[Cite as State v. Sida,
2025-Ohio-2021.]
COURT OF APPEALS
STARK COUNTY, OHIO
FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
STATE OF OHIO : JUDGES:
: Hon. Andrew J. King, P.J.
Plaintiff - Appellee : Hon. Kevin W. Popham, J.
: Hon. David M. Gormley, J.
-vs- :
:
JAVIER IVAN SIDA : Case No. 2024 CA 00096
:
Defendant - Appellant : OPINION
CHARACTER OF PROCEEDING: Appeal from the Stark County Court
of Common Pleas Case No. 2024
CR 0533
JUDGMENT: Affirmed
DATE OF JUDGMENT: June 5, 2025
APPEARANCES:
For Plaintiff-Appellee For Defendant-Appellant
Kyle L. Stone George Urban
Stark County Prosecuting Attorney 116 Cleveland Avenue N.W.
Vicki L. DeSantis Suite 808
Assistant Prosecuting Attorney Canton, Ohio 44702
110 Central Plaza South, Ste. 510
Canton, Ohio 44702
Gormley, J.
{¶1} Defendant Javier I. Sida appeals his burglary, disrupting-public-services,
and assault convictions following his jury trial in Stark County. Sida argues that his
convictions were not supported by sufficient evidence and that they were against the
manifest weight of the evidence. For the reasons explained below, we affirm Sida’s
convictions.
Facts and Procedural History
{¶2} M.S. and C.S. are a married elderly couple who owned several townhouses
in Massillon, Ohio and who rented out those townhouses to tenants. Though Sida was
not a tenant at any of their properties, the couple knew Sida because he was dating a
woman named Sherilyn, who was the sister of one of the couple’s tenants, Russel
Maxhimer. According to his trial testimony, M.S. had spoken to Sida on approximately
eight to ten occasions prior to the incident at issue in this case. The couple evicted
Maxhimer in December 2023.
{¶3} In March 2024, the couple were making repairs to the unit that Maxhimer
had been evicted from. One of the repairs included fixing a broken lock on the front door
of the unit. While he was working on the front door, M.S. saw Sida coming across the
front porch toward him. M.S. — according to his trial testimony — attempted to close and
lock the door, but he was prevented from doing so when Sida grabbed the door and held
it open.
{¶4} M.S. testified at trial that when Sida first approached him, Sida began asking
him where Sherilyn was. Despite being told by M.S. that Maxhimer had been evicted and
that Sherilyn was not at the residence, Sida refused to believe that M.S. did not know
where Sherilyn was. After M.S. told his wife to call the police because Sida would not
leave, Sida forced his way inside the apartment and punched and kicked M.S. Both C.S.
and M.S. testified that Sida then walked over to C.S. — who was holding her phone and
about to call the police — and said something to the effect of “call the police, bitch” before
punching C.S. in the face. The impact caused C.S.’s phone to fly out of her hand and her
glasses to slide off her face.
{¶5} After he punched C.S., Sida left the residence and slid into the front
passenger seat of a black Jeep that was parked nearby. Donald Lance, the neighborhood
mailman, witnessed the altercation through one of the windows at the townhouse and
contacted the police to provide them with the license plate number of the black Jeep that
Sida had entered. C.S. was able to call the police after Sida left, and officers responded
to the scene to take statements from M.S., C.S., and Donald Lance.
{¶6} Sida was arrested later that same evening for an unrelated incident at a
nearby tavern. At the time of his arrest, Sida was with the owner of a black Jeep that
matched the license plate number that had been provided to the police.
{¶7} Sida was indicted on one count of burglary, one count of disrupting public
services, and two counts of assault in connection with the incident that occurred at the
elderly couple’s townhouse. Sida was convicted on all four counts at his jury trial. He
now appeals.
Sida’s Convictions Were Supported by Sufficient Evidence
{¶8} In his first assignment of error, Sida argues that the state failed to present
sufficient evidence to support convictions on each of the four charges. In his third
assignment of error, Sida similarly contends that the trial court erred when it denied his
Crim.R. 29 motion for acquittal. Because his first and third assignments of error both
relate to the sufficiency of the evidence presented at the trial, we will address them
together.
{¶9} “When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, an appellate court does
not ask whether the evidence should be believed but, rather, whether the evidence, ‘if
believed, would convince the average mind of the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt.’” State v. Pountney, 2018-Ohio-22, ¶ 19, quoting State v. Jenks,
61 Ohio St.3d
259 (1991), paragraph two of the syllabus. “‘The relevant inquiry is whether, after viewing
the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could
have found the essential elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt.’”
State v. Howell,
2020-Ohio-174, ¶ 28 (5th Dist.), quoting Jenks at paragraph two of the
syllabus. A “verdict will not be disturbed unless the appellate court finds that reasonable
minds could not reach the conclusion reached by the trier-of-fact.” State v. Dennis,
79
Ohio St.3d 421, 430 (1997).
Conviction for Burglary
{¶10} In his challenge to the evidence supporting his burglary conviction, Sida
claims that the state failed to present sufficient evidence of any intent on his part to commit
a criminal offense in the townhouse owned by the elderly couple.
{¶11} To prove the R.C. 2911.12(A)(1) burglary charge in Sida’s case, the state
was required to introduce evidence that Sida, by force, stealth, or deception, “trespass[ed]
in an occupied structure . . . when another person other than an accomplice of the
offender [wa]s present, with purpose to commit in the structure . . . any criminal offense.”
R.C. 2911.12(A)(1). Trespass “is defined as knowingly and without privilege entering or
remaining on the premises of another.” State v. Ramunas, 2021-Ohio-3191, ¶ 15 (5th
Dist.), citing R.C. 2911.21(A)(1).
{¶12} The Supreme Court of Ohio — in interpreting the “purpose” element of
aggravated burglary — has explained that “a defendant may form the purpose to commit
a criminal offense at any point during the course of a trespass.” State v. Fontes, 87 Ohio
St.3d 527, 530 (2000). Our court has applied that principle to the crime of burglary.
Ramunas at ¶ 15 (“Because the language concerning ‘purpose to commit . . . any criminal
offense’ is also found in R.C. 2911.12, defining burglary, the rule of law set forth in Fontes
also applies to the offense of burglary.”).
{¶13} “A person acts purposely when it is the person’s specific intention to cause
a certain result.” R.C. 2901.22(A). “It is a fundamental principle that a person is
presumed to intend the natural, reasonable, and probable consequences of his voluntary
acts.” State v. Johnson, 56 Ohio St.2d 35, 39 (1978). The intent with which an act is
committed may be inferred from the doing of the act itself. State v. Asp,
2023-Ohio-290,
¶ 40 (5th Dist.).
{¶14} The state presented sufficient evidence that Sida acted with a purpose to
commit assault in the townhouse. Both M.S. and C.S. testified at trial that Sida forced his
way into the townhouse and assaulted them. M.S. testified that Sida punched and kicked
him, and C.S. testified that she was punched in the face and that Sida was her attacker.
Sida’s act of striking the two elderly townhouse owners was, in and of itself, sufficient
evidence from which the jurors could infer that Sida, during the trespass, acted with the
purpose of assaulting the couple.
{¶15} In support of his contrary view here, Sida points out that M.S. testified that
Sida initially came to the townhouse looking for Sherilyn, which Sida argues was his
“purpose” in going to the townhouse. As explained above, however, the state was not
required to show that Sida went to the townhouse with the purpose of assaulting the
elderly couple inside. Evidence that Sida decided to assault his victims while he was
committing the trespass was enough.
{¶16} The state presented sufficient evidence at Sida’s trial on each element of
the burglary charge.
Conviction for Disrupting Public Services
{¶17} Sida argues that the state failed to offer any proof that he had the requisite
mental state to support a conviction for disrupting public services under R.C.
2909.04(A)(1).
{¶18} Before Sida could be convicted of disrupting public services, the state was
required to prove that Sida “purposely by any means or knowingly by damaging or
tampering with any property . . . interrupt[ed] or impair[ed] . . . police, fire, or other public
service communications.” (Emphasis added.) R.C. 2909.04(A)(1). We note, initially, that
Sida appears to misinterpret the text of R.C. 2909.04(A). The statute prescribes two ways
in which Sida could have violated the statute in this case: (1) purposely, by any means,
interrupting or impairing telephone service or police communications, or (2) knowingly, by
damaging or tampering with any property, interrupting or impairing telephone service or
police communications. R.C. 2909.04(A)(1).
{¶19} “The statute is aimed at conduct which prevents a victim from using public
services to seek emergency assistance.” State v. Galindo, 2012-Ohio-3626, ¶ 17 (5th
Dist.). The act of “damaging . . . a single private telephone or cellular telephone” can fall
within the statute’s reach. State v. Robinson,
2009-Ohio-5937, ¶ 32. And because the
statute indicates that the crime can be committed “purposely by any means,” the state
need not prove that a phone or other property was actually damaged or destroyed. State
v. Walters,
2018-Ohio-3456, ¶ 26 (5th Dist.) (“Although he did not damage the cell phone,
[defendant] prevented [the victim] from making the call and placed the phone out of her
reach”).
{¶20} A person acts purposely when “it is the person’s specific intention to cause
a certain result.” R.C. 2901.22(A). “A person acts knowingly, regardless of purpose, when
the person is aware that the person’s conduct will probably cause a certain result or will
probably be of a certain nature.” R.C. 2901.22(B). “The intent with which an act is
committed may be inferred from the act itself and the surrounding circumstances,
including acts and statements of a defendant.” Asp, 2023-Ohio-290, at ¶ 40 (5th Dist.),
citing State v. Garner,
74 Ohio St.3d 49, 60 (1995). “When a person breaks into a
residence and their first act is to deprive the occupant of their means for contacting the
outside world, a natural and probable inference is that they did so with the intention of
preventing the occupant from calling the police.” State v. Jackson,
2019-Ohio-170, ¶ 80
(3d Dist.).
{¶21} M.S. — according to his testimony at trial — told his wife to call the police
because Sida would not leave the townhouse. C.S. in turn testified that she was holding
her phone and dialing the Massillon Police Department when Sida walked over to her and
said “call the cops, bitch” before punching her in the face. After C.S. was struck, her
phone flew out of her hand. That disruption necessarily interrupted C.S.’s effort to
summon help.
{¶22} The trial testimony of both M.S. and C.S. gave the jury sufficient evidence
to determine whether Sida’s conduct met either one of the culpable mental states required
by the statute. The jury could have found that Sida acted purposely to interrupt or impair
C.S.’s ability to use her phone or to contact the police by punching her in the face, with
that purpose being evident from Sida’s conduct itself and from his statement about her
calling the police. The jury, too, could have determined that Sida knowingly tampered
with C.S.’s cell phone and impaired her use of it when he decided to punch her — an
elderly woman — in the face while she was holding her phone and attempting to call the
police. Certainly, the jury could have concluded that Sida was aware that his conduct
would impair or interrupt C.S.’s ability to call for help.
{¶23} We are unpersuaded by Sida’s argument that he “permitted” C.S. to contact
law enforcement and did not damage or tamper with her cell phone in any way. As noted
above, the state need not necessarily prove that the phone was damaged or destroyed.
The state’s evidence in this case, when viewed in a light most favorable to the state, was
certainly sufficient to support the jury’s verdict. From the elderly couple’s testimony, the
jury could conclude that Sida was aware that a probable result of his decision to punch
C.S. in the face would be that her phone would be knocked out of her hand just as she
was about to use that phone to summon the police. We therefore reject Sida’s sufficiency
challenge to his disrupting-public-services conviction.
Convictions for Assault
{¶24} Sida also argues that the state failed to present sufficient evidence to prove
that Sida was the person who allegedly struck M.S. and C.S. To prove the two assault
charges, the state was required, under R.C. 2903.13(A), to show that Sida “knowingly
cause[d] or attempt[ed] to cause physical harm” to the two alleged victims.
{¶25} “[T]he testimony of one witness, if believed by the jury, is sufficient to
support a conviction.” State v. Williams, 2017-Ohio-803, ¶ 54 (5th Dist.). M.S. testified
at the trial that he knew who Sida was because he had interacted with Sida on
approximately eight to ten occasions prior to the townhouse encounter. When asked
during direct-examination if he had any doubt that Sida was the man who attacked him,
M.S. replied “none whatsoever, one hundred percent.”
{¶26} C.S. also testified during the trial that Sida was the man who punched her.
A recording of C.S.’s 9-1-1 call was played for the jury, and the jury heard C.S. tell the
dispatcher that Sida had attacked her and her husband. Additionally, both elderly victims
made in-court identifications of Sida as the man who attacked them.
{¶27} We find that the state presented sufficient evidence to support a guilty
verdict on each of the two assault charges. Sida’s first assignment of error is overruled.
Denial of Crim.R. 29 Motion for Acquittal
{¶28} In his third assignment of error, Sida argues that the trial court erred when
it denied his Crim.R. 29 motion for acquittal. We disagree.
{¶29} Crim.R. 29(A) provides that a criminal defendant can ask the trial court, after
either party in a criminal case has finished its presentation of evidence, to “order the entry
of a judgment of acquittal of one or more offenses charged in the indictment . . . if the
evidence is insufficient to sustain a conviction of such offense or offenses.” As we
explained above, the state presented evidence at the trial on each element of every
offense in the indictment, and that evidence was legally sufficient to support the jury’s
verdicts. Sida’s third assignment of error is overruled.
Sida’s Convictions Were Not Against the Manifest Weight of the Evidence
{¶30} In his second assignment of error, Sida contends that his convictions were
against the manifest weight of the evidence.
{¶31} In determining whether a conviction was against the manifest weight of the
evidence, an appellate court acts “as a ‘thirteenth juror,’ and after ‘reviewing the entire
record, weighs the evidence and all reasonable inferences, considers the credibility of
witnesses and determines whether in resolving conflicts in the evidence, the jury clearly
lost its way and created such a manifest miscarriage of justice that the conviction must
be [reversed] and a new trial ordered.’” State v. Hane, 2025-Ohio-120, ¶ 20 (5th Dist.),
quoting State v. Thompkins,
78 Ohio St.3d 380, 387 (1997). The reversal of a conviction
on manifest-weight grounds should occur only in “the ‘exceptional case in which the
evidence weighs heavily against the conviction.’”
Id.
{¶32} “Weight of the evidence concerns ‘the inclination of the greater amount of
credible evidence, offered in a trial, to support one side of the issue rather than the other.
It indicates clearly to the jury that the party having the burden of proof will be entitled to
their verdict, if, on weighing the evidence in their minds, they shall find the greater amount
of credible evidence sustains the issue which is to be established before them.’”
(Emphasis in original.) Thompkins at 387. “[A]n appellate court will leave the issues of
weight and credibility of the evidence to the factfinder, as long as a rational basis exists
in the record for its decision.” State v. Sheppard,
2025-Ohio-161, ¶ 66 (5th Dist.).
{¶33} The testimony provided at trial, Sida argues, casts serious doubt on the
question of whether he was the person who assaulted the elderly couple. Though C.S.
testified at the trial that Sida was the person who attacked her, she identified a photograph
of another man as being a photograph of Sida. The trial judge also had to interrupt C.S.’s
testimony multiple times to stop her from discussing topics that were not relevant at the
trial, such as previous complaints about Sida from neighbors and previous interactions
that she had had with Sida. Sida contends that these issues undermined C.S.’s credibility
and ought to have prompted the jury to acquit him.
{¶34} Sida also points to the testimony of another trial witness — Donald Lance
— to support his claim that the jury lost its way. Lance was the mailman who witnessed
the alleged assaults through a window of the townhouse, and he testified at the trial that
he told the police that the assailant was a white man with tattoos. Lance also testified
that he saw the assailant for less than 20 seconds and that he could not recall what the
tattoos looked like. (The record does not tell us about Sida’s race or about any tattoos,
but the jury of course had an opportunity to see him and to weigh Lance’s testimony.)
{¶35} After reviewing the full record of the trial, we cannot say that the jury lost its
way. Lance’s testimony about the physical description of the assailant was based on his
brief glimpse through a window and later outside the townhouse as the assailant fled. As
for the victims themselves, both, with what they described as 100% certainty, testified
that Sida was the person who assaulted them, and they both testified that they knew who
Sida was from prior interactions with him. Further, C.S., during her 9-1-1 call, identified
Sida as her attacker, and a recording of that call was played for the jury.
{¶36} “While the jury may take note of inconsistencies and resolve or discount
them accordingly, such inconsistencies alone do not render a conviction against the
manifest weight or sufficiency of the evidence.” State v. Wolters, 2022-Ohio-538, ¶ 20
(5th Dist.). Though there may have been hiccups in C.S.’s testimony at the trial, including
her identification of some other person in a photograph as being Sida, the jury was free
to weigh her credibility and consider her testimony as a whole.
{¶37} Having ourselves now evaluated the evidence and considered the credibility
of the witnesses and any inconsistencies in their testimony, we readily find that a rational
basis exists in the record for the jury’s determination that Sida was in fact the person who
assaulted the elderly couple. Sida’s second assignment of error is overruled.
{¶38} For the reasons explained above, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
By: Gormley, J.
King, P.J. and
Popham, J. concur.
