[Cite as In re N.C.,
2025-Ohio-2012.]
COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA
IN RE N.C., :
No. 114690
Minor Child :
[Appeal by D.T., Father] :
JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION
JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED
RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: June 5, 2025
Civil Appeal from the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas
Juvenile Division
Case No. AD23901915
Appearances:
Victor Chukwudelunzu, for appellant.
Michael C. O’Malley, Cuyahoga County Prosecuting
Attorney, and Joseph C. Young, Assistant Prosecuting
Attorney, for appellee Cuyahoga County Division of
Children and Family Services.
SEAN C. GALLAGHER, J.:
Appellant D.T. (“father”) appeals from the judgment of the Cuyahoga
County Court of Common Pleas, Juvenile Division (“juvenile court”), that awarded
permanent custody of his minor child N.C. (“N.C.” or “the child”) to the Cuyahoga
County Division of Children and Family Services (“CCDCFS” or “the agency”) and
terminated all parental rights.1 After a careful review of the record, we affirm the
juvenile court’s decision.
The child originally was placed in the emergency custody of CCDCFS
on November 9, 2022, when the child was less than two weeks old. After an initial
complaint could not be resolved within the statutory time frame, CCDCFS refiled a
complaint on February 13, 2023, alleging the child to be dependent and requesting
temporary custody to the agency. Following a hearing, the child was committed to
the predispositional temporary custody of CCDCFS.
In May 2023, the child was adjudicated to be dependent; thereafter,
the child was committed to the temporary custody of CCDCFS. Though mother and
father engaged in case-plan services, the agency had significant concerns that
remained. On September 25, 2023, CCDCFS filed a motion to modify temporary
custody to permanent custody. In May 2024, father filed a motion for an extension
of temporary custody. In November 2024, mother filed a motion for legal custody
to herself.
Trial was held in November 2024. At that time, the child was two
years old and was in the care of the maternal grandfather. The juvenile court heard
testimony from multiple witnesses and accepted evidence in the case. The child’s
guardian ad litem recommended permanent custody to CCDCFS. On December 9,
2024, the juvenile court journalized a judgment entry in which it made requisite
1 A separate appeal was filed by A.C., who is the mother of N.C., in the companion
case, In re N.C., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 114646. We only address father’s appeal herein.
statutory findings and granted CCDCFS’s motion to modify temporary custody to
permanent custody. The juvenile court committed the child to the permanent
custody of the agency and terminated all parental rights. Father’s appeal is now
before us.
Under his first assignment of error, father claims the juvenile court
erred and abused its discretion in finding it would be in the best interest of the child
to grant permanent custody to CCDCFS. Though father refers to an abuse-of-
discretion standard, the Supreme Court of Ohio has found that the abuse-of-
discretion standard does not apply when reviewing a permanent-custody decision
and that “the sufficiency-of-the-evidence and/or manifest-weight-of-the-evidence
standards of review” are the proper appellate standards of review, depending on the
argument presented. In re Z.C., 2023-Ohio-4703, ¶ 11. Here, the substance of
father’s argument challenges the juvenile court’s decision as being against the
manifest-weight of the evidence. “When reviewing for manifest weight, the
appellate court must weigh the evidence and all reasonable inferences, consider the
credibility of the witnesses, and determine whether, in resolving conflicts in the
evidence, the finder of fact clearly lost its way and created such a manifest
miscarriage of justice that the judgment must be reversed and a new trial ordered.”
Id. at ¶ 14, citing Eastley v. Volkman,
2012-Ohio-2179, ¶ 20.
“Under R.C. 2151.414(B)(1), a juvenile court may grant permanent
custody of a child to the agency that moved for permanent custody if the court
determines, ‘by clear and convincing evidence, that it is in the best interest of the
child’ to do so and that one of five factors enumerated in R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(a)
through (e) applies.” In re Z.C. at ¶ 7, quoting R.C. 2151.414(B)(1). “‘Clear and
convincing evidence is that measure or degree of proof which is more than a mere
“preponderance of the evidence,” but not to the extent of such certainty as is
required “beyond a reasonable doubt” in criminal cases, and which will produce in
the mind of the trier of facts a firm belief or conviction as to the facts sought to be
established.’” Id., quoting Cross v. Ledford,
161 Ohio St. 469 (1954), paragraph
three of the syllabus.
“[T]he best interests of the child are paramount in any custody
case[,]” and courts are to liberally interpret the statutes under R.C. Chapter 2151 “to
provide for the care and protection of the child . . . .” In re A.B., 2006-Ohio-4359,
¶ 32, citing R.C. 2151.01(A). R.C. 2151.414(D) sets forth the factors a juvenile court
is to consider in determining the best interest of a child in a permanent-custody
hearing. Pursuant to R.C. 2151.414(D)(1), in determining the best interest of a child
at a permanent-custody hearing, a juvenile court “shall consider all relevant factors,
including, but not limited to,” the factors listed thereunder. “There is not one
element that is given greater weight than the others pursuant to the statute.” In re
Schaefer,
2006-Ohio-5513, ¶ 56.
In this case, even though the juvenile court determined that the factor
under R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(d) applies, the record shows that CCDCFS asserted in its
motion that “the condition listed in R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(a) exists and that one or
more of the factors listed in R.C. 2151.414(E) apply to the parents of the child at
issue.” Consistent with CCDCFS’s reliance on R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(a), the juvenile
court found under R.C. 2151.414(E) that “the child cannot be placed with one of the
child’s parents within a reasonable time or should not be placed with either parent.”
The juvenile court found multiple factors under R.C. 2151.414(E) were met, and the
record supports a determination by clear and convincing evidence that R.C.
2151.414(B)(1)(a) applies. Therefore, despite the juvenile court’s mistaken finding
that R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(d) applies, we find the judgment is nevertheless correct.
See In re T.T., 2024-Ohio-2914, ¶ 14-17 (8th Dist.). The finding under R.C.
2151.414(B)(1)(a) is not disputed by father.
Father’s challenge focuses on the juvenile court’s best-interest
determination. The record shows that the juvenile court considered all relevant
best-interest factors, including the enumerated factors under R.C.
2151.414(D)(1)(a)-(e), which are specifically set forth in the court’s decision. The
juvenile court included the finding pursuant to R.C. 2151.414(E) and found the
factors under R.C. 2151.414(E)(1), (2), (14), and (16) applied, with the (E)(2) and (16)
factors applicable to father. The juvenile court included findings, among others, that
father “has displayed aggressive behavior towards CCDCFS employees, has been
alleged by everyone close to mother to have a physically and mentally abusive
relationship with her, and is alleged to have [recently] hit his child at a recent
supervised visitation with CCDCFS present[;]” and that he has “failed to show a
demonstrated benefit from [case-plan] services.” Ultimately, in this case, the
juvenile court determined “by clear and convincing evidence that it is in the best
interest of the child to be placed in the permanent custody of the CCDCFS.”
While father points to certain testimony favorable to him, the juvenile
court weighed all relevant factors in rendering its decision. The testimony and
evidence show that that there were anger-management and substance-abuse
concerns with father. Also, the alleged domestically violent relationship between
mother and father was a concern throughout the pendency of the proceedings, and
there was circumstantial evidence of their suspected ongoing relationship. Though
father engaged in treatment to address his substance-abuse issues, he was
inconsistent with completing his drug screens, he tested positive for cocaine in May
2024, and his sobriety date was July 12, 2024. Father was not always consistent
with visitation, and his visits were suspended after he put the child at risk while
engaging in aggressive behavior toward an agency worker. Though supervised
visitation was reinstated in October 2024, there was testimony that during a visit,
father became visibly frustrated and angered when the child was having a temper
tantrum. The caseworker testified that the child did not view father as an
authoritative figure and that father hit the child and stated he “can whoop [his
child.]” At the time of trial, father was living with his grandfather and was looking
for his own home.
Other testimony and evidence were provided demonstrating valid
concerns as to both father and mother, including as to mother’s ability to protect
herself and N.C. There was testimony showing that the child was doing well in the
maternal grandfather’s home and the child was well-bonded with the maternal
grandfather. The guardian ad litem for the child recommended permanent custody
to CCDCFS, indicating a variety of compelling reasons. At the time of trial, the child
had been in the custody of CCDCFS for over two years, and the child needed a safe,
stable, and permanent home environment.
Despite father’s arguments otherwise, the record supports the
juvenile court’s best-interest determination. Even though father completed certain
case-plan services, as the juvenile court determined, he failed to demonstrate
significant progress or a benefit from those services. Indeed, a parent’s successful
completion of a case plan does not preclude a grant of permanent custody to a social
services agency. See In re C.C., 2010-Ohio-780, ¶ 25 (8th Dist.), citing In re J.L.,
2004-Ohio-6024 (8th Dist.). The juvenile court properly determined in accordance
with R.C. 2151.414(D)(1) that an award of permanent custody to the agency was in
the child’s best interest. Additionally, although the juvenile court did not make an
explicit finding under R.C. 2151.414(D)(2), its decision demonstrates that all of the
R.C. 2151.414(D)(2) factors were met, in which case permanent custody is
necessarily in the best interest of the child.
After carefully reviewing the entire record, we do not find the juvenile
court clearly lost its way or committed a manifest miscarriage of justice by
terminating the parents’ parental rights and awarding permanent custody of the
child to CCDCFS. We are not persuaded by father’s arguments otherwise. We
conclude that the juvenile court’s judgment is not against the manifest weight of the
evidence. Accordingly, father’s first assignment of error is overruled.
Under his second assignment of error, father challenges the juvenile
court’s “reasonable-efforts” determination under R.C. 2151.419.
“Overall, Ohio’s child-welfare laws are designed to care for and
protect children, ‘whenever possible, in a family environment, separating the child
from the child’s parents only when necessary for the child’s welfare or in the
interests of public safety.’” In re C.F., 2007-Ohio-1104, ¶ 29, quoting R.C.
2151.01(A). With limited exception, an agency must make reasonable efforts toward
family reunification during child-custody proceedings prior to the termination of
parental rights. Id. at ¶ 43. “If the agency has not established that reasonable efforts
have been made prior to the hearing on a motion for permanent custody, then it
must demonstrate such efforts at that time.” Id.
In this case, the juvenile court made a reasonable-efforts finding at
numerous stages of the proceedings. In the decision granting permanent custody to
CCDCFS, the juvenile court again made a reasonable-efforts finding, stating as
follows:
The Court further finds that reasonable efforts were made to prevent
the removal of the child from the home, or to return the child to the
home and finalize a permanency plan, to wit: reunification. Relevant
services provided to the family include: The mother was referred for
parenting, mental health, and domestic violence. The father was
referred for substance abuse, basic needs, and anger management.
The juvenile court’s finding is consistent with the record and
supported by the evidence presented at trial. “The issue in a reasonable-efforts
determination is not whether the agency could have done more, but whether the
agency’s case planning and efforts were reasonable and diligent under the
circumstances of the case.” In re A.F., 2021-Ohio-4519, ¶ 35 (8th Dist.), citing In re
D.H.,
2021-Ohio-3984, ¶ 58 (5th Dist.). Father’s second assignment of error is
overruled.
Under his third assignment of error, father claims the juvenile court’s
decision violated his due process rights. Though father claims the juvenile court
violated his fundamental right to parent his child, it is well established that the
government has broad authority to intervene to protect a child’s health or safety.
See In re C.F., 2007-Ohio-1104, at ¶ 28, citing Troxel v. Granville,
530 U.S. 57, 66
(2000); R.C. 2151.01. Ultimately, the natural rights of a parent are always subject to
the ultimate welfare of the child, which is the controlling principle to be observed.
In re B.C.,
2014-Ohio-4558, ¶ 20, citing In re Cunningham,
59 Ohio St.2d 100, 106
(1979). Therefore, “[j]uvenile courts are afforded broad discretion in fashioning a
disposition following the adjudication of a child as being abused, neglected, or
dependent, because the courts are charged with protecting the best interests of
children.” In re R.G.M.,
2024-Ohio-2737, ¶ 16, citing R.C. 2151.353(A). Upon our
review of the record in this matter, we find the juvenile court acted in accordance
with the best interest and ultimate welfare of the child. Father’s third assignment of
error is overruled.
Judgment affirmed.
It is ordered that appellee recover from appellant costs herein taxed.
The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the
common pleas court, juvenile division, to carry this judgment into execution.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27
of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.
______________________
SEAN C. GALLAGHER, JUDGE
EMANUELLA D. GROVES, P.J., and
MARY J. BOYLE, J., CONCUR
