[Cite as State v. Wynn,
2025-Ohio-2016.]
COURT OF APPEALS
DELAWARE COUNTY, OHIO
FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
STATE OF OHIO, : JUDGES:
: Hon. Craig R. Baldwin, P.J.
Plaintiff - Appellee : Hon. William B. Hoffman, J.
: Hon. Andrew J. King, J.
-vs- :
:
DARIUS D. WYNN, : Case No. 24 CAA 09 0058
:
Defendant - Appellant : OPINION
CHARACTER OF PROCEEDING: Appeal from the Delaware County
Court of Common Pleas, Case No.
23 CRI 12 0746
JUDGMENT: Affirmed
DATE OF JUDGMENT: June 5, 2025
APPEARANCES:
For Plaintiff-Appellee For Defendant-Appellant
MELISSA A. SCHIFFEL WILLIAM T. CRAMER
Prosecuting Attorney 1554 Polaris Parkway, Suite 325
Delaware County, Ohio Columbus, Ohio 43240
By: KATHERYN L. MUNGER
Assistant Prosecuting Attorney
Delaware County Prosecutor’s Office
154 North Union Street, 3rd Floor
Delaware, Ohio 43015
Baldwin, P.J.
{¶1} The appellant, Darius D. Wynn, appeals his July 18, 2024, conviction and
sentence from the Court of Common Pleas of Delaware County, Ohio. The appellee is
the State of Ohio.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS AND THE CASE
{¶2} On December 21, 2023, the appellant was indicted on one count of
Engaging in a Pattern of Corrupt Activity in violation of R.C. 2923.32(A)(1), one count of
Aggravated Murder in violation of R.C. 2903.01(B) with a three-year firearm specification
pursuant to R.C. 2941.141, one count of Felony Murder in violation of R.C. 2903.02(B)
with a three-year firearm specification pursuant to R.C. 2941.141, two counts of
Aggravated Robbery in violation of R.C. 2911.01(A)(1) with a three-year firearm
specification, one count of Felonious Assault in violation of R.C. 2903.11(A)(2) with a
three-year firearm specification, and one count of Attempted Murder in violation of R.C.
2903.02(A) with a three-year firearm specification. All charges except Engaging in a
Pattern of Corrupt Activity included a three-year firearm specification pursuant to R.C.
2941.145.
{¶3} On July 18, 2024, the trial court held a change of plea hearing, the following
exchange took place at the appellant’s change of plea hearing:
THE COURT: Did you need any more time to speak with your lawyer now?
THE DEFENDANT: No, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Have you had enough time to think about the important
decision that you’re making?
THE DEFENDANT: I don’t think so, but it’s fine.
THE COURT: Did you need any more time today or any other day?
THE DEFENDANT: No. It’s good.
THE COURT: I see. And you’re certain this is what you want to do.
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.
{¶4} Ultimately, the appellant entered a plea of guilty to one count of Engaging
in a Pattern of Corrupt Activity in violation of R.C. 2923.32(A)(1), one count of Felony
Murder in violation of R.C. 2903.02(B) with a one-year firearm specification, and one
count of Aggravated Robbery in violation of R.C. 2911.01(A)(1) with a three-year firearm
specification, and Felonious Assault in violation of R.C. 2903.11(A).
{¶5} On August 28, 2024, the trial court held a sentencing hearing. At the
hearing, the trial court sentenced the appellant to a mandatory sentence of fifteen-years-
to-life for felony murder along with a mandatory consecutive term of one year for the
associated firearm specification, eleven to sixteen-and-a-half years for corrupt activity,
and ten years for aggravated robbery along with a mandatory consecutive term of three
years for the associated firearm specification. The trial court imposed the prison terms
consecutively for an aggregate term of forty-years-to-life. The trial court also imposed a
mandatory term of post-release control of two to five years for corrupt activity and
aggravated robbery.
{¶6} The appellant filed a timely notice of appeal and raises the following two
assignments of error:
{¶7} “I. APPELLANT’S GUILTY PLEAS WERE NOT KNOWING, INTELLIGENT,
OR VOLUNTARY BECAUSE APPELLANT INDICATED THAT HE NEEDED MORE TIME
TO CONSIDER THE ISSUE.”
{¶8} “II. BY CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE, THE RECORD DOES NOT
SUPPORT THE TRIAL COURT’S CONSECUTIVE SENTENCES FINDINGS UNDER
R.C. 2929.14(C)(4).”
I.
{¶9} In the appellant’s first assignment of error, the appellant argues his guilty
pleas were not knowing, intelligent, or voluntary. We disagree.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
{¶10} A determination of whether a plea is knowing, intelligent, and voluntary is
based upon a review of the record. State v. Spates, 64 Ohio St.3d 269, 272 (1992). If a
criminal defendant claims that his plea was not knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently
made, the reviewing court must review the totality of the circumstances in order to
determine whether or not the defendant’s claim has merit. State v. Nero,
56 Ohio St.3d
106, 108 (1990).
ANALYSIS
{¶11} The appellant argues his guilty plea was not knowing, intelligent, or
voluntary because the appellant indicated he may need more time to consider the plea.
We disagree.
{¶12} Due process mandates that a guilty plea must be knowing, intelligent, and
voluntary. Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238,
89 S.Ct. 1709,
23 L.Ed.2d 274 (1969); State
v. Clark,
2008-Ohio-3748, ¶25.
{¶13} At the change of plea hearing, the trial court inquired whether the appellant
had sufficient time to consider his decision. The appellant indicated he did not think so.
The trial court then followed up by asking if he needed any more time that day or on any
other day. The appellant replied that he did not need any more time. The trial court then
asked the appellant if he was certain he wanted to change his plea. The appellant
indicated that he did.
{¶14} The appellant points to State v. Sellman, 2019-Ohio-4185 (2nd Dist.), where
the appellant expressed confusion during the plea hearing and was permitted to consult
with counsel before proceeding. In the case at bar, the appellant contends that the trial
court should have allowed the appellant time to consult with counsel before proceeding
with the hearing. The record shows a more extensive interaction between the trial court
and the appellant. The trial court asked the appellant if he had enough time to consult
with counsel. The appellant said yes. The appellant indicated his attorney answered all
of his questions. The trial court also asked the appellant if he wanted more time that day
or any other day. The appellant said no. The trial court also asked the appellant if he
needed any more time to speak with his lawyer before proceeding. The appellant also
answered no.
{¶15} The appellant’s responses at the plea hearing do not indicate any confusion
on the appellant’s part. The trial court provided the appellant more time to consider or
speak further with counsel. The appellant declined. We do not find any merit that the
appellant’s plea was not knowing, intelligent, or voluntary.
{¶16} Accordingly, the appellant’s first assignment of error is overruled.
II.
{¶17} In the appellant’s second assignment of error, the appellant argues the
record fails to support the trial court’s imposition of consecutive sentences by clear and
convincing evidence. We disagree.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
{¶18} Generally, felony sentences are reviewed under R.C. 2953.08(G)(2). State
v. Goings, 2014-Ohio-2322, ¶20 (6th Dist.). An appellate court may increase, modify, or
vacate and remand a judgment only if it clearly and convincingly finds either “(a) the
record does not support the sentencing court’s findings under division (B) or (D) of section
2929.13, division (B)(2)(e) or (C)(4) of section 2929.14, or division (I) of section 2929.20
of the Revised Code, whichever, if any, is relevant” or “(b) the sentence is otherwise
contrary to law.” State v. Yeager,
2016-Ohio-4759, ¶7 (6th Dist.); citing R.C.
2953.08(G)(2).
{¶19} However, as discussed by this Court recently in State v. Bright, 2025-Ohio-
725 (5th Dist.), the appellant’s failure to object to his sentence while before the trial court
“leaves him with little recourse.” Id. at ¶6. The Bright Court stated:
Bright did not, however, object to the community-control conditions
that were imposed at her sentencing hearing. An error “that was not called
to the attention of the trial court at a time when the error could have been
avoided or corrected by the trial court” is deemed forfeited absent plain
error.
To be sure, had the trial judge announced the sentence and then
abruptly left the courtroom without giving the parties a chance to raise
objections to the judge’s ruling, Bright could not be faulted now for having
stayed silent then. See, e.g., United States v. Ralston, 110 F.4th 909, 919
(6th Cir.2024) (noting that federal district courts “are required to ask the
parties during the sentencing hearing whether they have any objections to
the sentence that has been imposed.”); U.S. v. Bostic, 371 F.3d 865, 872
(6th Cir.2004) (where a trial court fails to provide the parties with an
opportunity to object to the sentence, the parties “will not have forfeited their
objections and thus will not be required to demonstrate plain error on
appeal[ ]”).
Here, the trial judge – by asking the parties, after the sentence was
announced if they had “[a]nything further” to say – gave Bright a meaningful
opportunity to express the concerns that Bright now raises here. Neither
Bright’s trial counsel nor Bright herself objected to the sentence. We,
therefore, review Bright’s community-control sentence for plain error.
{¶20} In the case sub judice, the appellant failed to object to the sentence imposed
by the trial court at the time of sentencing, even when given the opportunity. The appellant
had a meaningful opportunity to address his sentence at that time and failed to do so. As
such, we review for plain error only.
ANALYSIS
{¶21} The Court’s decision in Bright concisely addressed plain error:
To constitute plain error, an error “must be on the record, palpable,
and fundamental, so that it should have been apparent to the trial court
without objection.” State v. Dunlap, 2004-Ohio-6652, ¶34 (8th Dist.). “Notice
of plain error under Crim.R. 52(B) is to be taken with the utmost caution,
under exceptional circumstances and only to prevent a manifest
miscarriage of justice.” State v. Long, 53 Ohio St.2d 91 (1978), paragraph
three of the syllabus.
Id. at ¶¶10-11. According to the record, the appellant planned all the crimes, continued
the plan after somebody was killed, and only entered a plea of guilty because a
codefendant changed his plea to guilty. The court noted his past record of multiple
offenses involving firearms. Furthermore, the appellant was sentenced in conformity with
statutory guidelines and made all the appropriate findings on the record. The court has
broad discretion in this regard and did not commit plain error when it sentenced the
appellant.
{¶22} Therefore, the appellant’s second assignment of error is overruled.
CONCLUSION
{¶23} Based upon the foregoing, the decision of the Delaware County Court of
Common Pleas is hereby affirmed.
By: Baldwin, P.J.
King, J. concur.
Hoffman, J. concurs separately.
Hoffman, J., concurring
{¶24} I concur in the majority’s analysis and disposition of Appellant’s first
assignment of error.
{¶25} I further concur in the majority’s disposition of Appellant’s second
assignment of error. However, I disagree with the standard of review it applies.
{¶26} The majority analyzes the second assignment of error under a plain error
standard of review. I disagree. I believe the proper standard of review is set forth by the
Ohio Supreme Court in its recent opinion in State v. Glover, 2024-Ohio-5195, ¶¶ 43-46.
When applying that standard, I concur in the majority’s decision to also overrule
Appellant’s second assignment of error.
[Cite as State v. Wynn,
2025-Ohio-2016.]
