[Cite as State v. Yoder,
2025-Ohio-1633.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT OF OHIO
HAMILTON COUNTY, OHIO
STATE OF OHIO, : APPEAL NO. C-240152
TRIAL NO. B-2201028
Plaintiff-Appellee, :
vs. :
JUDGMENT ENTRY
JAMES YODER, :
Defendant-Appellant. :
This cause was heard upon the appeal, the record, the briefs, and arguments.
The judgment of the trial court is affirmed for the reasons set forth in the
Opinion filed this date.
Further, the court holds that there were reasonable grounds for this appeal,
allows no penalty, and orders that costs are taxed under App.R. 24.
The court further orders that 1) a copy of this Judgment with a copy of the
Opinion attached constitutes the mandate, and 2) the mandate be sent to the trial
court for execution under App.R. 27.
To the clerk:
Enter upon the journal of the court on 5/7/2025 per order of the court.
By:_______________________
Administrative Judge
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT OF OHIO
HAMILTON COUNTY, OHIO
STATE OF OHIO, : APPEAL NO. C-240152
TRIAL NO. B-2201028
Plaintiff-Appellee, :
vs. :
OPINION
JAMES YODER, :
Defendant-Appellant. :
Criminal Appeal From: Hamilton County Court of Common Pleas
Judgment Appealed From Is: Affirmed
Date of Judgment Entry on Appeal: May 7, 2025
Connie M. Pillich, Hamilton County Prosecuting Attorney, and Scott Heenan,
Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for Plaintiff-Appellee,
Angela J. Glaser for Defendant-Appellant.
OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
NESTOR, Judge.
{¶1} Defendant-appellant James Yoder asserts four assignments of error in
this appeal of his convictions for rape, felonious assault and kidnapping. First, we hold
that the pre-indictment delay was justified by the State, and as a result there was no
violation of Mr. Yoder’s due process right to a speedy trial.
{¶2} Second, we hold there was no abuse of discretion when the trial court
overruled Mr. Yoder’s motion for a new trial based on a post-trial competency
evaluation.
{¶3} Third, we conclude that the rape and felonious assault convictions do
not merge because there was a separately identifiable injury for each conviction.
{¶4} Finally, on review of the entire record, we hold that there was sufficient
evidence for the rape convictions and that the convictions were not against the
manifest weight of the evidence.
{¶5} After reviewing both the law and record, we overrule each assignment
of error and affirm the convictions.
I. Factual and Procedural History
{¶6} A.P., the victim in this case, experienced homelessness on-and-off for
about 16 years in and around Cincinnati. A.P. lived at a homeless camp, consisting of
three tents in a wooded area underneath the Sixth Street Viaduct. Following an earlier
assault, A.P. was forced to have her leg amputated in early 2019. On July 21, 2019,
A.P. returned to the camp from her rehabilitation center to show off her new
prosthetic leg and “hang out” with her ex-boyfriend, her cousin, and Mr. Yoder, all
individuals living under the viaduct.
{¶7} A.P. testified at trial that at some point, her ex-boyfriend left to get the
group more beer, and an attack ensued. Suddenly, as A.P. spoke with her cousin she
3
OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
felt something around her neck. Mr. Yoder came up from behind A.P., put a rope
around her neck, and quickly pulled her out of her chair.
{¶8} Mr. Yoder dragged her away, tied her to a tree, and began striking her
in the face. A.P. testified that she then lost consciousness. Once she came to, she was
undressed, and Mr. Yoder was raping her. Attempting to alert someone, she screamed,
but Mr. Yoder threatened to pull the rope tighter. A.P. testified that at this point she
lost consciousness a second time and when she regained it, Mr. Yoder was raping her
again. She testified that the attack lasted throughout the night.
{¶9} Mr. Yoder continued to hit her and at one point pulled her closer to his
tent, where the violence continued. Once A.P. believed Mr. Yoder had fallen asleep,
she tried to inch away from him, but he quickly pulled her back to his bed in the tent.
Anticipating more harm from Mr. Yoder, A.P. then tried to block him with her legs,
but he forced them apart and broke her hip as a result. The next morning, A.P. called
9-1-1, reported the rape, and identified James Yoder as the perpetrator.
{¶10} On March 10, 2022, Mr. Yoder was indicted on four counts of rape and
one count each of felonious assault and kidnapping. Before trial, he filed a motion to
dismiss the indictment, alleging that his pre-trial right to a speedy trial was violated
by the delay between the event and indictment. After a brief hearing, the motion was
denied. At trial, he successfully moved for acquittals under Crim.R. 29 on two of the
four rape counts, which alleged anal rape, but the jury found him guilty of the
remaining counts.
{¶11} In the days leading up to Mr. Yoder’s sentencing hearing, he filed a
motion for a continuance to get a competency evaluation, which the court granted. On
August 10, 2023, he was found incompetent, and the trial court eventually authorized
the involuntary administration of medication. Later, in December 2023, Mr. Yoder
4
OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
was determined to be competent for the purpose of sentencing.
{¶12} In early 2024, the court denied both Mr. Yoder’s motion for acquittal
and motion for a new trial. As to the latter motion, the court provided a lengthy
explanation that concluded he was competent during the trial. On February 20, 2024,
Mr. Yoder was sentenced to an indefinite aggregate prison term of 26 to 31 years and
he was classified as a Tier III sex offender.
{¶13} Now raising four assignments of error, he appeals.
II. Analysis
A. First Assignment of Error
{¶14} In his first assignment of error, Mr. Yoder argues that the State’s 31-
month delay in indicting him was constitutionally unreasonable and violated his right
to a speedy trial. However, his position is unfounded in both United States and Ohio
law.
{¶15} Review of a trial court’s decision on a motion to dismiss based on a
violation of a defendant’s speedy-trial rights involves a mixed question of fact and law.
State v. Rice, 2015-Ohio-5481, ¶ 15 (1st Dist.). “We give due weight to the inferences
drawn from the facts found by the trial court as long as they are supported by
competent, credible evidence.”
Id. Additionally, “[w]ith respect to the trial court’s
conclusions of law, we employ a de novo standard of review, to determine whether the
facts satisfy the applicable legal standard.”
Id., citing State v. Terrell, 2003-Ohio-
3044, ¶ 17 (1st Dist.).
{¶16} Our analysis begins with the applicable statute of limitations and, as the
State argues, the 31-month delay was not outside the statute of limitations for any of
5
OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
Mr. Yoder’s charges.1 As the Supreme Court held in United States v. Lovasco, “statutes
of limitations, which provide predictable, legislatively enacted limits on prosecutorial
delay, provide ‘“the primary guarantee against bringing overly stale criminal
charges.”’” United States v. Lovasco, 431 U.S. 783, 789 (1977), quoting United States
v. Marion,
404 U.S. 307, 322 (1971), quoting United States v. Ewell,
383 U.S. 116, 122
(1966). However, the Court also explained that statutes of limitations do not fully
define a defendant’s rights regarding the events occurring prior to indictment and “the
Due Process clause has a limited role to play in protecting against oppressive delay.”
Marion at 324.
{¶17} In this case, the State asserts that the 31-month delay from the time of
the alleged crimes was due to a reasonable investigative delay, based in part on the
victim’s unwillingness to pursue charges. In Lovasco, the Supreme Court stated
“investigative delay is fundamentally unlike delay undertaken by the Government
solely ‘to gain tactical advantage over the accused,’ . . . precisely because investigative
delay is not so one-sided.” Lovasco at 795, quoting
Marion at 324. Also, “[r]ather
than deviating from elementary standards of ‘fair play and decency,’ a prosecutor
abides by them if he refuses to seek indictments until he is completely satisfied that he
should prosecute and will be able promptly to establish guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt.”
Id. The Court concluded that “prosecut[ing] a defendant following
investigative delay does not deprive him of due process, even if his defense might have
been somewhat prejudiced by the lapse of time.” Id. at 796.
{¶18} The Supreme Court observed “that proof of prejudice is generally a
1 Pursuant to R.C. 2901.13, which outlines the statute of limitations for criminal offenses, the statute
of limitations for R.C. 2907.02 (rape), R.C. 2903.11 (felonious assault), and R.C. 2905.01
(kidnapping) is 20 years at minimum.
6
OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
necessary but not sufficient element of a due process claim, and that the due process
inquiry must consider the reasons for the delay as well as the prejudice to the accused.”
Lovasco at 790. This idea ties directly into pre-indictment delay jurisprudence in
Ohio.
{¶19} For pre-indictment delay to be violative of one’s due process rights,
there must be a showing of actual prejudice to the defendant, but that alone does not
validate the claim. State v. Luck, 15 Ohio St.3d 150, 153-154 (1984), citing Lovasco,
431 U.S. at 789-790. The Ohio Supreme Court in Luck outlined a two-prong test to
determine if a pre indictment delay violates one’s due process rights. “First, the
defendant must present evidence that the State’s delay has caused ‘actual prejudice.’”
State v. Hahaj,
2025-Ohio-52, ¶ 20 (1st Dist.), citing State v. Jones,
2016-Ohio-5105,
¶ 13 and 16. Upon such a showing, “‘the burden shifts to the state to produce evidence
of a justifiable reason for the delay.’” Id., quoting Jones at ¶ 13, citing State v. Whiting,
84 Ohio St.3d 215, 217 (1998). We have also previously noted that “[d]etermining
whether a defendant has experienced ‘actual prejudice’ from a delay ‘involves a
delicate judgment and a case-by-case consideration of the particular circumstances’”
leading to a burden for defendants that is nearly insurmountable. Id. at ¶ 21, quoting
Jones at ¶ 20, and State v. Adams,
2015-Ohio-3954, ¶ 100. This court held that the
burden is that high because “‘proof of prejudice is always speculative.’” Id., quoting
Adams at ¶ 100.
{¶20} While the trial court found that there was actual prejudice, a court could
have found otherwise. As the Ohio Supreme Court explained, “‘[a]ctual prejudice
exists when missing evidence or unavailable testimony, identified by the defendant
and relevant to the defense, would minimize or eliminate the impact of the state’s
evidence and bolster the defense.’” State v. Bourn, 2022-Ohio-4321, ¶ 17, quoting
7
OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
Jones at ¶ 28. The Court explained that the “word ‘would’ in the Jones decision, is
significant.” Id. “It is not enough for a defendant to show that [] missing evidence or
unavailable testimony ‘could’ or ‘may’ help [them,] [i]nstead, [they] must show that
the evidence or testimony would help [them].” (Emphasis in original.) Id. Also, we
have held that “[o]rdinarily, the mere ‘possibility that memories will fade, witnesses
will become inaccessible, or evidence will be lost is not sufficient to establish actual
prejudice.’” Hahaj at ¶ 22, quoting Adams at ¶ 105. In this case, Mr. Yoder’s argument
is based on the inability to contact and interview witnesses such as Mr. Worden, A.P.’s
cousin, or the two bystanders who were allegedly nearby as the events took place. Mr.
Yoder also asserts there was no opportunity to thoroughly investigate the crime scene
because almost two years after the event, it was virtually impossible to access. His last
assertion was that the responding officer’s body-worn camera had been deleted, and
therefore, important witness statements were not available. But again, there is no
guarantee that any of this would have weakened the State’s case whatsoever, rather,
only speculation that it might have.
{¶21} Regardless, deferring to the trial court’s actual prejudice finding, the
delay was justifiable and therefore the second prong of the Luck test is met. As the
State explained, even though the detective who investigated the case made several
attempts to interview A.P. in 2019, she was unsuccessful. Also, A.P. was in a
rehabilitation facility for the injuries she suffered from the attack. Further, both A.P.
and the Cincinnati Police personal crimes detective explained A.P. was reluctant to
press charges because she feared for her safety. She testified that Mr. Yoder
threatened her with additional violence during the attack. She said that he threatened
to break “every bone” in her body after what had happened to her hip and that he told
another individual that he would not only rape her again, but that she was “lucky” that
8
OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
all he did was rape her because he could have killed her. This all made A.P. fearful of
Mr. Yoder and scared of what he might do to her in the future.
{¶22} A.P. explained that once Mr. Yoder was incarcerated on other charges
in 2021, she felt safe enough to be interviewed by the detective. To make matters
worse, she claimed that Mr. Yoder continued to call and threaten her while in the
Justice Center and he even sent A.P. a disturbing letter.
{¶23} Because of A.P.’s significant injuries, the fear she continued to
experience, and the State’s inability to move forward with the case without the victim’s
participation, the delay was justifiable. Therefore, Mr. Yoder’s first assignment of
error is overruled.
B. Second Assignment of Error
{¶24} In his second assignment of error, Mr. Yoder argues that the trial court
abused its discretion in overruling his motion for a new trial. A court abuses its
discretion when “‘[it] exercise[es] its judgment, in an unwarranted way, in regard to a
matter over which it has discretionary authority.’” Mallory v. Mallory, 2024-Ohio-
5458, ¶ 13 (1st Dist.), quoting Johnson v. Abdullah, 2021-Ohio-3304, ¶ 35.
{¶25} Mr. Yoder relies on Crim.R. 33(A) as the grounds for his argument that
he should be granted a new trial. As we previously held in State v. Blanton, “Crim.R.
33(A)(6) permits motions for new trials based on newly discovered evidence that the
defendant could not have with reasonable diligence discovered and produced at trial.”
State v. Blanton, 2025-Ohio-1192, ¶ 66 (1st Dist.). To prevail on such a motion, “a
defendant must establish that newly discovered evidence (1) discloses a strong
probability that it will change the result if a new trial is granted, (2) has been
discovered since the trial, (3) could not have been discovered in the exercise of due
diligence before trial, (4) is material, (5) is not merely cumulative to the former
9
OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
evidence, and (6) does not merely impeach or contradict the former evidence.” Id. at
¶ 67, citing State v. Petro, 148 Ohio St. 505 (1947), syllabus.
{¶26} Mr. Yoder argues that his motion for a new trial should have been
granted based on the competency evaluation that was produced after trial and before
sentencing. The trial court requested the competency evaluation at the conclusion of
the trial. The competency report tends to support the conclusion that Mr. Yoder was
not receiving his medication during trial, but the report does not conclude that Mr.
Yoder was not competent during trial.
{¶27} There is a presumption, focusing on a defendant’s present mental state,
that he is competent to stand trial. R.C. 2945.37(G). If the court finds by a
preponderance of the evidence, after a hearing, “that, because of the defendant’s
present mental condition, the defendant is incapable of understanding the nature and
objective of the proceedings against the defendant or of assisting in the defendant’s
defense, the court shall find the defendant incompetent to stand trial and shall enter
an order authorized by section 2945.38 of the Revised Code.” Id. While Mr. Yoder’s
arguments that he was incompetent focus on his outbursts at trial and the bizarre
things he said and did during the trial, on review of the record we conclude that the
trial court did not abuse it discretion when it overruled the motion for a new trial.
{¶28} As the trial court explained, Mr. Yoder’s outbursts were calculated
responses to adverse events at trial. Mr. Yoder behaved during most of the trial, but
both of his major outbursts came when he tried to fire his attorneys because he did not
believe they were doing a good enough job. Moreover, neither the court nor Mr.
Yoder’s attorneys ever brought his competency into question during the trial or
requested an evaluation during any part of the proceeding until two days before
sentencing. This, the trial court believed, showed that there were no questions as to
10
OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
his competency and that his trial outbursts were last-ditch efforts to change an
undesirable trial outcome. The competency evaluation received after trial did not
conclude that Mr. Yoder was not competent during the trial. Based on the evaluation
received and the trial court’s assessment of Mr. Yoder’s behavior at trial, we are unable
to conclude that the trial court erred in denying his motion for a new trial.
{¶29} The court did not abuse its discretion in overruling his motion for a new
trial. Accordingly, his second assignment of error is overruled.
C. Third Assignment of Error
{¶30} In Mr. Yoder’s next assignment of error, he contends that the trial court
should have merged the rape and felonious assault counts for sentencing.
{¶31} We review a trial court’s decision regarding allied offenses de novo.
State v. Williams, 2012-Ohio-5699, ¶ 28. “Under R.C. 2941.25[(A)], while a defendant
may be charged with multiple counts that constitute ‘two or more allied offenses of
similar import,’ the defendant may only be ‘convicted’ of one offense.” State v. Smith,
2020-Ohio-3516, ¶ 7 (1st Dist.), quoting State v. Chandler,
2020-Ohio-1371, ¶ 5 (1st
Dist.). However, when “‘the defendant’s conduct constitutes two or more offenses of
dissimilar import, or where [the defendant’s] conduct results in two or more offenses
of the same or similar kind committed separately or with a separate animus as to each,’
a defendant may be convicted of all such offenses.”
Id., citing R.C. 2941.25(B), and
State v. McRae,
2020-Ohio-773, ¶ 21 (1st Dist.). The Ohio Supreme Court held that
“offenses cannot merge if ‘(1) the offenses are dissimilar in import or significance—in
other words, each offense caused separate, identifiable harm, (2) the offenses were
committed separately, or (3) the offenses were committed with separate animus or
motivation.’”
Id., quoting State v. Ruff,
2015-Ohio-995, ¶ 25.
{¶32} An important aspect of our analysis is the separate and identifiable
11
OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
harms caused by Mr. Yoder. Although Mr. Yoder argues, focusing only on the broken
hip suffered by A.P., that his actions constitute the same conduct, animus, and import,
this is undermined by the record and A.P.’s injuries. In State v. Zeigler, the defendant
maintained that the felonious assault, rape, and aggravated burglary offenses should
have merged as allied offenses. State v. Zeigler, 2017-Ohio-7673 (1st Dist.). In that
case, the defendant’s forcing the victim to ingest chemical substances and her vomiting
blood as a result, supported the physical harm element of felonious assault, while
alternatively his forcing her to ingest Motrin despite her protests that she was allergic
to it constituted separate conduct supporting the physical harm element of aggravated
burglary. Id. at ¶ 26. Additionally, the defendant’s oral and vaginal penetration
constituted separate conduct supporting the rape offense but not the other offenses.
Id. at ¶ 25 and 26. Because each offense was committed separately, the court held that
they were not allied offenses of similar import.
{¶33} Further, we have held that placing a victim into a chokehold and
dragging her to a secluded area, even if a short distance, subjected the victim to an
additional, increased risk of harm beyond the rape itself, justifying convictions for
both rape and kidnapping. State v. Savage, 2022-Ohio-3653, ¶ 32 (1st Dist.). In State
v. Ward, the court found separate and identifiable harm justifying convictions for
felonious assault and rape where the defendant engaged in sexual conduct with a child
and did so while knowingly testing positive for HIV. State v. Ward,
2021-Ohio-1930,
¶ 8 (3d Dist.).
{¶34} Here, Mr. Yoder’s acts caused separate and identifiable harms to A.P.
Mr. Yoder was convicted of both felonious assault under R.C. 2903.11(A) and rape
under R.C. 2907.02(A)(2). Under R.C. 2903.11, a defendant must knowingly cause
“serious physical harm to another,” and R.C. 2907.02 provides that “[n]o person shall
12
OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
engage in sexual conduct with another when the offender purposely compels the other
person to submit by force or threat of force.” The felonious assault conviction resulted
from the evidence and testimony provided which showed that Mr. Yoder caused
serious physical harm to A.P. Separate and apart from the rape, A.P. suffered a broken
hip and a battered face, and she was dragged by a rope around her neck. A.P. testified
at trial that in addition to her broken hip, she also had a broken nose and jaw. While
these injuries happened around the same time as the rape, the evidence supports the
conclusion that each injury was a separate identifiable harm.
{¶35} Mr. Yoder’s felonious assault and rape convictions were for separate
identifiable harms and the trial court properly did not merge them as allied offenses.
Accordingly, Mr. Yoder’s third assignment of error is overruled.
D. Fourth Assignment of Error
{¶36} In his final assignment of error, Mr. Yoder argues that his rape
convictions are based on insufficient evidence and are against the manifest weight of
the evidence. “To determine whether a conviction is supported by sufficient evidence,
we inquire ‘whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the
prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the
crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt.’” State v. Trentman, 2024-Ohio-5661, ¶ 20
(1st Dist.), quoting State v. Jenks,
61 Ohio St.3d 259 (1991), paragraph two of the
syllabus. Under R.C. 2907.02(A)(2), “[n]o person shall engage in sexual conduct with
another when the offender purposely compels the other person to submit by force or
threat of force.”
{¶37} The record provides evidence that Mr. Yoder raped A.P. and violated
R.C. 2907.02. First, A.P. identified Mr. Yoder as the man who raped her as she phoned
9-1-1 immediately afterwards. Moreover, she testified that Mr. Yoder raped her
13
OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
multiple times on that night, as he dragged her, using a rope, by her neck to different
areas of the camp. She explained that at one point she tried to scream and he hit her
and said if she screamed again he would pull the rope tighter. All her testimony was
further corroborated by the rape-kit swabs revealing Mr. Yoder’s seminal DNA found
on her body.
{¶38} Based on this evidence, the record strongly supports that Mr. Yoder
forced A.P. to engage in penetrative sex by force. Thus, a rational trier of fact could
have found the essential elements of R.C. 2907.02(A)(2) proven beyond a reasonable
doubt
{¶39} A manifest-weight review, on the other hand, “requires this court to sit
as a ‘thirteenth-juror.’” State v. Jackson, 2024-Ohio-2728, ¶ 9 (1st Dist.), citing State
v. Thompkins,
78 Ohio St.3d 380, 388 (1997). “We review the record, consider witness
credibility, and determine if the ‘trier of fact clearly lost its way and created a manifest
miscarriage of justice.’”
Id., quoting State v. Powell,
2020-Ohio-4283, ¶ 16 (1st Dist.),
citing
Thompkins at 387. Moreover, “we will reverse the trial court’s decision to
convict and grant a new trial only in “‘exceptional cases in which the evidence weighs
heavily against the conviction.’”” State v. Kizilkaya,
2023-Ohio-3989, ¶ 15 (1st Dist.),
quoting State v. Sipple,
2021-Ohio-1319, ¶ 7, quoting State v. Martin,
20 Ohio App.3d
172, 175 (1st Dist. 1983).
{¶40} Upon reviewing the record, we hold that Mr. Yoder’s convictions were
not against the manifest weight of the evidence. The record contains (1) A.P.’s
testimony that Mr. Yoder raped her more than once on the evening in question, (2) the
9-1-1 call where she identified him as the perpetrator, and (3) A.P.’s rape-kit, which
confirmed that his DNA was found on many parts of A.P.’s body.
{¶41} Furthermore, “a jury is in the best position to judge the credibility of the
14
OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
witnesses.” State v. Grubbs, 2025-Ohio-1384, ¶ 96 (1st Dist.), citing State v. Hall,
2021-Ohio-3121, ¶ 44 (1st Dist.). “The jury [is] entitled to weigh the evidence, consider
the motivations of the witnesses, and choose to believe all, part, or none of the
testimony offered.”
Id., citing
Hall at ¶ 44. A.P. was the primary witness in this case.
After hearing the entirety of the evidence, the jury was entitled to believe or disbelieve
A.P., and it chose to believe her. The record lacks evidence that weighs heavily against
Mr. Yoder’s convictions. These convictions are not the “exceptional cases warranting”
reversal, and therefore, Mr. Yoder’s fourth assignment of error is overruled.
III. Conclusion
{¶42} Based on the foregoing, we overrule all of Mr. Yoder’s assignments of
error and we affirm the trial court’s judgment.
Judgment affirmed.
CROUSE, P.J., and MOORE, J., concur.
15
