[Cite as State v. Jones,
2025-Ohio-168.]
COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA
STATE OF OHIO, :
Plaintiff-Appellee, :
No. 113927
v. :
ALPHONSO JONES, :
Defendant-Appellant. :
JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION
JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED
RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: January 23, 2025
Criminal Appeal from the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas
Case No. CR-23-684880-A
Appearances:
Michael C. O’Malley, Cuyahoga County Prosecuting
Attorney, and Gregory M. Paul, Assistant Prosecuting
Attorney, for appellee.
Susan J. Moran, for appellant.
MARY J. BOYLE, J.:
Defendant-appellant, Alphonso Jones (“Jones”), appeals his
convictions for the murder of Jonathan Lanum (“victim”) and felonious assault of
Lakeisha Reynolds (“Lakeisha”), arguing that he acted in self-defense. For the
reasons that follow, we affirm.
I. Facts and Procedural History
At the time of the victim’s death, he was 23 years old and living in his
SUV with his girlfriend, Lakeisha, who was pregnant with their child. Jones and his
girlfriend, Quaisha Jones (“Quaisha”), were living in a duplex on Earlwood Avenue,
in Cleveland, Ohio with their 17-month-old daughter, and Quaisha’s 15-year-old son.
On July 7, 2023, Quaisha received a call from the victim, her favorite cousin, stating
that he was coming over to “chill” with her. (Tr. 427.) The victim and Lakeisha
arrived at approximately 11:30 p.m. Quaisha and the victim smoked marijuana and
drank alcohol. Jones and Lakeisha did not drink or smoke.
Later that evening, Jones went upstairs to check on his daughter.
When he returned to the living room Jones began to argue with Quaisha about her
parenting skills. Lakeisha attempted to diffuse the situation, however, Jones said
“shut the f*** up. I wasn’t talking to you.” (Tr. 435.) The victim then “got into
[Jones’s] face [and t]hey started like tussling.” (Tr. 435.) The victim dragged Jones
out onto the porch. Quaisha testified that she tried to break up the fight and kept
telling the victim and Lakeisha to leave. The victim threw Jones off the porch. Jones
got up and tried to reenter the house, but Quaisha blocked him because she thought
he wanted to retrieve his gun. Jones bit Quaisha on the back of her shoulder to get
past her. Meanwhile, the victim and Lakeisha walked toward their vehicle.
Quaisha testified that Jones went in the house and came out shooting.
He ran towards the victim’s SUV shooting. Quaisha testified that Jones stopped
shooting, and she observed Lakeisha drive away in their SUV. Jones ran back into
the house and Quaisha tried to call the police. She testified that Jones tried to take
the phone from her, but she was able to call the police. Jones packed a bag, left the
house, and never returned. She testified that Jones contacted her a few times to see
his daughter, but she would not allow him.
Lakeisha testified that after the fight on the porch, she and the victim
headed towards their vehicle. The victim handed her the keys and she entered the
driver’s side. Within seconds, the victim entered the passenger side. Lakeisha
testified that “as soon as [the victim] got in the car the bullets started going in the
window and stuff and it was like as the bullets was like breaking the window and
stuff, I was . . . still trying to get away.” (Tr. 676.) She felt glass hitting her; she heard
the victim scream. Lakeisha testified that she did not know the victim had been shot
until he told her. He was holding his chest, and he told her that he thought he was
going to die. She drove him to the hospital where he was immediately taken into
surgery and later died. The medical examiner testified that the victim’s cause of
death was gunshot wounds to the chest and right buttock and the manner of death
was homicide. The victim tested positive for amphetamines and
methamphetamines.
Lakeisha testified that the victim defended his cousin, Quaisha, but
did not punch Jones. She testified that the victim did not have a gun and did not
threaten Jones at any time during the evening. No gun was recovered from the
victim’s SUV.
The City of Cleveland had a surveillance camera located near the
shooting, and the recording was played for the jury. In the video, the victim and
Lakeisha can be observed walking toward their SUV, which is parked in the street.
The victim hands something to Lakeisha and then walks back towards the house.
Lakeisha walks to the SUV and enters. The video then shows the victim running to
the SUV and entering the passenger side. Within seconds, Jones can be observed
running up to the SUV and firing multiple shots into the passenger door. The SUV
can be observed speeding away, while Jones can be observed running back to the
house.
Jones testified on his own behalf. He testified that he was 30 years
old, did not have a criminal record, and legally owned a firearm. Jones testified that
he knew the victim had an assault conviction and owned a firearm. Jones testified
that he weighed 120 pounds and was 5′11,″ and that the victim was taller and
weighed approximately 200 pounds. The autopsy report indicates that the victim
was 5′8″ and 203 pounds.
Jones testified that when the victim arrived that evening, he was
“hyped up” on ecstasy and offered Jones some, which Jones declined. (Tr. 795.)
Jones testified that when he and Quaisha were arguing, the victim threatened him
saying “[W]atch how you are talking to her. You are going to mess around and get
hurt.” (Tr. 800.) Jones testified that he told the victim and Lakeisha to “get the f***
out,” but they would not leave. (Tr. 801.) The victim then charged Jones and
dragged him out onto the porch. Jones testified that the victim was on top of Jones,
holding him down, and Jones could not get up until he hit the victim in the testicles.
He said the victim was enraged, so Jones tried to get in the house, but Quaisha
blocked him. He testified that the victim grabbed him and lifted him up and
slammed him over the balcony. He said he landed on his face and neck and
shoulder. He testified that he was weak and groggy and had to crawl up the porch
steps. He said he begged Quaisha to let him in the house, and when she would not
move out of his way, he bit her shoulder.
According to Jones, he went inside, grabbed his gun, put it in his
pocket, and then went back outside. He testified that the victim was still enraged
and ran back towards Jones and said, “I got something for you.” (Tr. 806.) Jones
testified that the victim ran to his vehicle and got inside, but “the car didn’t pull off,
but he started going under the driver’s seat. . . . I took that as he was getting that
weapon, so I ran — I got up closer to actually like confirm that’s what he was doing,
and he was really bent over under the driver’s seat. Once I seen that I just fired my
weapon.” (Tr. 807.) Jones testified that he fired twice because he was afraid and he
thought the victim was going to shoot him, his daughter, or Quaisha.
After the shooting, Jones went back into his house. He testified that
Quaisha was hysterical and told him he was going to die for shooting at her cousin,
implying that her family would kill him. Jones testified that he packed a few things,
including the gun, said goodbye to his daughter and left the house. He testified that
he walked to his mother’s house. Jones testified he stayed with his cousin on
Lakeshore until he was arrested on September 11, 2023. He alleged that all of his
belongings, including the gun, were stolen along with his brother’s vehicle in August.
Jones did not make a police report.
The jury found Jones guilty of one count of felony-murder, three
counts of felonious assault, and one count of discharge of a firearm on or near
prohibited premises, along with the one- and three-year firearm specifications
attached to each count.1 The trial court sentenced Jones to 21 years to life in prison.
Jones now appeals and raises the following assignment of error for review:
The jury erred in concluding that the State met its burden of production
in disproving Mr. Jones acted in self-defense and rendered a verdict
against the manifest weight of the evidence.
II. Law and Analysis
In Jones’s sole assignment of error, he argues that the jury verdict is
against the manifest weight of the evidence because the State failed to meet their
burden of production and disprove that he acted in self-defense. We disagree.
“When considering a manifest weight claim, a reviewing court must
examine the entire record, weigh the evidence, and consider the credibility of
witnesses.” State v. Bowden, 2009-Ohio-3598, ¶ 13 (8th Dist.), citing State v.
Thomas,
70 Ohio St.2d 79, 80 (1982). A manifest-weight challenge questions
whether the prosecution has met its burden of persuasion.
Id., citing State v.
Thompkins,
78 Ohio St.3d 380, 386 (1997). “The court may reverse the judgment
of conviction if it appears that the factfinder “‘clearly lost its way and created such a
1 At the close of the State’s case, the trial court granted Jones’s Crim.R. 29 motion
dismissing the aggravated murder count and the attempted murder count.
manifest miscarriage of justice that the conviction must be reversed, and a new trial
ordered.”’” Id., quoting
Thompkins at 387, quoting State v. Martin,
20 Ohio App.3d
172, 175 (1st Dist. 1983). A judgment should be reversed as against the manifest
weight of the evidence “‘only in the exceptional case in which the evidence weighs
heavily against the conviction.’”
Thompkins at 387, quoting
Martin at 175.
In State v. Messenger, 2022-Ohio-4562, the Ohio Supreme Court
held that when a defendant claims self-defense the defendant “has the burden of
producing legally sufficient evidence that the defendant’s use of force was in self-
defense.” Id. at ¶ 25. “[I]f the defendant’s evidence and any reasonable inferences
about that evidence would allow a rational trier of fact to find all the elements of a
self-defense claim when viewed in the light most favorable to the defendant, then
the defendant has satisfied the burden,” and the State must then disprove self-
defense. Id. The defendant’s burden of production is “not a heavy one and one that
might even be satisfied through the State’s own evidence.” Id. at ¶ 22.
In order to disprove the claim of self-defense, the State must prove
beyond a reasonable doubt any one of the following elements: (1) that Jones was at
fault in creating the situation giving rise to the affray; or (2) that Jones did not have
reasonable grounds to believe or an honest belief that he was in imminent danger of
bodily harm; or (3) that Jones violated a duty to retreat or avoid danger. State v.
Scales, 2024-Ohio-2171, ¶ 25 (8th Dist.); State v. Walker,
2021-Ohio-2037, ¶ 13 (8th
Dist.). Upon review, the State disproved at least two of the three elements.
“[W]hether the defendant was at fault in creating the situation giving
rise to the affray — asks, in essence, whether the defendant was the initial
aggressor.” State v. Gardner, 2022-Ohio-381, ¶ 25 (8th Dist.), citing State v. Batie,
2015-Ohio-762, ¶ 8 (8th Dist.). Here, the evidence at trial established that the victim
was the initial aggressor during the first altercation; however, that altercation ended
when Jones entered the house and the victim headed to his vehicle. Unfortunately
for everyone involved, Jones came back outside with a gun. Although the evidence
established that the victim returned to the house and may have said something to
Jones, the evidence also established that, at this point, there was no new altercation,
that the victim did not have a gun, and that the victim ran back to his vehicle and
entered the passenger side. Jones was the initial aggressor and the only participant
in the second encounter. Even if, however, we were to conclude that the victim was
the initial aggressor and the altercation was continuous, we find that the State
disproved the second element of self-defense.
Jones argues that he had reasonable grounds to believe or an honest
belief that he was in imminent danger of bodily harm because the victim was
physically larger and stronger than Jones; the victim had a prior assault conviction;
the victim had a gun in his vehicle; and the victim threatened Jones with, “I’ve got
something for you.” (Tr. 806.) We find Jones’s argument unpersuasive.
“The second element of self-defense involves both objective and
subjective considerations.” State v. Hughkeith, 2023-Ohio-1217, ¶ 56, quoting State
v. Thomas,
77 Ohio St.3d 323, 330 (1997); Parma v. Treanor,
2018-Ohio-3166, ¶ 25
(8th Dist.). A defendant’s belief that he was in immediate danger of death or great
bodily harm must be objectively reasonable, and the defendant must have an honest
belief that he was in such danger.
Id. “[I]f the objective standard is met, the jury
must determine if, subjectively, this particular defendant had an honest belief that
[he] was in imminent danger.” Thomas at 326. The State may disprove self-defense
by demonstrating that the defendant’s belief was not objectively reasonable or that
he did not have an honest subjective belief that he faced imminent death or great
bodily harm. State v. Smith,
2020-Ohio-4976, ¶ 56 (1st Dist.).
In this case, we cannot say that Jones’s belief that he was in imminent
danger of death or great bodily was objectively reasonable. The victim did not have
a gun, and he retreated to his vehicle after Jones came outside with a gun. If Jones
believed that the victim was retrieving his gun, Jones could have gone in his house,
locked his doors, and called police. Instead, Jones pursued the victim to his vehicle
and then fired his weapon — at close range — into the passenger side window and
door where the victim was ducking to avoid being shot.
It is well settled that “‘a conviction is not against the manifest weight
of the evidence simply because the [trier of fact] rejected the defendant’s version of
the facts and believed the testimony presented by the state.’” State v. Jallah, 2015-
Ohio-1950, ¶ 71 (8th Dist.), quoting State v. Hall, 2014-Ohio-2959, ¶ 28 (4th Dist.).
Here, the jury heard all the evidence and believed the State’s version of the facts over
Jones’s. After reviewing the entire record, we cannot say that the jury lost its way
when it concluded that Jones did not act in self-defense. Nor can we say that his
convictions were against the manifest weight of the evidence.
Accordingly, Jones’s sole assignment of error is overruled.
Judgment is affirmed.
It is ordered that appellee recover from appellant costs herein taxed.
The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the
common pleas court to carry this judgment into execution. The appellant’s
conviction having been affirmed, any bail pending appeal is terminated. Case
remanded to the trial court for execution of sentence.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27
of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.
________________________
MARY J. BOYLE, JUDGE
EILEEN A. GALLAGHER, A.J., and
EILEEN T. GALLAGHER, J., CONCUR
