[Cite as State v. Sheppard,
2025-Ohio-161.]
COURT OF APPEALS
STARK COUNTY, OHIO
FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
STATE OF OHIO : JUDGES:
:
: Hon. Patricia A. Delaney, P.J.
Plaintiff-Appellee : Hon. William B. Hoffman, J.
: Hon. Andrew J. King, J.
-vs- :
: Case No. 2024 CA 00017
:
TRAMEL ANTWAN SHEPPARD :
:
:
Defendant-Appellant : OPINION
CHARACTER OF PROCEEDING: Appeal from the Stark County Court of
Common Pleas, Case No. 2023 CR
0505
JUDGMENT: Affirmed
DATE OF JUDGMENT ENTRY: January 21, 2025
APPEARANCES:
For Plaintiff-Appellee: For Defendant-Appellant:
Vicki L. DeSantis, Assistant Prosecutor D. Coleman Bond
110 Central Plaza South, Suite 510 116 Cleveland Ave. N.W., Suite 300
Canton Ohio 44702 Canton, Ohio 44702
[Cite as State v. Sheppard, 2025-Ohio-161.]
Delaney, P.J.
{¶1} Defendant-Appellant Tramel Antwan Sheppard has appealed from the
Judgment Entry of the Stark County Court of Common Pleas in which he was convicted
of menacing by stalking and criminal trespass. Plaintiff-Appellee is the State of Ohio.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
{¶2} Defendant was indicted on one count of Menacing by Stalking in violation of
R.C. 2903.211(A)(1)(B)(2)(e), a fourth degree felony, and one count of Criminal
Trespass, in violation of R.C. 2911.21(A)(3)(D)(1), a fourth degree misdemeanor. The
charges stem from acts towards a woman referred to as “T.R.” in this Opinion.
{¶3} Defendant and T.R. were introduced by a mutual friend in 2022 when they
worked together at a snack food manufacturer in Massillon, Ohio. The two worked in
different departments but would talk when Defendant came to T.R.’s station or when they
would see each other around the facility. T.R. initially considered him a work friend. They
did not socialize outside of work. Although Defendant gave T.R. his phone number, she
never gave hers to him.
{¶4} At one point, T.R. asked Defendant to give her a ride home from work. She
gave him her address so he would know where to drop her off. She felt comfortable doing
that because she knew she was moving soon after and would not be giving Defendant
her new address.
{¶5} On the ride to her home, they talked about their churches and Defendant
told T.R. about a difficult experience he had at the church he was attending. T.R. told him
that he could come to her church. She gave him the church’s location and the phone
[Cite as State v. Sheppard, 2025-Ohio-161.]
number. Defendant began coming to T.R.’s church and attending the Sunday service and
a midweek bible study.
{¶6} Soon after he gave her the ride home, Defendant began to make T.R. feel
uncomfortable at work. He asked her twice to go on dates. She declined the requests and
told him she “was in a relationship with God.” He began following her around and talking
to her, even when she asked him to stop. Although she did not take her break at a
scheduled time, he would be outside to meet her whenever she went on her break. He
asked her if she wanted to have sex and she said no. Defendant once told T.R. that he
couldn’t see his children because he was going to ask T.R. to marry him.
{¶7} On one occasion, T.R. fell asleep during a break and awoke to find
Defendant standing over her massaging her shoulders. She “shoved him off” and told him
to get away from her. He asked “you don’t like that?” and she responded “no.” She was
upset at the time because the unwanted touching made her feel scared and
uncomfortable. She wanted Defendant to stay away from her.
{¶8} T.R. stated that the unwanted behavior at work continued. She told her
supervisor and human resource department about the events. When he continued to
come to her workstation, she reported the behavior again. Defendant was fired from his
job in August 2022 for his conduct. He continued, however, to attend church.
{¶9} The church was attended by T.R.’s family and had been part of T.R.’s life
for approximately 20 years. Pastor Anicia Ann Brown, “took her in” when T.R. was around
13 years old because T.R.’s mother had died from cancer. T.R. was an usher at the
Sunday service.
[Cite as State v. Sheppard, 2025-Ohio-161.]
{¶10} Around the end of September or beginning of October, Defendant came up
to T.R. in the middle of a service and said he needed to talk to her “about us.” She shook
her head no, but he continued. A cousin intervened to get her away from him and
Defendant followed them out until the bishop pulled him aside.
{¶11} According to Pastor Brown, there was nothing out of the ordinary with
Defendant when he first attended the church. Soon after, however, his behavior changed
and several incidents occurred. At a service, she witnessed Defendant walk up to T.R. as
she was standing alone while serving as an usher. He said something to her and T.R.
looked afraid. Pastor Brown noticed that he made T.R. very uncomfortable. On another
occasion, Pastor Brown had placed a crown on a special chair in the pulpit. Defendant
walked up to the pulpit and said to Pastor Brown “that’s my crown, I’m God.”
{¶12} One Sunday, the church was having a testimony service. Defendant got up
in front of the congregation to testify and he asked T.R. to marry him. She said no. She
described being mortified at this unwanted behavior. Pastor Brown reiterated to
Defendant that the answer was no.
{¶13} T.R. was afraid of Defendant and began staying home rather than attending
church if he was there. The congregation knew T.R. did not want to be around Defendant
and someone would call her to let her know if he was in attendance.
{¶14} Although T.R. had to stop going because of Defendant’s behavior, incidents
continued to occur. Pastor Brown described another service during which Defendant
removed his shirt. He began using swear words and showing his tattoos. Pastor Brown
perceived his actions as a threat and men from the church came to help get him calmed
[Cite as State v. Sheppard, 2025-Ohio-161.]
down. She told him she did not want to call the police and that he should “just stop coming
here.” She said she told him that “several times.”
{¶15} Pastor Brown did eventually call the police “a couple of times.” Based on
Defendant’s behavior and T.R.’s reaction, she was very concerned for T.R.’s safety.
{¶16} In December 2022, T.R. learned that Defendant had posted about her on
Facebook on two separate occasions. Defendant had previously sent T.R. a request to
be his friend on Facebook, which she declined to accept. On December 6, 2022, he
posted “Okay, [T.R.], I get that you want to be the only girl which you are. I’m leaving on
Monday to California I want you on the plane with me. I may be a dog that barks at other
females but my loyalty is with you. I figured I’d let you know how I feel before I leave
town.” On December 10, 2022, he posted “I need somebody to talk to I’m bored and horny
. . . sooooo [T.R.]”
{¶17} T.R. was made aware that same month that Defendant had posted a video
on Facebook referring to her. Despite being asked not to return to church, Defendant
filmed himself walking on church property and posted it on Facebook. Defendant could
be seen walking around the property in an agitated state. As he filmed the front door of
the church and a car in front of it, he referred to T.R. as “the devil” and saying “See the
devil? Look she’s hiding from the camera. See the devil?” He claimed that he was “all
under her spell” and that she “disturbed my peace.” He referred to her as a “bitch.” In
addition to Defendant identifying T.R. by her name and using profanity, he said he “bet
she die a virgin, guaranteed.” He also stated that “she got me fired from my job.”
{¶18} In the video, Defendant also acknowledged that he had been previously
asked to leave the church. He repeated the statement they “kicked me out of the church”
[Cite as State v. Sheppard, 2025-Ohio-161.]
and then added but “now I’m back.” He referenced the incident where he took his shirt off
and that they were offended by it. He claimed “shit real serious over here.”
{¶19} On December 19, 2022, T.R. contacted the Canton Police about
Defendant’s behavior. On December 25, 2022, T.R. received a call that Defendant was
at church, and she should not come. T.R. had been planning to go with her grandmother
to the Christmas service but did not want to attend if Defendant was there because she
did not know “what he would do.” She was informed that “he was getting aggressive” and
she was afraid of him.
{¶20} T.R. took steps to protect herself, including getting pepper spray and
firearms. She was concerned about possible physical harm from Defendant. She felt his
behavior was getting more aggressive as the months went on. She sought counseling
from her pastors, she could not sleep, and it affected her eating habits.
{¶21} On February 26, 2023, Defendant again came into the church. T.R. had
been on her way, but when she learned of his presence she decided to go back home.
Her stepmother was there that day and saw him. She knew he was no longer allowed to
be there and called Pastor Brown. Pastor Brown instructed her to call the police.
{¶22} An officer with the Canton Police Department, Josh Tanner, and his partner
arrived at the church. At this point, Defendant had gone outside and was sitting in his car
in the parking lot. Defendant told the officers he was there to attend service, but the doors
were locked. The officer observed that the doors were clearly not locked and that it looked
as if the service was going to begin soon.
{¶23} While his partner stayed in the parking lot with Defendant, Officer Tanner
went inside and spoke with T.R.’s stepmother and Pastor Brown. From those
[Cite as State v. Sheppard, 2025-Ohio-161.]
conversations, it was the officer’s understanding that Defendant had trespassed on
church property, and Defendant was arrested.
{¶24} The trial court initially found that Defendant was incompetent to stand trial,
but restorable. After treatment, the parties stipulated to an expert’s report that found his
competency had been restored. The case went to trial on December 11, 2023. The jury
heard testimony from T.R., Pastor Brown, T.R.’s stepmother, Officer Josh Tanner, and
Defendant.
{¶25} During his testimony, Defendant stated that Tramel was his government
name and that he went by the name “God.” He also described an encounter he claimed
to have had with God at a bus stop years before meeting T.R., at which time he met God
who transferred his energy to Defendant. Defendant stated that he began to have feelings
for T.R. when they met at work. When he asked her if she was seeing anyone and she
responded “I’m God’s girl.” Defendant interpreted that to mean she “was my girl” because
“I’m God.”
{¶26} When asked about the video, Defendant denied that he intended to harm
T.R. He admitted that he did not have her phone number and did not know where she
lived. The only way he could have contact with her was at church. He stated that it didn’t
matter that he was told not to go to the church anymore because he was God. He stated
that it did not matter that T.R. told him she did not want a relationship with him because
“she told Tramel Sheppard that,” not God.
{¶27} The jury found Defendant guilty of menacing by stalking and criminal
trespass. On December 13, 2023, the trial court entered a Judgment Entry and sentenced
Defendant to a community control sanction. It is from this entry that he now appeals.
[Cite as State v. Sheppard, 2025-Ohio-161.]
ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR
I.
{¶28} THE STATE FAILED TO PRESENT SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO
SUSTAIN A CONVICTION AGAINST APPELLANT, AND THE CONVICTIONS MUST BE
REVERSED.
II.
{¶29} THE APPELLANT’S CONVICTION IS AGAINST THE MANIFEST WEIGHT
OF THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED AND MUST BE REVERSED.
ANALYSIS
I.
{¶30} In his first assignment of error, Defendant has argued that the State did not
present sufficient evidence of menacing by stalking and criminal trespass to sustain his
convictions. The standard of review for a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence is
set forth in State v. Jenks, 61 Ohio St.3d 259 (1991) at paragraph two of the syllabus.
State v. Taylor,
2023-Ohio-4160, ¶ 54 (5th Dist.).
{¶31} In Jenks, the Ohio Supreme Court held “[a]n appellate court's function when
reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to support a criminal conviction is to examine
the evidence admitted at trial to determine whether such evidence, if believed, would
convince the average mind of the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” Jenks,
at paragraph two of the syllabus. “The relevant inquiry is whether, after viewing the
evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have
found the essential elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id.
[Cite as State v. Sheppard,
2025-Ohio-161.]
{¶32} In State v. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380, 386–87 (1997), the Ohio
Supreme Court stated “‘sufficiency’ is a term of art meaning that legal standard which is
applied to determine whether the case may go to the jury or whether the evidence is
legally sufficient to support the jury verdict as a matter of law.” Citing Black's Law
Dictionary (6th Ed. 1990). See, also, Crim.R. 29(A) (motion for judgment of acquittal can
be granted by the trial court if the evidence is insufficient to sustain a conviction). It is, in
essence, a test of adequacy.
Id. Whether the evidence is legally sufficient to sustain a
verdict is a question of law.
Id., citing State v. Robinson,
162 Ohio St. 486 (1955).
Menacing by Stalking
{¶33} Defendant was convicted of Menacing by Stalking, R.C. 2903.211(A)(1).
The statute provides, in pertinent part, that “no person by engaging in a pattern of conduct
shall knowingly cause another person to believe that the offender will cause physical harm
to the other person . . . or cause mental distress to the other person . . . .” It is a felony of
the fourth degree if the offender has a history of violence toward the victim or any other
person. R.C. 2903.211(B)(2)(e). The parties stipulated to a prior conviction for felonious
assault and aggravated robbery in the case of State v. Sheppard, Summit C.P. No. CR
2010 01 0159.
{¶34} In this case, Defendant has argued that the State failed to present sufficient
evidence that he engaged in a pattern of conduct that knowingly caused T.R. to believe
that he would cause her physical harm or mental distress. He has claimed that there was
no evidence presented at trial that he “ever made any threats to T.R.” He has also claimed
that other than two incidents, his conduct in church occurred when T.R. was not present
and that his Facebook posts were not made directly to her.
[Cite as State v. Sheppard, 2025-Ohio-161.]
{¶35} The statute itself does not require proof of making a threat to the victim,
although a threat of physical harm to the victim would elevate the offense from a first-
degree misdemeanor to a fourth-degree felony. R.C. 2903.211(A)(1), 2903.211(B)(2)(b).
It requires evidence of a pattern of behavior that makes another person believe that the
offender will cause physical harm or mental distress. A “pattern of conduct” is defined, in
pertinent part, as “two or more actions or incidents closely related in time, whether there
as been a prior conviction based on any of those actions or incidents.” R.C.
2903.211(D)(1).
{¶36} The State produced evidence of incidents that occurred at the workplace
and church. Defendant did not dispute the existence or the description of the conduct
alleged in the State’s case. He disputed that his conduct knowingly caused T.R. to believe
he would cause physical harm or mental distress. In supporting his position, he did not
address any of the instances from the workplace, but instead focused on what happened
at church. He has argued that after he approached T.R. and asked to talk “about us” and
after he stopped a service to ask her to marry him, he had no more direct contact with
T.R. The time he stopped church to take a crown in the pulpit and the time he took his
shirt off in the service happened when T.R. was not in attendance. He similarly argued
that the Facebook posts and video were not communicated directly to her. Otherwise, he
claimed he “was simply attending church on Sundays.”
{¶37} Defendant specifically focused on the Facebook page as the only thing
which “arguably could have been perceived as a threat.” In support, he cited the case of
State v. Richard, 129 Ohio App.3d 556 (7th Dist. 1998). In that case, the defendant made
the statement “I should just kill her, maybe that will end it all.” The appellate court
[Cite as State v. Sheppard,
2025-Ohio-161.]
determined he was “not guilty of menacing because the alleged victim was not the person
to whom he addressed his statement.” Id. at 561.
{¶38} This Court disagreed with Richard in St. v. McWilliams, 2012-Ohio-663 (5th
Dist.). In McWilliams, the defendant argued that his conviction for aggravated menacing
should have been dismissed because he stated his threat to a third party and not to the
person who was the subject of the threat. We held that to sustain an aggravated menacing
conviction, a threat to cause the harm need not be made directly to the intended victim,
but may be sufficient if made to a third-party to whom the defendant knew or reasonably
should have known would convey the threat to the intended victim.
McWilliams at ¶ 27.
{¶39} Specifically addressing online posts, this Court has determined that public
Facebook posts were sufficient to knowingly cause mental distress. L.L. v. R.B., 2017-
Ohio-7553, ¶ 27 (5th Dist.). Another appellate court has found the posts were sufficient
even if the victims did not maintain a Facebook account. State v. Rowbotham, 2022-Ohio-
926, ¶ 94 (7th Dist.).
{¶40} Although it was unclear from the testimony how T.R. specifically learned of
the Facebook posts and video, they were on his public Facebook page and she learned
of them within a day or two of their posting. There was testimony that they had a least
one friend in common from work and that the members of the church were also familiar
with the situation.
{¶41} The two posts continued the theme of wanting a relationship and sex with
T.R. despite her clear and continued repudiation of the same. The video was taken on
the property of the church, even though Defendant had previously been asked to leave.
It showed him walking around the property and using profanity regarding T.R.
[Cite as State v. Sheppard, 2025-Ohio-161.]
{¶42} A person’s repeated actions or incidents may create a reasonable belief in
another person that they are in danger of physical harm or mental distress. Stalking may
require examination of the offender’s past conduct involving the victim to assist a jury in
understanding the context of what might appear to be an innocent act. State v. Horsley,
2006-Ohio-1208, ¶ 26. “‘Other acts evidence can be particularly useful in prosecutions for
menacing by stalking because it can assist the jury in understanding that a defendant's
otherwise innocent appearing acts, when put into the context of previous contacts he has
had with the victim, may be knowing attempts to cause mental distress.’”
Id., quoting State
v. Bilder,
99 Ohio App.3d 653 (9th Dist. 1994); State v. Tichon,
102 Ohio App.3d 758 (9th
Dist. 1995). It is important to take everything into consideration “‘even if some of the
person’s actions may not, in isolation, seem particularly threatening.’” State v. McDermitt,
2022-Ohio-2422, ¶ 86 (5th Dist.), quoting State v. Dillard
2018-Ohio-4842, ¶ 17 (10th
Dist.).
{¶43} At trial, the jury heard of numerous actions or incidents spanning from the
summer of 2022 to February 2023. At work, Defendant followed her around the workplace
and was outside waiting for her when she took her breaks, even after T.R. told him to
stop. He continued appearing at her workstation, despite being told to stop by supervisors
and human resources. She once awoke to him over top of her rubbing her shoulders.
Despite her telling him she did not want a relationship, he asked her out twice and asked
her if she wanted to have sex. He continued to pursue her despite her repeatedly telling
him no. He was terminated from work for his conduct.
{¶44} At church, defendant tried to talk to her even though she exhibited fear, and
a cousin had to intervene. Despite expressly knowing that the two were not in any type of
[Cite as State v. Sheppard, 2025-Ohio-161.]
relationship and knowing of T.R.’s desire not to have any such relationship, Defendant
stopped a worship service to ask her to marry him. After similar such behavior such as
walking toward the pulpit and claiming a crown was his and he was God, and another
where he took his shirt of and began discussing his tattoos, the church was aware that
his presence caused T.R. distress and she would be called and told not to attend if he
were there. T.R. specifically stopped going to church, including taking her grandmother
on Christmas, because she “did not know what he would do.”
{¶45} As a court viewing the sufficiency of the evidence, this Court’s duty is to
view the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution and determine whether any
rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of menacing by stalking
proven beyond a reasonable doubt. The record contains sufficient evidence that
Defendant engaged in a pattern of conduct that knowingly caused T.R. to believe that he
would cause her physical harm or mental distress.
{¶46} Defendant has argued that his conduct was somehow “evidence of his
affection” and that the evidence of mental distress was insufficient. He has claimed that
while there was evidence to show stress, this did not rise to the level of mental distress.
We disagree.
{¶47} Mental distress is defined as follows:
(a) any mental illness or condition that involves some temporary substantial
incapacity;
(b) Any mental illness or condition that would normally require psychiatric
treatment, psychological treatment, or other mental health services, whether
or not any person requested or received psychiatric treatment, psychological
treatment, or other mental health services.
[Cite as State v. Sheppard, 2025-Ohio-161.]
R.C. 2903.211(D)(2). Testimony that a respondent's conduct caused the person
considerable fear can support a finding of mental distress. L.L. at ¶ 27. Testimony that a
victim felt “nervous,” “frightened,” “upset,” “worried,” and “scared” was sufficient to support
a finding of mental distress for a restraining order. Middletown v. Jones,
2006-Ohio-3465,
¶ 8 (12th Dist.).
{¶48} Further, expert testimony is not required to establish the existence of mental
distress of a victim for the purpose of proving an element of menacing by stalking. R.C.
2903.211(C)(2)(b). McDermitt, 2022-Ohio-2422, at ¶ 92. A victim's testimony was
sufficient to establish mental distress because the jurors could rely on their own
experiences to determine whether the victim suffered the requisite mental distress as a
result of the defendant's actions. Tichon,
102 Ohio App.3d at 763.
{¶49} In this case, T.R. testified that she was unable to sleep and that it affected
her ability to eat. She stated that she talked to her pastors about what was happening.
She was unable to go to her family church and participate in worship at the times that
Defendant was there. She further stated that she was upset and scared. She contacted
the police regarding his behavior. She was told not to come to church when he was there.
In the video, Defendant’s statement that T.R. would “die a virgin” made her afraid. She
took steps to protect herself, including getting pepper spray and firearms. The record in
this case would allow a rational trier of fact to find that T.R. suffered mental distress
beyond mere stress, annoyance, or embarrassment.
{¶50} When reviewing this case in the light most favorable to the State, we
determine that any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of
[Cite as State v. Sheppard, 2025-Ohio-161.]
menacing by stalking proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Accordingly, there was
sufficient evidence for the verdict.
Criminal Trespass
{¶51} Defendant has also argued that there was insufficient evidence to
establish his conviction for criminal trespass. He has maintained that he had privilege to
be on the church property and that there was no clear communication from an owner or
agent of the property that he could not return. We disagree.
{¶52} Criminal Trespass R.C. 2911.21(A)(3) provides:
No person, without privilege to do so, shall do any of the following:
(3) Recklessly enter or remain on the land or premises of another, as to which
notice against unauthorized access or presence is given by actual communication
to the offender, or in a manner prescribed by law, or by posting in a manner
reasonably calculated to come to the attention of potential intruders, or by fencing
or other enclosure manifestly designed to restrict access.
Defendant has argued that he was privileged to be in the church because it was a public
place, giving him a “tacit” invitation to be there. Privilege is defined as “an immunity,
license, or right conferred by law, bestowed by express or implied grant, arising out of
status, position, office, or relationship, or growing out of necessity.” R.C. 2901.01(A)(12).
{¶53} In this case, there was ample evidence before the court that the defendant
entered church property on February 26, 2023, as a knowing trespasser. The record
reveals that the defendant had been informed that his privilege to attend church services
had been revoked. Pastor Brown testified regarding the incident when he took his shirt
off in the church. She stated he was cussing while showing his tattoos and saying “you
don’t know what this mean.” Pastor Brown testified that she felt threated by his actions.
The men of the church became involved, and Pastor Brown stated she was trying to get
[Cite as State v. Sheppard, 2025-Ohio-161.]
him to calm down and be peaceful. She told him “I don’t want to call the police, just stop
coming here. And I said it several times.” She testified that she ultimately did have to call
the police “a couple of times.” Despite being told to leave “several times,” Defendant kept
coming back until the February 26 incident, when he was arrested.
{¶54} There was evidence that he understood that he was not to be at the church.
In Defendant’s video, he repeatedly said “they kicked me out.” At one point saying “they
kicked me out, now I’m back.” He referenced the time he took his shirt off when he was
first asked to leave and stated “they really got offended when I pop top.” A rational trier of
fact could have found evidence for the essential element that he did not have privilege to
enter the church property and that he understood, at a minimum when he posted the
video in December, that he was not welcome back.
{¶55} Defendant has argued that State v. Barksdale, 2 Ohio St.3d 126 (1983),
stands for the proposition that privilege is “tacit” when a premise is open to the public. In
that case, the defendant broke into a car on a dealership lot. He was convicted and found
guilty of breaking and entering. The Ohio Supreme Court reversed the conviction because
the State could not prove the trespass element of breaking and entering. It held that
entering property with intent to commit a felonious act does not forfeit the right of entry
and make the defendant a trespasser.
Id. 128-29.
{¶56} Defendant analogizes himself as a “public invitee” to a public religious
service. The defendant misreads Barksdale. The court in that case held that a business
invitee cannot be charged with trespass in areas open to the public without evidence that
he entered with knowledge that he was not privileged to do so. Id. The Court was
concerned that the language of R.C. 2911(A)(3) would create a strict liability crime when
[Cite as State v. Sheppard,
2025-Ohio-161.]
a person entered public property with intent to commit a felonious act and held that
trespass required knowledge on the part of the accused that he was entering without
privilege.
Id. Unlike the record in Barksdale, the record here is replete with evidence that
this Defendant knew that he no longer had privilege to be on church property.
{¶57} Property does not lose its private character merely because the public is
generally invited to use it for designated purposes. Lloyd Corporation v. Tanner, 407 U.S.
551, 569 (1972). The owner or one in lawful possession has the right to determine whom
to invite, the scope of the invitation, and the circumstances under which the invitation may
be revoked.
Id. at 567. See also, In re C.J.,
2009-Ohio-5617 (people may have privilege
to be at a church or school, but for certain purposes); City of Akron v. Niepsuj, 2003-Ohio-
6581 (a public university’s campus is private property and the university has the authority
to revoke an individual's privilege to enter upon its property).
{¶58} Notwithstanding his lack of communication argument, Defendant has also
raised that there was no evidence to show a person authorized to revoke his privilege did
so. He posed that the congregation did not have the power and that it could have been
done only by an owner or agent.
{¶59} The testimony at trial was that the Pastor Brown asked Defendant to leave
on multiple occasions, up to and including calling the police to reinforce that demand. A
pastor is appointed to lead the congregation in worship services and to provide spiritual
counseling. A pastor acts as a representative of a church to both its members and the
community. When T.R.’s stepmother testified that she was unsure how to proceed next,
she contacted Pastor Brown. Pastor Brown was present that day and spoke to the
officers. She was present in her role as Pastor at the incidents that occurred at the church.
[Cite as State v. Sheppard, 2025-Ohio-161.]
While there was no testimony regarding the formal structure and hierarchy of the church,
there was sufficient evidence that Pastor Brown was an agent of the church and was
authorized to tell Defendant to leave.
{¶60} When reviewing this case in the light most favorable to the State, we
determine that any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the
criminal trespass proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Accordingly, there was sufficient
evidence for the jury to make its determination on Criminal Trespass.
{¶61} The evidence presented was sufficient to establish that Defendant engaged
in a pattern of conduct that would cause T.R. to believe that he would cause physical
harm or mental distress. Similarly, the evidence presented was sufficient to establish that
any privilege to be on the property was revoked. Defendant’s first assignment of error is
without merit.
II.
{¶62} In addition to his argument that there was insufficient evidence, Defendant
has also argued that the jury’s verdict was against the manifest weight of the evidence.
He has argued that the State’s witnesses were not credible.
{¶63} The criminal manifest weight of the evidence standard was explained in
Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380. The Court distinguished between “sufficiency of the
evidence” and “manifest weight of the evidence,” finding that these concepts differ both
qualitatively and quantitatively.
Id. at 386. Unlike sufficiency of the evidence which asks
whether the evidence is legally sufficient to support a verdict as a matter of law, weight of
the evidence addresses the evidence's effect of inducing belief.
Id. at 386-87. A reviewing
[Cite as State v. Sheppard,
2025-Ohio-161.]
court asks whether the state or the defendant’s evidence is more persuasive. State v.
Wilson,
2007-Ohio-2202, ¶ 25.
{¶64} Although there may be sufficient evidence to support a judgment, it could
nevertheless be against the manifest weight of the evidence. Thompkins at 387. “When
a court of appeals reverses a judgment of a trial court on the basis that the verdict is
against the weight of the evidence, the appellate court sits as a ‘thirteenth juror’ and
disagrees with the factfinder's resolution of the conflicting testimony.”
Id., citing Tibbs v.
Florida,
457 U.S. 31, 42 (1982).
{¶65} To evaluate a manifest weight claim, a court must review the entire record,
weigh the evidence and all reasonable inferences, and consider the credibility of
witnesses. State v. McKelton, 2016-Ohio-5735, ¶ 328. The court must decide whether the
jury clearly lost its way in resolving conflicts in the evidence and “‘created such a manifest
miscarriage of justice that the conviction must be reversed.’”
Id., quoting State v. Martin,
20 Ohio App.3d 172, 175 (1st Dist. 1983).
{¶66} The reviewing court must bear in mind, however, that credibility generally is
an issue for the trier of fact to resolve. State v. Issa, 93 Ohio St.3d 49, 67 (2001); State v.
Murphy,
2008-Ohio-1744, ¶ 31 (4th Dist.). “Because the trier of fact sees and hears the
witnesses and is particularly competent to decide ‘whether, and to what extent, to credit
the testimony of particular witnesses,’ we must afford substantial deference to its
determinations of credibility.” Barberton v. Jenney,
2010-Ohio-2420, ¶ 20 (Citations
omitted.) Thus, an appellate court will leave the issues of weight and credibility of the
evidence to the factfinder, as long as a rational basis exists in the record for its decision.
State v. Picklesimer,
2012-Ohio-1282, ¶ 24 (4th Dist.); accord State v. Howard, 2007-
[Cite as State v. Sheppard,
2025-Ohio-161.]
Ohio-6331, ¶ 6 (4th Dist.) (“We will not intercede as long as the trier of fact has some
factual and rational basis for its determination of credibility and weight.”).
{¶67} In determining whether a verdict is against the manifest weight of the
evidence, the appellate court acts on the same level as the jury and reviews the entire
record. Thompkins at 387. It then “weighs the evidence and all reasonable inferences,
considers the credibility of witnesses, and determines whether in resolving conflicts in
evidence the jury ‘clearly lost its way and created such a manifest miscarriage of justice
that the conviction must be reversed and a new trial ordered.’”
Id., quoting State v. Martin,
20 Ohio App.3d 172, 175 (1st Dist. 1983).
{¶68} Defendant has argued that Pastor Brown’s testimony was not credible
because she stated that Defendant began coming to church in 2023 but discussed
incidents that occurred in 2022. She also testified that she did not know the Defendant,
but then testified about incidents in which “she had a personal interaction” with him.
{¶69} Review of the testimony, however, reveals that it was competent and
credible evidence from which the jury could make its determination. Pastor Brown
refenced the “beginning of ‘23” but then stated “somewhere in there” and “I don’t know
exactly.” The events she described were consistent with other testimony and the record.
It was also consistent with her testimony that nothing unusual had happened when
Defendant first came to the church, but that his behavior escalated up until the final
incident in February 2023. Pastor Brown identified her knowledge of Defendant as “I don’t
know him, but I know of him.” She stated she met him through him “coming to the church.”
As T.R. and Defendant did not have a relationship, Pastor Brown would have known him
[Cite as State v. Sheppard, 2025-Ohio-161.]
only through the church. There is nothing about her testimony that would cause the jury
to lose its way.
{¶70} Next Defendant has argued that T.R.’s testimony was contradictory
because she testified she only saw Appellant at work, but she invited him to her church
and rode home with him from work on one occasion. There is nothing inconsistent about
this testimony. She explained that they met working together and that on one occasion
he gave her a ride home. During that ride, he explained a situation that had happened at
his church and in an attempt to share her faith she invited him to attend her church.
{¶71} Finally, Defendant argued that T.R.’s stepmother’s testimony contradicted
Officer Tanner’s testimony. The specific testimony was as follows:
Q. When you called the police on February 26, did you tell the police that Tramel
was at the church at that time harassing you daughter?
A. I told him - - I told him that he was at the church and he was not allowed to be
at the church.”
Q. Okay. But that’s, that’s all you told them?
A. That’s all I said.
In addition, she stated she did not call T.R. and tell her not to come to church that day.
{¶72} Officer Tanner testified that he went into the church to speak with “our caller”
and she informed him that Defendant had been “stalking and harassing her daughter.”
T.R.’s stepmother’s testimony was that she called the police when Defendant arrived per
Pastor Brown’s instruction because he was not allowed to be there. Whether she did not
remember giving the police officer the specific background information does not affect her
credibility Defendant was present at the church.
[Cite as State v. Sheppard, 2025-Ohio-161.]
Stark County, Case No. 2024 CA 00017 22
{¶73} In resolving Defendant's manifest weight claim, this Court has reviewed the
entire record, weighed the evidence and all reasonable inferences, and considered the
credibility of witnesses . The jury did not lose its way in resolving the conflicts in the
evidence. It did not create such a manifest miscarriage of justice that the conviction must
be reversed . The second assignment of error is without merit.
CONCLUSION
{¶74 } The judgment of the Stark County Court of Common Pleas is affirmed .
By: Delaney, P.J.,
Hoffman , J. and
King, J., concur.
