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2025 Ohio 180

State v. Chester

Ohio Court of Appeals

Decided January 22, 2025

Ohio Court of Appeals · decided 2025-01-22

Motion for Leave to File Delayed Motion for New Trial - Crim.R. 33 - Appellant Failed to Establish Unavoidably Prevented from Discovery of Evidence

Relies on Brady v. State of Maryland · State v. Adams · State v. Schiebel

Decided 2025-01-22

[Cite as State v. Chester, 
2025-Ohio-180
.]


                                        COURT OF APPEALS
                                       STARK COUNTY, OHIO
                                    FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT


 STATE OF OHIO                                  JUDGES:
                                                Hon. William B. Hoffman, P.J.
         Plaintiff-Appellee                     Hon. Craig R. Baldwin, J.
                                                Hon. Andrew J. King, J.
 -vsCase No. 2024CA00021
 TAVIST D. CHESTER

          Defendant-Appellant                   OPINION




 CHARACTER OF PROCEEDINGS:                      Appeal from the Stark County Court of
                                                Common Pleas, Case No. 2019CR0977B


 JUDGMENT:                                      Affirmed

 DATE OF JUDGMENT ENTRY:                        January 22, 2025


 APPEARANCES:


 For Plaintiff-Appellee                         For Defendant-Appellant

 DAVE YOST                                      G. MICHAEL GOINS
 Ohio Attorney General                          13609 Shaker Blvd., Suite 3-A
                                                Cleveland, Ohio 44120
 ANDREA K. BOYD
 Special Prosecuting Attorney
 Assistant Attorney General
 30 East Broad Street, 23rd Floor
 Columbus, Ohio 43215
Stark County, Case No. 2024CA00021                                                                         2


Hoffman, P.J.
        {¶1}    Defendant-appellant Tavist D. Chester appeals the February 8, 2024

Judgment Entry entered by the Stark County Court of Common Pleas, which denied his

Motion for Leave to File Delayed Motion for New Trial. Plaintiff-appellee is the State of

Ohio.

                                STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND FACTS

        {¶2}    On July 17, 2019, the Stark County Grand Jury indicted Appellant on one

count of aggravated murder, in violation of R.C. 2903.01(A) (Count 1); one count of

murder, in violation of R.C. 2903.02(A) and/or (B) (Count 2); and three (3) counts of

felonious assault, in violation of R.C. 2903.11(A)(1) and/or (A)(2) (Counts 3, 4, and 5).

Each count carried an attendant firearm specification, in violation of R.C. 2941.145.

Appellant appeared before the trial court for arraignment on July 19, 2019, and entered a

plea of not guilty to the Indictment.

        {¶3}    The matter proceeded to jury trial on January 6, 2020.                     The following

evidence relevant to this appeal was presented at trial.1

        {¶4}    Officer Vincent Romanin with the Canton Police Department was

dispatched to the R Bar on Wertz Avenue, Northwest, Canton, Stark County, Ohio, during

the early morning hours of May 12, 2019, in response to a shooting casualty. When he

arrived at the scene, Officer Raminin found a crowd outside, surrounding an unresponsive

male, who was motionless on the ground. The multiple gun casings scattered around the

parking lot as well as several parked cars with gunshot damage suggested a shootout.



1 For a complete recitation of the evidence presented at trial, see this Court’s Opinion in State v. Chester,

2021-Ohio-918
 (5th Dist.).
Stark County, Case No. 2024CA00021                                                        3


       {¶5}   Video footage from the bar security camera showed a late-model Dodge

Ram pickup truck pulling up to the bar. Officer Romanin recognized the pickup truck from

an incident which occurred months earlier and involved an exchange of gunfire between

vehicles on Interstate 77. Someone at the bar provided police with Appellant’s name and

Officer Romanin determined the pickup truck was associated with Appellant.

       {¶6}   Witness testimony established Appellant and his cousins had been at the

bar for a short time when Nigel Jackson, unprovoked and without warning, punched

Appellant in the head. Samuel “Franco” Jamerson, one of the bouncers, attempted to

break up the ensuing fight between Appellant and Jackson. Jamerson grabbed Appellant

and pulled him toward the exit, telling Appellant he had to leave. Appellant ran toward the

parking lot with his cousins following after him. As Jamerson was dealing with Appellant,

Jackson swung at Joshua Moore, the bar manager, and the two began to fight. Antonio

Wallace approached with a gun in his hand and told Moore to “get the fuck off my boy.”

Moore instructed Jackson, Wallace, and their associate to leave, which they did after

some “jawing.” As Jackson, Wallace, and their associate exited the bar, Jamerson heard

“boom, boom, boom” then saw Jackson slowly fall to the ground. Wallace raised his gun

and fired back. Moore fired two shots into the air to scare people away from the area.

       {¶7}   Appellant testified on his own behalf. He recalled, in February, 2019, he was

involved in an incident with Wallace at a different bar, the M Bar, which ended with

someone shooting at his truck while he was traveling on Interstate 77 (“I-77”). Appellant

stated, for several months following the incident, he received vague threats from others

on behalf of Wallace, causing him to fear for his life. Appellant began to carry a gun while

on his route as a mail carrier. He also kept an AK-47 hidden in his truck.
Stark County, Case No. 2024CA00021                                                      4


      {¶8}   Appellant described the events of the evening of May 11, 2019. Prior to

entering the R Bar, Appellant secreted a handgun on the top of a tire in the wheel well of

his parked truck. Appellant indicated he believed Wallace was the individual who had

punched him in the head. After being punched, he ran out of the bar and retrieved his

hidden gun. Appellant ran back toward the parking lot of the bar. He claimed he saw

Wallace aim a gun in his direction, so he raised his own gun and immediately began

shooting. Appellant fled the scene on foot.

      {¶9}   After hearing all the evidence and deliberating, the jury acquitted Appellant

of Count 1, aggravated murder, but found him guilty of the remaining counts of murder

and felonious assault. At the sentencing hearing on January 17, 2020, the trial court

sentenced Appellant to an aggregate mandatory minimum prison term of 23 years to a

maximum prison term of 24 years to life.       The trial court memorialized Appellant’s

convictions and sentence via Judgment Entry filed March 4, 2020.

      {¶10} On December 26, 2019, prior to the start of trial, the State filed a Notice of

Intent to Use Other Acts Evidence and Motion in Limine. The State also provided

Appellant with discovery relative to the February 3, 2019 incident between Appellant and

Wallace at the M Bar. A short time later, Appellant presented at Aultman Hospital with a

gunshot wound which he alleged occurred when someone shot at his vehicle while he

was traveling on I-77 South. The Canton Police Department investigated the shooting

and recovered evidence from Appellant’s truck. The evidence recovered revealed shots

were fired from inside Appellant’s truck to the outside and from outside his truck to the

inside. Within 24 hours of the incident at the M Bar, someone fired a large number of

rounds into Wallace’s home. Canton Police interviewed Appellant about the incident at
Stark County, Case No. 2024CA00021                                                             5


the M Bar and the gunfire exchange on I-77. The information gathered by Canton Police

and the prosecutor’s office regarding those incidents was disclosed to Appellant and his

attorney.

       {¶11} In addition, the State provided Appellant with discovery regarding the

State’s ongoing investigation into the criminal gang, “Shorb Blocc,” and Antonio Wallace’s

involvement in the gang. Appellant initially informed police he had no knowledge of

Wallace’s criminal history at the time he shot and killed Nigel Jackson. Id. at p. 3. The

State added Appellant raised the issue of self-defense; therefore, testimony of prior

specific acts of misconduct by the victims unrelated and unknown to Appellant at the time

of the R Bar shooting were not relevant and inadmissible. Id. The trial court agreed with

the State and ruled the prior unrelated bad acts the alleged victims in the case had

committed or which had been investigated were inadmissible pursuant to Evid.R. 404(B).

       {¶12} Appellant filed a timely Notice of Appeal to this Court, which affirmed his

convictions and sentence. State v. Chester, 
2021-Ohio-918
 (5th Dist.). Appellant

subsequently filed a motion to reopen his direct appeal, claiming appellate counsel was

ineffective for failing to argue trial counsel was ineffective for failing to challenge the trial

court instructing the jury Appellant had a duty to retreat. Via Judgment Entry filed October

13, 2021, this Court denied Appellant’s application. The Ohio Supreme Court decline to

accept review. State v. Chester, 
2022-Ohio-85
.

       {¶13} On August 7, 2023, Appellant filed a Motion for Leave to File Delayed

Motion for New Trial. The alleged newly discovered evidence upon which Appellant based

his motion was (1) an October 21, 2022 correspondence from the United States

Department of Justice, which informed Appellant he had been identified by law
Stark County, Case No. 2024CA00021                                                          6


enforcement as a victim or potential victim of the Shorb Blocc gang (“the DOJ letter”) and

(2) an indictment filed in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Ohio on August

11, 2021, charging sixteen (16) members of the Shorb Blocc gang with a racketeering

conspiracy (“the federal indictment”) as well as the docketing statement of that matter.

Appellant stated he was unavoidably prevented from discovering the evidence within the

statutory timeframe. Appellant argued “the newly discovered evidence attached hereto

verifies that [he] was a victim of the Shorb Blocc gang and associates that terrorized the

greater Canton area … [tracking back to] 2005.” Motion for Leave to File Delayed Motion

for New Trial pursuant to Criminal Rule 33(A)(6) at p. 6. Appellant explained he was the

victim, not the aggressor in the incident at the R Bar. Appellant further asserted he is

entitled to a new trial because the State “suppressed the ongoing criminal investigation

[into] the notorious violent gang Shorb Blocc,” in violation of Brady v. Maryland, 
373 U.S. 83
 (1963). 
Id.

       {¶14} The State countered “[t]he ‘newly discovered’ evidence here is not the DOJ

letter itself, or even the indictment of the Shorb Blocc gang members, but rather the

subject matter of those documents.” State’s Memorandum Contra Defendant’s Motion for

Leave to Filed Delayed Motion for New Trial pursuant to Criminal Rule 33(A)(6) at p. 9.

The State explained the only new information contained in the DOJ letter and the federal

indictment was the fact Appellant could possibly be a victim witness in the federal case.

Appellant was aware of Wallace’s gang affiliation at the time of trial as such information

was provided to him in discovery. The State further argued Appellant failed to provide an

explanation for the delay in filing his motion.
Stark County, Case No. 2024CA00021                                                      7


       {¶15} Via Judgment Entry filed February 8, 2024, the trial court denied Appellant’s

Motion for Leave to File Delayed Motion for New Trial. The trial court found Appellant

failed to establish, by clear and convincing evidence, he was unavoidably prevented from

discovering the evidence upon which he intends to base his motion for new trial. The trial

court further found the allegedly newly discovered evidence was information known to

Appellant at the time of trial.

       {¶16} It is from this judgment entry Appellant appeals, raising the following

assignments of error:



               I. THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION AND VIOLATED

       APPELLANT’S         DUE    PROCESS      RIGHTS,     WHEN      IT    DENIED

       APPELLANT’S MOTION FOR LEAVE, FINDING APPELLANT FAILED TO

       SHOW       BY    CLEAR     AND   CONVINCING       EVIDENCE         HE   WAS

       UNAVOIDABLY PREVENTED FROM DISCOVERING THE EVIDENCE

       THAT APPELLANT INTRODUCED IN HIS MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL,

       WHEN THE EVIDENCE ON ITS FACE DEMONSTRATED SUCH

       UNAVOIDABLENESS.

               II. THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION, WHEN IT

       DENIED APPELLANT’S MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE MOTION FOR

       NEW TRIAL WITHOUT CONDUCTING AN EVIDENTIARY HEARING AS

       APPELLANT SUBMITTED DOCUMENTATION THAT ON ITS FACE

       SUPPORTED APPELLANT’S CLAIM THAT HE WAS UNAVOIDABLY

       PREVENTED FROM DISCOVERING SAID EVIDENCE EARLIER.
Stark County, Case No. 2024CA00021                                                            8


                                               I

       {¶17} In his first assignment of error, Appellant asserts the trial court abused its

discretion and violated his rights to due process in denying his motion for leave to file

delayed motion for new trial. We disagree.

       {¶18} A motion for a new trial pursuant to Crim.R. 33 is addressed to the sound

discretion of the trial court. State v. Schiebel, 
55 Ohio St.3d 71
 (1990). It is also within the

discretion of the trial court to determine whether a motion for a new trial and the material

submitted with the motion warrants an evidentiary hearing. State v. Hill, 
1992-Ohio-43
.

The term “abuse of discretion” connotes more than an error of law or of judgment; it

implies that the court's attitude is unreasonable, arbitrary or unconscionable. (Citations

omitted.) State v. Adams, 
62 Ohio St.2d 151, 157
 (1980).

       {¶19} Crim.R. 33(B) provides a motion for new trial based on newly discovered

evidence must be filed:



              [W]ithin one hundred twenty days after the day upon which the

       verdict was rendered. If it is made to appear by clear and convincing proof

       that the defendant was unavoidably prevented from the discovery of the

       evidence upon which he must rely, such motion shall be filed within seven

       days from an order of the court finding that he was unavoidably prevented

       from discovering the evidence within the one hundred twenty day period.



       {¶20} The verdict in Appellant’s case was rendered on January 14, 2020, but he

did not file his motion until August 7, 2023. “Because appellant's motion was filed well
Stark County, Case No. 2024CA00021                                                           9


outside the 120-day period, he was required to obtain leave of court to file his motion for

new trial.” State v. Waddy, 
2016-Ohio-4911, ¶17
 (10th Dist.). To obtain such leave, the

defendant must demonstrate by clear and convincing proof that he or she was

unavoidably prevented from discerning the evidence within the 120 days. 
Id.
 A party is

“unavoidably prevented” from filing a motion for a new trial if they had no knowledge of

the ground supporting the motion and could not have learned of the existence of that

ground within the time prescribed for filing the motion in the exercise of reasonable

diligence.” 
Id.
 quoting State v. Walden, 
19 Ohio App.3d 141, 145-146
 (10th Dist. 1984).

       {¶21} Appellant's proof must be more than conclusory allegations. “Clear and

convincing proof that the defendant was ‘unavoidably prevented’ from filing ‘requires more

than a mere allegation that a defendant has been unavoidably prevented from discovering

the evidence he seeks to introduce as support for a new trial.’ ” State v. Lee, 2005-Ohio-

6374, ¶9 (10th Dist.). The requirement of clear and convincing evidence puts the burden

on the defendant to prove he was unavoidably prevented from discovering the evidence

in a timely manner. State v. Rodriguez-Baron, 
2012-Ohio-5360, ¶11
 (7th Dist.). Clear and

convincing proof is that “which will produce in the mind of the trier of facts a firm belief of

conviction as to the facts sought to be established.” Schiebel, 
55 Ohio St.3d at 74
.

       {¶22} The “unavoidably prevented” requirement in Crim.R. 33 mirrors the

“unavoidably prevented” requirement in R.C. 2953.23. State v. Thornton, 
2017-Ohio-637, ¶ 47
 (5th Dist.). “The phrase ‘unavoidably prevented’ means that a defendant was both

unaware of the facts and was unable to learn of them through reasonable diligence.” 
Id.

       {¶23} Thus, the central inquiry in Appellant's motion for leave to file a motion for

a new trial is whether he was unaware of the facts disclosed by the evidence and whether
Stark County, Case No. 2024CA00021                                                        10


he was unavoidably prevented from obtaining that information through reasonable

diligence. We answer both parts of this inquiry in the negative.

       {¶24} We find Appellant was aware of the facts disclosed by the evidence. In his

motion for leave to file delayed motion for new trial, Appellant asserted, “It is very

important to note that the newly discovered evidence/information is very, very significant

and impactful on the issue that [Appellant] now brings before this Honorable Court.” Id. at

p. 2. Appellant continues, “from the very beginning [he] asserted that he was a victim of

the acts of physical violence involving assaults, intimidation, and threats including being

a victim of a shooting incident from the organization (gang) that is known as ‘Shorb Blocc’

and/or associates thereof and therefore, [Appellant] was in fear for his life during the

attack … at the R Bar.” Id. The basis for Appellant’s motion was the fact he was the

victim of the Shorb Blocc gang and feared for his life.

       {¶25} During the initial investigation, Appellant told police he did not know

anything about Wallace or his criminal history at the time of the shooting. Accordingly,

Wallace’s involvement in the Shorb Blocc gang could not have had a bearing on

Appellant’s decision to shoot Jackson.        Nonetheless, during discovery, the State

disclosed to Appellant information regarding Wallace’s involvement in the Shorb Blocc

gang. In addition, the State provided Appellant with discovery regarding the State’s

ongoing investigation into the criminal activity of the Shorb Blocc gang. At trial, Appellant

testified he feared for his life due to being victimized by Wallace and his associates

following the February, 2019 shooting incident on I-77, and he began to carry a gun on

his person while he worked and kept an AK-47 in his truck.
Stark County, Case No. 2024CA00021                                                         11


       {¶26} The newly discovered evidence upon which Appellant supported his motion

was (1) an October 21, 2022 correspondence from the DOJ, which identified Appellant

as a victim or potential victim of the Shorb Blocc gang and (2) the federal indictment

against sixteen (16) members of the Shorb Blocc gang filed the Northern District of Ohio

on August 11, 2021. The letter from the DOJ and the federal Indictment were newer

documents, however, the general information contained therein relative to the Shorb

Blocc gang was not new evidence. “The test for newly discovered evidence for a new trial

motion is not merely ‘newly available’ evidence.” (Citation omitted.) State v. Johnson,

2023-Ohio-918, ¶ 34
 (7th Dist.). The “evidence” contained in the DOJ correspondence

and the federal indictment does not change what Appellant knew at the time of the trial

or how he presented his claim of self-defense.

       {¶27} We further find Appellant has failed to establish, by clear and convincing

evidence, he was unavoidably prevented from discovering the evidence upon which he

seeks to base his motion for new trial. Although the correspondence from DOJ is dated

October 21, 2022, and the federal indictment was filed on August 11, 2021, beyond the

120-day requirement of Crim.R. 33, as discussed supra, the general information set forth

therein was known to Appellant at the time of trial. Furthermore, with respect to the federal

indictment, “[a] court's docket is public record.” (Citation omitted.) State v. Johnson, 2022-

Ohio-78, ¶ 24 (8th Dist.). “[I]f something is stored within the public record, a defendant

cannot be unavoidably prevented from discovering it.” (Citation omitted) Id. We recognize

Appellant is incarcerated and acknowledge the logistical difficulties for inmates in

investigating and obtaining legal representation. State v. Miller, 
2022-Ohio-378, ¶ 5
 (8th

Dist.). However, Appellant does not attest to the circumstances relating to his late
Stark County, Case No. 2024CA00021                                                       12


discovery other than the dates associated with the evidence. Once Appellant became

aware of the evidence, “caselaw dictates that it is incumbent upon him to act within a

reasonable time period.” State v. McConnell, 
2011-Ohio-5555, ¶ 18
 (2nd Dist.). He failed

to do so.

       {¶28} Based upon the foregoing, Appellant’s first assignment of error is overruled.

                                                  II

       {¶29} In his second assignment of error, Appellant contends the trial court abused

its discretion in denying his motion for leave to file a motion for new trial without

conducting an evidentiary hearing.

       {¶30} “The decision whether to grant or hold an evidentiary hearing on a

defendant's request for leave to file a delayed motion for new trial falls within the sound

discretion of the trial court and will not be disturbed on appeal absent an abuse of that

discretion.” (Citation omitted.) State v. Hill, 
2015-Ohio-1652
, ¶ 16 (8th Dist.).

       {¶31} Appellant argues a defendant is entitled to a hearing on his motion for leave

when he “submits documents that on their face support his claim of being unavoidably

prevented from meeting Crim.R. 33’s time requirements.” (Citation omitted) State v. Hiler,

2017-Ohio-7636, ¶ 12
 (2nd Dist.). Having found, supra, Appellant failed to establish, by

clear and convincing evidence, he was unavoidably prevented from discovering the

evidence upon which he intends to base his motion for new trial, we find the trial court

was not required to hold a hearing and did not abuse its discretion in not doing so.

       {¶32} Within this assignment of error, Appellant also asserts “the trial court should

have given a detail [sic] finding of facts and conclusions of law that addresses the impact

of the newly discovered evidence.” Brief of Appellant at pp. 15-16. “[A] trial court is not
Stark County, Case No. 2024CA00021                                                   13


required to issue findings of fact and conclusions of law when denying without a hearing

a motion for leave to file a delayed motion for new trial.” State v. Briscoe, 2021-Ohio-

4317, ¶ 27 (8th Dist.). We find the trial court’s judgment entry clearly and succinctly

provided a thorough analysis to support its decision.

      {¶33} Appellant’s second assignment of error is overruled.

      {¶34} The judgment of the Stark County Court of Common Pleas is affirmed.



By: Hoffman, P.J.
Baldwin, J. and
King, J. concur

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