nonbreaching party. Appellants cannot demonstrate the elements of breach of a settlement agreement because they themselves did not perform under the agreement. The trial court did not err in denying the motion to enforce settlement agreement.

Crim.R. 11 plea hearing; Crim.R. 32.1 motion to withdraw guilty plea; felony sentencing; postrelease control notification; the Reagan Tokes Law notification. Defendant's convictions of felonies including aggravated robbery, felonious assault and having weapons while under disability, with various specifications, are affirmed following his guilty plea. His plea was not coerced by the trial court. The court did not err by denying the defendant's motion to withdraw his plea, even though it was made immediately prior to the court imposing a prison sentence, because the defendant did not articulate a reasonable legitimate basis for withdrawing his plea. Defendant's 12–15-year indefinite prison sentence is reversed because the court failed to properly advise the defendant of the mandatory statutory notifications at his sentencing hearing under R.C. 2929.19(B)(2)(f) (regarding postrelease control) and R.C. 2929.19(B)(2)(c) (regarding the Reagan Tokes Law). Defendant's sentence is reversed and this case is remanded for the limited purpose of holding a resentencing hearing.

Patient abuse; plain error; Crim.R. 52(B); sufficiency; knowingly; physical harm. Defendant was convicted after a jury trial of patient abuse. Defendant asserted on appeal that the evidence was insufficient to support two elements of patient abuse: Mens rea of knowingly and whether the victim suffered physical harm as a result. Defendant's conviction is based on sufficient evidence where the State introduced evidence of video surveillance of the incident, training defendant had received, and testimony concerning improper restraint techniques utilized by the defendant. Further, since defendant's defense at trial was that the evidence was insufficient to support the elements for patient abuse, he was precluded from raising a self-defense claim. As such, no plain error occurred when the jury was not instructed as to self-defense.

Presentence motion to withdraw guilty plea; motion to continue sentencing; Crim.R. 32.1. Judgment affirmed. The trial court did not abuse its discretion when it denied appellant's presentence oral motions to withdraw his guilty plea and for a continuance of the sentencing hearing.

Felony sentencing; consecutive sentences; R.C. 2929.14(C)(4); R.C. 2953.08(G)(2); R.C. 2953.08(F); endangering children. Appellant appeals her conviction arguing the court's proportionality finding for the consecutive sentences in this case was not supported by clear and convincing evidence. We disagree. The record was overflowing with evidence to support that the consecutive sentences are not disproportionate to the seriousness of appellant's conduct and the danger she posed to the public and her children. Judgment affirmed.

Crim.R. 43(A); Global Positioning System ("GPS") monitoring; sentence. Judgment affirmed. The trial court informed the defendant of the length of time he would be subject to both community control and GPS monitoring in open court and on the record during the sentencing hearing. Therefore, the imposition of GPS monitoring in the sentencing entries was not contrary to law.

Pro se; App.R. 9; transcript; presume validity of lower court's proceedings. Where appellant failed to provide the court of appeals with a transcript or appropriate substitute as permitted under App.R. 9(C) or (D), this court had no alternative but to presume the validity of the lower court's proceedings and affirm its decision.

Community-control sanctions violation; medical marijuana; res judicata; revocation of community control. - Judgment affirmed. The trial court did not err in finding appellant in violation of his community-control sanctions after testing positive for marijuana after the trial court did not allow appellant permission to use medical marijuana and appellant was warned several times that a positive test is a probation violation. Williams was not criminalized or convicted for testing positive for marijuana; he was found in violation of his community-control sanctions.

Permanent custody; manifest weight of the evidence; R.C. 2151.414(E); best interest of the child. The trial court's decision to grant permanent custody to Cuyahoga County Department of Children and Family Services ("CCDCFS") is not against the weight of the evidence under R.C. 2151.414(E) and is in the best interests of the children.

Final appealable order; motion to appoint a receiver; R.C. 2505.02; R.C. 2735.01. The denial of plaintiff-appellant's motion to appoint a receiver amounted to an abuse of discretion where the mortgagor consented to the appointment of a receiver in the mortgage documents, the mortgagee met the statutory requirements to appoint a receiver, and the mortgagor did not oppose the motion for appointment.

Relator's request for a writ of mandamus ordering the Industrial Commission of Ohio to vacate its order denying relator's request for temporary total disability ("TTD") compensation and ordering the commission to issue an order granting him TTD compensation is denied. The commission objected to a magistrate's decision that recommended granting the requested writ, arguing that the magistrate erred by recommending a full writ of mandamus instead of a limited writ with a remand to the commission for the commission to analyze whether relator was not working as a direct result of psychological conditions allowed in his workers' compensation claim. Because the magistrate relied on this court's discussion of R.C. 4123.56(F) in State ex rel. AutoZone Stores, Inc. v. Indus. Comm., 2023-Ohio-633 (10th Dist.), which the Supreme Court of Ohio has since reversed, the court does not adopt the magistrate's conclusions of law. Based on the Supreme Court's decision in State ex rel. AutoZone Stores, Inc. v. Indus. Comm., 2024-Ohio-5519, relator is not entitled to TTD compensation because, when his psychological conditions rendered him unable to work, relator was not working as the direct result of reasons unrelated to his industrial injury. Commission's objection is moot, and writ of mandamus is denied.

Respondent filed no objection to the magistrate's decision. The magistrate first found that because Columbus Division of Police ("CDP") fulfilled relator's public records request, that issue was moot. However, the magistrate went on to conclude that CDP failed to produce the public records requested by relator within a reasonable time as contemplated by R.C. 149.43. The magistrate concluded that relator was entitled to $1,000 in statutory damage. Finally, the magistrate held that relator was not entitled to court costs as she failed to present any evidence regarding alleged bad faith, conscious wrongdoing, or ulterior motive. Because there is no error of law or other defect evident on the face of the magistrate's decision, it is adopted and the request for a writ of mandamus is partially granted.

R.C. 2329.66(A)(6)(b) and 3911.10 exempt from garnishment life insurance policies taken out for the benefit of an insured person's spouse or children, even where the beneficiary is a co-debtor to the same creditor as the insured. R.C. 2716.13(B) binds the property of a judgment debtor in the possession of the garnishee at the time of service on the garnishee. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding the appellees met their burden of proof that their life insurance policies remained in effect at the time of the trial court's garnishment order.

Counseled brief filed pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967) did not raise any non-frivolous issues regarding the appellant's sentence for obstructing justice in violation of R.C. 2921.32. Judgment affirmed.

The magistrate's decision contained no error of law or other defect on its face. Therefore, we adopt as our own the magistrate's decision finding that there is insufficient evidence in the record to support the parole board hearing officer's finding that relator committed three separate counts of violating Rule 1 of the terms of his postrelease control, and that viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the APA, no rational trier of fact could find the postrelease control violations proven by a preponderance of the evidence. Accordingly, relator's request for a writ of mandamus is granted.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW – DUE PROCESS – JUVENILE – SEX OFFENSES – R.C. 2152.83(A): R.C. 2152.83(A), which mandates that a 16- or 17-year-old juvenile who commits a sex offense be classified into a tier under Ohio's version of the Adam Walsh Act as a juvenile-offender registrant at the initial classification hearing, does not violate the juvenile's right to procedural due process.

On Requester's motion for contempt, and after a show-cause hearing, the Court denied Requester's motion for contempt. However, the Court found by clear and convincing evidence that Mr. Tanner Salyers, in his capacity as Safety Service Director of the City of Mount Vernon, Ohio, and Mr. P. Robert Broeren, Jr., in his capacity as Director of Law, City of Mount Vernon, Ohio, were in indirect civil contempt for failing appear at the show-cause hearing, absent good cause shown. The Court imposed a civil fine with instructions for purging the civil contempt.

Public Records; R.C. 149.011(A); R.C. 149.431; While the availability of relief under R.C. 149.431 does not automatically preclude a finding of functional equivalence, its applicability cuts against functional equivalence; A non-profit entity covered by R.C. 149.431 may be required to produce records even if it is not the functional equivalent of a public office; Financial records covered by R.C. 149.431 relate to money or the way money is managed or pertain to monetary receipts and expenditures.

R.C. 149.43(A)(1)(b). The court overruled requesters' objections and adopted the special master's report and recommendation because mere discussion of records pertaining to probation and parole proceedings or proceedings related to the imposition of community control sanctions does not amount to disclosure.

Public Records; R.C. 2151.421; R.C. Chapter 2743; R.C. 2743.75(D)(2); R.C. 5153.17.

Public Records; R.C. 2151.421; R.C. Chapter 2743; R.C. 2743.75(D)(2); R.C. 5153.17; A case is properly dismissed pursuant to R.C. 2743.75(D)(2) if asserts claims beyond the court's capacity to resolve; a party can access records otherwise protected by R.C. 2151.421 and R.C. 5153.17 if he shows "good cause" for granting him access; Good cause exists if access would be in the best interests of the children involved or if access is necessary to prevent a denial of due process; The determination of whether good cause exists is usually made by the trial court presiding over the proceedings where the records would be used; The existence of good cause to override the confidentiality provided by R.C. 2151.421 and R.C. 5153.17 is primarily a domestic relations matter; R.C. Chapter 2743 does not give the Court of Claims jurisdiction over domestic relations matters.

Public Records; R.C. 149.43(A)(1)(dd); R.C.149.43(A)(17)(p) and (q); R.C. 149.45(A); R.C. 149.45(A) only exempts information about individuals; Neither 149.43(A)(1)(dd) nor R.C. 149.45(A) exempt license plate numbers from the class of public records; Neither 149.43(A)(1)(dd) nor R.C. 149.45(A) exempt insurance information from the class of public records; Neither 149.43(A)(1)(dd) nor R.C. 149.45(A) exempt vehicle registration information from the class of public records; Neither 149.43(A)(1)(dd) nor R.C. 149.45(A) exempt images of individuals from the class of public records; Neither 149.43(A)(1)(dd) nor R.C. 149.45(A) exempt offender's residential addresses from the class of public records; R.C.149.43(A)(17)(p) and (q) only exempt images of the interior of residences and private businesses from the class of public records.

On objections, the Court sustained, in part, and denied, in part Respondent's objections to a Special Master's Report and Recommendation, and the Court found that certain other objections were moot. The Court found that Requester had not sustained his burden to provide clear and convincing evidence that records containing the additional data that Requester sought were created or received by Respondent. Pursuant to R.C. 2743.75(F)(2), the Court rejected the Report and Recommendation.

Public Records; R.C. 2743.75(D)(2); a complaint is properly dismissed pursuant to R.C. 2743.75(D)(2) if the public records request to be enforced is facially overbroad.

Public Records; R.C. 2743.75(D)(2); a complaint is properly dismissed pursuant to R.C. 2743.75(D)(2) if the public records request to be enforced is facially overbroad.

License suspension was contrary to law

Theft - Ineffective Assistance of Counsel ("IAC") - Admission of Guilt - Maximum Sentence

Suspension commercial driver's license - Administrative appeal. Appellant failed to exhaust administrative remedies; therefore, trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction. Statute setting for BMV mailing procedure not unconstitutional - R.C. 4501.022 - R.C. 119.12

State's appeal. The trial court did not err in dismissing misdemeanor charges against appellee based upon a speedy-trial violation. The appellee's pretrial suppression motion only tolled the speedy-trial clock for the time reasonably necessary to decide the motion. The record contains no conceivable justification for a 513-day delay between a hearing on appellee's motion and the trial court's resolution of it. The fact that appellee's suppression motion may have been untimely did not negate the speedy-trial issue. Judgment affirmed.

The denial of a criminal defendant's right to allocution does not amount to constitutional error. The trial court did not deny, and the appellant fully exercised, the right to allocution pursuant to R.C. 2929.19(A) and Crim.R. 32(A)(1). Judgment affirmed.

The trial court did not err in denying appellant's Crim.R. 29(A) motion for acquittal on two counts of aggravated menacing and one count each of menacing by stalking and telecommunications harassment. The threatening and harassing text messages were properly admitted into evidence. Judgment affirmed.

The trial court did not abuse its discretion in overruling appellant's petitions for postconviction relief. Although part of an investigative report was erroneously submitted to the jury at trial, issues related to that exhibit had been litigated on direct appeal and were barred by res judicata. Appellant's claims of prosecutorial misconduct based on the prosecutor's alleged nodding, head shaking, and facial expressions during witness questioning were not "new evidence" and could have been raised on direct appeal, but were not. Judgment affirmed.

Appellant's plea of guilty to the petty offense of criminal damaging was entered knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily because the trial court informed her that the plea was a complete admission of guilt. Judgment affirmed.

Attorneys at law—Resignation with disciplinary action pending—Gov.Bar R. VI(11)(C).

Zmuda, J., writing for the majority, affirms the judgment, finding the defendant demonstrated application of the statute, limiting his Second Amendment rights, was unconstitutional as applied to the facts of the case, with the state failing to proffer historical analogue to support the specific application of the statutory limitation to the circumstances of the defendant's case.

Judge Duhart. Writ of mandamus. Res judicata.

No common pleas court error upon R.C. 2506 appeal reversing administrative action by county board of commissioners. Judgment affirmed. Osowik

Appellant was not provided with ineffective assistance of counsel, was not subject to prosecutorial misconduct, and the trial court did not err by denying appellant's motion to suppress, by allowing a certain witness to testify as an expert witness, or in sentencing appellant to prison, where appellant was arrested and charged with two counts of third-degree felony operating a vehicle while intoxicated ("OVI"), both of which included a specification for certain repeat OVI offenders, as well as one count of fourth-degree felony failure to comply with an order or signal of a police officer, and one count of second-degree misdemeanor resisting arrest, following a chase that ultimately resulted in appellant being removed from a creek by law enforcement suffering from symptoms of hypothermia that required him to receive medical treatment, which included having his blood drawn and tested for drugs and alcohol.

Appellant's convictions for violating a protection order and resisting arrest were supported by the weight of the evidence where appellant was informed about the protection order but refused to leave the residence he was ordered to vacate and then resisted lawful arrest. Appellant did not receive ineffective assistance of counsel, nor did the trial court abuse its discretion in rendering its misdemeanor sentencing decision.

Trial court erred in finding that a husband's patent costs claim against his former wife was barred by the statute of limitations in R.C. 2305.06.

magistrate's decision, objections, transcript, nunc pro tunc, Crim.R. 19(D)(3)(b)(iii)

Civ.R. 60(B)(5), relief from judgment, default judgment, Civ.R. 6, Civ.R. 7.

annexation, R.C. 709.033, division, segmentation, road maintenance, benefit, detriment, general good

R.C. 2151.414, permanent custody, best interest, legal custody, extension of temporary custody

R.C. 2907.09(B)(4), public indecency, sufficiency, manifest weight

CIVIL - bench trial; replevin; dog ownership; sales receipt; R.C. 955.11; manifest weight of the evidence; credibility of witnesses; breach of contract; damages summary; Evid.R. 1006; conversion; circumstantial evidence; inference.

CRIMINAL – Rape; R.C. 2907.02; Gross Sexual Imposition; R.C. 2907.05; Fifth Amendment; self-incrimination; voluntary confession; custodial interrogation; prosecutorial misconduct; effective assistance of counsel; plain error.

APPELLATE REVIEW - Merely adopting magistrate's decision is not a final appealable order; trial court needs separate and distinct order.

PROBATE - decedent's estate; assignments of error; App.R. 12(A) and 16(A); partial account; exceptions; R.C. 2109.33; App.R. 9 statement.

APPELLATE REVIEW - App.R. 4(A); thirty-day rule; Civ.R. 58(B); untimely appeal.

CRIMINAL LAW - murder; discharge of a firearm on or near prohibited premises; improperly handling of a firearm in a motor vehicle; firearm specifications; defendant testified on his own behalf; improper questioning by the state; open the door; objection; purpose is to rebut false impressions; improper propensity evidence; error; objection should have been sustained; harmless error; jury instruction; no duty to retreat; stand your ground; read together, aggrieved instruction did not affect outcome; no prejudicial error.

CRIMINAL LAW - guilty plea; involuntary manslaughter; Anders v. California, sentence valid; plea entered knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily; motion for appellate counsel to withdraw granted; judgment affirmed.

CRIMINAL LAW - plea of no contest; felonious assault on a peace officer; first-degree felony; not guilty by reason of insanity; two separate evaluations offered; defendant's refusal; mandatory, indefinite sentence; R.C. 2929.13(F)(6); prior conviction; felony of the second degree; different state; substantially equivalent conviction; qualifying offense requiring mandatory term; not inconsistent with R.C. 2929.13(F)(4); prior conviction did not raise degree of offense; only enhanced penalty; not required to be charged in indictment; no abuse of discretion in denying continuance; trial court not obligated to advise defendant he could have an independent expert evaluation; dehors the record; no ineffective assistance of counsel.

CRIMINAL LAW - Fourth Amendment; suppression of evidence; traffic stop; canine sniff; reasonable and articulable suspicion; prolong stop; impairment; field sobriety tests.

Motion for Summary Judgment, Employment, Age Discrimination, Sex Discrimination. No genuine issues as to any material fact existed regarding plaintiff's claims for age or sex discrimination. Defendant presented legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons for plaintiff's termination. Plaintiff failed to establish a prima facie case by presenting facts which demonstrated that defendant's reasoning for termination of plaintiff's employment was pretextual. Defendant's motion for summary judgment was granted.

Civ.R. 56; motion for summary judgment; University of Toledo Athletic Department; athletics; negligent misrepresentation; promissory estoppel; negligence; discretionary immunity. In an action where plaintiff was removed from University of Toledo's women's soccer team, the court found that defendant was entitled to discretionary immunity for the decision to remove plaintiff from the team. Defendant was entitled to summary judgment on plaintiff's claim for negligent misrepresentation because plaintiff failed to demonstrate that defendant supplied false information to plaintiff that the document plaintiff signed was a National Letter of Intent, and therefore, plaintiff failed to satisfy all the elements of the claim. Defendant was also entitled to summary judgment on plaintiff's claim for promissory estoppel because the court found that plaintiff's relationship with University of Toledo was contractual in nature, and therefore, the claim failed as a matter of law. Defendant was further entitled to summary judgment on plaintiff's claim for negligence as the court concluded that plaintiff failed to state a prima facie case for the claim since plaintiff pointed to no facts or supportive law that would allow the court to conclude that a duty of care existed to provide a safe team environment free from abuse, harassment, ridicule, embarrassment, and hostility. Judgment for defendant.

Authentication, ineffective assistance of counsel

Administrative warrant

The magistrate's decision is adopted, including the findings of fact and the conclusions of law therein, as Relator has failed to establish a right to a writ of mandamus.

The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying appellant's motion because Ohio law does not provide a procedural mechanism for a trial court to reissue a civil entry to restart the clock for filing a timely appeal. Judgment affirmed.

R.C. 2151.414, permanent custody, best interest

adjudication, dependency, R.C. 2151.04(C), admissibility of medical records as business records under Evid.R. 803(6), self-authentication under R.C. 2317.422(A)

immunity, R.C. 2744, school, accident, woodworking, radial arm saw, negligence, reckless, physical defect

self-defense, manifest weight, Howard charge, ineffective assistance of counsel

political subdivision immunity, exceptions to political subdivision immunity, express liability, R.C. 2744.02(B)(5), law of the case doctrine.

Attorneys at law—Retirement—Gov.Bar R. VI(11)(C).

Maximum sentence; Post-release control violation sentence

Appellate court lacked jurisdiction to consider Marsy's Law appeal from trial court's order prospectively granting defendant's motion to change venue

Crim.R. 29; sufficiency; jail-time credit; other acts; Evid.R. 404(B). Trial court did not err in allowing the admission of other acts evidence where the appellant put motive and identity into question by suggesting that he did not commit the crime and establishing a line of questioning that suggested suicide as an alternative. State met its burden of production to establish the crime of tampering with evidence where there was evidence that an investigation was likely to be implemented and there was evidence that the appellant tried to clean up the crime scene. However, State failed to meet its burden of production with respect to the attendant firearm specification where there was no witness to the crime and no basis to support a finding that appellant had a gun on or about his person at that time. Trial court correctly noted the amount of jail-time credit but erred when its journal entry did not reflect the jail-time credit established by the appellant's time in jail at the time of sentencing.

Civ.R. 60(A); Civ.R. 60(B); clerical error; nunc pro tunc. Substituting one version of the parties' separation agreement with a second, updated version was an improper use of a nunc pro tunc pursuant to Civ.R. 60(A).

R.C. 2305.19; savings statute; statute of limitations. The trial court did not err when it did not apply R.C. 2305.19 to the appellant's claims, because the appellant failed to follow a court order, and its claims were barred by the statute of limitations.

Domestic-violence civil-protection order; evidence; plain error; manifest weight; domestic violence. Judgments on competing petitions for domestic-violence civil-protection orders were supported by the manifest weight of the evidence where video evidence established that ex-girlfriend and her new boyfriend were the primary aggressors who attempted to cause harm to ex-boyfriend.

Postsentence motion to withdraw guilty plea; Crim.R. 32.1. Because the appellant has not established that a manifest injustice occurred in the sentencing proceedings, the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it denied the appellant's postsentence motion to withdraw his guilty plea.

Motion to dismiss; lack of subject-matter jurisdiction; Civ.R. 12(B)(1); de novo review; administrative appeal; right conferred by statute; R.C. 4112.06; 30 days after service by mail; pro se litigant; timing requirements are jurisdictional. Appellant's administrative appeal was not filed with the common pleas court within the statutory time period. The court therefore lacked jurisdiction over the administrative appeal and properly dismissed the case.

Medical malpractice; refiled complaint; jurisdiction; final appealable order; R.C. 2505.02; Civ.R. 54(B); sound judicial administration; Civ.R. 10(D)(2); affidavit of merit; extension of time; circumstances; justify; beyond 90 days; abuse of discretion; motion to dismiss; pending; motion for leave; motion for extension; untimely; due process; notice; opportunity to respond. Affirmed the trial court's decision in a refiled medical-malpractice action that denied appellants' motion for leave to file an affidavit of merit and granted appellee's motion to dismiss for failing to file the affidavit. Although the trial court entered final judgment as to fewer than all claims against all parties in this case, there was a final appealable order when the requirements for a final order under R.C. 2505.02 were met, the trial court included the requisite Civ.R. 54(B) language, and the record indicated that the interests of sound judicial administration could be served by a finding of "no just reason for delay." The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying leave to submit an affidavit of merit after appellants had already been granted a 90-day extension and the circumstances did not justify an extension beyond the 90 days. The trial court did not err by granting the motion to dismiss that was not timely opposed and did not abuse its discretion in denying an extension of time to respond to the motion to dismiss. Appellants were afforded notice and an opportunity to respond, and no denial of due process occurred.

Consecutive sentences; awaiting trial; statutory interpretation; under indictment. Defendant was under indictment but had not yet been arraigned when he committed criminal offenses in a second case. The court determined that since he was under indictment when he committed the offenses, he was "awaiting trial" as required under R.C. 2929.14(C)(4)(a).

Double jeopardy; motion to dismiss; Double Jeopardy Clause; de novo review; multiple prosecutions; mistrial; retrial; prosecutorial misconduct; intended to elicit or cause mistrial; trial court's findings; inadvertence. Appellant failed to demonstrate that his right against multiple prosecutions under the Double Jeopardy Clause had been violated, and the trial court properly denied his motion to dismiss the indictment.

Civ.R. 12; judgment on the pleadings; unauthorized practice of law; pro se; immunity; R.C. 2744.02.

R.C. 2929.14(C)(4); consecutive sentences; courses of conduct; seriousness of the offender's conduct; history of criminal conduct; clearly and convincingly. Appellant failed to demonstrate consecutive sentences were clearly and convincingly not supported by the record. Defendant's repeat convictions for identity fraud and theft supported trial court's finding that offender's history of criminal conduct made consecutive sentences necessary to protect the public from future crime. Harm to victim's personal and business credit supported trial court's finding that no single prison term adequately reflected the seriousness of the offender's conduct.

VENUE — JUV.R. 11(B) — MANDATORY TRANSFER: The juvenile court erred in finding that transfer of the cause to another county was mandatory under Juv.R. 11(B) where no other action was pending at the time that the custody complaint was filed in Hamilton County.

LEGAL CUSTODY — JUV.R. 40(D)(4)(d) — OBJECTION — INDEPENDENT REVIEW: The juvenile court's decision must be reversed where it is unclear whether the juvenile court inappropriately applied appellate standards of review to the magistrate's decision upon father's objection rather than conducting the requisite independent review under Juv.R. 40(D)(4)(d) as to the objected matter.

Mandamus—Public-records requests—R.C. 149.43—Relator's public-records requests have been satisfied—Request for writ denied as moot—Statutory damages awarded in amount of $1,000.

Habeas corpus—Sentencing entries unambiguously sentence appellant to serve eight years in prison—Appellant does not claim that his eight-year prison term has expired—Court of appeals' judgment dismissing petition affirmed.

The trial court's decision to terminate appellants' parental rights and grant custody of their minor children to a children services agency was not against the manifest weight of the evidence and was supported by sufficient evidence. Judgments affirmed.

The fact that the trial court did not orally inform appellant of his appellate rights prior to accepting his guilty pleas did not render the pleas less than knowing, intelligent, and voluntary where there was no evidence in the record that appellant was confused about his appellate rights. Appellant failed to establish that his guilty pleas were less than knowing, intelligent, and voluntary because he received ineffective assistance of trial counsel. Judgments affirmed.

The jury reasonably concluded that the State had proved beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant did not act in self-defense when he committed an assault. Judgment affirmed.

The trial court did not err in granting summary judgment to appellees in their partition action where there was no genuine issue of material fact that they had a present, possessory interest in the property resulting from a bequest made by their grandmother. Judgment affirmed.

The trial court did not err in granting summary judgment to a landlord based on the doctrine of res judicata. The claims raised in the tenant's second lawsuit against the landlord could have and should have been raised in his first lawsuit, because they arose out of the same rental transaction that was litigated in the first lawsuit. Judgment affirmed.

The trial court erred in finding that appellee had a vested right to build its solar facility when it did not first appeal the zoning inspector's stop work order to the board of zoning appeals. Judgment reversed.

aggravated trafficking in drugs; having a weapon while under disability; guilty plea; court made required statutory consecutive sentencing findings; consecutive sentencing findings supported by record; no violation of right to allocution

CRIMINAL LAW – illegal use of minor or impaired person in nudity oriented material or performance; pandering obscenity involving a minor or impaired person; guilty plea; Tier II Sex Offender; consecutive sentence; 32 years in prison; substantial compliance with non-constitutional notice provisions under Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(a)-(b); trial court not obligated to follow joint sentencing recommendation; Appellant's sentence is not contrary to law; R.C. 2953.08(G); judgment affirmed.

refiled action barred by four-year statute of repose for medical claims; where original action was timely filed but then voluntarily dismissed, the saving statute may allow refiling within one year for purposes of the statute of limitation but this does not extend the statute of repose, as the Ohio Supreme Court considers the statute of repose a hard deadline that is not satisfied by refiling under saving statute.

CERTIFICATION – App.R. 25(A); Ohio Constitution, Article IV, Section 3(B)(4); this court's decision is not in conflict with the decisions cited by Appellant from the Second, Third, Fourth, Eighth, Ninth, and Tenth District Courts of Appeal. EN BANC – App.R. 26(A)(2); our decision is not in conflict with another decision from our district; Appellant has failed to identify a dispositive issue; there is no basis for en banc consideration; joint application denied.

RECONSIDERATION – App.R. 26(A); Appellant has not demonstrated any obvious errors or raised any issues that were not adequately addressed in our previous opinion; this court is not persuaded that we erred as a matter of law; application denied.

having weapons while under a disability; aggravated drug possession; guilty plea; no ineffective assistance of counsel; jointly recommended sentence

CRIMINAL – non-violent fifth degree felonies, maximum sentence, presumption against incarceration, exception, commission of a felony, previously served prison time.

Osowik - Trial court's decision to grant appellee's Civ.R. 60(B) motion for relief from judgment of grant of appellant's Civ.R. 41(B)(1) motion for dismissal for failure to prosecute was arbitrary and, therefore, an abuse of discretion, as appellee did not adduce evidence of a failure of service, as argued in support of the Civ.R. 60(B) motion. Judgment reversed.

On remand from resentencing to correct allied-offenses sentencing error, defendant's challenge to sentences unaffected by the remand order is barred by res judicata.

Mayle - Jury's rejection of defendant's claim of self-defense was not against the manifest weight of the evidence where the state presented evidence that defendant was at fault in creating the situation giving rise to the altercation.

Osowik - Appellant's convictions were not against the manifest weight of the evidence. Trial court did not err in not merging aggravated burglary and felonious assault convictions for sentencing purposes, as they were not allied offenses of similar import. Judgment affirmed.

Trial court abused its discretion by summarily holding individual in direct criminal contempt for allegedly contemptuous conduct that occurred outside the trial court's physical presence and of which the court had no personal knowledge. Under those circumstances, the trial court was required to comply with the procedural requirements of R.C. 2705.03. Although the trial court conducted a contempt hearing, no written charge was filed with the clerk of court and no entry of the charge was made on the journal; therefore, the procedural requirements were not satisfied.

Trial court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of driver of motor vehicle on claim for negligent operation of a motor vehicle brought by administrator of the estate of a child pedestrian. Trial court erred in failing to consider whether the heightened duty of care afforded child pedestrians applied. Trial court properly granted summary judgment in favor of city school district pursuant to the doctrine of political subdivision immunity under R.C. Chapter 2744 on administrator's claims for negligent operation of a motor vehicle and reckless actions.

PROHIBITION — JURISDICTION — ADULT PAROLE AUTHORITY: Because relator failed to demonstrate his underlying convictions and sentences were void, he cannot establish the Ohio Adult Parole Authority patently and unambiguously lacks jurisdiction over his parole proceedings, and, thus, cannot demonstrate entitlement to a writ of prohibition. Cause dismissed.

The trial court abused its discretion in determining appellant's income when it included nonrecurring or unsustainable income as part of its gross income calculation. Additionally, the trial court erred in making its award of child support when it imputed income to appellant without first making the required determinations pursuant to R.C. 3119.01(C)(18). Judgment reversed and remanded for the trial court to properly determine appellant's income and issue a decision consistent with the requirements of R.C. Chapter 3119.

Mandamus—A court of common pleas is not sui juris, and suing an entity that is not sui juris is a ground for dismissal—Court of appeals' judgment granting motion to dismiss affirmed.

illegal use of a minor or impaired person in nudity-oriented material or performance: engaging in prostitution; possessing criminal tools; sufficient evidence supported convictions; convictions not against manifest weight of the evidence; trial court made statutory consecutive-sentencing findings

Appellant's conviction was reversed and vacated where the record did not show that appellant expressly pled guilty to the charged offense and, therefore, there was no basis for the conviction.

Issuance of civil protection order ("CPO") affirmed. Respondent was constructively served CPO petition and ex parte CPO at the time he attempted to deliberately avoid personal service of process from sheriff. The trial court therefore had jurisdiction to issue a full CPO after conducting a hearing the respondent did not attend. Further, respondent's judicial admission that he called to the court to advise he would be late to the hearing demonstrated he had notice of the hearing.

The trial court did not err in dismissing appellant's complaint for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction because disputes over electrical service rates and charges fall within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Public Utilities Commission of Ohio ("PUCO") and merely casting allegations as a breach of contract does not confer jurisdiction on the trial court. Appellant's arguments regarding the magistrate's bias were waived, and arguments regarding the trial judge's bias were not a proper subject for appellate review. Appellant's eighth amendment claims regarding entirely separate proceedings were not properly before the appellate court and were therefore disregarded.

The trial court erred by sentencing appellant to one year in jail, six months more than what was statutorily permissible under R.C. 2929.16(A)(2), thereby rendering the trial court's sentence otherwise contrary to law in violation of R.C. 2953.08(G)(2)(b).

Sua sponte, causes dismissed as having been improvidently certified and accepted.

final appealable order, R.C. 2505.02(B), Civ.R. 41(B), Civ.R. 75(P)

motion for new trial based on newly discovered evidence; Crim.R. 33(A)(6), recantation testimony, abuse of discretion, hearing requirement.

moot, mootness, R.C. 711.39, bond, stay, administrative appeal

disorderly conduct, spit, sufficiency, manifest weight, ineffective assistance, competency evaluation, R.C. 2917.11(A)(1), mens rea, not guilty by reason of insanity, diminished capacity

plea agreement – guilty plea – no contest plea – abuse of discretion

law of the case, child support

PERMANENT CUSTODY; POST-TRIAL SUBMISSION OF EVIDENCE; PLAIN ERROR. The trial court's admission of a supplemental report by the agency constituted a prejudicial abuse of discretion and constitutes plain error because it denied mother-appellant of a fair hearing and it erodes the public trust in the integrity of the judicial process.

BENCH TRIAL; ADMISSION OF EVIDENCE; MANIFEST WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE; AGGRAVATED POSSESSION OF DRUGS; FELONY SENTENCING; R.C. 2953.08(G)(2)(a); R.C. 2929.11; R.C. 2929.12. The trial court did not abuse its discretion by admitting State's Exhibits 1, 3, and 4 as evidence of his possession of contraband even though the exhibits also included items that were not subjected to testing for contraband. The defendant-appellant's aggravated possession of drugs convictions are not against the manifest weight of the evidence. The defendant-appellant's sentence is not contrary to law because his sentence is within the sentencing range and the trial court properly considered R.C. 2929.11 and 2929.12.

Legal Custody; Reasonable Efforts. Trial court's determination awarding legal custody to relatives is supported by the evidence.

Consecutive Sentences; Findings; R.C. 2929.14(C). Before imposing prison terms consecutively, a trial court must make several required findings that are stated in R.C. 2929.14(C)(4). On review, the appellate court is to apply a deferential standard and may not merely substitute its judgment for that of the trial court.

R.C. 2945.75; Verdict forms; Plain error. The verdict forms that did not comply with the requirements of R.C. 2945.75 did not amount to plain error in this case.

CRIMINAL – Felonious Assault; R.C. 2903.11; Other-acts evidence; Evid.R. 404; Evid.R. 403; R.C. 2945.59; witness intimidation constitutes other-acts evidence that may be relevant for non-propensity purposes; ineffective assistance of counsel; sufficiency of the evidence; manifest weight of the evidence; prosecutorial misconduct; prosecutor's statements during examination did not amount testimony in place of witness.

APPELLATE REVIEW - untimely appeal; App.R. 4(A)(1); App.R. 4(A)(3); postconviction proceedings; thirty-day rule; lack of jurisdiction.

CIVIL - subject matter jurisdiction; municipal courts; small claims division; R.C. 1925.01(A); claim brought by an assignee; transfer to general division; R.C. 1935.10(A); substantive/remedial statutory amendments; retroactive; law of the case.

CIVIL - case dismissed with prejudice; Civ.R. 58(B); notice of the judgment; App.R. 4(A)(1); untimely appeal; Local Rule 3(C)(2); failure to attach a copy of the judgment entry to the notice of appeal is not a jurisdictional defect; Civ.R. 60(B); motion for relief from judgment; not a substitute for a timely appeal.

CIVIL - negligence; summary judgment; failure to keep roads in repair and free of obstruction; political subdivision immunity; exceptions to immunity; R.C. 2744.02(B); ordinary traffic on regularly traveled portion of the road; all terrain vehicle.

Ineffective Assistance of Counsel; R.C. 2935.26, Minor Misdemeanor Arrest; Open Container; 4th Amendment, Search and Seizure, Exclusionary Rule, Consensual Encounter, Investigatory Stop, Arrest, Reasonable Articulable Suspicion, Probable Cause; Crim.R. 12 (C), Motion to Suppress; Plain Error, Substantial Rights, Miscarriage of Justice

Prohibition—Mandamus—Appellant's statement purporting to set forth balance of his inmate account for each of the preceding six months lacks the cashier's certification required by R.C. 2969.25(C)(1)—Court of appeals' judgment dismissing complaint affirmed.

We adopt the magistrate's decision, including the findings of fact and the conclusions of law therein, as our own and conclude that Relator has failed to establish a right to a writ of mandamus

DIVORCE — PROPERTY — OBJECTION — JUDICIAL NOTICE: In a divorce proceeding, the record does not demonstrate any error in the trial court's failure to take judicial notice of records from the Ohio Bureau of Motor Vehicles where defendant husband failed to file any objections to the magistrate's decision and failed to file any transcript of proceedings, and the magistrate's entry indicates that husband did not dispute at the hearing that the vehicle at issue was acquired during the marriage.

STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS — SAVINGS STATUTE — R.C. 2305.19 — VOLUNTARY DISMISSAL — OTHERWISE THAN UPON THE MERITS: The trial court erred in determining that Ohio's savings statute, R.C. 2305.19, did not apply to plaintiff's refiled complaint where plaintiff voluntarily dismissed his first complaint under Civ.R. 41(A)(1), which was a failure "otherwise than upon the merits" under the savings statute, despite the fact that the dismissal occurred after the expiration of the statute of limitations and after Civ.R. 3(A)'s one-year commencement period, as the plain language of the savings statute only asks whether a previous case failed otherwise than upon the merits and Civ.R. 41(A)(1)(a) expressly states that a plaintiff's first voluntary dismissal is without prejudice and not on the merits.

CRIMINAL-JAIL TIME CREDIT - Because we presume the trial court properly applied the law and because it is the Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Corrections' duty to credit a defendant with the number of days he or she was confined between the date of sentencing and date of transportation to prison, trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying Appellant's motion for jail-time credit.

R.C. 2953.23(A)(1)(a) and (b), untimely petition for postconviction relief, successive petition for postconviction relief

obstructing official business, R.C. 2921.31(A), manifest weight of the evidence

scope of review, issues not raised by the parties, administrative appeal

legal custody – six-month extension of temporary custody – best interest of the child – preponderance of the evidence – manifest weight of the evidence

arbitration; choice of law; federal preemption doctrine; final, appealable order

Juror misconduct; challenge for cause, R.C. 2313.17(B)(9); abuse of discretion; peremptory challenge; new trial on basis of juror misconduct, Crim. R. 33(B)(2); child competency; competency determination, R.C. 2317.01; Evid. R. 601; child testimony; manifest weight of the evidence; sufficiency of the evidence; rape, R.C. 2907.02(A)(1)(b); gross sexual imposition, R.C. 2907.05(A)(4)

abuse of discretion; valuation of real property; factual issue; whether offer to purchase property was genuine goes to the weight of the evidence; date of appraisals goes to weight to be given the evidence, not admissibility; characterization of property as marital or separate involves a factual inquiry; credibility determinations afforded discretion.

Summary judgment standard; manifest weight of the evidence; Civ.R. 12(B)(6); motion to dismiss; failure to state a claim; service; leave; counterclaim; Civ.R. 60(B); relief from judgment; bias; disqualification; compensatory damages; punitive damages; fraud; conversion; civil theft; civil conspiracy; breach of contract; used car; open title. Trial court's judgment rendered after trial was not inconsistent with prior decision reversing summary judgment where summary judgments and trial verdicts are subject to different standards. Trial court properly denied appellant's Civ.R. 12(B)(6) motion to dismiss where all the claims in the complaint properly alleged claims upon which relief might be granted. Trial court properly denied motion for leave to file a counterclaim because it was untimely. Despite appellant's claims that the trial judge was biased, nothing in the record indicated an unfair bias or that appellant was deprived of his right to fair trial. Trial court's award of compensatory and punitive damages was supported by the manifest weight of the evidence and is not contrary to law. Trial court's award of attorney fees was reasonable and supported by the record. Trial court properly denied appellant's motion to quash the certificate of judgment rendered against him even though it did not issue findings of fact and conclusions of law where findings of fact and conclusions of law were not required.

Objection; abuse of discretion; Evid.R. 613; impeachment by self-contradiction; prior inconsistent statement; Evid.R. 404(B); prior bad acts; prosecutorial misconduct; closing argument; ask jury to make inferences upon evidence; prejudicial; plain error; prosecutor may comment on credibility; ineffective assistance of counsel; failure to raise Daubert challenge; expert scientific testimony; trial strategy; jury is presumed to follow instructions given by trial court; self-defense; separate verdict form; Crim.R. 29; motion for acquittal; sufficiency of the evidence; manifest weight of the evidence; cumulative effect of errors; firearm specifications; consecutive sentences; mandatory; discretionary; R.C. 2929.14. The trial court did not err in overruling the defense's objection to the State's characterization of the victim as a battered woman and allowing the State to use text messages between the victim and appellant for impeachment; these did not constitute prior bad acts evidence under Evid.R. 404(B). The trial court also did not err in telling potential jurors they would "become the government" during the trial, or in declining to provide a separate verdict for the self-defense verdict. The court properly imposed consecutive prison sentences on all three firearm specifications. In addition, the prosecutor did not engage in misconduct in his questioning of appellant or closing argument, and appellant's trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to raise a Daubert challenge or declining to object to certain statements made by counsel for the State. Finally, the verdict was supported by sufficient evidence and not against the manifest weight of the evidence.

R.C. 2929.19(B)(4); sentencing hearing; violation hearing; community-control sanctions; statutory notice requirements; revocation of community-control sanctions. The trial court's failure to issue a sentencing judgment entry that notified the offender of the specific prison term it would impose as to each offense should the offender violate his community-control sanctions was not error where the notification at the sentencing hearing complied with the notice requirements of R.C. 2929.19(B)(4). The absence of violation hearings each time the offender violated the conditions of his community-control sanctions did not impact the trial court's satisfaction of the R.C. 2929.19(B)(4) notifications.

Felonious assault; serious physical harm; self-defense; hung jury; acquittal; collateral estoppel; double jeopardy. - Trial court did not err in denying appellant's motion to dismiss based on double-jeopardy grounds. The jury's acquittals on certain counts did not decide issues of ultimate fact of self-defense or harm that would invoke the protections of double-jeopardy with a successive prosecution.

Plain error; jury instruction; in-trial identification; ineffective assistance of counsel; weight of the evidence. Affirmed. Defendant has not demonstrated that the failure to give a jury instruction with respect to a pretrial identification or his trial counsel's failure to object to an in-trial identification was in error given the totality of the instructions provided to the jury, and the conviction for felonious assault of a police officer is not against the weight of the evidence presented at trial even if the in-court identification of the defendant as the shooter was ignored.

Breach of contract; guaranty agreement; forbearance agreement; default; consideration. - Judgment affirmed. The trial court did not err in granting summary judgment to appellees for breach of contract because, contrary to appellant's argument, the guaranty agreement was supported by consideration.

Double jeopardy; collateral estoppel; res judicata; retrial. Defendant was charged in a multicount indictment. He was found not guilty on some of the counts. The jury was hung on the remaining counts. Since none of the remaining counts were necessarily decided on an issue required for a conviction on the remaining counts, double jeopardy did not prevent a retrial on the remaining counts.

Conceded error; expungement; R.C. 2953.32; hearing requirement. Reversed, vacated, and remanded. The trial court erred by expunging the misdemeanor conviction without first setting and then conducting a hearing in order to make the determinations required by R.C. 2953.32, as well as to provide notice to the State at least 60 days in advance of that hearing.

Legal custody; temporary custody; abused; neglected; dependent; substance abuse; fentanyl; R.C. 2151.353(A); R.C. 2151.353(F)(2); dispositional hearing; best interest; preponderance of the evidence; sufficiency; manifest weight. Affirmed juvenile court's judgment in each child's case, which adopted the magistrate's decision and committed the minor child to the legal custody of a relative caretaker. The juvenile court's decision was supported by sufficient evidence and was not against the manifest weight of the evidence. The record showed mother had not made significant progress in addressing her substance-abuse issues and serious concerns remained. The juvenile court's best-interest determination was supported by a preponderance of the evidence. The juvenile court properly determined that each child's continued residence or return to mother's home was not in the child's best interest, nor was the continued temporary custody of the child. The record did not support mother's other arguments.

Municipal court; assault; bench trial; psychiatric referral; competency; right to trial by jury; misdemeanor offenses; petty offenses; aggregation theory; R.C. 1901.24; Crim.R. 2; Crim.R. 23; Crim.R. 29 motion; venue; 911 call; plain error; hearsay; Confrontation Clause; authentication; sufficiency; manifest weight; sentencing; misdemeanor sentencing; R.C. 2929.27(A); community control; anger-management classes; judicial bias; R.C. 2701.03; affidavit of disqualification; due process. Defendant's assault conviction and his misdemeanor sentence, which included a referral to anger-management classes as one of his community-control conditions, were both affirmed. Defendant was presumed competent to stand trial, and the record revealed no indicia of incompetence that would require a competency hearing. The trial court did not err in holding a bench trial because the case involved petty offenses, and defendant failed to file a written jury demand. Defendant's Crim.R. 29 motion based on venue was properly rejected because the victim's testimony indicated the incident occurred in the City of Cleveland. Defendant did not object to the admission of the 911 call recording, and there was no plain error in that respect. The 911 call was authenticated by the victim. The case was tried to the bench, and there was no indication that the trial court relied on inadmissible hearsay. Defendant's Confrontation Clause arguments with respect to the 911 call were unavailing because the victim/caller was subject to cross-examination and defendant did not suggest that any dispatcher statements were testimonial in nature. Defendant's assault conviction was supported by sufficient evidence and was not against the manifest weight of the evidence. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in sentencing defendant to community-control conditions that included anger-management classes, which the probation department had recommended. The referral to anger-management classes reasonably related to the goals of community control. Defendant's judicial bias arguments failed because he did not file an affidavit of disqualification and nothing suggested the trial court's behavior rose to the level of a due-process violation.

R.C. 2929.14(C)(4); consecutive sentences; postrelease control; nunc pro tunc entry. Appellant failed to demonstrate consecutive sentences were clearly and convincingly not supported by the record. Defendant admitted at a hearing he committed crimes while on postrelease control for prior offenses. Defendant's repeat convictions supported trial court's finding that offender's history of criminal conduct made consecutive sentences necessary to protect the public from future crime. Remanded to trial court for nunc pro tunc entry clarifying postrelease-control sentence applies only to felonious-assault conviction, instead of to all convictions.

Motion to vacate default judgment; Civ.R. 60(B) motion; lack of service; service of process; perfect service; rebuttable presumption; personal jurisdiction; void judgment; vacate judgment; abuse of discretion. Where the defendant-appellant provided a competent, credible, and uncontested sworn statement that demonstrated he was not served a forfeiture complaint pursuant to the civil rules, the defendant-appellant rebutted the presumption of service. Absent proper service of the complaint, the trial court lacked personal jurisdiction over the defendant-appellant and, therefore, the court's grant of default judgment against the defendant-appellant was void and the trial court's subsequent denial of the defendant-appellant's motion to vacate the default judgment was an abuse of discretion.

Anders; wholly frivolous; meritorious; consecutive sentence; guilty plea. Motion to withdraw pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), granted where there are no meritorious grounds for appeal.

Motion to dismiss. The trial court did not err when it granted the appellees' motion to dismiss the appellant's complaint.

Permanent custody; neglected; dependent; substance abuse; R.C. 2151.353(A); R.C. 2151.414(E); R.C. 2151.414(E)(11); R.C. 2151.414(D)(1); legal custody; reversible error; plain error; ineffective assistance; cumulative error. Affirmed juvenile court's decision granting permanent custody of the child to the children services agency and terminating mother's parental rights. The juvenile court's decision was supported by sufficient evidence and was not against the manifest weight of the evidence. The court engaged in the proper analysis and made the requisite determinations pursuant to R.C. 2151.353(A)(4) and in accordance with R.C. 2151.414(E) and 2151.414(D)(1) and did not err in denying legal custody to a proposed legal custodian. Though many challenges were raised, no reversible error occurred. Mother failed to demonstrate that the juvenile court committed plain error or that her counsel was ineffective. The cumulative-error doctrine was inapplicable.

Legal custody; temporary custody; statutory authority. Juvenile court erred when it denied Cuyahoga County Division of Child and Family Service's motion to terminate temporary custody where the child had been adjudicated delinquent and committed to the legal custody of the Department of Youth Services. By statute, the juvenile court had authority to place the child in the legal custody of one agency or the other but not both simultaneously.

R.C. 2151.252(A)(3); legal custody; abuse of discretion; neglected and dependent; continuance; preponderance of the evidence

custodial status; plain error review; prison or jail clothing; presumption of innocence; curative instruction; sufficiency of the evidence; manifest weight of the evidence; forfeiture; felony sentencing

The commission abused its discretion in denying the application for temporary total disability compensation where the commission did not rely on some evidence to support the denial of compensation for the entirety of the requested period. The commission additionally abused its discretion in denying the application for compensation under R.C. 4123.56(F) without first considering the additional restrictions on the claimant's ability to return to work stemming from the newly allowed condition. Respondents' objections overruled; limited writ of mandamus granted; and matter remanded for reconsideration of the application for temporary total disability compensation.

On the state of Ohio's appeal of trial court dismissal of charges of attempted murder and felonious assault based on violation of defendant's right to a speedy trial. The specific delay in response to the defendant's request for discovery was troubling, but overall time expended prior to trial was not unreasonable, unconstitutional, or violative of the speedy trial statute. The trial court erred by counting 129 days against the speedy trial clock, where that time was both tolled under R.C. 2945.72(E) and constituted a reasonable period of continuance pursuant to R.C. 2945.72 (H). The state's first assignment of error is sustained, its second assignment of error is overruled as moot, the trial court's judgment of dismissal is reversed, and the cause is remanded for further proceedings.

Respondents filed no objection to the magistrate's decision. The magistrate recommended that this court issue a writ of mandamus ordering respondents to vacate the order that found West violated the conditions of his postrelease control and to enter a new order finding insufficient evidence was presented to find West violated the conditions of postrelease control. Because there is no error of law or other defect evident on the face of the magistrate's decision, it is adopted and the request for a writ of mandamus is granted.

The trial court did not err in dismissing plaintiff's action to enforce a charitable trust because pursuant to R.C. 109.24 the attorney general has exclusive authority to prosecute actions to enforce charitable trusts.

DORMANT JUDGMENT – REVIVOR MOTION – R.C. 2329.07 – SERVICE: The trial court did not err in denying property management company's motion for revivor of a dormant judgment entered against a former tenant because the return receipt failed to establish the judgment debtor was properly served at the intended address. Judgment affirmed.

Consecutive sentences

Probate Court has authority to order repayment of attorney fees taken without court approval

Post-Conviction Relief - Res Judicata - Evidence De Hors the Record

CRIM.R. 33(B) — UNAVOIDABLE PREVENTION: The common pleas court did not abuse its discretion by denying defendant's Crim.R. 33(B) motion for leave to file a new-trial motion based on irregularity in the proceedings and newly discovered evidence where defendant could not demonstrate that he was unavoidably prevented from discovering the grounds upon which he now relies to support his new-trial motion.

FOURTH AMENDMENT — SEARCH AND SEIZURE — REASONABLE GROUNDS — PROBATION — ANONYMOUS TIP — SENTENCING — MINIMUM SENTENCE: Defendant-probationer's Fourth Amendment rights were not violated when probation officers searched defendant-probationer and his apartment because defendant-probationer consented to being searched if there were reasonable grounds to believe defendant-probationer violated the terms of probation and an anonymous tip received by the probation officer, which included a photograph of defendant-probationer with a firearm that was verified by the probation officer as credible, established reasonable ground to believe that defendant-probationer was violating the terms of probation. The trial court did not err when it selected a three-year minimum sentence as part of defendant's indefinite sentence for committing a second-degree felony because the sentencing statute requires a trial court to select a minimum sentence for a conviction of a second-degree felony, the three-year minimum falls within the range prescribed by the sentencing statute, and defendant's attorney told the trial court that defendant was subject to a three-year minimum sentence.

JUVENILE — PLEA AGREEMENT — JUDICIAL RELEASE: The juvenile court erred when it granted the juvenile judicial release where the juvenile was ineligible for judicial release under the terms of the plea agreement and where the juvenile court bound itself to the agreement when it signed the agreement, accepted the agreement in its dispositional entries, and made assurances at the plea hearing to the juvenile that he would not receive judicial release. [See CONCURRENCE IN JUDGMENT ONLY: The juvenile court erred in refusing to enforce the plea agreement because the plea agreement was a valid and enforceable contract between the juvenile and the State.]

OVI — R.C. 4511.01(HHH) —SUFFICIENCY— MANIFEST WEIGHT: In an OVI prosecution, the State presented sufficient evidence of operation under R.C. 4511.01(HHH), and defendant's OVI conviction was not against the manifest weight of the evidence where police found defendant unconscious in the driver's seat of a vehicle parked at a gas station with drug paraphernalia in his hand, defendant admitted to driving the car from his parents' home to the gas station 20 minutes prior to police contact, defendant stipulated that he was intoxicated when police found him, and the State introduced a toxicology report showing the presence of a number of chemical substances in defendant's system.

The trial court erred in ordering appellant to produce potentially privileged materials to opposing counsel without first determining if the documents were, in fact, privileged. Judgment reversed and remanded. (Epley, P.J., dissenting.)

The record does not portray any ineffective assistance of counsel affecting the validity of the appellant's guilty plea. Judgment affirmed.

State's appeal. The juvenile court erred in finding no probable cause to believe that appellee, a minor, aided and abetted in the commission of felony murder, aggravated robbery, felonious assault, attempted grand theft of a motor vehicle, and possession of criminal tools. The juvenile court's judgment will be reversed as to those offenses, and the case will be remanded for an amenability hearing. Absent any argument from the State regarding probable cause to believe that appellee also was responsible for evidence tampering, the juvenile court's finding of no probable cause as to that offense will not be disturbed. Judgment affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.

Appellant's guilty pleas were not less than knowing, voluntary, and intelligent solely because the trial court sentenced him to a lengthier prison term than the parties' joint recommendation. Appellant had been informed orally and in writing that the trial court was not required to follow the joint recommendation. Appellant failed to show he was prejudiced by the trial court's alleged error in ordering part of his sentence to run concurrently to a previous sentence. The trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying appellant's motion to withdraw his guilty pleas. Judgment affirmed.

Appellant's motion seeking specific performance of his 2014 plea agreement with the State was barred by the doctrine of res judicata. Moreover, appellant would not be entitled to specific performance based upon his own breach of the plea agreement. Judgment affirmed.

The trial court did not err in denying appellant's motion to suppress because appellant voluntarily consented to the search of his backpack. The State presented sufficient evidence to support convictions on aggravated murder, murder, and aggravated burglary, and the jury's guilty verdicts were not against the manifest weight of the evidence. The State failed to provide sufficient evidence on each "alternate means" of committing tampering with evidence where there was no evidence that appellant tampered with the gun. The trial court properly imposed sentence on a firearm specification for a count of aggravated murder that was merged into another count of aggravated murder. The record supports the conclusion that the trial court considered appellant's ability to pay restitution of nearly $10,000. Conviction for tampering with evidence reversed; in all other respects, judgment affirmed.

On defendant's appeal of trial court ruling denying motion for de novo resentencing. Following Harper, Hudson, and Bates, trial court correctly held that defendant's motion was barred by res judicata, as the motion did not address the trial court's subject-matter jurisdiction or whether the case was properly before the trial court when decided. Assignment of error overruled and judgment affirmed.

Trial court judgment granting motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted is affirmed. Osowik.

Per Mayle, J., trial court did not err in joining two cases for trial because evidence was simple and direct. Convictions were not against the manifest weight of evidence. Trial counsel was not ineffective because alleged errors did not effect outcome of trial. Sixth Amendment right to counsel was not violated by denial of counsel's motion to withdraw. Trial court did not abuse its discretion in imposing maximum sentences because there is no evidence that trial court considered improper factors.

Per Mayle, J. trial court did not err in declining to impose jointly-recommended community-control sanctions. Defendant signed written plea agreement indicating his understanding that sentencing recommendation was not binding on court. At plea hearing, defendant confirmed his understanding after court informed him of possible penalties for offenses, made clear it was not bound by State's sentencing recommendation, and explained that it was within its discretion to determine appropriate sanction.

No common pleas court juvenile division error transferring jurisdiction to general division, and no trial court error accepting conviction-by-plea and imposing sentence. Judgment affirmed. Osowik

Appeal of misdemeanor traffic convictions by a "sovereign-citizen" claiming to not be subject to the laws and jurisdiction of the State of Ohio is baseless.

Per Mayle, J., appellee sufficiently alleged that road was a "county road" per R.C. 5535.01, which showed that appellant had duty to maintain the road. Appellee was not required to plead around possible affirmative defenses, and facts in complaint sufficiently alleged that an immunity exception in R.C. 2744.02(B) could apply. Appellee failed to sufficiently plead remaining claims, including intentional torts, public nuisance, and injunction, so trial court should have dismissed them under Civ.R. 12(B)(6).

Duhart. Affirming, because appellant's trial counsel was not ineffective and because appellant's plea was made in compliance with Crim.R. 11.

Violating a Protection Order - Telecommunications Harassment - Consecutive Sentencing

Restitution order did not violate Marsy's Law

Guilty plea; ineffective assistance of counsel; sentencing

Felonious Assault - Tampering with Evidence - Weapons Under Disability - Plea Bargain - Authentication of Jail Calls - Manifest Weight/Sufficiency

Trial Court Must Conduct Hearing on Application to Expunge or Seal - R.C. 2953.32

Defendant appeals from conviction for aggravated murder following a plea negotiation and a jointly-recommended sentence. Defendant's plea was made knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily notwithstanding fact that trial court did not inform defendant that he could not appeal a jointly-recommended sentence pursuant to R.C. 2953.08(D)(1). Crim.R. 11(C) does not require court to advise defendant of effect of jointly-recommended sentence.

Appellant's conviction for gross sexual imposition in violation of R.C. 2907.05(A)(4) was supported by sufficient evidence and was not against the manifest weight of the evidence, and the trial court did not err by providing the jury with a course of conduct instruction or in sentencing appellant to prison, where it was proven beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant had engaged in sexual contact with the child victim by touching her leg and upper thigh for the purposes of his own sexual gratification. Appellant's sentence was nevertheless reversed for the trial court to employ the postrelease control correction procedures set forth in R.C. 2929.191.

Juvenile's delinquency adjudication for receiving stolen property was not supported by sufficient evidence as the state failed to show the juvenile knew or had reasonable cause to believe the vehicle was stolen.

Crim.R. 32.1 – presentence motion to withdraw – Crim.R. 11 – nonconstitutional – maximum penalty – consecutive sentences

R.C. 2953.08, sentencing, consecutive sentences, clear and convincing evidence, findings

OVI – driving under suspension – plea agreement – community control sanction – community control violation – prison sentence

CRIMINAL - Crim.R. 16; failure to disclose exculpatory evidence; evidence discovered during trial; discovery; unfair surprise; violation not willful; continuance must be sought; used failure to submit evidence for testing as trial strategy.

CRIMINAL LAW - motion for leave to file motion for new trial; Crim.R. 33(B); unavoidably prevented; Brady v. Maryland; abuse of discretion; untimely; cell phone records; photo lineup; evidence was available at trial; appellant was not unavoidably prevented from discovering the evidence.

CIVIL LAW - motion to vacate; abuse of discretion; summary judgment; due process; jury trial; calculation of damages; amount awarded by another county not in dispute.

Contracts; Specific performance; Settlement agreements; Authority of attorney to settle litigation; Summary judgment. The judgment of the trial court is reversed as the trial court erred in denying the plaintiff-appellant's motion for summary judgment.

Rape; R.C. 2907.02(A)(2); Gross Sexual Imposition; R.C. 2907.05(A)(1); Force or Threat of Force; Hearsay; Evid.R. 803(8)(b); Evid.R. 805; Evid.R. 701; Evid.R. 404(B); Other Acts Evidence; Merger; Evid.R. 106; Rule of Completeness; Harmless Error. Defendant-appellant's convictions were supported by sufficient evidence. The trial court did not violate defendant-appellant's right to confrontation when it sustained objections during cross-examination. The trial court did not err in allowing purported undisclosed expert testimony because such testimony was not expert testimony. The trial court did not err in allowing purported other-acts evidence without the State providing notice pursuant to Evid.R. 404(B)(2). The trial court did not err in declining to merge the rape and gross sexual imposition offenses. The trial court did not err when the State showed the jury certain portions of defendant-appellant's videotaped police interview and did not require the State to play the entire video.

Possession of drugs; Sufficiency of Evidence; Manifest Weight; Venue; Knowledge; Constructive Possession; Prior Inconsistent Statement; Evid.R. 613. Defendant-appellant's possession-of-cocaine conviction is supported by sufficient evidence and is not against the manifest weight of the evidence. The trial court did not commit reversible error by attempting to impeach a witness with a prior inconsistent statement.

JUVENILE COURT – MANDATORY BINDOVER – JURISDICTION – R.C. 2151.23(H) – POSTCONVICTION PETITION: The trial court did not err in finding it had jurisdiction to convict defendant of murder and attempted murder as an adult because the juvenile court found probable cause to believe he committed these two offenses following bindover proceedings. Moreover, because defendant's postconviction petition was untimely and he did not argue either of the exceptions in R.C. 2953.23(A) permitting untimely postconviction petitions applied, the trial court correctly determined it lacked authority to consider the untimely postconviction petition. Judgment affirmed.

APPELLATE REVIEW/CIVIL — ADMINISTRATIVE — ZONING — R.C. 2506.04 — APP.R. 16: In an administrative zoning appeal, it is the appellant's burden to set forth arguments in compliance with App.R. 16(A)(7) that demonstrate error by the court of common pleas that is reviewable by the appellate court under R.C. 2506.04. The record does not show that the trial court failed to conduct an independent review of the evidence where the trial court expressly stated that it reviewed the administrative transcript and the additional evidence filed by the appellants, and there is nothing contradictory in the record. The appellants failed to demonstrate error in the trial court's decision where they failed to cite to the record in support of their argument. The appellants failed to establish an improper administrative search where they failed to cite to the record in support of their argument, and did not identify the precise incident from which they claimed an improper search. The appellants failed to establish a "misapplication of the zoning laws" where they failed to identify any zoning provision that was misapplied. The appellants failed to establish error in the trial court's decision where they argue noncompliance with a zoning provision that is inapplicable to the cause before the court.

FELONIOUS ASSAULT — SELF-DEFENSE — DEADLY FORCE — ALLIED OFFENSES: Defendant's convictions for felonious assault were not contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence on defendant's claim of self-defense where the record credibly supports that defendant acted as the first aggressor by striking the victim with a landscaping machete when the victim attempted to remove his wayward dog from defendant's open truck and credible evidence negated that defendant truly believed he was in imminent danger of death or great bodily harm and his only means of escape was in the use of deadly force against the victim, who was older, smaller, and noticeably more frail than defendant. The trial court's imposition of concurrent prison terms in lieu of merging two counts of felonious assault was contrary to law as the offenses constituted allied offenses of similar import, and therefore, the cause must be remanded for resentencing.

Trial Court did not rely on detective's opinion as to appropriate sentence to impose upon Appellant - R.C. 2929.19

Sufficiency of evidence regarding deadly weapon

Anders - Guilty Plea - Sentencing

Sufficiency and manifest weight

Protection order; Stalking; Pattern of conduct; Mental distress

Plain error review of community-control condition

Summary Judgment - Dram Shop Act Liability - R.C. 4399.18

sufficient evidence, manifest weight of the evidence, felonious assault, sword, DNA

CIVIL – domestic violence civil protection order; clear and convincing evidence; fear; change in routine; judicial bias; failure to assert property rights.

Post-conviction relief denied

sufficiency of evidence in police investigation

affirming summary judgment to bank on credit card account; no genuine issue of fact raised on unconscionability; contractual interest rate was not limited by 8% usury statute; no due process violation in ruling on bank's motion for extension.

On objections, the Court overruled Requester's partial objections to a Special Master's Report and Recommendation and adopted the Report and Recommendation. The Court found that the Special Master correctly applied the functional equivalency test set forth in State ex rel. Oriana House, Inc. v. Montgomery, 2006-Ohio-4854. In accordance with the Special Master's recommendations, the Court (1) granted Requester's claim for the production of certain records, (2) ordered Respondent to file a written certification by a specified date that it produced these certain records to Requester, and (3) ordered that Requester was entitled to recover from Respondent the amount of the filing fee of twenty-five dollars and any other costs associated with the action that were incurred by Requester, excepting attorney fees.

Public Records; R.C. 149.43(B)(7)(c)(i) and (iii); R.C. 2743.75(C)(2); Dismissal is only appropriate under R.C. 2743.75(C)(2) if the case both presents an issue of first impression and the issue is of substantial public interest; R.C. 149.43(B)(7)(c)(i) and (iii) explicitly authorize public offices to adopt policies limiting the number of records provided in response to commercially motivated requests.

Public Records; R.C. 149.43(A)(17)(a); R.C. 149.45(A)(1); The term "primary" connotes more than quantitative or proportional primacy, it also has a qualitative sense; Common usage establishes that something can be "primary" if it is "basic, fundamental" or "essential" to the subject considered; Something can be "primary," even if it is not the quantitatively predominate feature of the thing considered, so long as it is essential to that thing; A child can be a "primary" subject of a law enforcement recording for purposes of R.C. 149.43(A)(17)(a) if addressing the child's needs was an essential part of law enforcement's response to the situation prompting the recording; Telephone numbers are not among the types of information listed in R.C. 149.45(A)(1)'s definition of personal information.

Public Records; R.C. 149.43(A)(1); Supp. R. 44; Materials that would be court records in the possession of a court, are also public records subject to R.C. 149.43 in the hands of a non-court public office.

After court of appeals sua sponte dismissed Requester's appeal, the Court sua sponte vacated its stay of the case, denied Requester's motion for an extension of time, denied Requester's notice seeking dismissal of Respondent's response to Requester's objections, and overruled Requester's objections to a Special Master's Report and Recommendation. In accordance with the Special Master's recommendations, the Court found that Requester's claim for production of records was moot, found that Requester failed to prove a violation of R.C. 149.43(B)(4), rejected Requester's delay claim, and rejected Requester's claims about the administration of concealed carry laws.

Malicious prosecution; false arrest; false imprisonment; political subdivision immunity; R.C. 2744.02; R.C. 2744.03(A)(6); summary judgment; genuine issue of material fact; collateral estoppel; probable cause; police officers; City of Cleveland; civil liability; intimidation; Servicemembers Civil Relief Act; juvenile court bindover. The City of Cleveland is entitled to political subdivision immunity under R.C. 2744.02 for the state-law claims, as no applicable exceptions applied. The federal court's finding of probable cause precluded White's claims against the officers, and collateral estoppel barred relitigating those issues in state court. The trial court erred in denying the individual defendants summary judgment, because White did not present evidence that any officer acted with malicious purpose, in bad faith, or in a wanton or reckless manner.

R.C. 2907.02, rape; R.C. 2905.01, kidnapping; R.C. 2941.148, sexually violent predator; allied offenses; Evid.R. 701; lay witness testimony; plain error; manifest weight; sufficiency of the evidence.

Judgment on the pleadings; statute of limitations; cognizable event; legal-malpractice.

Involuntary manslaughter; having weapons while under disability; firearm specifications; guilty plea. Affirmed. The defendant's guilty plea was knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently entered because the trial court advised him of his right to a jury trial and was not required to specifically include additional information about the jury unanimity requirement or how many jurors would be on the panel.

Felony sentencing; consecutive sentences; ineffective assistance of counsel. Defendant's 23-year prison sentence is affirmed because the court complied with R.C. 2929.14(C)(4) when imposing consecutive sentences. Defense counsel was not ineffective for failing to present mitigating evidence at sentencing because: 1) it is not a factor for consideration under R.C. 2929.14(C)(4); 2) failure to present mitigating evidence is not per se ineffective assistance of counsel; 3) the mitigating evidence at issue is not part of the record; and 4) the defendant failed to show prejudice.

R.C. 2953.08; R.C. 2929.14(C)(4); consecutive sentences; clearly and convincingly; attempted rape; burglary; maximum sentence. The trial court's imposition of the maximum sentence was not contrary to law. The trial court did not err in imposing consecutive sentences.

Political-subdivision immunity; summary judgment; R.C. 2744.02(B)(3); exception; negligent failure; public roads; in repair; repair; depression; de minimis; hazardous condition; duty; knowledge; actual notice; constructive notice; reasonable apprehension; lack of evidence. Reversed the decision of the trial court that denied summary judgment to the city on the basis of political-subdivision immunity. The exception to political-subdivision immunity under R.C. 2744.02(B)(3), for the negligent failure to keep public roads in repair, could not be found to apply in the matter. The plaintiff could not establish from the evidence that the city had a duty to repair the subject depression in the road where her scooter-accident occurred. Even if she could, there was nothing to show that the city actively created the condition or that it had actual or constructive notice of the condition or that it should have anticipated that the depression posed a hazard or potential danger.

Juvenile court; competency hearing; R.C. 2152.51 through 2152.59; ineffective assistance of counsel; statutory timing requirements for conducting competency evaluations of juveniles; failure to order residential competency treatment. Juvenile court's judgment adjudicating the juvenile delinquent and committing him to the Ohio Department of Youth Services is reversed. Evidence in the record showed that the juvenile was likely incompetent when he entered his admission to aggravated robbery. Additionally, the court erred when it failed to comply with various timing requirements in the juvenile competency statutes. The juvenile's counsel was ineffective for failing to raise the issue of competency, failing to file a motion to withdraw the admission, and failing to object to the court not complying with the statutory timing requirements concerning competency. Furthermore, the court erred when it found that it had no "authority" to refer the juvenile for residential competency treatment.

Notice of conceded error; partial sealing; multiple offenses. The defendant was convicted of three counts of drug possession and one count of physical control of vehicle while under the influence. He was also charged in a separate indictment arising from the same set of facts. The latter indictment was dismissed. He was ineligible to have either of his cases sealed since physical control of vehicle while under the influence is not eligible for sealing or expungement.

Permanent custody, Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967). Appeal dismissed; appointed counsel's motion to withdraw pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), is granted. There is clear and convincing evidence in the record to support the juvenile court's determinations, and the evidence was legally sufficient to support the trial court's decision as a matter of law. Further, the juvenile court's decision to grant permanent custody to Cuyahoga County Division of Children and Family Services ("CCDCFS") was not against the manifest weight of the evidence. Moreover, Mother failed to present clear and convincing evidence that, despite having had her parental rights terminated for a sibling of the subject child, she would be able to provide a legally secure permanent placement and adequate care for the health, welfare, and safety of the child as required under R.C. 2151.414(E)(11). On this record, an extension of temporary custody was not warranted and the trial court did not abuse its discretion by not granting an extension.

Foreclosure; confirmation of the sale; bond; motion for stay; moot; R.C. 2329.45. Appeal dismissed as moot. Appellant failed to obtain a stay of the confirmation of the sale because she did not post the required bond set by the trial court. Therefore, the sale of the property was confirmed and the proceeds were distributed. Appellant's argument that the appeal was not moot because R.C. 2329.45 provides a remedy when the property has been sold is unpersuasive because this court has held that R.C. 2329.45 applies only to appeals that were taken from the order confirming the sale and when an appellant successfully obtains a stay. Here, the appellant failed to obtain a stay. Thus, the appeal is moot.

Return of property; forfeiture; res judicata; timely; waiver. - Trial court did not commit prejudicial error in denying appellant's motion for return of property because he did not timely raise the issue with the trial court during the pendency of the case and res judicata now bars the issue from consideration in his criminal case.

Complaint for abuse and neglect, R.C. 2151.353(A)(4), request for permanent custody, cannot be placed with one of the child's parents within a reasonable time, should not be placed with either parent, R.C. 2151.414(D)(1), best interests of the child, clear and convincing evidence, R.C. 2151.414(E). Cuyahoga County Division of Children and Family Services ("CCDCFS") filed a complaint alleging abuse and neglect, requesting temporary custody of twin four-year-old children. The trial court did not abuse its discretion by granting the agency permanent custody where it found the children cannot be placed with one parent in a reasonable time, should not be placed with either parent, and temporary custody was in the best interests of the children. There was clear and convincing record evidence sufficient to support the court's findings, which were not against the manifest weight of the evidence. This evidence included that the children had been previously found abused while under parents' care, resulting in injuries to Ar.M. that required significant, ongoing medical care; CCDCFS later became unable to locate the children because of mother's failure to communicate with her case worker; the children were eventually found with an inadequate caregiver who suffered from dementia; the children were dirty, dehydrated or severely underweight, requiring hospitalization; mother was incarcerated at time of trial facing charges of child endangering regarding these children; the children had been in temporary agency custody for more than half of their lives; and CCDCFS could not identify alternative adequate caregivers. Judgment affirmed.

Permanent custody; abused; neglected; dependent; special needs; paternity; R.C. 2151.353(A); R.C. 2151.414(E); R.C. 2151.414(E)(1); R.C. 2151.414(E)(4); R.C. 2151.414(E)(14); R.C. 2151.414(E)(15); R.C. 2151.414(D)(1); legal custody; reunification; reasonable efforts; sufficiency; manifest weight; clear and convincing. Affirmed juvenile court's decision granting permanent custody of twin children to the children services agency and terminating father's parental rights. The court engaged in the proper analysis and made the requisite determinations pursuant to R.C. 2151.353(A)(4) and in accordance with R.C. 2151.414(E) and 2151.414(D)(1). Its findings were supported by sufficient evidence and were not against the manifest weight of the evidence. The record indicated that the agency made reasonable efforts to reunify the family. The juvenile court made multiple reasonable-efforts determinations prior to the dispositional hearing.

In determining whether new and changed circumstances existed under R.C. 4123.58(G), the commission staff hearing officer committed legal error in ignoring the amendment of R.C. 4123.58(D)(3) and the report of the independent specialist that the relator is unable to work due to an allowed condition. Because the independent specialist's report is relevant to why the relator is not working, it constitutes new and changed circumstances that affects the prior denial of permanent total disability compensation.

The Court of Claims did not err in granting the commission's motion to dismiss pursuant to Civ.R. 12(B)(1) and (6). Despite appellants' framing of their claims as gross negligence, fraud, and civil conspiracy, it is clear from the face of the complaint they are seeking review and reversal of the administrative decision denying the discrimination claim, and the Court of Claims lacks subject-matter jurisdiction to review the commission's administrative determination. Additionally, because appellants did not allege an underlying primary tort from which the loss of consortium claim could derive, appellants failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted for their loss of consortium claim.

CIV.R. 60(B) — MOTION FOR RELIEF FROM JUDGMENT — AFFIDAVIT — EXCUSABLE NEGLECT — ABUSE OF DISCRETION: Where defendant submitted an affidavit in support of a Civ.R. 60(B) motion for relief from judgment, there was evidence in the record to support the trial court's entry granting the motion. Where the record contained evidence in support of a motion for relief from judgment in the form of an affidavit, and where the party opposing the motion failed to respond, failed to raise a challenge to the credibility of the statements in the affidavit, and failed to request the opportunity to present its own evidence, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in failing to take additional evidence before ruling on the motion. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in failing to issue findings of fact in support of its ruling on a Civ.R. 60(B) motion for relief from judgment, particularly where no such request was made by a party pursuant to the Rules of Civil Procedure. Where defendant admitted receiving service of the complaint, contacted counsel for plaintiff to tell counsel that defendant had not been involved in the automobile accident that was the subject of the complaint, failed to receive a response from plaintiff's counsel, and failed to respond to the complaint based on a belief that it was a scam, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding the presence of excusable neglect and in granting defendant's Civ.R. 60(B) motion for relief from judgment.

POSTCONVICTION PETITION — R.C. 2953.23: The trial court did not err in dismissing defendant's untimely petition for postconviction relief where defendant failed to meet the jurisdictional requirements of R.C. 2953.23. Judgment affirmed.

Crim.R. 8(A), Joinder; Crim.R. 14, Severance, Undue Prejudice, "Spill Over Effect", Limiting Instruction; Evidence is Simple and Direct, Evidence Admissible under Evid.R. 404(B); Abuse of Discretion; Plain Error; Regan Tokes Act; Ineffective Assistance of Counsel; Deficient Performance, Prejudice; R.C. 2929.18(B), Affidavit of Indigency, Waiver, Fine

Parental Rights, Mootness Doctrine, Emancipation

Right to Respond to Victim Impact Statement - R.C. 2930.14

Denial of motion of appointment of court appointed counsel; Denial of motion for preparation of transcript

Hostile Work Environment; Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress

Because the trial court had retained jurisdiction over spousal support for ten years, it had jurisdiction to establish monthly spousal support even though no periodic spousal support had been awarded in the divorce decree. The trial court reasonably determined that a change of circumstances had occurred and that spousal support to the former wife was appropriate. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in ordering the spousal support to continue indefinitely. Judgment affirmed.

The parties' shared parenting plan addressed most parenting issues, but they did not agree on which parent would be the residential parent for school purposes. The trial court's conclusion that it was in the child's best interest that Father be designated as the residential parent for school purposes was not an abuse of discretion. Judgment affirmed.

The trial court erred in failing to make required findings before imposing a consecutive sentence in Case No. 2024CR0041 for having a weapon while under disability. If the findings had been made, however, the trial court would have possessed authority to order that sentence to be served consecutively to existing sentences in Case Nos. 2021CR0634 and 2022CR0518, which involved concurrent prison terms imposed upon revocation of community control. Judgments in Case Nos. 2021CR0634 and 2022CR0518 affirmed. Judgment in Case No. 2024CR0041 reversed and remanded for the trial court either to make the necessary findings or to impose a concurrent sentence.

Res judicata precludes appellant from challenging the trial court's personal jurisdiction over him. Appellant previously raised the same issue in an unsuccessful Civ.R. 60(B) motion. The record reflects, however, that appellant was not served with an April 9, 2024 notice of the trial court's intent to emancipate the parties' oldest child and to order him to pay a child-support arrearage. The lack of service of that notice deprived appellant of an opportunity to object to those proposed actions. As a result, the trial court's subsequent May 13, 2024 judgment entry emancipating the child and ordering appellant to pay the arrearage will be reversed and the case will be remanded to give appellant a chance to object to the arrearage. Judgment reversed and remanded.

The trial court erred in ordering restitution, over defense counsel's objection, without holding a hearing on the amount of restitution. The trial court erred in failing to consider appellant's ability to pay restitution. Judgment reversed and remanded as to the restitution order; judgment affirmed in all other respects.

Per Mayle, J., appellant's convictions are supported by sufficient evidence and are not against the manifest weight of the evidence. The state proved that appellant had constructive possession of drugs found in car and actual possession of gun, and detective's testimony did not contradict his report.

Per Mayle, J., plaintiff failed to present Civ.R. 56 evidence showing it incurred consequential damages potentially covered by contractor's Commercial General Liability ("CGL") policy. Faulty workmanship is not an "occurrence" under CGL policy. Property owner was "additional insured" under CGL policy only with respect to third-party claims for liability caused by contractor's acts or omissions. Once it was determined that there was no coverage under CGL policy, insurer's duty to defend ceased.

Judge Duhart. Juvenile. Murder. Plea. Amenable.

Osowik - Trial court did not err in not merging felonious assault and discharge of a firearm as allied offenses of similar import. The record reflects separate victims and separate harm. Parties concur that trial court misstated case numbers in the sentencing entries. Judgement affirmed, in part, and reversed and remanded, in part, for issuance of a nunc pro tunc.

Where defendant entered a guilty plea and was represented by counsel, he waived his right to appeal any non-jurisdictional defect that occurred during earlier stage of proceeding, including any alleged error relating to the trial court's denial of his motion to suppress.

Zmuda, J., writing for the majority, finds that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in awarding custody to father.

Sulek, J. In an appropriation action, the trial court did not err in denying plaintiff's motion in limine to prohibit property owner's expert appraiser's valuation testimony.

Per Mayle, mother can challenge trial court's subject-matter jurisdiction years after case filed. Texas was child's home state on filing date, so court lacks Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Agency ("UCCJEA") jurisdiction. Absence not temporary under duration test when child was away for six consecutive months ending within six months of filing. Nothing shows that mother stipulated to jurisdictional facts, she could not consent to nonexistent jurisdiction, and record evidence is sufficient to determine home state, so transcripts are unnecessary.

Writ of mandamus-appellant lacked standing to pursue mandamus relief when requested relief would not have affected any of appellant's rights.

Sentencing court may, in its discretion, order a PSI for an offense that requires a mandatory prison sentence.

Summary judgment-trial court did not err by granting insurer summary judgment when plain and unambiguous policy language established that appellant did not qualify as an "insured" entitled to UM coverage under insurer's policy.

The juvenile court's decision naming Father the residential parent and legal custodian of the parties' minor child was supported by the manifest weight of the evidence and was not an abuse of discretion where there was ample evidence in the record to support that such a designation was in the best interest of the child.

Defendant's convictions for, among other charges, aggravated murder and aggravated robbery are affirmed. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying a self-defense instruction where no evidence supported defendant's assertion he believed marijuana would be purchased (as opposed to taken) from the victim. Even if his testimony were believed, defendant unreasonably escalated a dispute over the theft of the victim's marijuana by drawing a gun and shooting the victim. Testimony and evidence regarding other activity done by defendant and his associates throughout the day was not propensity evidence but instead context that demonstrated intent, preparation, planning, and opportunity to rob the victim. Finally, defendant's convictions were not against the manifest weight of the evidence because the jury believed the testimony and evidence presented by the state. Defendant's testimony of his actions following the incident demonstrated consciousness of guilt.

Obstructing Justice; R.C. 2921.32(A)(1); Assault on a Police Officer; R.C. 2903.13(C)(5)(a); Resisting Arrest; R.C. 2921.33(A); Prosecutorial Misconduct. Defendant-appellant's convictions for obstructing justice, assault on a police officer, and resisting arrest were supported by sufficient evidence and were not against the manifest weight of the evidence. Even assuming the prosecutor's comments during opening statements and closing arguments were inappropriate, the trial court did not commit plain error in allowing them.

Summary Judgment; Open and Obvious; Attendant Circumstances. Trial court properly granted summary judgment where extended step was open and obvious.

Consecutive Sentence; Required Findings. The trial court did not err in imposing consecutive sentences when it made the necessary findings which were supported by the record.

Sentencing; Guilty Plea; Admission of Guilt; Contrary to Law. A guilty plea constitutes a complete admission of guilt. In entering a guilty plea, the defendant waives the right to have the State produce evidence that proves the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Accordingly, the defendant may not generally raise sufficiency or manifest-weight challenges on appeal. The degree of the theft offense is determined by the value of the property stolen and not the amount of the economic loss sustained by the victim.

EXPIRED CIVIL STALKING PROTECTION ORDER; COLLATERAL-CONSEQUENCES EXCEPTION TO THE MOOTNESS DOCTRINE. Appeal dismissed as moot since the civil stalking protection order expired by its terms. The collateral-consequences exception to the mootness doctrine does not apply since the respondent-appellant failed to demonstrate that he has suffered any legal collateral consequences arising from the expired order.

Felony Sentencing; R.C. 2953.08(G)(2); R.C. 2929.11; R.C. 2929.12. Defendant-appellant's prison sentence is not clearly and convincingly contrary to law.

CONSECUTIVE SENTENCES; R.C. 2929.14(C)(4). The trial court made the appropriate R.C. 2929.14(C)(4) findings necessary to impose a consecutive sentence and the record supports the trial court's findings.

Divorce; Division of marital assets and debt; Spousal support. The trial court did not err in the division of debts and assets ordered in the parties' divorce, nor did the trial court err in denying wife's request for spousal support.

Criminal appeal/Discretionary transfer to adult court/Amenability/Ineffective assistance of counsel/Sentencing review/Standard of review/Juvenile courts

CIVIL - unjust enrichment; benefit conferred; recipient's knowledge of benefit; reasonable excuse for failing to provide recipient opportunity to decline benefit.

CIVIL - breach of contract; oral agreement; manifest weight of the evidence; finder of fact is in the best position to judge credibility of witnesses; motion for directed verdict; Civ.R. 50(A)(4); R.C. 1335.05; statute of frauds; requirement that contract not to be performed within one year must be in writing is literally and narrowly construed.

CRIMINAL LAW - attempted aggravated menacing; guilty plea; Crim.R. 11; petty offense; knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily entered; no ineffective assistance of counsel; misdemeanor sentence; R.C. 2929.21(A); relevant statutory factors; lenient sentence; no error.

CIVIL - insurance; breach of contract; property damage; plain error; jury instruction; waiver; manifest weight of the evidence; policy period; dates of coverage.

CIVIL - money damages; medical debts; R.C. 3103.03; Ohio's "necessaries statute"; summary judgment; statutory right to pursue non-debtor spouse; encourage third parties to provide essential items and services; primary debtor able to pay debt; if unable to pay; spouse's liability may be considered; no justiciable issue; separate case; judicial notice; cannot conclude case is analogous; refile; within relevant statute of limitations.

Defendant's right to allocution

APPELLATE REVIEW - App.R. 4(A); thirty-day rule; Civ.R. 58(B); untimely appeal.

CRIMINAL - guilty plea; maximum penalty; Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(a); knowing, intelligent and voluntary; presumption of prison; prejudice; mandatory fine; community control violation; maximum sentences; consecutive sentences; proportionality findings; postrelease control advisement; ineffective assistance of counsel; merger; allied offenses of similar import; affidavit of indigency

CIVIL - fraudulent inducement; residential real property disclosure form; R.C. 5302.30; failure to disclose pending sewer assessment; latent defect; caveat emptor; justifiable reliance; motion to file transcript of magistrate's hearing; Civ.R. 53(D)(3)(b)(iii); motion for judgment on the pleadings; motion not ruled on before final judgment is deemed denied.

CRIMINAL LAW - prosecutorial misconduct; opening statements; closing arguments; cross-examination of the defendant; guilt; R.C. 2907.02(D); rape-shield law; R.C. 2945.59; Evid.R. 404(B); Evid.R. 608(B); defendant's prior sexual history; witness credibility; golden rule; comments did not compromise appellant's right to a fair trial; admission of evidence; abuse of discretion; other acts; testimony elicited by party; invited error; Evid.R. 807; child victim testimony; out of court statements; victim testified at trial; Evid.R. 803(4); expert testimony; Crim.R. 16(K); scope of testimony; duplicative testimony; ineffective assistance of counsel; sufficiency of evidence; rape; sexual conduct; cunnilingus.

CRIMINAL - Gross Sexual Imposition; Burglary; res judicata; law of the case; voidable; final order; speedy trial; indictment

CIVIL – motion to dismiss; Civ.R. 12(C); compulsory counterclaim; logical relation test; Civ.R. 13(A); small claims court; contract and tort claims

JUVENILE - termination of parental rights; permanent custody; Indian Child Welfare Act; 25 U.S.C. 1911(b); child-custody proceeding; 25 C.F.R. 23.2; best interests of the child; R.C. 2151.414; relative placement

CIVIL - summary judgment; commercial automobile insurance policy; underinsured motorist coverage; nonmotorized scooters; occupying a covered auto; ambiguity; rules of contract construction; auto medical payments coverage; pedestrian.

CRIMINAL - Sufficiency of the Evidence; manifest weight of the evidence; Felonious Assault; R.C. 2903.11; Discharge of a Firearm On or Near Prohibited Premises; R.C. 2923.162; Improperly Handling Firearms in a Motor Vehicle; R.C. 2923.16; and Obstructing Official Business, a fifth-degree felony in violation of R.C. 2921.31.

SPEEDY TRIAL – R.C. 2945.71 – PLEAS – WAIVER: Defendant's voluntary guilty plea constituted a waiver of his statutory speedy-trial rights under R.C. 2945.71. Defendant's voluntary guilty plea constituted a waiver of his constitutional speedy-trial rights where the trial judge informed defendant that his plea would waive his constitutional right to a speedy trial.

FEDERAL EMPLOYERS' LIABILITY ACT – NEGLIGENCE – RAILROADS – SUMMARY JUDGMENT – CIV.R. 56 – CAUSATION: Disputed issues of material fact precluded summary judgment on plaintiff employee's Federal Employers' Liability Act ("FELA") claim where plaintiff testified in his deposition that defendant railroad had failed to repair the nonfunctioning crane on his work truck, where he testified that failure to repair required plaintiff to repeatedly lift abnormally heavy objects into his truck, and where plaintiff introduced expert affidavits attesting that "excessive physical labor at the railroad" caused plaintiff's knee and back injuries. Plaintiff did not provide evidence of railroad negligence under FELA where plaintiff introduced evidence that defendant railroad had failed to perform certain assessments and offer certain trainings, but provided no evidence of what those assessments would have disclosed or what those trainings would have taught. Expert doctors' affidavits attesting that "excessive physical labor at the railroad" caused plaintiff's degenerative injuries did not provide adequate evidence to show that plaintiff's trip-and-fall on a particular date played a part in those degenerative injuries. Plaintiff failed to show that defendant railroad breached its duty of care

SEXUAL IMPOSITION — CORROBORATION — INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL — JUVENILE SEX OFFENDER CLASSIFICATION: The juvenile's adjudication for sexual imposition was supported by corroborating evidence where the victim immediately disclosed the offense to multiple individuals, and the juvenile repeatedly apologized and made admissions via text messages. Trial counsel did not provide ineffective assistance by failing to file objections to the magistrate's decision because the State provided sufficient corroborating evidence, the juvenile's assertion that the juvenile court would have made different credibility determinations is speculative, and counsel's admission that the juvenile engaged in offensive sexual contact occurred after his adjudication, and therefore, did not prejudice the juvenile. The trial court did not err in classifying the juvenile as a sex offender because the offense involved offensive sexual contact, which, by definition, is not consensual.

Trial court improperly ordered prosecutor's office to pay court costs in a dismissed action.

PERMANENT CUSTODY – PARENTAL TERMINATION – BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD – INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL: The juvenile court's award of permanent custody to the Hamilton County Department of Job and Family Services was supported by sufficient evidence and not against the manifest weight of the evidence where domestic violence was the basis for removing the children from the home, where that domestic violence persisted throughout the proceedings, and where the trial court reasonably determined that mother and father continued to be "intertwined in each other's lives." The juvenile court did not plainly err in not rejecting the magistrate's decision because of the alleged ineffective assistance of the children's appointed counsel.

magistrate's decision – objections – summary judgment – trial – motion for an extension of time

4511.19(A)(1)(a), Operating a Vehicle While Under the Influence, ("OVI"), Field Sobriety Test, Horizontal Gaze Nystagmus Test, ("HGN"), Vertical Gaze Nystagmus Test, ("VGN"), Reasonable Suspicion, Specific Articulable Facts of Criminal Activity, Indicia of Intoxication, Slurred Speech, Bloodshot Eyes, Single Vehicle Accident; Motion to Suppress the Evidence, Ineffective Assistance of Counsel, Deficient Performance, Prejudice, Speculation Insufficient to Show Prejudice

application for reconsideration denied; plain language of 1918 deed applied and lease royalties based on pooling of the premises at issue must be shared by the non-participating royalty interest.

Admissibility of evidence; sufficiency of the evidence; pierce the corporate veil; breach of contract; apparent agency; consumer sales practices act; conspiracy to commit fraud. The trial court's judgment in favor of the plaintiff on breach-of-contract, consumer sales practices act violations, and conspiracy-to-commit-fraud-claims after a bench trial is affirmed in part and reversed in part. Judgment for plaintiff on her breach-of-contract claim is affirmed. There was evidence presented at trial that the defendant LLC is liable for the actions of the "bad actor" in this case under the doctrine of apparent agency. Judgment on the remaining two claims is reversed because it is not supported by sufficient evidence in the record.

Divorce; division of marital property; equitable division of property; spousal support; temporary support; abuse of discretion; Civ.R. 75(N); R.C. 3105.171; de facto marriage termination; financial entanglements; bilateral; unilateral; motion for new trial; motion for relief from judgment; invited error; failure to prosecute; modification of temporary support; credit for payments during divorce proceedings; valuation of property; valuation evidence; time limits on presentation of evidence; prejudice; mootness; marriage inception date; pension; R.C. 3105.18. On Husband's assignments of error, the trial court did not abuse its discretion or err as a matter of law in rejecting a de facto marriage termination date of May 1, 2017, in favor of the final hearing date, October 11, 2023. The record supported the trial court's determination that the separation was the result of unilateral action by Wife rather than bilateral action by both parties, that there were continuing financial entanglements, and that there was insufficient evidence of the value of marital property on May 1, 2017, hampering the trial court's ability to equitably divide marital property as of that date. The trial court did not abuse its discretion or err as a matter of law by not retroactively modifying the temporary spousal-support order premised upon Husband's retirement. Husband did not prosecute his Civ.R. 75(N)(2) motion and never filed a motion to modify temporary support. The trial court did not abuse its discretion or err as a matter of law by not granting Husband credit for direct payments made to Wife during the pendency of the divorce proceedings. Trial court took payments into account in its ultimate property division determinations, and arguments regarding marital property valuation were waived where Husband failed to submit valuation evidence. The trial court did not abuse its discretion or err as a matter of law by placing time limitations on direct examination and cross-examination. Husband did not demonstrate what evidence he was prohibited from presenting due to the limitations and how he was prejudiced by the limitations. Furthermore, the transcript does not reflect that the trial court favored one side over the other in its timekeeping. Husband's arguments with respect to his motion for a new trial are disposed of by our resolution of his other assignments of error. Having overruled Husband's other assignments of error, we find that his assignment of error regarding the denial of his motion for a new trial is moot. On Wife's assignments of error, the trial court did not err as a matter of law or abuse its discretion in finding that the parties were married on September 8, 1989, the date of their civil marriage, rather than sometime in 1981, when Wife claimed they privately exchanged vows in an Islamic ceremony. There was no evidence that it would be inequitable or prejudicial for the trial court to use the legal marriage date as the marriage inception date, especially where all significant marital property was obtained after the civil marriage date. The trial court did not err as a matter of law or abuse its discretion in ordering Husband to pay Wife monthly support in the amount of $1,500 per month for life, absent Wife's cohabitation or remarriage. The record reflects that the trial court considered Husband's pension in its analysis of the R.C. 3105.18 factors with respect to an equitable division of property and did not abuse its discretion in its treatment of Husband's pension.

Interlocutory appeal; political immunity; governmental function; provision of a system of public education; motion for summary judgment; settlement agreement; sharing of tax revenue. Judgment affirmed. The trial court's denial of Warrensville Heights' motion for partial summary judgment was proper. Warrensville Heights is not entitled to political subdivision immunity for Beachwood's unjust-enrichment, promissory estoppel, fraud, and conversion claims because Warrensville Heights' breach of the parties' settlement agreement is not conduct related to the provision of a system of public education and, as a result, is not a governmental function.

Jail-time credit; offense specific; concurrent sentences; fully served; pretrial detention; separate cases; equal protection. An appeal from a trial court's decision on a motion for additional jail-time credit was dismissed as moot because the defendant-appellant had fully served his sentences on the offenses for which jail-time credit may have applied and jail-time credit on those offenses cannot transfer to a separate sentence incurred in a separate case.

Constructive notice; negligence; slip and fall; directed verdict; judgment notwithstanding the verdict; Civ.R. 50; business invitee. Defendant-appellant did not have constructive notice of a liquid substance on the floor prior to plaintiff-appellee's slip and fall. Plaintiff-appellee cannot rely on speculation to prove how long a liquid substance was on the floor prior to her fall.

Temporary protection order; expired; effective assistance of counsel; due process; fair trial; sufficiency; abduction; new trial. Appellant's conviction for abduction was supported by sufficient evidence where the appellant, without permission, drove off in the victim's car with the victim's child present in the backseat. Appellant was denied a fair trial and effective assistance of counsel when his counsel failed to object or recognize that the temporary protection order that the State used in support of its case had expired prior to the alleged commission the offenses. Appellant is entitled to a new trial.

Guilty plea; Crim.R. 11(C); nonconstitutional rights; prejudice; consecutive sentence; findings; R.C. 2929.14(C)(4); supported by the record; Reagan Tokes; unconstitutional. Defendant entered his guilty pleas knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily even though court did not advise him that it could, theoretically, proceed directly to judgment and sentence because the substitute judge who accepted the guilty pleas informed the defendant that the assigned judge would sentence him at a later date. Trial court's findings in support of consecutive sentence were supported by the record. Indefinite sentence imposed pursuant to Reagan Tokes Law is constitutional.

Consecutive sentences; R.C. 2929.14(C); not disproportionate to seriousness and danger posed; adequately reflects seriousness of defendant's crimes; R.C. 2953.08(G)(2); clearly and convincingly find that the record does not support the trial court's findings; cruel and unusual punishment; Eighth Amendment; proportionality; Crim.R. 32(A); unreasonable delay. Appellant failed to demonstrate that the record did not support the imposition of consecutive sentences and did not show that the sentences imposed consecutively to the sentence in an unrelated case constituted cruel and unusual punishment or amounted to an unreasonable delay.

Consecutive sentences; R.C. 2929.14(C)(4). Judgment affirmed. The trial court engaged in the proper analysis, considered the required statutory criteria, and made the necessary findings before imposing consecutive sentences. Moreover, the record clearly supports the trial court's findings that consecutive sentences were appropriate in this case.

Appellate jurisdiction; State appeal as of right; R.C. 2953.08; sentence contrary to law; modification of sentence; leave to appeal; App.R. 5; motion to dismiss indictment; R.C. 2950.04(A)(1)(a); Megan's Law; completion of prison sentence. The trial court properly denied appellant's motion to dismiss the indictment. Appellant was required to register under R.C. 2950.04(A)(1)(a) because, contrary to his assertion, he had not completed his prison term before July 1, 1997. His prison sentence had been resumed when he returned to prison for parole violations.

Confirmation of sale; R.C. 2329.021 et seq.; res judicata; law of the case; foreclosure. Appellant's attempts to challenge the decree of foreclosure were barred by the law- of-the-case doctrine, waiver, and res judicata; accordingly, the only issue before the court of appeals was whether the trial court abused its discretion when it confirmed the sale of the property. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in confirming the sale where the appellant failed to challenge the valuation of the property or challenge appellee's compliance with R.C. 2329.021 et seq., before the trial court.

Nunc pro tunc; denial; resentencing; postrelease control; Tier III; sex offender; jurisdiction; presumption of regularity; sentencing entry. Trial court did not err in denying defendant-appellant's request for a nunc pro tunc order of a sentencing entry when nothing in the record indicated that there was an error or omission in the sentencing entry that required correction through a nunc pro tunc order.

Conceded error; effective assistance of counsel; conflict of interest. Our review of the record reveals a clear conflict of interest exists in this case; assigned defense counsel for the defendant's community-control violation hearing was previously the State's prosecuting attorney in the same matter. Judgment reversed and remanded to the trial court for the assignment of new defense counsel and a community-control violation hearing.

Summary judgment; warehouse lien; breach of contract; Civ.R. 56(F). Trial court erred in granting plaintiff's motion for summary judgment and awarding damages when there were genuine issues of material fact as to whether plaintiff breached the parties' contract and as to the amount of damages if any.

Parental rights, permanent custody, legal custody, R.C. 2151.353(A)(3), R.C. 2151.011(B)(21), best interest, abuse of discretion, manifest weight, R.C. 2151.414(D), R.C. 3109.04(F), R.C. 2151.414(B)(1), R.C. 2151.414(D)(2), clear and convincing evidence, R.C. 2151.414(E). Judgments affirmed. The trial court did not abuse its discretion when it awarded Father legal custody of the youngest child, because it was in the best interest of the child to be in a stable and loving environment. Further, granting permanent custody of the oldest child to the Agency was not against the manifest weight of the evidence, when Mother did not sufficiently remedy her mental-health issues, which caused the removal of her children, and it was in the child's best interest to live in a safe and stable environment.

Permanent custody; reasonable efforts; child in the temporary custody of agency for 12 or more months of a consecutive 22-month period; children "cannot or should not" be returned to parent; parent demonstrated a "lack of commitment"; permanent custody to agency in children's best interest. Judgment affirmed. The record demonstrates that the agency made reasonable efforts to reunite mother with her children and the juvenile court documented those efforts throughout the case. Clear and convincing evidence supported the juvenile court's finding that the children cannot or should not be returned to mother and that mother had a lack of commitment toward the children. The record demonstrates that it was in the best interest of the children to grant the agency's motion for permanent custody.

Judgment reversed and cause remanded for a new trial. As the state concedes, the trial court erred by failing to strictly comply with the jury waiver requirements of R.C. 2945.05 before conducting the bench trial that resulted in appellant's convictions for felonious assault and having a weapon while under disability. Appellant's assignments of error challenging the trial court's evidentiary rulings are moot, but remand does not moot his challenge to the legal sufficiency of the evidence. Based on the testimony of the victim, which was corroborated by an audio recording of the incident, as well as the certified copies of appellant's previous convictions, the state's evidence was legally sufficient to convict appellant on both counts.

Some evidence in the record supported the commission's denial of relator's request for temporary total disability compensation. Because the commission did not abuse its discretion, the first joint objection is sustained; the second joint objection is overruled as moot; and the petition for a writ of mandamus is denied. Action dismissed.

The trial court did not err in granting the motion of appellee Oil and Gas Land Management Commission's to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to Civ.R. 12(B)(1). The Commission's approval of the seven nominations at issue in this matter was not subject to appeal under R.C. 119.12 because the approvals were not adjudicatory orders of a state agency performing a licensing function. Nor did the trial court err in finding that even if there were a right to appeal the nomination approvals under R.C. 119.12, appellants in this case lacked standing to do so. Finally, the trial court did not err in addressing the issue of standing after it had already found the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction. Judgment affirmed.

The trial court did not err in determining birth father's consent to the adoption was not required pursuant to R.C. 3107.07(A) where birth father failed to have more than de minimis contact with the child in the year preceding the filing of the adoption petition. Birth father did not file timely objections to the magistrate's decision, and birth father did not demonstrate plain error from the trial court's adoption of the magistrate's decision that his consent to the adoption was not required.

Sufficiency of evidence; Manifest weight of evidence; Strangulation; Serious physical harm; Substantial risk of harm; Bench trial

Sentencing Third Degree Felony

Permanent court commitment; Best interests of child; Permanent custody; Reunification; Reasonable efforts; R.C. 29

Victim not notified of hearing

PROBATE — LOST WILL — APPELLATE REVIEW/CIVIL — TRANSCRIPT: In a probate case, appellant failed to file a transcript of the hearing on his application to admit a lost will, and therefore, he cannot establish any error on the part of the probate court in denying the admission of the lost will to probate.

The trial court did not err in dismissing appellant's complaint for failing to state a claim upon which relief could be granted, because appellant's complaint for declaratory judgment was a collateral attack on his criminal conviction. Judgment affirmed.

The trial court erred in granting appellee's motion to strike, because appellant's motions were not "legal nullities." They should have been considered on the merits. Judgment reversed and remanded.

The trial court did not err in overruling appellant's motion to suppress; he was not subject to a custodial interrogation requiring Miranda warnings, and his statements were voluntary. Appellant's convictions were not against the manifest weight of the evidence. Judgment affirmed.

Appellant was convicted of obstructing official business for refusing to provide identification to police officers. Appellant's failure to identify himself to police officers did not constitute an "act" that hampered or impeded police officers, and such an act is a necessary element of obstructing official business. As such, appellant's conviction was not supported by sufficient evidence. Judgment vacated.

The trial court did not err when it granted appellee's motion for directed verdict, which denied appellants' request for injunctive relief. Judgment affirmed.

The trial court properly denied appellant's Civ.R. 60(B)(5) motion for relief from judgment where the alleged errors raised in the motion could have been raised in a direct appeal from the dismissal of appellant's complaint. Judgment affirmed.

The trial court did not err in striking appellant crime victim's motion to modify defendant's bond conditions. Neither Marsy's Law nor R.C. 2930.09 gave appellant a right to file a pretrial motion to modify the defendant's bond outside the context of a "public proceeding" such as the arraignment at which bond initially was set. Judgment affirmed.

After appellant stole a car with a child inside, he was convicted of kidnapping, grand theft (auto), and petty theft. The trial court correctly found that it, and not the jury, was required to determine the repeat violent offender specification. Appellant's convictions for kidnapping and grand theft were not subject to merger. Plain error is not demonstrated in the trial court's denial of separate trials for appellant's offenses. There was no evidence that the State had failed to preserve materially exculpatory evidence allegedly contained in a body camera video and, in any event, the failure to admit such evidence would have been harmless error. Appellant's right to confrontation was not violated by the court's admission of the child-victim's excited utterance or by the fact that the child did not testify at trial. Appellant was not denied due process or the right to cross-examine a witness who identified him by means of a photo array by the fact that she did not testify at a suppression hearing; the identification procedure was not unduly suggestive, and the witness was not required to testify. The trial court correctly instructed the jury that direct and circumstantial evidence are of equal weight. The trial court did not err in overruling appellant's motion to suppress surveillance video footage from a nearby business; appellant's challenge was not based upon Fourth Amendment principles but on the video's authenticity, which went to the weight of the evidence, not its admissibility. Appellant was not denied compulsory process because a witness he subpoenaed for a suppression hearing was not properly served, and he had no right to subpoena a witness to a pretrial conference. Because appellant did not raise the issue of the witnesses' failure to appear at trial, the issue was waived. Appellant's convictions were supported by sufficient evidence. Appellant's right to a speedy trial was not violated. The Reagan Tokes Act, under which appellant was sentenced, is not unconstitutional. However, the trial court did not provide all of the advisements required under the Reagan Tokes Act at sentencing, and it committed plain error in failing to determine restitution at the sentencing hearing. Although the Tier I sex offender/child victim offender designation arose by operation of law, the trial court lacked jurisdiction to impose it in a separate judgment entry after an appeal had been filed. Judgment reversed with respect to sentencing and remanded for resentencing consistent with the Reagan Tokes Act, the proper imposition of the Tier 1 designation, and proper consideration of restitution. Judgment affirmed in all other respects.

No contest plea waived right to present evidence to rebut having weapons under disability conviction.

Mandamus—Public-records requests—Requester failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that the requested records exist—Writ, statutory damages, and court costs denied—Prosecutor's motion for sanctions denied.

Sulek - In a direct appeal, claim for ineffective assistance of trial counsel must fail where it relies upon evidence from outside of the record.

The State presented legally sufficient evidence to support defendant's misdemeanor conviction for adulterating her coworker's beverage with a harmful substance, where the defendant admitted to putting hand sanitizer into co-worker's drink and the State presented evidence that coworker could have suffered physical harm as a result and was "seriously annoyed" by defendant's act.

Duhart. The trial court did not err in finding that the Village extended a good faith offer to appellants. In addition, the trial court did not err in finding that appellants failed to rebut the presumption of necessity that arose from the Village's Resolution 376.

In a "books and records action" under R.C. 1701.37, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in awarding attorney fees to the plaintiff, a 50% shareholder of a closely held corporation who was wrongfully denied records, where there was clear and convincing evidence that the corporation and its president/treasurer engaged in dilatory tactics and with an intent to mislead the shareholder. President/treasurer's conduct also subjected him to a forfeiture award under R.C. 1701.94 and precluded indemnification under the company's bylaws.

knowingly and intelligently represented himself at trial; manifest weight

domestic violence, sufficiency, manifest weight, knowingly, R.C. 2919.25(A), mens rea

sufficiency of the evidence, manifest weight of the evidence, R.C. 4511.19(A)(1)(a), meaning of "under the influence."

Appellant's conviction for theft by deception in violation of R.C. 2913.02(A)(3) was supported by sufficient evidence and not against the manifest weight of the evidence. However, because the trial court did not afford appellant her right to allocution at sentencing, the trial court's judgment was reversed and remanded for the limited purpose of resentencing to afford appellant her right to allocution as provided by Crim.R. 32(A)(1). WITH DISSENTING OPINION.

By stipulating to the admission of a cell phone download, which included text messages recovered from the phone, and by failing to object to any of the individual text messages offered by the state into evidence, appellant waived his right to challenge the admissibility of the evidence. Appellant's weapons and drug-related convictions were not against the manifest weight of the evidence. WITH CONCURRING OPINION.

Trial court did not abuse its discretion in confirming a commissioners' report and finding that land owned by appellant and appellee could not be partitioned, because doing so would cause manifest injury to its value where the resulting parcels would not comply with local zoning requirements. The trial court provided adequate notice that zoning variance issues would be considered at the final evidentiary hearing, the commissioners' report was supported by competent credible evidence, and the court was under no obligation to provide appellant additional time to seek a zoning variance that was unlikely to be granted.

The trial court erred in accepting appellant's no contest plea where the trial court failed to advise appellant during the plea colloquy that by entering his no contest plea, he was waiving his right to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses. As the trial court failed to explain a constitutional right set forth in Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(c), we presume the plea was entered involuntarily and unknowingly and appellant did not need to show prejudice to have his plea vacated. WITH DISSENTING OPINION.

Release of escrowed rent to tenant affirmed. Landlord waived notice of rent escrow proceedings because it did not provide tenant with an Ohio address as required by R.C. 5321.18. Tenant's testimony that mold at rental home was not addressed by landlord was uncontroverted and merited release of the escrowed rent to her.

Defendant's conviction for having a weapon while under disability was not against the manifest weight of the evidence.

Although it was unclear whether Preble County was the proper venue, the Preble County Juvenile Court had subject-matter jurisdiction over the dependency cases of the appellant's children.

Maximum Sentences, Consideration of Sentencing Factors. Trial court did not err in sentencing defendant to a maximum sentence. Defendant challenges the conclusions reached when the trial court considered the statutory sentencing factors. Such consideration is not subject to appellate review pursuant to State v. Jones, 2020-Ohio-6729.

CIVIL - summary judgment; breach of contract; equitable estoppel; genuine issue of material fact; no-oral modification provision; waiver; subsequent conduct; detrimental reliance; reasonableness.

FINAL APPEALABLE ORDER - foreclosure; R.C. 2505.02(B); Civ.R. 54; each party's rights and responsibilities; validity and priority of liens; nunc pro tunc; clerical errors; legal nullity.

CRIMINAL LAW - Fourth Amendment; suppression of evidence; traffic stop; canine sniff; sufficient evidence; manifest weight of the evidence; improperly handling firearm in motor vehicle; having weapon while under disability; constructive possession; possession of cocaine; knowingly.

CRIMINAL LAW - felonious assault; fight with neighbors; notice of intent to assert affirmative defense of self-defense; speedy trial; statutory right; R.C. 2945.71; 270 days; triple count; tolling provisions; defendant did not respond to reciprocal discovery order or the state's motion; other tolling events; untimely notice; Crim.R. 12.2; R.C. 2945.72(E); no statutory violation; no constitutional speedy-trial violation.

CRIMINAL LAW - aggravated possession of drugs; indictment issued over two and one-half years after stop and two years after results of testing were received; dash cam video evidence destroyed; no ability to review and challenge stop; motion to dismiss; preindictment delay; must demonstrate actual prejudice; appellant elucidated basis for prejudice; dismissal affirmed.

EXTRAORDINARY WRITS - complaint for writ of mandamus; public records request; R.C. 149.43; documents relating to an alleged assault in correctional facility; petitioner's son; statutory damages sought; video documentation; default judgment inappropriate; service; motions for summary judgment; evidence of compliance with requests; evidentiary quality materials; records custodian not required to create new records or documents; complaint denied; petitioner not entitled to statutory damages.

Trial court did not err when it did not merge defendant's rape conviction and gross sexual imposition conviction for sentencing because rape and gross sexual imposition were not allied offenses of similar import; record does not clearly and convincingly fail to support the trial court's imposition of consecutive sentences; trial counsel did not render ineffective assistance of counsel.

Mandamus—Public-records requests—R.C. 149.43—Public office failed to comply with its obligations under R.C. 149.43(B)—Limited writ granted and $1,000 in statutory damages awarded.

On certification of default.

Trial court review of arbitration award

Motion to Reconsideration; Guardianship

Attorneys at law—Resignation with disciplinary action pending—Gov.Bar R. VI(11)(C).

Manifest weight of the evidence; Sufficiency of the evidence

Administrative appeal

Judges—Misconduct—Violations of the Code of Judicial Conduct—Conditionally stayed six-month suspension.

Divorce-Ohio Public Employees Retirement System-former wife was not entitled to a constructive trust over 25 percent of survivor benefits paid to former husband's surviving spouse.

DOMESTIC RELATIONS — PARENTING TIME — R.C. 3109.051(D) MODIFICATION — DUE PROCESS — CUMULATIVE EVIDENCE — NOTICE — FORFEITURE: The trial court did not abuse its discretion when it denied appellant-mother's motion to modify appellee-father's parenting time because evidence in the record of Father's progress in his relationship with his children supported the trial court's determination that an increase in parenting time was in the children's best interest under R.C. 3109.051. The trial court did not abuse its discretion when it limited appellant-mother's evidence to events that occurred after 2022 because evidence of appellee-father's 2013 conviction was cumulative to the evidence of that conviction that was already in the record, and because the trial court's temporal limitation was consistent with a 2022 agreed entry reinstating appellee-father's parenting time that the parties submitted six months after appellee-father was charged with domestic violence. Appellant-mother forfeited her challenge to the admission of the GAL's testimony on appeal because she failed to object to the GAL's testimony at the hearing and failed to argue that the admission of that testimony was plain error.

The trial court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that the plaintiff did not properly serve the defendant pursuant to Civ.R. 4.4(A)(1). The trial court, therefore, did not err in granting the defendant's motion to vacate the default judgment based on the trial court's lack of personal jurisdiction over the defendant.

R.C. 3129.02(A)(2) — GENDER-AFFIRMING CARE — MEDICAL CARE OF CHILDREN — PARENTS' FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS — DUE COURSE OF LAW — HEALTH CARE FREEDOM AMENDMENT: The trial court erred in applying rational basis review to parents' claim that R.C. 3129.02(A)(2)'s categorical ban on gender-affirming pharmaceutical medical care for minors diagnosed with gender dysphoria violates parents' fundamental right under the Ohio Constitution to direct and obtain medical treatment for their children that has been recommended by qualified medical professionals and is consistent with the prevailing standards of care. Such a sweeping and inflexible ban on parents' ability to access medical care for their children is not narrowly tailored to advance the state's articulated interest: the protection of children. Applying strict scrutiny, R.C. 3129.02(A)(2) facially violates Ohio parents' right to substantive due process under the Due Course of Law Clause of the Ohio Constitution. Moreover, R.C. 3129.02(A)(2) facially violates the Health Care Freedom Amendment to the Ohio Constitution, as adopted by voters, because it impermissibly prohibits parents, acting on behalf of their minor children, from accessing treatment protocols in accordance with the standards of care and guidelines widely accepted in the professional medical community to treat gender dysphoria in minors by subjecting medical care providers who follow accepted medical practices to professional discipline. Judgment reversed and cause remanded for imposition of a permanent injunction as to enforcement of R.C. 3129.02(A)(2)'s categorical ban on transgender minors' access to gender-affirming pharmaceutical medical care.

ADMINISTRATIVE CHILD SUPPORT ORDER – OHIO ADM.CODE 5101:12-45-05.3(D) – CONTEMPT – R.C. 2705.02: Because father did not timely object to the administrative child support order in the manner provided by Ohio Adm.Code 5101:12-45-05.3(D) and uncontroverted evidence established he had actual notice of the hearing and a full and fair opportunity to appear and defend against issuance of that order, the trial court did not err in adopting, over father's objections, the magistrate's decision enforcing the administrative child support order as an order of the court and finding Mr. McCall in contempt for nonpayment of child support. Judgment affirmed

The trial court did not err in denying appellant's motion for sentencing on an alleged "hanging charge" for an offense of felonious assault underlying appellant's felony murder conviction because the argument was barred by res judicata and based on an erroneous understanding of the felony murder conviction.

The trial court did not abuse its discretion in overruling appellant's objections to a magistrate's decision and approving and adopting the magistrate's decision regarding the guardianship of appellant's daughter.

Appellant's convictions for purposeful and felony murder with firearm specifications were supported by sufficient evidence and not against the manifest weight of the evidence. Trial court erred in permitting introduction of a business card representing appellant's involvement in a rap music production business, but error did not affect substantial rights and, therefore, was harmless.

Judgment affirmed. In this appeal challenging the amount ordered child support, appellant failed to rebut the presumption under R.C. 3119.03 that the trial court ordered "the correct amount of child support due," or that the trial court abused its discretion when applying the provisions of R.C. 3119.231 that govern a downward deviation in child support based on extended parenting time with the obligor.

Appellant's convictions affirmed because they were supported by sufficient evidence and were not against the manifest weight of the evidence. Based on the record contained on direct appeal, appellant cannot establish that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to call witnesses or failing to advise appellant to testify at trial. The trial court did not err by referring to a determination of appellant's 'guilt or innocence,' because no reasonable juror would believe the incidental reference to innocence shifted the state's burden of proof. The trial court committed a clerical error by including consecutive-sentence findings in the sentencing entry that were not made at the sentencing hearing, in addition to consecutive-sentence findings that were made at the sentencing hearing, but that error can be corrected through a nunc pro tunc entry.

Motion for leave to file a motion for new trial; murder; new witness; recanting witness; affidavit testimony; Crim.R. 33; newly discovered evidence; unavoidably prevented. - Judgment affirmed. Tucker's motion for leave to file a motion for new trial fails to make the required showing that Tucker was unavoidably prevented from discovering an allegedly previously unknown witness, and Tucker's arguments regarding a recanting witness are barred by res judicata.

Suppression/Search Warrant

direct and indirect contempt; issues not addressed in trial court's judgment cannot be addressed in appeal

There was subject matter jurisdiction on first voluntary dismissal; two voluntary dismissals; savings statute inapplicable; Civ.R. 60(B) motion properly denied.)

distracted driving under R.C. 4511.204 overturned upon exception for cell phone held "directly near" ear

evidence proving engaging in pattern of corrupt activity; Reagan Tokes information must be stated at sentencing hearing and included in sentencing entry

planned permanent living arrangement – objection – Juv.R. 40 – failure to preserve the issue – six-month extension of temporary custody – significant progress on the case plan

legal custody – best interest of the child – preponderance of the evidence – manifest weight of the evidence – six-month extension of temporary custody – clear and convincing evidence

Elections—Mandamus—Validation of signatures on nominating petition—Would-be candidate failed to show that board of elections abused its discretion in refusing to certify his name for placement on primary-election ballot or that board had duty to reconsider its decision at a public meeting or hearing—Writ denied.

Elections—Mandamus—R.C. 519.12(H)—Writ sought to compel board of elections to place a zoning referendum on primary-election ballot—Because referendum petition's summary of zoning amendment was misleading, board of elections did not abuse its discretion or act in clear disregard of applicable legal provisions when it sustained protest against the petition and decertified the zoning referendum from ballot—Writ denied.

Conditional term of incarceration not contrary to law; whether trial court advised defendant of all possible sanctions for violating community control not ripe for review

Right to appeal under R.C. 2506.01

Right to appeal under R.C. 2506.01

Right to appeal under R.C. 2506.01

Right to appeal under R.C. 2506.01

Right to appeal under R.C. 2506.01

Right to appeal under R.C. 2506.01

Right to appeal under R.C. 2506.01

Right to appeal under R.C. 2506.01

Right to appeal under R.C. 2506.01

Right to appeal under R.C. 2506.01

Right to appeal under R.C. 2506.01

Anders brief no non-frivolous issues found

Felony sentencing; maximum sentence

Calculation of post-release control time

Substantial impairment rape; sufficiency of the evidence; hearsay; failure to object; ineffective assistance of counsel. Judgment vacated. The State failed to produce sufficient evidence that the defendant knew of the alleged victim's substantial impairment. Counsel was ineffective for not objecting to the victim's hearsay testimony that a bartender told her that other woman at the bar had been drugged, as well as other witnesses' hearsay testimony.

Crim.R. 29; sufficiency of the evidence; manifest weight of the evidence; ineffective assistance of counsel; hearsay testimony; sentence contrary to law. The trial court did not err when it denied appellant's motion for acquittal under Crim.R. 29 because there was sufficient evidence to convict the appellant. Appellant's convictions were not against the manifest weight of the evidence. The appellant was not deprived of his right to effective assistance of counsel. The trial court did not allow inadmissible hearsay testimony. The appellant's sentence was not contrary to law.

Magistrate's decision; breach of lease; late fees; local rules. The trial court did not err in adopting the magistrate's decision and further concluding that the appellant's request for monetary damages was improper under the local rules.

Equitable contribution, summary judgment, declaratory judgment, life estate, de novo review. Judgment affirmed. The trial court did not err by granting summary judgment in favor of appellee and declaring that she was not required to reimburse appellant for the monies he paid towards the tax liens because the surrender of appellee's life estate without compensation was sufficient contribution.

Ineffective assistance of counsel; objections; trial strategy; consecutive sentences; R.C. 2929.14(C)(4). Judgment affirmed. Trial counsel's purported failure to object to a witness's testimony amounts to a trial strategy that, even if debatable, does not rise to the level of ineffective assistance. Moreover, the defendant fails to establish that trial counsel's alleged deficient performance prejudiced the defense. Accordingly, we cannot say that the defendant received ineffective assistance of trial counsel. Further, we find that the trial court engaged in the proper analysis, considered the required statutory criteria, and made the necessary findings before imposing consecutive sentences. The record clearly supports the trial court's findings that consecutive sentences were appropriate in this case.

Felonious assault; strangulation; abduction; inducing panic; domestic violence; Crim.R. 29 motion; manifest weight of the evidence; merger; effective assistance of counsel; court's witness; restitution. Judgment affirmed in part; reversed in part. The State presented sufficient evidence to support the convictions, and the convictions were not against the manifest weight of the evidence. There was no plain error in the trial court's failure to merge the counts. The harm caused by each count was separate and/or committed with a separate animus. Counsel was not ineffective for failing to seek merger of the counts. The trial court did not abuse its discretion by allowing the State to call the victim as a court witness, even if the State was not surprised by the victim's recantation. The city and its police department were not victims, and thus the order of restitution in their favor was error. Convictions affirmed; restitution order reversed.

Declaratory judgment; quiet title; deed; fraudulent transfer; motion for summary judgment; voluntary satisfaction; judgment; stay; moot. Appeal dismissed as moot. Plaintiff claimed that defendants defrauded her out of her home and recorded a fraudulent deed. The trial court granted plaintiff's motion for summary judgment, voided the fraudulent deed, and entered declaratory judgment ordering that the subject property is quieted and all right, title and interest is vested in plaintiff. Plaintiff recorded a copy of the trial court's judgment entry with the Cuyahoga County Fiscal Office. The next day, defendants filed the instant appeal and sought a stay of the judgment with the trial court five days later. The trial court denied the stay as moot, finding that plaintiff has already executed the judgment. It is a well-established principle of law that a satisfaction of judgment renders an appeal from that judgment moot. Here, defendants failed to obtain a stay of the trial court's judgment nullifying a quitclaim deed to the subject property prior to plaintiff quieting title against the defendants. Therefore, the appeal is moot.

Permanent custody; R.C. 2151.414(B)(1); R.C. 2151.414(D)(1); best interest of the child, reasonable efforts; manifest weight; legal custody; termination of parental rights. Judgment affirmed. The termination of Mother's parental rights and granting of permanent custody to the Agency was not against the manifest weight of the evidence. Mother did not complete the case-plan services, which included services for substance abuse and mental health, or did not demonstrate she benefitted from services. The juvenile court did not err when it denied the motion for legal custody of three of the Children to a maternal aunt because it was not in the children's best interest. The juvenile court did not err when it found that reasonable efforts had been made to reunify Mother with the Children.

Motion for continuance; due process; abuse of discretion. Judgment affirmed. The juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in denying Father's motion for continuance or violate his right to due process. The record before us does not suggest that Father exhibited cooperation or communicated with counsel and the juvenile court and fails to demonstrate good cause for a continuance. Moreover, after weighing the potential prejudice to Father against the juvenile court's right to control its docket and the public's interest in the prompt and efficient dispatch of justice, we cannot say that the juvenile court acted unreasonably, arbitrarily, or unconscionably in denying Father's motion.

Permanent custody; continuance; R.C. 2151.414(A)(2); Juv.R. 4(A); discretion; R.C. 2151.414(B)(1); R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(d); best interest; R.C. 2151.414(D)(1); R.C. 2151.414(D)(2); R.C. 2151.414(E); clear and convincing; manifest weight. Affirmed the juvenile court's judgments granting permanent custody of two children to the agency and terminating mother's parental rights. The juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in denying a request for a continuance of the permanent-custody trial. The juvenile court engaged in the proper analysis and made the requisite determinations under R.C. 2151.414(B)(1) and 2151.414(D) and (E), and its judgments were not against the manifest weight of the evidence.

Relator filed no objection to the magistrate's recommendation to dismiss the mandamus complaint because its accompanying affidavit failed to comply with the requirements of R.C. 2969.25. Finding no error of law or other defect evident on the face of the magistrate's decision, it is adopted in full and the relator's complaint is dismissed.

The trial court did not err in granting appellees' motion for summary judgment on appellant's claims related to appellees' implementation and enforcement of COVID-19 policies and protocols. The statute of limitations bars appellant's claims related to certain Columbus City Council meetings in 2020, and both the City of Columbus and individual employees of the city are entitled to immunity on appellant's intentional tort claims brought under state law. Appellant failed to demonstrate the existence of a genuine issue of material fact on his claims of infringement of his right to religious expression, deprivation of civil rights, infringement of his freedom of speech and of the press, violations of the Takings Clause, and conspiracy. Additionally, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in impliedly denying the motion to compel discovery by ruling on the motion for summary judgment, and we deny appellant's motion to take judicial notice. Judgment affirmed.

Trial court did not err in granting summary judgment in favor of appellee on appellant's claim alleging a violation of the right to privacy.

CRIM.R. 44 — WAIVER OF COUNSEL — VENUE — FELONIOUS ASSAULT — IMPROPERLY DISCHARGING A FIREARM AT OR INTO A HABITATION — EVIDENCE — SUFFICIENCY: The trial court substantially complied with the requisite Crim.R. 44 colloquy during its extensive inquiry to determine whether defendant was intelligently, knowingly, and voluntarily waiving his right to counsel and appointed standby counsel who was present throughout the trial, and therefore, defendant was not deprived of the effective assistance of trial counsel. The trial court did not err in entering convictions for two counts of felonious assault and one count of having weapons while under a disability where the State proved venue beyond a reasonable doubt through circumstantial and direct evidence. Defendant is discharged from his conviction for receiving stolen property where the State concedes the record is devoid of evidence that defendant knew the handgun used in the commission of the offenses was stolen. Defendant's conviction for improperly discharging a firearm at or into a habitation was supported by sufficient evidence where defendant's identity as a complicitor in the offenses was established by video evidence from surveillance cameras and witness testimony—one being a codefendant—and where defendant conceded on appeal that he made statements to encourage his codefendant to shoot the victim, who was standing in front of his home when the codefendant opened fire.

JAIL-TIME CREDIT — MOOTNESS — POSTRELEASE CONTROL: Defendant's appeal was not moot where, although his prison sentence was completed by the time his appeal was heard, he remained under postrelease control, which satisfies his burden of demonstrating an adverse legal consequence of his conviction. The trial court did not err in denying defendant's motion for jail-time credit where the credit he sought was served pending a different, unrelated criminal conviction.

On certification of default of child support order.

Mandamus—Jail-time credit—Appellant failed to establish entitlement to writ—Alleged errors regarding award of jail-time credit not cognizable in mandamus—Court of appeals' judgment affirmed.

Failure to object to magistrate decision forfeit right to appeal; Valuation of business; Division of marital property

Judges—Affidavits of disqualification—R.C. 2701.03—Affidavit of disqualification granted to allay any concerns about fairness and integrity of proceedings and to assure parties and public of unquestioned neutrality of trial judge.

Appellant's convictions for having weapons while under disability and a firearm specification were supported by sufficient evidence. The court had jurisdiction to try appellant on the firearm specification, collateral estoppel did not bar the prosecution for having weapons while under disability, and defense counsel was not ineffective for failing to move for dismissal. The trial court did not violate Evid.R. 404(B); the court was free to consider evidence from the jury trial at the bench trial. Appellant's sentence was not contrary to law and was supported by the evidence. Judgment affirmed.

The trial court erred in granting a directed verdict in favor of appellees-patients on appellant-physicians' counterclaim for breach of contract. Although the court found the contract unconscionable, there were genuine issues of fact concerning whether the contract was substantively unconscionable. The court did not err in rejecting appellant's claim for unjust enrichment where the parties had entered into an express contract. The court did not abuse its discretion in allowing the testimony of appellees' billing expert or in refusing to bifurcate the trial. Appellees did not waive any defenses, and the court did not err in allowing them to amend their answer during trial; appellant was well aware of the parties' positions and did not object at trial to amendment of the answer or to the defenses raised. The trial court also did not err in denying appellant's motion for summary judgment on his counterclaim, as there were genuine issues of material fact as to the validity of the contract. Finally, objections to the court's limitation of appellant's attorney fee request to expenses associated with his counterclaim are premature because the court bifurcated the attorney fee claim, and no trial was ever held on that point, and because we are reversing and remanding the trial court's judgment with respect to the counterclaim. Judgment reversed and remanded.

The trial court did not err in granting summary judgment to appellee-hospital on appellants' claim for violation of the Ohio Consumer Sales Practices Act. The hospital had no duty to inform appellants about the billing practices of an independent contractor physician who treated appellants after they came to the hospital's emergency room. However, the court did err in granting summary judgment to appellee-physician on appellants' fraud claims. There were genuine issues of material fact concerning whether the physician acted fraudulently and with actual malice, in conscious disregard of appellants' rights. The court also erred in granting the physician summary judgment on appellants' claims for breach of the physician's contracts with the hospital. Appellants were clearly intended third-party beneficiaries of those contracts and could assert breach of contract claims. Judgment affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.

The trial court did not err in affirming the decision of the Ohio Department of Job and Family Services denying appellant Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program benefits. His family's income exceeded the income eligibility standard for benefits following his new marriage. Judgment affirmed.

The $9 in costs imposed at appellant's sentencing pursuant to Marsy's Law was mandatory, but the juvenile court had discretion to waive it. Because appellant requested a waiver, the court erred in failing to exercise its discretion and evaluate his indigency for purposes of paying the costs. Judgment reversed and remanded as to the imposition of costs. In all other respects, judgment affirmed.

Appellant's convictions on three counts of felonious assault, with attendant firearm specifications, were supported by sufficient evidence and were not against the manifest weight of the evidence. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in instructing the jury on the element of knowingly. Appellant's sentences on the felonious assault offenses were not contrary to law. Pursuant to State v. Beatty, 2024-Ohio-5684, only two of the three prison terms on the firearm specifications could be imposed consecutively; the imposition of the third consecutive firearm specification was contrary to law. Judgment reversed as to the third firearm specification and remanded for resentencing on that specification. In all other respects, judgment affirmed.

The misinformation concerning appellant's post-release control in the plea form did not prejudice appellant and therefore does not warrant vacating his guilty plea to domestic violence. Because the trial court failed to give certain statutorily-required advisements about appellant's duty to enroll in the violent offender database, the portion of the trial court's judgment pertaining to that duty is reversed, and the matter is remanded for the trial court to comply with the statutory requirements. Judgment affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.

Application to reopen appeal; App.R. 26(B).

Zmuda, J., writing for the majority affirms the stay for arbitration pursuant to R.C. 2711.02(B), as a trial court properly stays the entire action pending arbitration of the arbitrable issue before proceeding in the case.

Judge Duhart. Wrongful imprisonment. Res judicata.

Osowik - Evidence was sufficient to establish that appellant violated R.C. 2903.22(A)(1) where victim testified that she believed that it was possible that appellant would touch her. The conviction was not against the manifest weigh of the evidence. Judgment affirmed.

Sulek - Beneficiary's decision to not exercise a joint option to purchase a property jointly that was granted in a trust agreement and subsequent "release" of that right is akin to declining the option, and is not a "disclaimer" of that right for purposes of R.C. 5815.36.

Osowik - Appellant's attempted murder conviction was supported by sufficient evidence, and was not against the manifest weight of the evidence. Trial court did not err in not merging abduction and domestic violence offenses with attempted murder offense, as they were committed separately, with separate harm, and thus, were not allied offenses. Judgement affirmed.

domestic-violence conviction supported by sufficient evidence and not against the manifest weight of the evidence; request for new appointed counsel denied

manifest injustice, withdrawal of plea, post-sentence, involuntary, ineffective assistance of counsel

Public Records; R.C. 2743.75(D)(2); A case may be dismissed pursuant to R.C. 2743.75(D)(2) if the requester has abused the public records laws; Abuse of the public records law is evidenced by excessive numbers of public records requests and/or enforcement actions; Abuse of the public records laws is evidenced by a requester making multiple records requests or filing multiple enforcement actions in rapid succession; Abuse of the public records laws is evidenced by the requester making duplicative records requests or filing duplicative enforcement actions; Abuse of the public records laws is evidenced by the requester using records requests or enforcement actions to demean the public office or its employees; A case may be dismissed pursuant to R.C. 2743.75(D)(2) if the court lacks the capacity to grant the relief requested.

Felony Sentencing; R.C. 2953.08(G)(2); R.C. 2929.11; R.C. 2929.12; Crim.R. 11; Substitution of Counsel. Defendant-appellant's prison sentence is not clearly and convincingly contrary to law. Defendant-appellant did not demonstrate that his plea was anything other than knowing, intelligent, and voluntary. The trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying defendant-appellant's request for new counsel.

Speedy Trial; R.C. 2945.71; R.C. 2945.72; R.C. 2945.73; Indictment; Crim.R. 7(D); Motion to Amend Indictment; Trafficking in Cocaine; Trafficking in Heroin; Trafficking in a Fentanyl-Related Compound; Sufficiency of Evidence; Manifest Weight; Merger. Defendant-appellant's constitutional right to a speedy trial was not violated. The trial court did not err by granting the plaintiff-appellee's motion to amend the indictment. Defendant-appellant's trafficking-in-drugs convictions are supported by sufficient evidence and are not against the manifest weight of the evidence. The trial court did not err by failing to merge defendant-appellant's trafficking-in-cocaine, trafficking-in-heroin, and trafficking-in-a-fentanyl-related-compound offenses for sentencing.

The trial court erred in awarding spousal support to appellee where appellee had specifically withdrawn his request for spousal support and appellant relied upon that withdrawal in the presentation of his case.

Trial court did not err in denying defendant's request for new counsel where defendant later withdrew his request and entered a valid guilty plea.

The trial court did not err in accepting appellant's guilty plea where the record reflects the court complied with Crim. R. 11 and his plea was knowing, voluntary, and intelligent in all respects.

Trial court did not err in entering final judgment where plaintiff's attempt to dismiss only remaining claims under Civ.R. 41(A)(1)(a), while preserving prior summary judgment rulings, was a legal nullity. Trial court did not err in granting summary judgment to nursing home where son's personal liability arose from breach of contractual duty to manage mother's resources rather than from prohibited third-party payment guarantee under Federal Nursing Home Reform Act. Trial court did not err in calculating damages based on diverted funds rather than Medicaid rates where nursing home was entitled to private-pay rates before resident established Medicaid eligibility. Trial court did not err in granting summary judgment on Consumer Sales Practices Act counterclaim where nursing home's contract enforcement and debt collection practices had colorable legal basis and did not constitute deceptive or unconscionable conduct.

CRIMINAL - Possession of Drugs; R.C. 225.11; warrantless search; motion to suppress search; third-party consent; voluntariness of consent; automobile exception; odor of marijuana.

CIVIL LAW - declaratory judgment; summary judgment; Civ.R. 56; contracts; ambiguity; exclusion of the word 'expired' from contract's exclusions did not create ambiguity and was not against public policy.

CRIMINAL LAW - sentencing; R.C. 2953.08(G); failure to comply; R.C. 2921.331(C)(5)(b); additional sentencing factors; presentence investigation; sentence was not contrary to law.

EXTRAORDINARY WRIT - petition for procedendo; improper case caption; not entitled to a writ of procedendo; adequate remedy at law; no evidence of filing in lower court.

CRIMINAL LAW - sentencing; failure to comply; R.C. 2921.331; prior conviction; mandatory lifetime driver's license suspension; Eighth Amendment; cruel and unusual punishment; constitutional; lifetime driver's license suspension is not disproportionate.

POSTCONVICTION RELIEF - due process violations; doctrine of res judicata; ineffective assistance of counsel; sufficient operative facts; evidentiary documents; findings of fact and conclusions of law; leave to amend petition; abuse of discretion.

CRIMINAL - Violating a Protection Order; R.C. 2919.27; sufficiency of the evidence; manifest weight of the evidence; recklessness; R.C. 2901.22(C); ineffective assistance of counsel; trial strategy

Mandamus—Relator failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that he sent a public-records request to city's chief of police against whom he filed action or city's police department—Writ and relator's request for statutory damages denied.

Mandamus—Public Records Act—R.C. 149.43—Public-records requester not entitled to writ, because he failed to present evidence to rebut respondent's averment in affidavit that no responsive records exist for the first two public-records requests and because requester already has copies of records containing the information he asked for in his third public-records request—Writ and requests for statutory damages, court costs, and attorney fees denied.

Mandamus—Public-records requests—Inmate failed to show by clear and convincing evidence that prison failed to provide kites he had sent to prison library, that prison possesses or has control over kites he sent to third-party vendor that supplies and services electronic tablets provided to inmates, or that before providing copy to him prison removed any fields from kite he had requested—Inmate failed to show existence of inmate sign-in sheet he had requested, admits that he has received property-room form and grievance he requested, and failed to provide evidence refuting prison's assertion that prison video footage he requested no longer exists—Writs denied, relator's requests for statutory damages denied in case Nos. 2024-0740, 2024-0747, and 2024-0846, and $1,000 in statutory damages awarded in case No. 2024-0856.

Mandamus—Public-records requests—R.C. 149.43—Because all records responsive to public-records request were provided, court of appeals correctly determined that petition for writ was moot—Upon finding that a writ claim is moot, the correct disposition is to deny the writ—Court of appeals' judgment modified and judgment denying petition as moot entered.

Appellant's convictions for aggravated murder and having a weapon while under disability, both with accompanying firearm specifications, were not against the manifest weight of the evidence, nor were they based on legally insufficient evidence, where appellant was found hiding in the trunk of his girlfriend's car with the murder weapon minutes after a shooting. Appellant's right to confront witnesses under the Confrontation Clause of the United States Constitution and the Ohio Constitution was not violated by the state's failure to produce the witnesses heard on the video recordings of law enforcement officers' body-worn cameras because their statements, made minutes after the shooting, had the primary purpose of assisting the officers during an ongoing emergency and were therefore nontestimonial in nature. Judgment affirmed.

The magistrate correctly found there was some evidence in the record supporting the commission's order denying temporary total disability ("TTD") compensation for the period of September 7, 2022 through November 7, 2022. The magistrate further correctly found the commission's determination denying relator's second request for TTD compensation for an identical time period was entirely proper based upon principles of res judicata. Writ of mandamus denied.

Because a reasonably prudent person would foresee that vandals would use the removal of the protective fencing on the north side of an overpass to throw or drop objects onto the highway below, the Ohio Department of Transportation owed a special duty to the motorists on the highway to take adequate measures to prevent vandalism. The Ohio Department of Transportation breached its duty to a passenger in a vehicle traveling on the highway below the overpass because it took no measures to prevent future vandalism after removing the protective fencing from the overpass. A reasonably prudent person would anticipate that taking no measures to prevent vandalism would result in damage to persons and property from the projectiles launched from the overpass. Thus, the passenger's death was a natural and probable consequence of the Ohio Department of Transportation's negligence. Finally, the Ohio Department of Transportation was not entitled to discretionary immunity where it did not make a discretionary policy decision to take no action but, instead, took no action because it did not perceive a problem.

Judgment reversed. Although appellant did not answer the complaint for divorce, appellant's appearance at the final hearing and statement informing the trial court she "needed more time" to answer the complaint should have alerted the court to the fact she intended to contest some issue in the divorce. Because the trial court did not offer appellant an opportunity to present evidence, cross-examine the witnesses, or present an argument at the final hearing, the court erred by denying her a meaningful opportunity to participate in the final hearing. The trial court did not abuse its discretion by failing to continue the final hearing.

The trial court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of appellees because it incorrectly applied the requirements of the saving statute, R.C. 2903.19. Judgment reversed; cause remanded.

On review of magistrate's decision in this public records case, recommending dismissal of petition for writ of mandamus for failure to comply with R.C. 2969.25. As relator failed to file objections, and as we have found no error of law or other defect on the face of the magistrate's decision, we adopt it as our own, including the findings of fact and conclusions of law as they are set forth in the decision. Respondent Ohio Dept. of Rehab. & Corr. ("ODRC")'s motion to dismiss is granted, relator's complaint is dismissed, and relator's motion for default judgment is dismissed as moot.

The magistrate properly applied the relevant law to the facts of the case concluding that the respondent's motion to dismiss should be granted as the relators can prove no set of facts entitling them to the relief they seek in mandamus. Moreover, while the respondent did not technically comply with Loc.R. 2(E), the error is harmless and cannot provide a basis for reversal as there was no delay or prejudice from the respondent serving the relators by email. Therefore, we adopt the magistrate's decision as our own, including the findings of fact and conclusions of law contained therein. The relators' objections are overruled, and we dismiss the relators' complaint for a writ of mandamus.

INSURANCE — VACANCY — CUSTOMARY OPERATIONS — BAD FAITH — SUMMARY JUDGMENT: Where the customary operations of the insured property were those of a church or synagogue, and where the property was not being used for those purposes, but rather was used as a warehouse, the trial court did not err in granting summary judgment to the insurer on a claim for breach of contract because the insurer properly denied coverage under a vacancy provision in the policy that required at least 31 percent of the property be used to conduct customary operations. Where the insurer had a reasonable justification to deny coverage, the insurer did not act in bad faith and the trial court properly granted summary judgment to the insurer on the insured's claim for bad-faith denial of coverage.

The trial court did not abuse its discretion or otherwise err in issuing its decision and judgment entry adopting the December 15, 2023 magistrate's decision in which the magistrate granted sole custody of the parties' minor child to Father, with parenting time for Mother to be determined, and overruling Mother's objections to the magistrate's decision. Judgment affirmed.

MOTION TO WITHDRAW — INVOLUNTARY DISMISSAL: The trial court did not abuse its discretion in granting plaintiff's counsels' motion to withdraw where the record reflects that plaintiff's first attorney withdrew while plaintiff was still represented by two other attorneys from the same law firm, and where the record reflects that plaintiff attended a hearing on a motion to withdraw filed by the two remaining attorneys, who alleged that plaintiff had terminated their relationship, and plaintiff did not object to their withdrawal, and therefore, plaintiff waived any issue with regard to the withdrawal of his second and third attorneys. The trial court erred in sua sponte dismissing plaintiff's case under Civ.R. 41(B)(1) for plaintiff's failure to comply with a pretrial filing deadline where the trial court did not give plaintiff an opportunity to explain noncompliance with the pretrial filing deadline before dismissing plaintiff's case.

Delayed request for jury trial; Ineffective assistance of counsel

Manifest weight; Prosecutorial misconduct

Evidence; Operating a Vehicle Impaired ("OVI")

Sexual Battery - Gross Sexual Imposition - Failure to Record - Trial Court/Jury Questions - Others Acts Evidence - Manifest Weight/Sufficiency of Evidence - Ineffective Assistance of Counsel - Cumulative Error

Reagan Tokes, ineffective assistance of counsel, breach of plea bargain

search warrant, motion to suppress, Fourth Amendment, particularity requirement, staleness, confidential informant, hearsay, probable cause, drug trafficking

Civ.R. 15(A), motion to amend pleadings, Civ.R. 52, findings by the court

breach of contract – consumer sales practices act – home construction services act – home solicitation sales act – slander of title – mechanic's lien – consumer transaction – construction – repair – tree

R.C. 2945.71, speedy trial, tolling, Crim.R. 29, acquittal, obstructing official business

arguable merit, triable issues on face, motion for sanctions, R.C. 2323.51, Civ.R. 11, deny, hearing

Civ.R. 23 – class certification – rigorous analysis – law of the case

workers' compensation, injury, summary judgment, R.C. 4123.01(C)

Motion to modify/terminate spousal support due to retirement denied.

Motion for Resentencing was a Petition for Post-Conviction Relief Despite Caption - Res Judicata

Motion for reconsideration; Civ.R. 6; response time; due process; judgment on the pleadings; saving statute; statute of limitations; double-dismissal rule. Trial court did not violate plaintiff's due-process rights even though it ruled on motion for reconsideration before plaintiff's response deadline had passed because plaintiff filed a brief in opposition to the motion for judgment on the pleadings that was the subject of the reconsideration. Trial court erred in finding that plaintiff's third complaint was barred by Ohio's saving statute and the applicable statutes of limitations where first refiled complaint was dismissed by the trial court without prejudice pursuant to Civ.R. 41(A)(2), and Civ.R. 41(A)(2) does not include a double-dismissal rule. Late production of plaintiff's expert reports did not warrant dismissal where court did not grant defendants' motion to strike the reports.

Anders brief; lack of meritorious grounds for appeal; wholly frivolous; motion to withdraw; dismiss the appeal; plea made knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily; Crim.R. 11(C)(2); remand; nunc pro tunc; clerical error. Motion to withdraw pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), granted where there are no meritorious grounds for appeal. Case remanded for the trial court to issue nunc pro tunc judgment entries that reflect the offenses to which the defendant-appellant pleaded guilty and the sentences imposed.

Summary judgment, de novo review, trespass, prescriptive easement, nuisance, affidavit, personal knowledge. Judgment affirmed. Because appellate review of a trial court decision on a motion for summary judgment is de novo, a reviewing court may affirm a trial court's decision for a different reason. We affirm the trial court's judgment granting the appellee's motion for summary judgment on a ground different than the trial court. While the trial court found that the appellee had an express easement for one of the subject poles at issue and a prescriptive easement for the other two poles at issue, our de novo reveals that all three poles were subject to a prescriptive easement. Because the poles were subject to a prescriptive easement, appellant failed to demonstrate a trespass cause of action against appellee. We further find that the poles did not constitute a nuisance. The trial court properly disregarded portions of an affidavit as not being based on personal knowledge and containing conclusory averments.

Housing court; community control; violations of community control; sanctions; interior inspection; reasonably related; overbroad. Judgment reversed. The trial court's order requiring defendant to permit interior inspections of his two properties as a violation of his community control was not reasonably related to the goals of community control and overbroad and, therefore, impermissible.

Civil contempt; clear and convincing evidence; prima facie case; valid court order; knowledge of the order; violation of the order; abuse of discretion; agreed judgment entry; shared-parenting plan; intent of parties; order is subject to more than one reasonable interpretation; ambiguous. The trial court abused its discretion in finding Father in contempt for home-schooling the children because the language in the agreed judgment entry was ambiguous, and thus, there was not clear and convincing evidence that he had violated the court's order.

Operating a Vehichle Impaired ("OVI"); under the influence; Traf.R. 10; Traf.R. 10(D); Traf.R. 10(B); Traf.R. 1(B); Traf.R. 2(D); Crim.R. 11; Crim.R. 1(C)(3); traffic case; ordinance; misdemeanor; petty offense; plea; effect; no contest; accepted; never entered; conviction; nullity. Reversed appellant's conviction for operating a vehicle while under the influence, which was a petty misdemeanor traffic offense. Because the case involved the violation of a traffic ordinance, Traf.R. 10 applied, rather than Crim.R. 11. Appellant challenged whether the trial court complied with Traf.R. 10(B) and (D). Regardless of any deficiencies in informing appellant of the effect of the plea of no contest, the record showed that appellant never actually entered a plea of no contest, which was conceded by the city. Therefore, appellant's conviction was a nullity.

Sufficiency of the evidence; manifest weight; drug possession; R.C. 2925.11(A). Judgment affirmed. Appellant's conviction for possession of drugs was supported by sufficient evidence and was not against the manifest weight of the evidence. Appellant argued that he did not possess the pill bottle that was later found to contain methamphetamines. Both police officers' testimonies and video evidence showed that appellant had something in his hand that resembled the pill bottle, and later, as he was being apprehended by police, he crouched down near the spot where the pill bottle was found.

Manifest weight of the evidence. Judgment affirmed. Appellant's theft conviction was not against the manifest weight of the evidence. The trial court was in the best position to judge the witnesses' credibility, and this is not the exceptional case in which the evidence weighed heavily against the conviction.

Sentencing hearing; victim-impact statement; Marsy's Law; rights of crime victims; Ohio Const., art. I, § 10a; R.C. 2929.19(A); trial court discretion; nonvictim statements at sentencing hearing; victim's representative; R.C. 2930.02(A)(1); R.C. 2930.02(D). Trial court did not err by allowing the victim's mother to speak at the defendant's sentencing hearing, even though she was not a designated victim representative under Marsy's Law. Ohio law grants trial courts discretion to allow others besides victims to speak at sentencing hearings with the court's approval. Marsy's Law expanded the rights of crime victims but did not limit the trial court's preexisting discretion under R.C. 2929.19(A) to hear from other individuals. In addition, nothing in the record indicated the defendant was prejudiced by the trial court permitting the victim's mother to speak. When the trial court proceeded to sentencing, it focused on the statutory factors relevant to sentencing and did not mention the statements of the victim's mother.

On appeal of dismissal of operating a vehicle impaired ("OVI"), operating without license, driving with suspended license, failure to control, and refusing a chemical alcohol test while having a prior OVI conviction within the preceding 20 years, the City of Columbus asserts that the trial court committed plain error by dismissing the charges based on a violation of the defendant's right to a speedy trial. Review of the record demonstrates that dismissal pursuant to R.C. 2941.401 is improper because that statute's 180-day clock had not expired on the date of the dismissal, and dismissal based on R.C. 2945.71 is improper because the speedy trial clock was tolled between June 13, 2023 and September 19, 2023, and between October 19, 2023 and November 6, 2023 pursuant to R.C. 2945.72(H). The City of Columbus' sole assignment of error is sustained, and the judgment dismissing the case is reversed and remanded for further proceedings.

Order dismissing charge based on finding of incompetence to stand trial affirmed. Appellant failed to prove ineffective assistance of counsel in seeking second competency evaluation because she does not contest the psychologist's observations or conclusions and did not establish a reasonable probability of a different outcome if her counsel acted differently. Trial court did not err by finding appellant incompetent to stand trial because the second evaluation report was reliable and credible evidence supporting the trial court's decision.

Trial court did not err in denying appellant's motion to suppress; judgment of conviction affirmed

Defendant's convictions for Rape, Kidnapping, Attempted Rape, and Felonious Assault were supported by sufficient evidence. Furthermore, Defendant failed to show on appeal that his convictions were against the manifest weight of the evidence. Judgment affirmed.

Because appellant failed to raise a cognizable claim that the Ohio Parole Board denied him meaningful consideration for parole, the trial court did not err in granting the board's Civ.R. 12(B)(6) motion to dismiss. Judgment affirmed.

The trial court abused its discretion in denying petition for certificate of qualification for employment under R.C. 2953.25(C)(3) without first considering the rebuttable presumption in favor of granting the petition contained in R.C. 2953.25(C)(5). Judgment reversed and cause remanded for further consideration in accordance with the statutory framework set forth in R.C. 2953.25.

The probate court did not err in interpreting the language in the decedent's will that bequeathed to his daughter a motor vehicle of her choice other than "the one used by my wife." Additionally, the probate court did not err in determining from the evidence that the motor vehicle the daughter chose did not qualify as the motor vehicle the decedent's wife used at the time of the decedent's death.

GRAND JURY — DISCLOSE OF TRANSCRIPTS — PARTICULARIZED NEED: The trial court abused its discretion in ordering full disclosure of grand jury transcripts to defense counsel where lesser remedies would adequately furnish the factual bases necessary for the trial court to decide the defendant's motion to dismiss the indictment on allegations that the grand jury was biased due to the prosecution's failure to present substantially exculpatory evidence to the grand jury.

SENTENCING — R.C. 2953.08 — R.C. 2929.12 — IMMIGRATION STATUS: An appellate court cannot vacate or modify a sentence under R.C. 2953.08(G)(2)(b) based on its view that the imposed sentence is not supported by the record under R.C. 2929.11 and 2929.12. Pursuant to R.C. 2929.12(B), the trial court properly considered whether the offender's conduct constituted the worst form of the offense. Where the offender's immigration status was one of many considerations that the trial court relied on when imposing a maximum sentence, the court did not err in considering the immigration status under R.C. 2929.12.

Sentencing; Consecutive sentences; Findings on the record to impose consecutive terms; Sentencing entry

Final Appealable Order - Civ.R. 60(B)

Summary judgment; Motion to strike; Authentication; Affidavit; Breach of contract; Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act ("RESPA"); Damages; Default notice

Appellant has not established a due-process violation based on the State's failure to preserve bloody items recovered from the scene of the victim's kidnapping. The record does not reflect prosecutorial misconduct based on a failure to disclose the victim's cell-phone records or the identity of her cell-phone service provider. The trial court did not err in admitting testimony about the victim's bloody wallet and cell phone being found near the scene of her kidnapping. The record does not portray ineffective assistance of trial counsel. Appellant's convictions were supported by legally sufficient evidence and were not against the manifest weight of the evidence. Judgment affirmed.

The trial court did not err in denying appellant's untimely and successive Civ.R. 60(B) motion. Judgment affirmed.

The trial court did not err in overruling appellant's motion to suppress; the search warrant was supported by probable cause, and appellant was properly advised of all Miranda warnings prior to being interrogated. The trial court did not err in denying appellant's motion to dismiss based on venue where the indictment sufficiently identified the element of venue. Judgment affirmed.

The trial court did not err in allowing the jury to consider the agreed-upon exhibits during deliberations; the trial court's statements to counsel and the jury reflected that it had deemed those exhibits admitted. Appellant did not demonstrate that defense counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to cite Evid.R. 616(A) in seeking to ask a State's witness about her pending indictment on drug charges and motion for intervention in lieu of conviction. Judgment affirmed.

Appellant's argument that his 24.5-year sentence should actually be 23 years is barred by res judicata. Judgment affirmed.

Because appellant's pro se brief does not comply with the requirements of App.R. 16(A), including setting forth assignments of error or arguments supported by references to the record, we cannot address the merits of his appeal. Appeal dismissed.

The trial court did not err in determining that a Five Rivers Metroparks ranger possessed territorial jurisdiction to initiate a traffic stop of the appellant's vehicle on a public road adjacent to Metroparks property and adjacent to Miami Conservancy District property that Five Rivers Metroparks policed under a memorandum of understanding. Judgments affirmed.

Appellant's objection to the trial court's finding as to his lack of remorse is precluded by res judicata; this issue could have been raised on direct appeal, and our remand was limited to a different, specific issue. The trial court did not err by failing to give notice under Crim.R. 43(A)(2) of appellant's appearance for resentencing by video. Appellant waived his appearance in person during the resentencing hearing and did not object to any lack of notice. Appellant concedes that the trial court did not err in imposing court costs without considering his ability to pay. Judgment affirmed.

The trial court erred in dismissing a partition action for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, where the land was located within the trial court's jurisdiction and the action was not a collateral attack on the parties' prior divorce decree. Judgment reversed and remanded.

The trial court erred in dismissing defendant-appellant's counterclaim for breach of contract under Civ.R. 12(B)(6). The trial court did not err, however, in entering summary judgment for plaintiff-appellee on its foreclosure complaint. As for the trial court's overruling of a motion for disqualification, appellant lacks standing to raise the issue, as the motion was filed by a non-appellant co-defendant. In addition, a court of appeals lacks jurisdiction over disqualification and recusal issues involving common pleas court judges. Judgment affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.

Appellant's conviction for loitering to engage in solicitation was not against the manifest weight of the evidence even though the witnesses presented conflicting testimony. The credibility of the witnesses and the weight to be given to their testimony were matters for the trier of fact to resolve. In addition, the evidence presented, viewed in a light most favorable to the State, was sufficient to demonstrate that appellant acted purposely in engaging another in a conversation to solicit sexual activity for hire while in a public place. Judgment affirmed.

Osowik - Trial court did not err in granting appellee's motion to suppress. Under the totality of the circumstances, appellee's consent to search his motor vehicle was not knowingly given, due to appellee's English language barrier. Judgment affirmed.

Zmuda, J., writing for the majority, reverses the judgment and remands for evidence or stipulation as to undisputed facts, as necessary for finding the defendant demonstrated application of the statute, limiting his Second Amendment rights, was unconstitutional as applied to the facts of the case.

Per Mayle, J., Court is bound by stare decisis to apply legal standards enunciated by Ohio Supreme Court and will not adopt new standard. State asserted legitimate race-neutral reason for exercising peremptory challenge where juror said she would expect DNA evidence as part of proper protocol. State's misconduct did not clearly and unquestionably demonstrate intent to invite mistrial, thus retrial not barred by double jeopardy.

Duhart. Trial court did not err, and sentence was not contrary to law, where trial court made required findings for consecutive sentences at a second, "reconvened," sentencing hearing that was held prior to the issuance of a journalized judgment entry.

Zmuda, J., writing for the majority, find that trial court did not err in denying appellants' motions to suppress and that the state introduced sufficient evidence to support appellants' convictions. Judgment affirmed.

Zmuda, writing for the majority, affirms the convictions arising from misuse of charity funds, finding no abuse of discretion in precluding testimony and declining to provide "claim of right defense" jury instruction, finding the convictions supported by sufficient and credible evidence, finding no ineffective assistance of counsel, and finding costs imposed did not include non-mandatory costs.

Duhart. Reversing trial court's decision reversing denial of property owner's request for variance and denying municipality's request for injunction.

Duhart. The trial court did not employ the wrong legal standards as related to "materially exculpatory" evidence and/or its destruction. Nor did it err in failing to consider bad faith argument. It was not reversible error to mention records retention policies in decision granting dismissal. Also, no reversible error in dismissing all of the counts on the basis of a due process violation.

Judge Duhart, legal malpractice, statute of limitations, purported partnership under R.C. 1776.38(A).

Trial court did not err in denying appellant's motions to suppress and to sever, in imposing financial sanctions on appellant's felony sentence, or in disposition of appellant's minor misdemeanor traffic offense. Judgment affirmed.

Zmuda, J., writing for the majority, find that trial court erred in denying appellant's motion to suppress. Judgment reversed and remanded.

Municipal court judge and clerk of courts are immune from civil liability for claims arising from the performance of their duties. Further, under R.C. 1901.20, a municipal court has subject matter and personal judication over the violation of any ordinance or misdemeanor occurring within the territorial limits.

Zmuda, J., writing for the majority, affirms the dismissal of the complaint pursuant to Civ.R. 25, with the dismissal otherwise than on the merits and without determining the validity of any affirmative defense to the claims.

Per Mayle, J., the prosecution failed to present sufficient evidence that the victim had a subjective belief that appellant would cause him physical harm, so appellant's menacing conviction under R.C. 2903.22(A)(1) is not supported by sufficient evidence.

motion to suppress; Operating a Vehicle Impaired ("OVI"); R.C. 4511.19(D)(4)(b); field sobriety test; HGN test; substantial compliance; National Highway Traffic Safety Administration ("NHTSA") standards; Google Translate

Judicial Appeal - Investment Advisor License

Appellate review of weight of the evidence

Award of attorney fees; Denial of 60(B) motion

Limited-purpose public figure and private citizen; jury verdict not against manifest weight of evidence; attorney's fees

Summary Judgment - Conversion - Indemnification

Domestic violence; Jury instruction; Lesser included offense; Manifest weight of the evidence; Ineffective assistance of counsel

Failure to file objections to magistrate's decision; plain error review of modification of parental rights

Motion to suppress; Regulatory compliance of blood draw

Permanent Custody; Indian Child Welfare Act

EXTRAORDINARY WRITS - Petition for writ of habeas corpus; motion to dismiss; Civ.R.12(B)(1); court divested of jurisdiction after petitioner's custody transferred to institution outside court's territorial bounds.

CRIMINAL - knowing, intelligent, and voluntary plea; Crim.R. 11; maximum penalty; nonconstitutional right; prejudice; jointly recommended sentence; proportionality; danger to public, consecutive sentences; contrary to law; sentencing factors

App.R. 16(A)(7), standard for pro se litigants, forfeiture of issues on appeal for failure to raise at trial.

Juvenile defendant appeals from his manslaughter conviction. Defendant argued that the court erred by failing to expressly consider R.C. 2929.19(B)(1)(b), the youth-mitigation factors, at sentencing. Sentencing record supported conclusion that trial court considered defendant's youth before imposing sentence.

Appellant's conviction for obstructing official business was not against the manifest weight of the evidence where the state demonstrated appellant obstructed and delayed officers in their duty to fully investigate a 9-1-1 hang-up call made by his wife.

Appellant's convictions for abduction and strangulation were not allied offenses of similar import as the offenses were committed with separate conduct and the harms that resulted from the two offenses were separate and identifiable.

theft, unauthorized use of gas card, sufficiency, Crim.R. 29, manifest weight, prosecutorial misconduct, bench trial, constitutional right to a speedy trial, Barker v. Wingo

motion to withdraw, substitution of counsel, guilty plea

manifest injustice, withdrawal of plea, hybrid representation

First Amendment – signs – mail – littering – plea agreement

protection order – manifest weight of the evidence – community control violation

R.C. 2903.11(A)(1), R.C. 2919.22(B)(1), R.C. 2919.22(A), Daubert, R.C. 2953.21(A)(2), Crim.R. 11, postconviction relief, ineffective assistance of counsel, ineffective assistance of appellate counsel, evidence outside the record, res judicata, abuse of discretion, harmless error

custody, division of property, abuse of discretion

SYO dispositional sentence – R.C. 2152.14(E)(1) – appeal – scope of remand

summary judgment, trust, credit shelter trust, trustee, intent

Civ.R. 54(B), judicial economy, inextricably intertwined, multiple claims, jurisdiction

foreclosure, confirmation of sale, distribution of proceeds, moot

R.C. 2913.51(A), Alford plea, R.C. 2953.08(G)(2), R.C. 2929.14(A)(5), R.C. 2929.13(B)(1)(a)(i), R.C. 2929.13(B)(1)(b)

Fourth Amendment, motion to suppress, exclusionary rule, good faith exception, recalled warrant

Appellant's plea was knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily entered where the totality of the circumstances indicated appellant understood the nature of the charges and the bill of particulars, which served as the state's recitation of facts, provided a sufficient basis to satisfy the elements of the offenses and to establish venue in Warren County. As enrollment in the violent offender database, R.C. 2903.41 et seq., is a collateral consequence rather than a punishment, Crim.R. 11 does not require a trial court to inform a defendant of the registration and notification requirements before accepting the defendant's guilty plea. Appellant's convictions for aggravated burglary, kidnapping, felonious assault, and retaliation were not allied offenses of similar import. Notice of postrelease control provided at the plea hearing and set forth in the sentencing entry does not correct the trial court's failure to impose postrelease control at the sentencing hearing.

Appellant failed to file a transcript of the proceedings necessary for this appeal. When portions of the transcript necessary for resolving assigned errors are omitted from the record, the reviewing court has nothing to evaluate and must presume the regularity or validity of the lower court's proceedings and affirm.

Divorce decree affirmed. There was no plain error by the trial court where its consideration of affidavits submitted by husband and wife was agreed to by husband's counsel. There was also no error in determining husband's separate interest in the marital home's equity because husband did not sufficiently tie purported loans to the marital home.

The trial court did not abuse its discretion in determining that debtor was liable for the balance of a credit card account opened in her name where the court did not find credible the debtor's testimony that the account was fraudulently opened and used without her knowledge or authorization.

PERMANENT CUSTODY; REASONABLE EFFORTS; R.C. 2151.419(A)(2)(e); LEGAL CUSTODY. The trial court did not err by awarding permanent custody of Jas.M. and Jax.M. to the agency because the agency was not required to demonstrate that it made reasonable efforts to reunify the family since mother-appellant had her parental rights involuntarily terminated as provide for in R.C. 2415.419(A)(2)(e). It was not plain error for the trial court o grant legal custody of S.L., J.L., and N.L. to legal custodians.

SPEEDY-TRIAL STATUTE; R.C. 2945.71; TOLLING EVENT; R.C. 2945.72(D). The defendant-appellant's speedy-trial rights were not violated because, as of the change-of-plea hearing, a total of 260 days ran against the State. The defendant-appellant's conduct in leaving the State of Ohio and/or hiding his location from the State, while knowing of an impending felony charge and related misdemeanor charge, constitutes a delay occasioned by neglect or improper act as contemplated by R.C. 2945.72(D).

Judicial Release; Abuse of Discretion. On appeal, a trial court's decision to revoke judicial release is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. An abuse of discretion is a decision that arbitrary, unreasonable, or unconsionable.

Mootness of Appeal. This appeal is moot because defendant-appellant voluntarily completed the jail term without seeking a stay from the trial court, the jail term was imposed for a non-felony offense, and there was no evidence from which an inference could be drawn that defendant-appellant will suffer some collateral disability or loss of civil rights because of the challenged judgment apart from the already-served sentence.

Trial court erred by imposing sentence that was contrary to law because it was outside the mandatory range provided by statute. Judgment reversed and remanded with instructions to vacate the judgment entry and plea agreement.

Judgment affirmed. Because the Franklin County Treasurer and the Franklin County Auditor are political subdivisions engaged in governmental functions and therefore "not liable in damages in a civil action" under the immunity granted by R.C. 2744.02(A)(1), the trial court did not err when sustaining their motion for judgment on the pleadings in a civil suit filed by a taxpayer seeking damages from them for allegedly misidentifying her as a property owner and sending her a bill for unpaid taxes.

Appellant's adjudication for rape was supported by sufficient evidence and not against the manifest weight of the evidence. Trial court did not err in permitting testimony of nurse that a normal exam is consistent with sexual abuse. Trial court did not abuse its discretion by not reopening the evidence to allow testimony of juvenile who opted not to testify during the adjudicatory hearing. Judgment affirmed.

The Court of Claims did not err when it granted summary judgment in favor of the employer in a racial discrimination action. Plaintiff was not able to establish that the comparable individual was similarly situated, and thus failed to establish a prima facie case of discrimination. The judgment of the Court of Claims is affirmed.

Appeal dismissed for failure to comply with the requirements in App.R. 16.

EVIDENCE - SUFFICIENCY - MANIFEST WEIGHT - COMPLICITY - INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL: Convictions for offenses involving a shooting death and felonious assault of another were supported by sufficient evidence and are not against the manifest weight of the evidence where defendant's identity as a principal offender or an aider and abettor in the offenses was established by video evidence and witness testimony. Because the state satisfied its burden in disproving, beyond a reasonable doubt, any claim of self-defense in this case, defendant cannot establish the prejudice required to support his ineffective assistance of counsel claim. Judgment affirmed.

The trial court erred in failing to allocate any jail-time credit to case No. 23CR-3214 as some portion of appellant's pre-sentence confinement was attributable only to that case. Any error in allocating jail-time credit to case No. 24CR-440 cannot be corrected as appellant has completed his imposed sentence of time served in that case. Judgment reversed and cause remanded for trial court to allocate appropriate number of jail-time credit days to case No. 23CR-3214.

OVI — MOTION TO SUPPRESS — PROBABLE CAUSE — MOTION TO DISMISS — EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE: The trial court did not err in overruling defendant's motion to suppress where the officer had probable cause to arrest defendant for operating a vehicle while impaired where defendant admitted to consuming alcohol, had an odor of alcohol on his breath, exhibited delayed speech patterns and disorientation, was unable to follow simple instructions, and performed poorly on the field-sobriety tests. The trial court did not err in overruling defendant's motion to dismiss because there is a rational connection between the level of marihuana metabolites and impairment that furthers a legitimate governmental interest in highway safety, and therefore, the statute does not violate the Equal Protection Clause.

Counsel not ineffective for failing to file motion to suppress; OVI conviction not against manifest weight of the evidence

Anders - Sentencing - Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

Strangulation/physicial harm

Per Mayle, J., under plain language of R.C. 2305.113(B)(1), a plaintiff need not send a 180-day letter to both the hospital and a non-physician employee in order to extend the statute of limitations for bringing a claim for vicarious liability against only the hospital.

Neither trial court error nor ineffective assistance of counsel in sentencing appellant after jury convictions for importuning and attempted unlawful sexual conduct with a minor. Judgment affirmed. Osowik.

summary judgment; oil and gas lease; Westfield Ins. Co. v. Galatis, 2003-Ohio-5849; champerty and maintenance; plain language; funds in escrow; breach of contract; award of attorney's fees; Civ.R. 37(A)(5) findings required; frivolous conduct.

RECEIVING STOLEN PROPERTY — POSSESSION — KNOWLEDGE — CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE — INFERENCES — SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE — MANIFEST WEIGHT: The juvenile's delinquency adjudication for receiving stolen property was supported by sufficient evidence, and not contrary to the weight of the evidence, where the State's circumstantial evidence proved that the juvenile used the stolen car for transportation and aided and abetted the driver, including evidence that the juvenile fled alongside two other young men from both the crashed stolen vehicle on the side of an expressway and from bystanders offering assistance. The juvenile's delinquency adjudication for receiving stolen property was supported by sufficient evidence, and not contrary to the weight of the evidence, where the State's circumstantial evidence proved that the juvenile knew the car was stolen, including evidence that the stolen car's steering column and rear window had been damaged, the lack of a key in the stolen car, and the juvenile's flight from both the crashed stolen vehicle on the side of an expressway and from bystanders offering assistance.

Allocation of child support arrearage; supervised visitation

Motion to suppress improperly granted

Sentencing; consecutive sentences

Ineffective assistance of counsel

Suppression; search warrant

CRIMINAL – application to reopen; hearsay; duplicative testimony; cross-examination.

sentencing – minimum prison sentence – appellate review – R.C. 2953.08 – aggravated robbery

sexual imposition – sufficiency – weight – oath – harmless error – ineffective assistance of counsel – sexual arousal or gratification – bartender

Sentencing entry; sentencing hearing; misdemeanor community-control sanctions; moot; presence during the imposition of sentence; Crim.R. 43(A)(1). Judgment affirmed in part and dismissed in part. Appellant's arguments that the trial court's community-control sanctions are improperly excessive as they relate to other properties are dismissed as moot because appellant did not own any other properties and the sentencing orders only relate to the subject property. Although not verbatim, the sentencing entry did not differ from the sentencing imposed during the sentencing hearing.

Having weapons while under disability; facially unconstitutional; Second Amendment to the United States Constitution; right to keep and bear arms; temporarily disarm a person who is under indictment for a violent felony. The trial court's finding that a portion of R.C. 2923.13(A)(2), which governs having weapons while under disability, is unconstitutional on its face under the Second Amendment is affirmed. The offending provision of the statute prohibits people who are under indictment for violent felonies — rather than having been convicted of violent felonies — from possessing a firearm. Under the United States Supreme Court's recent jurisprudence concerning the right to keep and bear arms pursuant to the Second Amendment, this provision of R.C. 2923.13(A)(2) does not pass constitutional muster because it has no "historical analogue" in this Nation's tradition of firearm regulation.

Felony murder; independent intervening cause; sufficiency; manifest weight; effective assistance of counsel; grand jury; essential facts. - Judgment affirmed. There was no error in allowing a witness to testify who had not been present for the grand jury proceedings. The defendant's convictions were not based on insufficient evidence or against the manifest weight of the evidence. The trial court did not err in deciding not to instruct the jury on independent intervening cause. The defendant did not receive ineffective assistance of counsel.

Felony murder; improper discharge of a firearm into a habitation; sufficiency of the evidence; insufficient evidence; manifest weight of the evidence; drive-by shooting; habitation, video surveillance; forensic analysis; direct evidence; circumstantial evidence; aiding and abetting; accomplice liability; affirm; vacate; remand; resentencing. Defendant-appellant's jury trial convictions for felony murder and one count of improper discharge of a firearm into a habitation are affirmed on direct appeal. There was sufficient evidence presented that defendant-appellant aided and abetted the principal offender in the commission of the offenses and his convictions for felony murder and one count of improper discharge of a firearm into a habitation were not against the manifest weight of the evidence because there were no credibility issues or inconsistencies with regard to the State's witnesses' testimonies. The remaining four counts of improper discharge of a firearm into a habitation are vacated, however, due to the fact that only one habitation was at issue. Case remanded for resentencing.

Felony murder; improperly discharging a firearm at or into a habitation; jury instructions; independent intervening cause of death; sufficiency of the evidence; manifest weight of the evidence. Defendant's conviction for felony murder in this drive-by-shooting case is affirmed. Defendant and two accomplices fired over 30 shots into a house from their car. One person in the house died of a gunshot wound. Defendant was not entitled to a jury instruction about independent intervening cause of death, even though the evidence showed that return gunfire from inside the house may have been the immediate cause of death of the victim. Under felony murder, the direct cause of death is irrelevant if the proximate cause of death is the defendant's commission of the underlying felony, which in this case was improperly discharging a firearm into a habitation. It is foreseeable, natural and logical that firing a gun into an occupied structure might kill someone. Four of the five convictions for improperly discharging a firearm at or into a habitation are reversed based on insufficient evidence. The State charged the defendant with one count of this offense for each individual who was inside the house when the shooting took place. A jury convicted the defendant of five counts of this offense. However, this court has held that the offense is a crime against the habitation, not a crime against a person. One house was shot into in this case, and this supports one count of the offense.

Personal injury; jury trial; medical expert; damages award; noneconomic damages; R.C. 2315.19. - Judgment affirmed. The trial court did not err in upholding the jury's $75,000 noneconomic damages verdict based on the guidance in R.C. 2315.19. The trial court also did not err in the various rulings raised as error both before, during, and after trial.

Compel arbitration; waiver. Affirmed. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in compelling arbitration based on tangentially related claims being litigated in an out-of-state proceeding, which has since concluded, or based on the defendants' conduct in the underlying case that was limited to responding to the complaint by filing a motion to compel arbitration after a series of requests for continuances to respond.

Interpreter; interpreter oath; Crim.R. 11(C)(2); Evid.R. 604; Evid.R. 702; R.C. 2311.14(B); sex offender registration. Affirmed. Appellant appeals his judgment of conviction after pleading guilty to attempted rape and burglary, arguing that his plea was not knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily made. The court finds no error when the oath to the interpreter is not on the record verbatim, the interpreter asked the prosecutor to repeat himself twice, and defendant expressed he did not know what the word "probation" meant, or if he had been advised by an immigration attorney. The trial court's statement during the plea colloquy that there was "the chance" defendant would have to register as a sex offender was not error.

Consecutive sentences; agreed term; contrary to law; authorized by law; R.C. 2953.08(G)(2); R.C. 2953.08(D)(1). R.C. 2929.14(C)(4) allows consecutives whenever a person is convicted of multiple felonies without regard to the level of offense. Accordingly, the trial court did not err when it imposed consecutive sentences for a charge of murder with a life tail and a charge of felonious assault with an S.B. 201 sentence as the sentence was authorized by law. Finally, the sentence on felonious assault was within the statutory range and therefore not clearly and convincingly contrary to law.

One- and three-year firearm specifications attendant to same count; R.C. 2929.14(B)(1)(g); sentencing on firearm specifications is not analogous to sentencing for allied offenses; trial court decides under which specification defendant will be sentenced. Judgment affirmed. The trial court did not err in sentencing the defendant on the one-year firearm specification after he was found guilty of both the one- and a three-year firearm specification for the same count. The exception under R.C. 2929.14(B)(1)(g) is inapplicable to this case, and the other relevant statutes — R.C. 2941.141(B) and 2941.145(B) — preclude sentencing on both a one- and three-year firearm specification attendant to the same count. The statutes do not elevate the three-year specification over the one-year specification. Firearm specifications are sentencing enhancements and are not analogous to allied offenses, where the State chooses which count to proceed to sentencing on.

Guilty plea; maximum sentence; Crim.R. 11. Trial court was not required to advise appellant of the maximum penalty he faced on his community-control violation when he pleaded guilty to a new case. The trial court complied with Crim.R. 11 when it advised appellant of the maximum penalties of his current charges.

Fourth Amendment; warrantless entry; consent; search warrant; fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine; exclusionary rule. Judgment affirmed. The denial of the suppression motion was not in error. Appellant consented to officers' initial entry into his home to retrieve clothing for appellant to wear. The evidence was in plain view, and that observation can be used as the basis for a subsequent search warrant.

Appellant's rape convictions were supported by sufficient evidence and not against the manifest weight of the evidence; the victim's testimony established all necessary elements of the rape charges, and the jury did not lose its way in resolving conflicts in the evidence and believing the victim's account. The trial court did not plainly err by failing to sua sponte merge two rape offenses after defense counsel conceded that the offenses should not merge. The jury's not-guilty verdict for gross sexual imposition was not impermissibly inconsistent with its guilty verdicts for rape. Appellant did not establish plain error in the admission of the victim's narrative statement to a sexual assault nurse examiner where the statement was merely cumulative to the victim's testimony. Judgment affirmed.

Judgment affirmed in part; reversed in part. The parties' contract required appellee to pay appellant two percent of the income derived from electronic raffle machines operating "Raffle 3.0 or other legal upgraded charitable electronic games." The trial court did not err by finding the plain and unambiguous meaning of the term "legal" in the contract meant conformance with statutory laws. Because the electronic raffle machines operating the Raffle 2.0 software did not comply with the charitable gaming laws in R.C. Ch. 2915, the Raffle 2.0 machines were not "legal" charitable electronic games. Therefore, the two percent fee described in the contract did not apply to the machines operating Raffle 2.0. Appellee admitted it breached the parties' contract by failing to pay appellant two percent of its gross revenue from the machines operating the Raffle 3.0 software and claimed the damages resulting from the breach totaled $581.17. However, the evidence appellee presented demonstrated the damages resulting from the Raffle 3.0 machines totaled $2,375.89. As such, we found genuine issues of material fact regarding the damages resulting from appellee's admitted breach of contract and reversed, in part, the trial court's decision granting appellee's motion for summary judgment. Because the trial court did not address the parties' arguments regarding the meaning of a term in the contract, this court would not address the arguments in the first instance on appeal. The trial court did not err by granting appellee summary judgment on appellant's claim for an accounting.

RAPE — GROSS SEXUAL IMPOSITION — ADMISSIBILITY — INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL — SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE — PLAIN ERROR — SENTENCING — NEW TRIAL: The trial court did not commit plain error by admitting certain statements from defendant's recorded police interview where defendant failed to object to the admission of the statements and failed to show how the statements prejudiced him in a way that would have changed the outcome of the trial. Defendant's convictions for two counts of rape of a child and one count of gross sexual imposition were supported by sufficient evidence where the child testified to acts that demonstrated that defendant anally penetrated her and forcefully touched her buttocks and thighs with a toy, and where the child was diagnosed with the same sexually-transmitted disease as defendant. Defendant could not prevail on his ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim where he failed to demonstrate how defense counsel's failure to object to the admission of his recorded statements to police prejudiced him. Defendant's sentence of life without parole for each rape count was not unconstitutionally disproportionate for the rape of a child under ten. The trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying defendant's motion for a new trial because the alleged newly-discovered evidence did not create a strong probability that the result of a new trial would be different.

CRIMINAL — CONSTITUTIONAL LAW/CRIMINAL — SECOND AMENDMENT — CARRYING CONCEALED WEAPONS — IMPROPER HANDLING OF FIREARMS IN A MOTOR VEHICLE — JUVENILE ADJUDICATION —WAIVER: The trial court erred in denying defendant's motion to dismiss his charges for carrying concealed weapons in violation of R.C. 2923.12(A)(2) and improper handling of firearms in a motor vehicle under R.C. 2923.16(B) where the State failed to carry its burden under the Second Amendment to show that the charges were consistent with the nation's historical tradition of firearm regulations, where the State does not impose restrictions on defendant's ability to possess a concealed weapon for comparable reasons as historical analogues, and defendant's juvenile adjudication for a nonviolent weapons charge failed to support a presumption that defendant was dangerous and subject to disarmament, and the juvenile adjudication was the sole reason the State argued to justify limiting defendant's ability to carry a concealed weapon and to have a weapon accessible to him while in a motor vehicle. The trial court did not commit plain error in denying defendant's motion to dismiss a carrying-concealed weapons charge, for which the State charged defendant while under indictment for defendant's first weapons-related charges, as defendant failed to assert at the trial level that Ohio's limiting his ability to carry a concealed weapon based on his being under indictment for a felony violated the Second Amendment. [But see DISSENT: Rather than addressing the cause on the merits for the first time, the cause should be remanded for the trial court to analyze whether the challenged statutes are constitutional by applying the test set forth in New York State Rifle & Pistol Assn. v. Bruen, 597 U.S. 1 (2022) and United States v. Rahimi, 602 U.S. 680 (2024).]

LEGAL CUSTODY – BEST INTEREST – COMPETENT AND CREDIBLE EVIDENCE – R.C. 2152.414(D)(1) – R.C. 3109.04(F)(1) – ABUSE OF DISCRETION: The trial court did not abuse its discretion when it awarded legal custody of appellant's minor son to appellant's adult daughter, given the presence of competent and credible evidence that the court considered the best-interest factors when it reached its determination.

OBSTRUCTING OFFICIAL BUSINESS — AFFIRMATIVE ACT — PURPOSE — TOTALITY OF THE CIRCUMSTANCES — DUE PROCESS — JUDICIAL BIAS — SENTENCING — ALLOCUTION: Defendant's conviction for obstructing official business was supported by sufficient evidence where defendant provided false identifying information to the officer who pulled her over and, despite the officer's repeated orders to step out of the vehicle, defendant persisted in conditioning her compliance upon an explanation from the officer, argued with him, and pulled away when the officer grabbed her arm to remove her from the vehicle. While trial judge questioned the merits of the case with counsel in chambers, the record did not support that the judge harbored a high degree of antagonism or favoritism toward either party or their counsel where the judge permitted the parties to present evidence and arguments and, thereafter, the judge assessed the evidence, applied the legal precedent he deemed fit, and rendered his verdict accordingly. The trial court failed to afford the defendant her right of allocution at sentencing, requiring a new sentencing hearing.

Mandamus—Public Records Act—R.C. 149.43—Relator failed to establish entitlement to writ compelling respondent to produce requested public records—Because relator failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that he sent public-records request to respondent by certified mail, relator is not entitled to statutory damages—Writ and request for statutory damages denied.

Appellant did not comply with the requirements set forth in App.R. 9(A) or App.R. 16(A) in her pro se appeal. No transcript of the trial court's proceedings was submitted for review; as such, even if she had set forth any assignments of error, we would have to presume the regularity of the trial court proceedings. Appeal dismissed.

Appellant has served his entire prison term and is not under post-release supervision. Therefore, there is no relief that we can grant him. Appeal dismissed as moot.

The record does not portray ineffective assistance of counsel based on defense counsel's failure to file an interlocutory appeal from an adverse suppression ruling or failure to seek appointment of a translator. Appellant's rape and gross-sexual-imposition convictions were not against the manifest weight of the evidence. Judgment affirmed.

The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying appellant's request for new counsel in the middle of trial. Appellant did not demonstrate a breakdown in the attorney-client relationship of such magnitude as to jeopardize his Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel. Judgment affirmed.

Although part of the endangering children statute, R.C. 2919.22(A), imposes criminal liability for crimes committed by persons like parents and persons having custody of a child, R.C. 2919.22(B) refers more broadly to "all persons," which includes persons who are not adult caretakers or babysitters. As such, the trial court did not err in adjudicating appellant delinquent under R.C. 2919.22(B)(5). Appellant's adjudication as a delinquent for committing extortion was supported by sufficient evidence. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying appellant's motion for mistrial; the State provided all relevant information to appellant, and there was no discovery violation. Judgment affirmed.

The trial court did not abuse its discretion when it overruled appellant's motion to change venue; there was no evidence in the record that pretrial publicity was so pervasive and prejudicial that an attempt to seat a jury would be a vain act or that any juror was actually biased. Trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to use the peremptory challenges differently, as how they were used was a matter of trial strategy. Judgment affirmed.

The trial court did not abuse its discretion in granting appellees' motion for appointment of a receiver without first holding a separate hearing, because appellant consented to the appointment of a receiver during a default judgment hearing. The trial court abused its discretion by including a provision in its order appointing a receiver that required the receiver, at the time of termination of the receivership, to turn over to appellees all the receivership property despite the undisputed fact that appellant had a one-third ownership interest in the receivership property. Judgment affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.

The jury's findings of guilty on several drug offenses were not against the manifest weight of the evidence. The court did not abuse its discretion in excluding a defense exhibit which purportedly showed that appellant had purchased legal hemp and not illegal marijuana; the document was hearsay, it was not self-authenticating, and there was no witness to authenticate it. There was also no evidence that the drugs in appellant's possession at the time of his arrest were the same substances reflected on the purchase documents. The court imposed fines within the statutory limits and properly considered appellant's ability to pay financial sanctions. Judgment affirmed.

Attorneys at law—Resignation with disciplinary action pending—Gov.Bar R. VI(11)(C).

motion to suppress – custody – findings of fact

The trial court did not err by denying the Civ.R. 60(B) motion for relief from judgment where the appellants failed to point to a meritorious defense or claim they could present if relief were granted and there were no grounds for relief as set forth in Civ.R. 60(B)(1)-(5).

INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL; R.C. 2901.05; R.C. 2901.09; SELF-DEFENSE CLAIM; CASTLE DOCTRINE. In the absence of any evidence of an unlawful entry on the part of the victim, the defendant-appellant's trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to request a jury instruction on the castle doctrine.

Consecutive Sentences, R.C. 2929.11, R.C. 2929.12, R.C. 2929.14. Trial court considered the purposes and principles of sentencing and also the required statutory factors. Appellate courts lack the authority to review the conclusions the trial court reaches. Record supported trial court's findings regarding consecutive sentences.

Attorney Fees, Probate Estate, Non-probate Assets. Trial court did not abuse its discretion in following the local rule that prohibits consideration of non-probate assets when determining the appropriate attorney fees for a probate estate.

SERIOUS YOUTHFUL OFFENDER; BLENDED SENTENCE; DELINQUENCY ADMISSION; JUV.R. 29; R.C. 2152.13(D)(3); ADULT PORTION OF SERIOUS YOUTHFUL OFFENDER'S SENTENCE; CONSECUTIVE SENTENCES; R.C. 2929.14(C)(4); CONSECUTIVE INDEFINITE SENTENCES; R.C. 2929.144. The adjudicated delinquent child-appellant's delinquency admissions were knowing, intelligent, and voluntary because, based on the totality of the circumstances, the juvenile court substantially complied with the requirements of Juv.R. 29(D)(2). The juvenile court erred by imposing consecutive sentences because it did not make any of the three statutorily required findings before imposing consecutive sentences, either at the sentencing hearing or within the sentencing entry. The adjudicated delinquent child-appellant's sentence is also contrary to law because the trial court imposed consecutive indefinite sentences in contravention of R.C. 2929.144.

Sentencing; Contrary to Law; Information at Sentencing; R.C. 2953.08. At sentencing, a trial court is to examine the character and history of the defendant. The information presented to a trial court at sentencing need not be limited to evidence that relates to the offenses that yielded convictions. A trial court may consider pending charges as these are required to be included in the presentence investigation report.

R.C. 2941.51(D); Court-Appointed-Counsel Fees; Civil Assessment; Future Ability to Pay; Abuse of Discretion; State v. Taylor, 2020-Ohio-6786. A trial court may not order a defendant to pay court-appointed-counsel fees as a part of his or her sentence. Rather, a trial court may issue a civil assessment for court-appointed-counsel fees. A trial court may, pursuant to R.C. 2941.51(D), assess some or all of the court-appointed-counsel fees incurred during a defendant's representation. A trial court may assess court-appointed-counsel fees if the defendant is found to have a present or future ability to pay these costs. Appellate courts review the imposition of court-appointed-counsel fees as a civil assessment under an abuse of discretion standard.

CIV.R. 42(B); EVID.R. 408; ABUSE OF PROCESS; CIV.R. 59(A); HARMLESS ERROR; CIV.R. 61; DEFAMATION; R.C. 2311.21; CIVIL CONSPIRACY; PLAIN ERROR. The trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying the plaintiff-appellant's request to bifurcate the claims and conduct separate trials. The trial court properly considered the convenience of the parties, judicial economy, and the need to preserve the defendant-appellee's right to a jury trial. The trial court did not abuse its discretion by admitting an amended operating agreement. The document was relevant to address the issue of the defendant-appellee's ownership interest in the company. The trial court did not abuse its discretion by admitting a letter from counsel of the plaintiff-appellant regarding settlement negotiations because the letter was not offered for the purpose of establishing liability or the value of any claim discussed therein. The letter was offered for another purpose, i.e., to show the plaintiff-appellant's abuse of process. The trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying the plaintiff-appellant's motion for a new trial. The trial court did not abuse its discretion by admitting evidence related to the plaintiff-appellant's reputation before and after publication of the alleged defamatory statements. Even if the trial court did abuse its discretion by admitting such evidence, any error is harmless since the plaintiff-appellant failed to demonstrate the admission affected his material rights. The plaintiff-appellant's potential claims for defamation against deceased appellee abated by his death and any claim for civil conspiracy also fails since the plaintiff-appellant did not prevail at trial. The plaintiff-appellant waived all but plain error since he did not object to the trial court's instruction on punitive damages and attorney fees, nor did he object to the corresponding verdict form. The trial court did not err by determining the amount of attorney fees to be paid by plaintiff-appellant.

abuse of discretion; community control revocation; competency determination; mitigating factor

Mandamus—Public Records Act—R.C. 149.43—Relator failed to show by clear and convincing evidence that sheriff did not produce public records responsive to request No. 3—Sheriff failed to produce evidence to determine whether the information redacted from sheriff's responses to request Nos. 6, 10, and 11 is exempt from disclosure—Writ denied in part and held in abeyance in part as to sheriff, and sheriff ordered to file under seal for in camera inspection unredacted copies of sheriff's responses to request Nos. 6, 10, and 11—Because Ohio Department of Public Safety produced all records responsive to request No. 13, request for writ against department and its director is moot—Department produced all records responsive to request No. 13 within reasonable period and did not act in bad faith—Writ and requests for statutory damages, attorney fees, and court costs denied as to department and its director.

Final Appealable Order

Petitioner for Post-Conviction Relief

Search Warrant Affidavit and Probable Cause

Appellate Rule 16/Appellate Rule 18

victim; right to be heard; Marsy's Law; R.C. 2930.14; R.C. 2930.19; directly and proximately harmed

Dependency finding was supported by sufficient evidence and was not against the manifest weight of the evidence; mother not deprived of a fair hearing

Ineffective assistance; sufficiency; manifest weight

Mandamus—Teacher seeking higher salary and backpay had an adequate remedy in ordinary course of law by filing grievance under collective-bargaining agreement with school district—Court of appeals' judgment granting school board's motion for judgment on pleadings affirmed.

The trial court erred by accepting appellant's guilty plea without strictly complying with Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(c). The trial court did not inform appellant that, by pleading guilty, he was giving up the right to compulsory process to obtain witnesses to testify on his behalf. The trial court's question whether appellant understood he was waiving his right to present any defenses did not reasonably inform appellant that he had the right to utilize the court's subpoena power to compel witnesses to appear and testify on his behalf. Judgment reversed.

The trial court erred by dismissing this administrative appeal concerning a joint county improvement petition without first convening a panel of judges consisting of one judge of the court of common pleas from each of the affected counties, as required by R.C. 6133.10(A). The inclusion of a demand for damages in the notice of appeal did not transform the appeal of an order to proceed with a petition following a first hearing into "an appeal on compensation or damages" for purposes of R.C. 6133.10(A). R.C. 6131.25 provides the right to appeal an order to proceed made at the conclusion of a first hearing on a joint county improvement petition, and appellant is an "affected owner" under R.C. 6131.25(A) who may maintain such an appeal.

The trial court did not abuse its discretion when it dismissed appellant's eighth postconviction petition without a hearing. The petition was filed over twenty years after judgment. Therefore, it is untimely and no exceptions applied. In addition, res judicata bars the issues raised in the petition. The judgment of the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas is affirmed.

To have standing to appeal a Chief's Order pursuant to R.C. 1509.36, a person must demonstrate he or she was "adversely affected" by showing the Order produced an effect that is harmful to his or her interest, i.e., an actual injury or a realistic danger of injury arising from the challenged action that is not so remote as to be merely speculative. Accordingly, the trial court's judgment holding otherwise was reversed.

Judgment of the Franklin County Municipal Court is affirmed, appellant has not shown that her counsel's actions denied her effective assistance of counsel.

Trial court erred when it granted motion to suppress evidence.

Trial court erred when it granted motion to suppress evidence.

R.C. 5171.04 – errors – jurisdiction

Prohibition—Mandamus—Common pleas court did not patently and unambiguously lack subject-matter jurisdiction to accept transfer of municipal-court case—Appellee had adequate remedy in ordinary course of law—Court of appeals' judgment granting writs reversed.

Motion for summary judgment; Civ.R. 56; defamation; inmate. Plaintiff failed to establish the existence of an issue of material fact as to whether Defendant defamed Plaintiff. Defendant's motion for summary judgment was granted.

Civ.R. 56; motion for summary judgment; discretionary immunity. Defendant was entitled to summary judgment on plaintiff's claims relating to defendant's decision to replace inmate JPay tablets with ViaPath tablets while plaintiff was in the custody and control of defendant because defendant's decision was based on prison safety and administration considerations and was an executive function that involved a high degree of official discretion, and therefore, defendant was entitled to discretionary immunity. Judgment for defendant.

Juvenile court; competency hearing; incompetency; competency assumed; ineffective assistance of counsel; sufficient indicia of competency; probable cause hearing; bindover hearing; amenability hearing; moot; abuse of discretion. Juvenile appellant has three cases in juvenile court that were bound over to adult court. In his first assignment of error appellant appeals his convictions arguing he received ineffective assistance of counsel when his trial counsel failed to raise the issue of his competency in juvenile court prior to an amenability hearing. For his first two cases, there was not sufficient indicia of incompetency such that his counsel was not ineffective for not raising the issue in juvenile court. However, his counsel was ineffective for not raising the issue of competency in his third juvenile case since there was more than sufficient indicia of incompetency at that time such that counsel should have filed a motion in the juvenile court for a competency determination. This assignment of error is sustained in part, vacated in part and remanded in part. In appellant's second assignment of error he argues the trial court abused its discretion by finding him not amenable to juvenile court and transferring his cases to adult court. We find, for his first two cases that the trial court did not abuse its discretion finding appellant was not amenable and properly transferred the two cases. For this third case we find the abuse-of-discretion determination to be moot, since the third case's amenability finding was vacated and remanded in the prior assignment of error.

Home equity line of credit, note, mortgage, foreclosure action, action on account, Civ.R. 60(B), relief from judgment, excusable neglect, abuse of discretion, business records, hearsay, relevance, prejudice, Evid.R. 401, 403, 801, 803(3), and 901, authentication. Judgment affirmed. The trial court did not err when it determined that the case was a foreclosure action. Although a home equity line of credit operates similarly to a credit card, it is secured by a mortgage on property, which gives the lender the ability to foreclose on the property when the debtor defaults. Therefore, the plaintiff-lender was only required to prove the amount of principal and interest due, not a complete payment history with a beginning balance of zero, as appellants contended. Further, the evidence establishing the amount of principal and interest due was properly admitted under the business records exception. Finally, the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it granted plaintiff's motion for relief from judgment finding excusable neglect.

Motion for summary judgment; motion for reconsideration; res judicata; claim preclusion; issue preclusion. The trial court did not err in granting the defendants-appellees' motions for summary judgment where the causes of action argued by the plaintiffs-appellants were barred by res judicata. The trial court did not err in denying the plaintiffs-appellants' motion for reconsideration of the dismissal of Count 2 under its complaint. Pursuant to claim preclusion, Count 2 should have been litigated in a prior lawsuit that shared the same parties and arose from the same occurrence or transaction and, therefore, the claim was barred by res judicata.

Petition for postconviction relief; untimely petition; R.C. 2953.21; R.C. 2953.23; Brady material; ripeness. Trial court did not err when it denied appellant's untimely petition for postconviction relief for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction where the petition failed to establish entitlement to consideration as required by R.C. 2953.23(A). Appellant's unsubstantiated and self-serving claim that he did not receive police reports was insufficient to establish that the State suppressed evidence, where the appellant argued in the alternative that he did not receive the police reports, or if he received them, he received ineffective assistance of counsel when his attorney failed to utilize them to impeach the State's witnesses. Appellant's argument challenging the State's res judicata argument is not ripe for review because the trial court summarily denied the petition and did not reach the merits.

Juvenile court; delinquency; amenability; discretionary transfer; bindover; R.C. 2152.12; abuse of discretion. The juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in denying the State's motion for a discretionary transfer where the court considered the relevant statutory factors in favor of and against transfer and the record reflects a rational basis for the court's findings. The juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in not permitting the detective to testify at the amenability hearing.

Sentencing; R.C. 2953.08(G)(2); consecutive sentences; R.C. 2929.14(C); life sentence; clearly and convincingly; necessary. Judgment affirmed. A sentence of life with the possibility of parole after the statutory time period does not make it unnecessary or prohibit a trial court from ordering consecutive sentences for multiple crimes. Appellant pled guilty to felony murder with a three-year firearm specification in one case and attempted felonious assault and robbery in a second case. The trial court ordered that the sentences be served consecutively. Appellant's consecutive sentence is necessary to protect the public and to punish the appellant and is not disproportionate to the harm caused by appellant and the danger he poses to the public.

Sufficiency; manifest weight; assault; R.C. 2903.13; attempt; physical harm. Affirmed. For the purposes of R.C. 2903.13(A) committed against a law enforcement officer, the State need not prove that the defendant actually harmed the officer or that the defendant purposefully or intentionally kicked the officer in an attempt to cause harm. Further, based on the evidence that the defendant intentionally bit an officer during a lawful arrest, the State has proven the crime of assault beyond a reasonable doubt.

Juvenile court; discretionary bindover; probable cause; grand theft; aggravated robbery; robbery. - Juvenile court erred in finding no probable cause on certain counts of the complaint. The State presented credible evidence to establish probable cause to believe that the then-juvenile committed grand theft, aggravated robbery, and robbery because the then-juvenile refused to return the victim's property after the victim revoked his consent and fled the scene with the property after another individual shot the victim.

Plain error; Juv.R. 40(D)(3)(b)(iv); adjudication; disposition; R.C. 2151.35(A)(1); R.C. 2151.353(A)(2)(a); temporary custody. Judgment affirmed. Mother waived any arguments regarding the juvenile court's dependency finding and fails to argue that the juvenile court plainly erred in adjudicating L.H. dependent on appeal. Accordingly, her challenge to the juvenile court's adjudication of L.H. is overruled. Moreover, Mother did not object to the magistrate's decision recommending temporary custody be granted to the Cuyahoga County Division of Children and Family Services ("CCDCFS") and does not argue on appeal that the juvenile court's adoption of that recommendation amounted to plain error. However, even if Mother's challenge to the trial court's temporary custody determination were properly raised, we decline to find that the trial court plainly erred in granting temporary custody to CCDCFS.

Postconviction-relief petition; R.C. 2953.21(H); findings of fact and conclusions of law; apprise; appellate review. - Trial court erred in failing to set forth sufficient findings of fact and conclusions of law pursuant to R.C. 2953.21(H) to apprise the appellant of the basis for the trial court's denial of his timely postconviction-relief petition and to facilitate appellate review.

Appellate review; maximum sentence. Appellant claimed that the eight-year prison sentences imposed on his convictions for attempted kidnapping and attempted rape were not supported by the record. This court is without authority to review whether a sentence is supported by the record under R.C. 2929.11 and 2929.12.

Improper discharge of a firearm on or near prohibited premises; postrelease control; manifest weight of the evidence; offense of violence. - Judgment affirmed. The jury's verdict finding defendant guilty of a single violation of improper discharge of a firearm on or near prohibited premises was not against the manifest weight of the evidence. The trial court did not err in imposing postrelease control because this court has previously found that R.C. 2923.162(A)(3) qualifies as an offense of violence that allows for the imposition of postrelease control.

Summary judgment; commercial lease; App.R. 12; App.R. 16; Civ.R. 52; Civ.R. 56; declaratory judgment; breach of contract; tenant improvement allowance. Judgment affirmed. This court declines to address assignments of error in which appellants failed to follow the appellate rules and in which have been rendered moot by prior judgments and orders. The trial court correctly granted summary judgment in favor of the landlord on the tenant's counterclaims because the tenant was unable to show that it was entitled to tenant improvement funds when the tenant never submitted receipts or invoices for improvements made to the business.

Termination of parental rights; permanent custody; dispositional hearing; R.C. 2151.35; 90 days after filing of complaint; dismiss with prejudice; plain error; hearing must commence; ineffective assistance of counsel; deficiency prejudiced defense; failure to seek writ of procedendo; R.C. 2151.414; statutory timeframe for resolution of motion for permanent custody. The trial court did not err in declining to dismiss the case because it did not violate the statutory timeframe. The dispositional hearing was commenced within 90 days of the refiled complaint. Further, Mother's counsel did not demonstrate that her counsel was ineffective for failing to seek a writ of procedendo with regard to the motion for permanent custody.

Parental rights; permanent custody; clear and convincing evidence; R.C. 2151.414(D)(2); best interests of the child; manifest weight of the evidence. It was not against the manifest weight of the evidence where the juvenile court granted permanent custody of the child to Cuyahoga County Division of Children and Family Services ("CCDCFS"). The juvenile court's findings under R.C. 2151.414(D)(2) were supported by competent and credible evidence. Mother was unable substantially remedy the conditions that caused the child to be placed outside the child's home, which included mental health, substance abuse, and adequate housing concerns. Father was not in contact with CCDCFS, and mother continued to test positive for marijuana, had stopped taking her medications, and had continued to use marijuana to deal with her mental-health issues.

Community-control-sanction violation; hearing; Crim.R. 32.3; minimum requirements of due process. The Sixth Amendment's Confrontation Clause does not apply to community-control-sanction-violation hearings because they are not criminal prosecutions. Hearsay statements were admissible at defendant's community-control-sanctions-violation hearing as long as there was no due-process violation.

NO-CONTEST PLEA — OVI — WAIVER — R.C. 4511.19(A)(1)(j)(ix) — EXPLANATION OF CIRCUMSTANCES – R.C. 2937.07: The trial court erred in finding defendant guilty of operating a motor vehicle with a specific concentration of methamphetamine in his urine following a no-contest plea to R.C. 4511.19(A)(1)(j)(ix) where the State's explanation of circumstances did not identify the substance or its amount that was present in defendant's system, either expressly or by implication. Defendant did not explicitly and clearly waive the explanation-of-circumstances requirement under R.C. 2937.07 by indicating that he did not want to hear the facts following his no-contest plea.

RESPONDEAT SUPERIOR – VICARIOUS LIABILITY: Where plaintiff sued defendant hospital but not its employee nurse, the trial court erred when it granted summary judgment in favor of defendant because vicarious-liability exceptions pertaining to suits involving physicians and hospitals do not apply in cases involving a hospital and its nurse employee.

Aggravated Murder - Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea - Res Judicata

Consecutive Sentences

The record does not support appellant's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel affecting the validity of his guilty plea. Judgment affirmed.

Appellant's sentence was not contrary to law; it was within the statutory range for fourth-degree felonies, and the trial court stated in its judgment entry that it had considered the principles and purposes of felony sentencing and the seriousness and recidivism factors in R.C. 2929.11 and R.C. 2929.12. Judgment affirmed.

Appellant's convictions for murder and having a weapon while under disability were not against the manifest weight of the evidence and were supported by sufficient evidence. Because the State's challenge to an African-American prospective juror was for cause, Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986), was not implicated. The trial court did not commit plain error in admitting Evid.R. 404(B) other acts evidence. The trial court did not err by overruling appellant's motion to suppress statements he made to police officers or in failing to merge the murder and having a weapon while under disability convictions. Under the authority of State v. Bollar, 2022-Ohio-4370, the trial court did not err by imposing a three-year sentence for a firearm specification attached to a felonious assault conviction that was merged at sentencing with the murder conviction. Finally, we cannot clearly and convincingly conclude that the record did not support the trial court's consecutive sentence findings. Judgment affirmed.

Appellant's felonious assault conviction was supported by sufficient evidence and was not against the manifest weight of the evidence. Appellant's sentence was not contrary to law. Judgment affirmed.

The probate court erred in granting a directed verdict in favor of Father on the issue of whether Father's consent to Stepfather's adoption of the child was required. We are unable to review Stepfather's assertions that the probate court erred in failing to correct the written transcript, because the audio recording of the proceedings is not part of the record. Judgment reversed and remanded.

The trial court did not err in overruling appellant's post-conviction motion for a "plain error analysis." The trial court did not modify his sentence without his presence in violation of Crim.R. 43. Instead, the Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Correction administratively recalculated appellant's sentences and parole hearing date based on State ex rel. Fraley v. Ohio Dept. of Rehab. & Corr., 2020-Ohio-4410. The administrative recalculation resulted in a three-year reduction in appellant's sentences, consistent with the sentences the trial court originally imposed. Appellant was not entitled to have counsel appointed. Judgment affirmed.

The trial court violated four of the victim's constitutional rights under Marsy's Law, a notice requirement under R.C. 2930.161(A)(1), and the victim's statutory rights to be present and heard at proceedings under R.C. 2930.09 when it failed to notify the victim of a review hearing at which it terminated appellee's community control sanctions. Judgment terminating community control sanctions vacated; remanded for a new community control review hearing that complies with Marsy's Law and R.C. Chap. 2930.

Appellant's conviction for failure to comply with an order or signal of a police officer was based on sufficient evidence and not against the manifest weight of the evidence; the evidence demonstrated that appellant was the driver of the vehicle that fled from law enforcement during an attempted traffic stop. Appellant's leaving the vehicle and hurrying into his aunt's home after fleeing from law enforcement did not constitute obstructing official business. The record does not support a conclusion that the trial court failed to consider the factors in R.C. 2129.331(C)(5)(b) at sentencing. Judgment affirmed as to the conviction for failure to comply and vacated as to the conviction for obstructing official business.

parental rights; ineffective assistance of counsel; continuance; best interest of the child; manifest weight of the evidence

Mandamus—Appellant failed to show that common pleas court patently and unambiguously lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to recognize Tennessee court's jurisdiction—Appellant had and made use of adequate remedy in ordinary course of law by appealing from common pleas court's judgment declining to exercise jurisdiction over his divorce and child-custody case—Court of appeals' dismissal of petition affirmed.

(Osowik): Petition for a writ of mandamus, ordering the trial court to vacate an order in relator's criminal case and to order the State to return seized property that is the subject of a forfeiture action by State, is dismissed sua sponte where petition seeks the same relief as two previously-filed original actions and where relator had an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of the law.

Zmuda, J., writing for the majority, find that trial court did not err in imposing consecutive sentences for convictions within the same case and consecutive to previously-imposed sentences.

Trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying plaintiff's motion for relief from judgment under Civ.R. 60(B) where the motion was unsupported by any operative facts or evidence establishing her right to relief.

Per Mayle, J., trial court's finding that appellant failed to present clear and convincing evidence proving that she can provide a legally secure permanent placement and adequate care for child's health, welfare, and safety, as required under R.C. 2151.414(E)(11), is supported by clear and convincing evidence and is not against the manifest weight of the evidence. Because only one factor under R.C. 2151.414(E) is needed to support permanent custody award, remaining arguments under that section are moot.

Zmuda, J., writing for the majority, affirms the trial court's imposition of consecutive sentences as not clearly and convincingly unsupported by the record

Appeal dismissed as having been improvidently accepted.

Because testimony from a zoning board hearing did not contradict the affidavit that stated that Respondent provided all responsive records, the Court found that Requesters failed to submit clear and convincing evidence that Respondent possesses additional unprovided responsive records. Therefore, Court overruled Requesters' objections and adopted the Special Master's R&R.

On Requester's objections to a report and recommendation, the Court found unpersuasive Requester's contentions that the requested records existed and were accessible under the "Database Rule," that the initial request was not overbroad, and that costs should not be assessed against Requester. The Court overruled Requester's objections and adopted the report and recommendation.

Requester failed to provide clear and convincing evidence that the City maintains possession over housing court financial records. Therefore, the Court overruled Requester's objections. Further, because Requester requested the records from the City and not the housing court, the Court found that the special master correctly applied the Public Records Act and not the Rules of Superintendence in this case. Therefore, the Court overruled Respondent's objection and adopted the Special Master's R&R.

Unreasonable search and seizure; Miranda rights; Post-Miranda; Reasonable and articulable suspicion; Fourth amendment; Harmless error

Sentencing; Consecutive sentences; Findings on the record to impose consecutive terms; Sentencing entry

Mandamus, Prohibition, Civ.R. 12(B)(6)

CRIMINAL – application to reopen; amend charge; grand jury.

CIVIL – Civil Rule 5(A); new or additional claims for relief or for additional damages; no service; intervenors' complaints.

CRIMINAL LAW – attempted possession of a deadly weapon while under detention; guilty plea; the parties jointly recommended a 12-month prison term to be served consecutive to Appellant's other case in Montgomery County; Appellant's sentence is not contrary to law; R.C. 2953.08(D)(1) and (G); judgment affirmed.

postconviction petition; no hearing required; doctrine of res judicata barred relief; no ineffective assistance of counsel

CIVIL – oral settlement agreement; material term; "meeting of the minds"; clear and convincing evidence.

CIVIL – reconsideration; affirm; separate grounds; evidentiary basis; no obvious error; no issue not considered; en banc consideration; no intra-district conflict.

CIVIL – bench trial; manifest weight. CONTRACTS - EAU was not legally in existence at the time the purchase agreement was entered into and signed by the parties; personal liability; EAU's sole member and manager is not shielded from liability; Civ.R. 15(B); amendment of a pleading; abuse of discretion standard; Civ.R. 54(B). DAMAGES – the trial court, having observed the presentation of the invoices and the related testimony, was in the best position to calculate and award damages; judgment affirmed.

Ineffective assistance of counsel, deficient performance, not guilty by

CIVIL – sovereign immunity; proprietary function; R.C. 2744.01(G)(2)(C); municipal corporation water supply system; regional water and sewer district; utility; expressio unius est exclusio alterius.

CRIMINAL LAW – having weapons while under disability; jury trial; sentenced to 24 months in prison; sufficiency of the evidence; the trial court did not err in overruling Appellant's Crim.R. 29 motion; manifest weight; the jury chose to believe the State's witnesses; judgment affirmed.

CIVIL – summary judgment; Civ.R. 56; de novo review; oil and gas case; lease; bonus money; disgorgement; equitable remedy; no wrongdoing; unjust enrichment; Dormant Mineral Act; R.C. 5301.56(B)(3) and (H)(1); judgments affirmed.

REOPENING – App.R. 26(B); timely application to reopen direct appeal; Appellant fails to meet the standard under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984); assignments of error; failure to raise objection; failure to file motion to suppress dash cam video; whether felonious assault serves as a predicate offense for felony murder; cumulative error; Appellant fails to establish that he was denied the effective assistance of appellate counsel warranting a reopening; application denied.

CRIMINAL – prior inconsistent statement; prior bad acts; rape shield law; defense witness; opened the door; defendant's prior sexual history; prejudicial; inflammatory; harmless error; overwhelming evidence of guilt; expert witness; delayed disclosure; direct appeal.

application for nutrition assistance; food stamps; R.C. 5101.35; trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction; failure to exhaust administrative remedies

Postconviction petition; petition cannot be considered by a trial a court if it is untimely and no exception applies; fact that petition is successive is grounds for denying; a petitioner is barred by res judicata from raising arguments that have been or could have been raised on direct appeal.

CIVIL – summary judgment; Civ.R. 56; de novo review; slip and fall; parking lot; business invitee; open and obvious; no attendant circumstances; judgments affirmed.

Appellant's conviction for failure to comply with an order or signal of a police officer and obstructing official business were supported by sufficient evidence and not against the manifest weight of the evidence and no plain error occurred with respect to the verdict form for appellant's conviction of failing to comply with an order or signal of a police officer where appellant failed to prove any defect in the verdict form affected the outcome of his trial.

Trial court erred in assigning husband any outstanding liability to a third person in its property division where trial court failed to address the third party's advances to the parties during the parties' marriage, much less classify the advances as a marital or separate debt or a gift, and where trial court failed to make the required R.C. 3105.171(G) written findings of fact.

Trial court abused its discretion by imposing five-year no-contact order between father and his minor children as condition of community control following domestic violence conviction against children's mother. No-contact order was not an appropriate community-control condition as it lacked rehabilitative focus and was overly broad.

Evid.R. 404(B); Other Crimes, Wrongs, or Acts; Aggravated Funding of Drug Trafficking; R.C. 2925.05(A). Text messages did not constitute evidence of any other crime, wrong, or act and, therefore, fell outside the scope of Evid.R. 404(B), so the trial court did not deny defendant-appellant a fair trial by not barring admission of the text messages based on Evid.R. 404(B). There was insufficient evidence to sustain defendant-appellant's conviction for aggravated funding of drug trafficking and, therefore, that conviction must be vacated.

Felony sentencing review; R.C. 2953.08; R.C. 2929.11; R.C. 2929.12. The prison sentence imposed by the trial court was not clearly and convincingly contrary to law.

Sexual Battery; R.C. 2907.03(A)(5); Fines; R.C. 2953.08(G). Defendant-appellant's conviction was not against the manifest weight of the evidence. The trial court's imposition of a $10,000 fine, in addition to a prison term, did not violate defendant-appellant's constitutional rights.

Denial of Motion to suppress; turn signal violation

Pro se untimely challenge of guilty plea and sentencing; defendant properly advised of sentence; not entitled to free transcript

No waiver of right to move for disqualification; evidentiary hearing not required; court properly applied Dana test

Motion in limine; manifest weight of the evidence; self-defense; curative jury instructions

Mandamus—Public Records Act—R.C. 149.43—For each category of relator's public-records request, respondent properly denied the request, produced the records, or averred that the records do not exist—Because relator has not shown that respondent failed to comply with an obligation under R.C. 149.43(B), relator is not entitled to statutory damages—Writ and request for statutory damages denied.

Habeas corpus—Following conviction, any error regarding issue of pretrial bail is moot—Inmate's petition rendered moot by his subsequent conviction—Appeal dismissed.

Attorneys at law—Reciprocal discipline from the Supreme Court of Kentucky—suspended from the practice of law in Ohio—Gov.Bar R. V(20).

CIVIL - summary judgment; gender discrimination; disability discrimination/failure to accommodate; retaliation; prima facie case of discrimination; legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason; pretext for discrimination; disability; honest belief rule; adverse employment action; materially adverse change; terms/conditions of employment; burden on summary judgment; nonmoving party.

On appeal from domestic relations court decisions finding defendant in contempt of prior divorce orders. On review of the trial court's order, the appellate court held that the trial court had properly ruled upon all of defendant's objections to magistrate's decision and that the order finding her in contempt was final and appealable, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that there was sufficient evidence of personal property value in the record and that there was sufficient evidence that defendant had refused to return personal property to the plaintiff as previously ordered, that the trial court's determinations regarding defendant's credibility on all other matters were within its discretion. Defendant's assignments of error overruled and judgment affirmed.

The trial court did not err by granting defendants' motion for judgment on the pleadings and motion to dismiss, which the trial court converted into a motion for summary judgment, because plaintiffs' legal malpractice claims were barred by the four-year statute of repose in R.C. 2305.117(B). Contrary to plaintiffs' arguments, the trial court reviewed the correct version of the complaint when ruling on defendants' motions. The trial court did not abuse its discretion by not ruling on plaintiffs' motion to compel, filed after the discovery-cutoff date, and did not err by denying plaintiffs' untimely motion for substitution of a deceased defendant. Judgment affirmed.

Procedendo; R.C. 2969.25(A) and (C); vain act. Relator seeks a writ of procedendo in order to require the respondent judge to render rulings with regard to pending motions for leave to file motions for new trial. Initially, we find that the relator has failed to comply with the mandatory requirements of R.C. 2969.25(A) and (C). In addition, a review of the docket, in the relator's two criminal cases, fails to disclose that any motions for leave to file motions for new trial were docketed. Finally, this court will not issue a writ of procedendo to compel a vain act.

Administrative warrant

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW/CRIMINAL — BRADY — COUNSEL — MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL — DISCOVERY VIOLATION — EVIDENCE — MANIFEST WEIGHT — IDENTITY: Defendant's due process rights under Brady v. Maryland, 337 U.S. 83 (1963), were not violated by the State's disclosure of exculpatory evidence during closing arguments of defendant's bench trial because the new evidence was disclosed during trial, the trial court granted a three-month continuance for the parties to investigate the newly disclosed evidence, and defendant was able to admit the evidence and effectively use it; while defendant argued on appeal that he would have presented a different alternate-suspect theory of the case had he known about the exculpatory report prior to trial, defendant was not denied a fair trial given that defendant had suggested an alternate suspect might have been the shooter at trial. Defendant cannot show that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel based on his trial counsel's failure to pursue DNA testing and investigate potential alternate suspects as the results of these potential investigations were not in the record and accordingly defendant could not show prejudice in his direct appeal; defendant's further argument that his counsel was ineffective for failing to maintain a request for a mistrial failed because defendant's argument amounted to a disagreement with his trial counsel's trial strategy. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying defendant's motion for a mistrial where the State's nondisclosure of exculpatory evidence was not willful and the trial court's three-month continuance and allowing defendant to introduce the withheld evidence was a reasonable method of mitigating any prejudice that defendant suffered from the late disclosure. Defendant's convictions stemming from a shooting were not against the manifest weight of the evidence where, although an eyewitness's statements to police the night of the shooting were inconsistent with her trial testimony, these inconsistencies were noted at trial and the remaining evidence was undisputed that defendant engaged in a heated argument with the eyewitness, drove away in a maroon car, and the eyewitness was shot at by someone in that maroon Ford a few hours later.

CIV.R. 41 — INVOLUNTARY DISMISSAL: The trial court did not abuse its discretion when it sustained petitioners' objections to the magistrate's orders dismissing their petitions for civil-stalking-protection orders against respondent based on uncontested facts, and petitioners' prompt objections to the orders dismissing their petitions were contrary to having abandoned their petitions.

GUILTY PLEA — COMPETENCE TO STAND TRIAL — STIPULATED REPORT — ARSON-OFFENDER REGISTRY — PLEA COLLOQUY — AGREED SENTENCE – DOUBLE JEOPARDY – ALLIED OFFENSES: The trial court did not err when it found defendant competent to stand trial and then accepted defendant's guilty pleas because defendant stipulated to the psychologist's competency report and the trial court based its competency determination on the stipulated report, which accounted for defendant's history, mental-health issues, and concerning behavior and concluded that defendant was competent to stand trial. Defendant's guilty pleas were not unknowingly, unintelligently, or involuntarily entered despite the trial court's misstatement regarding defendant's duty to register as an arson offender for life where defendant failed to demonstrate that the trial court's misstatement affected his decision to plead guilty. Where defendant forfeited the issue of allied offenses or double jeopardy when he failed to raise the issues to the trial court as it imposed the jointly-recommended sentences and defendant failed to argue plain error on appeal, defendant cannot show that his jointly-recommended sentences are not authorized by law.

SENTENCING — R.C. 2953.09(A)(2) — R.C. 2929.13(B)(1)(b)(iv) — APPELLATE REVIEW/CRIMINAL: Where defendant was convicted of gross sexual imposition, a fourth-degree felony, sentenced to 16 months in prison, and did not seek leave to appeal his sentence, he had no right to appeal his sentence under R.C. 2953.08(A)(2) where the trial court sentenced him to a prison term after it found that he was convicted of a sex offense, and the presumption of community control for fourth-degree felonies does not apply to sex offenses under R.C. 2929.13(B)(1)(b)(iv).

change of legal custody order, R.C. 2151.42(B), change in circumstances, death of parent, Mother's marriage to inappropriate man

motion to vacate – due process – service of notice – Civ.R. 73 – waived – standing – subject matter jurisdiction

Arbitration; motion to vacate arbitration award; R.C. 2711.10(D); arbitrator exceeds authority; arbitration award must draw essence from CBA; CBA ambiguous language; arbitrator interpretation of CBA; notice of right to prior teaching service credit; filing grievance; timeliness; arbitrability

Summary judgment; Landlord duties; Fit and habitable condition; Issues of material fact; Negligence per se

Suppression - Marked Lanes Violation

Minor adjudicated delinquent - rape with serious youthful offender disposition - No violation of Appellant's right to confront witnesses against him. Forensic interviewer at Child Assessment Center could testify to statements made by the child-victim Parents' testimony relating child's statements to them admissible under excited utterance exception - Manifest Weight - Sufficiency of Evidence

App.R. 26(B) application for reopening; App.R. 26(B)(2)(b) 90-day period to file timely application; untimely filed; failure to establish good cause for untimely filing of application; good cause not applied for an indefinite period of time. The applicant has filed an App.R. 26(B) application for reopening beyond the 90-day period for filing a timely application per App.R. 26(B)(2)(b). The applicant has failed to establish good cause for the untimely filing of the application for reopening.

App.R. 26(B); application to reopen; ineffective assistance of appellate counsel; ineffective assistance of trial counsel; aggravated murder; perjured evidence; failure to investigate; manifest weight of the evidence. The court denied an App.R. 26(B) application to reopen based on ineffective assistance of appellate counsel. Perjury is not shown by unsworn statements. Appellate counsel forcefully argued manifest weight of the evidence. The argument that trial counsel was ineffective for failure to investigate relied on too much speculation.

Crim.R. 11; guilty plea; knowing, intelligent, voluntary; R.C. 2929.14; consecutive sentences. Appellant's guilty pleas were knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily made. The trial court partially complied with Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(a) and (b), and the appellant failed to demonstrate prejudice. The trial court's imposition of consecutive sentences was pursuant to law.

Felonious assault; serious physical harm; sufficiency of the evidence; manifest weight of the evidence; ineffective assistance of counsel. Appellant's convictions were supported by sufficient evidence and were not against the manifest weight of the evidence where the State presented evidence that the victim suffered serious physical harm in the form of a laceration requiring stitches and a diagnosis of post-concussion syndrome. Appellant did not receive ineffective assistance of counsel; decisions about introducing evidence, calling or not calling witnesses, and the scope of cross-examination are within the scope of trial strategy.

R.C. 2945.75; lifetime driver's license suspension; Crim.R. 52(B); plain error; R.C. 2921.331; R.C. 4510.02; Crim.R. 11; guilty plea; prior conviction. Judgment affirmed. The appellant is unable to show that the trial court erred in imposing the mandatory lifetime driver's license suspension. When a prior conviction enhances the punishment for committing a subsequent crime but does not raise the degree of the offense, the prior conviction does not have to be included in the indictment because it is not an essential element of the subsequent crime. Thus, the State was not required to provide appellant notice of his prior conviction because the prior conviction is only relevant as a sentencing enhancement; it is not an element of the offense charged under R.C. 2921.331.

Motion for summary judgment; Civ.R. 56; genuine issues of material fact; breach of contract; statute of limitations; exclusion of warranties; R.C. 5321.04; R.C. Ch. 4781; R.C. Ch. 5321; common areas; criminal activity by tenants; covenant of quiet enjoyment; rent increase; retaliation; OAC 4781-12-28; R.C. 955.28; strict liability; dog bite and personal property damage; landlord; misrepresentation; fraud; Consumer Sales Practices Act; OAC 4781-12-08; slander; scope of employment; intentional and malicious torts; destruction of personal property; and notice. The trial court did not err when it granted summary judgment to a defendant-appellee because the complaint alleged no causes of action against that particular defendant-appellee. The trial court did not err when it granted summary judgment to a defendant-appellee on a breach-of-contract claim where the claims were time-barred by the contractually agreed to statute of limitations and the purchase agreement excluded any express or implied warranties. The trial court did not err when it granted summary judgment to a defendant-appellee because a landlord or manufactured park operator is not responsible for the alleged criminal activity and resulting damage caused by tenants on a resident's own property. The trial court also did not err when it found there were no genuine issues of material fact stemming from the plaintiffs-appellants' allegations that another tenant, rather than the landlord, breached the covenant of quiet enjoyment. Because the landlord imposed a rent increase on all residents due to increased operational costs and the lease agreement permitted rent increases with the requisite notice, the trial court did not err when it found the plaintiffs-appellants' allegations of a rent increase due to retaliation did not create a genuine issues of material fact. The trial court did not err when it granted summary judgment to defendant-appellant landlord where the plaintiffs-appellants failed to demonstrate the alleged incident with a dog occurred in the common area. Plaintiffs-appellants claimed they relied on a document from the community property manager when they executed the lease agreement. However, the defendant-appellant was entitled to summary judgment on the claim of misrepresentation and fraud because the lease agreement specifically stated (1) the document constitutes the entire agreement and (2) the plaintiffs-appellants did not rely on any representations, written or oral, as an inducement to execute the lease. The trial court correctly granted defendants-appellees' motion for summary judgment because the claimed violation of Ohio Administrative Code 4781-12-08 lacked merit. Absent evidence to demonstrate an employee's alleged intentional, malicious torts were performed to further or promote his employer's business, the trial court did not err when it granted summary judgment on the issue of slander. The trial court did not err in granting summary judgment where the plaintiffs-appellants failed to show that their landlord had notice that construction materials were placed on their tenant's property. The trial court erred in granting summary judgment where genuine issues of material fact existed as to whether the landlord was notified about a damaged branch in the common areas and whether the landlord or his employee removed the tenant's back steps and door without replacing them.