[Cite as State v. Craft,
2025-Ohio-2045.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
CRAWFORD COUNTY
STATE OF OHIO,
CASE NO. 3-23-44
PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE,
V.
DAKOTA CRAFT, OPINION AND
JUDGMENT ENTRY
DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.
Appeal from Crawford County Common Pleas Court
Criminal Division
Trial Court No. 23-CR-0244
Judgment Affirmed
Date of Decision: June 9, 2025
APPEARANCES:
William T. Cramer for Appellant
Matthew E. Crall for Appellee
Case No. 3-23-44
MILLER, J.
{¶1} Defendant-appellant, Dakota Craft (“Craft”), appeals the November 2,
2023 judgment entry of sentencing of the Crawford County Common Pleas Court.
For the reasons that follow, we affirm.
{¶2} On August 8, 2023, Craft was indicted on six counts: Count One of
felonious assault in violation of R.C. 2903.11(A)(2), a second-degree felony; Count
Two of improperly discharging a firearm at or into a habitation in violation of R.C.
2923.161(A)(1), a second-degree felony; Count Three of intimidation of an
attorney, victim, or witness in a criminal case in violation of R.C. 2921.04(B)(2), a
third-degree felony; Count Four of having weapons while under disability in
violation of R.C. 2923.13(A)(2), a third-degree felony; and Counts Five and Six of
tampering with evidence in violation of R.C. 2921.12(A)(1), third-degree felonies.
Counts One, Two and Five each included a firearm specification. At his
arraignment on August 10, 2023, Craft entered not-guilty pleas to the counts in the
indictment.
{¶3} A jury trial was held on October 19-20 and 23-24, 2023. At trial,
Bobbilee Perry (“Perry”) testified that she lived at 410 South Union Street in Galion,
Ohio on May 23, 2023 with her boyfriend, her eight children, and her boyfriend’s
parents. That morning, she awoke to gunshots. Although initially Perry did not
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believe that her house had been shot, shortly thereafter, she recognized that her
house had been targeted when she noted bullet holes in her wall and television.
{¶4} Investigators at the scene observed a bullet hole in the window and one
in the siding of the house at 410 South Union Street. Several days later, they learned
of a third bullet entry in the garage behind the house. Law enforcement also
collected three shell casings from the scene. Detective Robert Bukey recovered a
bullet from inside Perry’s dresser and another bullet in the sheets of the bed that
Perry and her boyfriend, Dusty Harris (“Harris”) were sleeping in at the time of the
shooting.
{¶5} Although Perry was initially unsure of who fired a gun into her house,
she detailed that she soon began to suspect Craft. Perry recalled an incident two
days earlier where she and Harris were working outside on the deck of their house.
Perry’s friend Karrie Murphy (“Karrie”) and her husband Brandon Murphy
(“Brandon”), who had one time stayed at 410 South Union, were also present that
evening helping Perry and Harris work on their deck and socializing. While
working outside, Perry noticed Craft and his girlfriend Victoria Loftis (“Loftis”)
walking down the alley by 410 South Union together and laughing. The sighting of
Craft and Loftis was uncomfortable because Brandon and Loftis had previously
been involved romantically while Brandon and Karrie were separated. As a result,
there was a sustained period of “bad blood” and “anger” between Karrie and Loftis.
(Oct. 19-20 & 23-24, 2023 Tr. at 263-264).
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{¶6} Karrie became upset at Loftis and Craft’s presence, and Karrie followed
Loftis around the corner, taunting her. Eventually, Karrie initiated a physical
altercation with Loftis, and Perry, Harris, and Brandon followed Karrie and became
involved in the altercation. However, Craft attempted to break up the fight and Craft
and Loftis walked away.
{¶7} At 12:03 a.m. on May 23, 2023, Karrie sent Craft a message on
Facebook messenger stating “Tf [sic] you sending me a friend request for? Nah
nvm just tell your dirty bitch I ain’t done with her yet.” (State’s Ex. C). At 4:30
a.m., Craft responded to Karrie’s message saying “Idk who you even are lmao.”
(Id.). Within an hour, the shooting at 410 South Union occurred. Karrie testified
that she believed Craft had the mistaken belief that she and her family resided at
410 South Union Street.
{¶8} Loftis testified that on the morning of May 23, 2023, she and Craft were
staying in the garage of Craft’s mother’s house at 543 McDonald in Galion and had
been staying there for several weeks. She described the location at 543 McDonald
as being only a few blocks away from 410 Union Street and recalled that because
Craft did not have a working vehicle, their main method of transportation was
walking. Craft was in the business of selling drugs and Craft was using drugs,
including steroids, hallucinogenic mushrooms, and marijuana.
{¶9} Loftis recalled that on the morning of May 23, 2023, she awoke around
4:30 or 5:00 a.m. concerned that Craft was not in bed. She got up and attempted to
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locate him. Eventually, she observed Craft getting on his bicycle and leaving.
Loftis was unsure of where he was going. Approximately 10 to 15 minutes later,
Craft returned “out of breath” and “sweating.” (Oct. 19-20 & 23-24, 2023 Tr. at
308-309). Loftis testified that in the time that Craft was gone on his bike, she heard
three gunshots coming from the direction of Perry and Harris’s house. Accordingly,
Loftis suspected that Craft shot at Perry and Harris’s house. Loftis testified that
Craft later admitted to her that he shot three rounds through the front door of the
house.
{¶10} When Craft got off his bike, she noticed that Craft had “bulk”
consistent with a firearm on his waistband. (Id. at 341). Then, Craft asked Loftis
to go with him to “ditch the bike.” (Id. at 310). After abandoning the bike at a
nearby trailer park, Craft and Loftis returned home. Loftis testified that she had
seen Craft with a gun before and described the firearm as a black handgun with a
snakeskin design on the handle grips.
{¶11} Loftis recalled that, on the morning of the shooting, she was in the
shower when the police arrived at 543 McDonald to ask questions. Loftis recalled
that Craft came into the bathroom to tell her the cops were there and to warn her to
“be cool” and “keep my fucking mouth shut.” (Id. at 313). Loftis stated that she
did not tell the police that morning that Craft shot up the house because she
understood Craft’s statement to be a threat and she did not want him to hurt her.
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{¶12} According to Loftis, in the weeks leading up to the shooting in May,
Craft was using steroids, THC, acid, and DMT. With respect to Craft’s steroid use,
Loftis testified that she observed that Craft’s steroid use caused him to act “angry”
and that it seems like he had “roid rage.” (Oct. 19-20 & 23-24, 2023 Tr. at 323).
{¶13} On June 28, 2023, several weeks after the shooting, Loftis was arrested
on unrelated charges. While she was incarcerated, Loftis continued to communicate
with Craft, who was also incarcerated. In one of the communications, Loftis stated,
“Just remember who kept quiet bro...” (State’s Ex. F-1). Craft responded to the
message by stating “I know and just remember who trie[d] to keep you out of jail
and better your life [for real].” (State’s Ex. Nos. F-2, F-3).
{¶14} Eventually, Loftis spoke to law enforcement about her observations
the morning of the shooting. In exchange for her truthful testimony, the State
offered her a deal dismissing pending charges in her unrelated case. (State’s Ex. P).
{¶15} Several additional witnesses testified regarding Craft’s use of steroids
and other drugs. Notably, Matthew Fargo (“Fargo”), a longtime friend of Craft,
testified that he and Craft communicated frequently on the Facebook Messenger
platform regarding various subjects, including their anabolic steroid use.
{¶16} In a June 9, 2023 conversation, Craft told Fargo that the steroids “made
me do some bad shit.” (State’s Ex. N). Craft then sent Fargo two Facebook
messages which Craft subsequently deleted. (Id.). However, Fargo recalled that
the deleted messages may have been links to articles regarding the shooting in
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Galion. (Oct. 19-20 & 23-24, 2023 Tr. at 403). Fargo testified that Craft then told
him in person that he “shot a house up in Galion.” (Id. at 406).
{¶17} Detective Patrick testified that information obtained from search
warrants of Craft’s phone and Facebook accounts indicated that he viewed the
Galion Police Department website approximately 48 times between May 26, 2023
and July 8, 2023. According to Detective Patrick, the records law enforcement
obtained started on May 1, 2023, but Craft did not begin searching the Galion Police
Department Facebook page until after the shooting.
{¶18} State’s Exhibit K-3, a recording of a phone conversation between Craft
and his mother was also played at trial. During that conversation, Craft instructed
his mother to delete the information on his phone by performing a factory reset of
the device.
{¶19} At the conclusion of the trial, the jury found Craft guilty on all counts.
However, the jury found Craft not guilty of the firearm specification associated with
Count Five.
{¶20} On November 1, 2023, Craft appeared for sentencing. The trial court
sentenced Craft to a combination of consecutive and concurrent sentences for an
aggregate term of 20 to 24 years in prison.
{¶21} Craft filed a notice of appeal on November 27, 2023. He raises four
assignments of error for our review. For ease of discussion, we address his first and
second assignments of error together.
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First Assignment of Error
The trial court committed plain error by permitting the
prosecution to present evidence that appellant refused to take a
polygraph.
Second Assignment of Error
The trial court violated the Due Process rights of appellant by
permitting the prosecution to present evidence that appellant
refused to unlock his phone for the police.
{¶22} In his first two assignments of error, Craft argues that the trial court
erred by allowing two pieces of evidence. In his first assignment of error, Craft
argues that the trial court erred by permitting evidence suggesting that Craft refused
to take a polygraph test. In his second assignment of error, Craft challenges the trial
court’s decision to permit testimony that Craft refused to provide law enforcement
with the PIN to unlock his cell phone. For the reasons that follow, we disagree.
Relevant Law
{¶23} Generally, the admission or exclusion of evidence lies within the trial
court’s discretion, and a reviewing court should not reverse absent an abuse of that
discretion and material prejudice. State v. Conway, 2006-Ohio-2815, ¶ 62, citing
State v. Issa,
93 Ohio St.3d 49, 64 (2001). An abuse of discretion implies that the
trial court acted unreasonably, arbitrarily, or unconscionably. State v. Adams,
62
Ohio St.2d 151, 157 (1980).
{¶24} However, at trial, Craft did not object to the evidence which he now
assigns error, nor did he request the trial court issue a limiting instruction with
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respect to the evidence. Accordingly, we review the admission of the evidence for
plain error. State v. Davis, 2017-Ohio-2916, ¶ 23 (3d Dist.). See also State v.
Banner,
2010-Ohio-5592, ¶ 17 (8th Dist.). We recognize plain error “‘with the
utmost caution, under exceptional circumstances and only to prevent a manifest
miscarriage of justice.’” State v. Landrum,
53 Ohio St.3d 107, 111 (1990), quoting
State v. Long,
53 Ohio St.2d 91 (1978), paragraph three of the syllabus. For plain
error to apply, the trial court must have deviated from a legal rule, the error must
have been an obvious defect in the proceedings, and the error must have affected a
substantial right. State v. Barnes,
94 Ohio St.3d 21, 27 (2002). Under the plain
error standard, the appellant must demonstrate that there is a reasonable probability
that, but for the trial court’s error, the outcome of the proceeding would have been
otherwise. State v. West,
2022-Ohio-1556, ¶ 35-36. See also State v. McAlpin,
2022-Ohio-1567, ¶ 90 (“McAlpin could not establish plain error, because he cannot
show a reasonable probability that but for standby counsel’s actions, the jury would
have acquitted him.”).
Polygraph Examination
{¶25} We turn first to Craft’s argument that the mention of a polygraph test
was plain error. “[T]o find plain error in this case we must determine that the error
in admitting the testimony regarding the polygraph test affected the outcome of the
trial.” Banner at ¶ 19.
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{¶26} “The results of a polygraph examination may be admissible at trial
only under limited conditions.” Id. at ¶ 20. Furthermore, “the mere offer or refusal
to undergo such test should also be excluded because unwarranted inferences are
likely to be drawn as to the defendant’s guilt or innocence.” State v. Bates, 1982
WL 5268, *4 (8th Dist. Apr. 1, 1982).
{¶27} At trial, the State offered a video recording of Detective Patrick’s
jailhouse interrogation of Craft. The quality of the audio was very poor, rendering
much of Craft’s statements intelligible. As a result, Detective Patrick summarized
Craft’s portion of their conversation.
[State]: There you offered to have [Craft] submit to a
polygraph?
[Det. Patrick]: Yes.
[State]: What is his response to you?
[Det. Patrick]: He is not hesitant, but he agrees to do it and then
in my opinion quickly justifies the fact that he
uses steroids, so his heart rate would be elevated
almost making any excuse in case it came back
and he failed.
[State]: He says to you his hea[r]t rate would be elevated
and he checks it three times a day?
[Det. Patrick]: Yes.
[State]: It is in the hundreds or something like that?
[Det. Patrick]: Yes.
[Another portion of State’s Exhibit G-4 was played.]
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[State]: There he says he checks his heart rate because he
doesn’t want to die, is that what you heard?
[Det. Patrick]: Yes.
[State]: You ask him then why do you use steroids?
[Det. Patrick]: Yes.
[State]: And what is his reply?
[Det. Patrick]: Because I just do.
[Another portion of State’s Exhibit G-4 was played.]
[State]: All right. Detective, is it fair to say you offer the
polygraph, he talks about the steroid use, he asks
about it being today and your reply is what?
[Det. Patrick]: It is not going to be today.
[State]: Once you reply it is not going to get him out of
jail today, what does he do?
[Det. Patrick]: He leans forward and then I think he makes the
comment, all right, let’s go.
[State]: So he was willing to do that if it kept him out
today?
[Det. Patrick]: Yes.
(Oct. 19-20 & 23-24, 2023 Tr. at 481-482).
{¶28} Craft argues that the above testimony and the accompanying video
referencing the polygraph test constituted plain error. However, here, there was no
direct evidence that Craft submitted to a polygraph examination or the results of any
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examination, if, in fact, one was given. State v. Jones, 2014-Ohio-674, ¶ 21 (10th
Dist.). “At most, the unexpected evidence of a ‘test’ permits an inference that
defendant may have taken a polygraph and that he may have failed.”
Id. Indeed,
the jury could have favorably interpreted Craft’s willingness to submit to a
polygraph examination.
{¶29} After reviewing the references to the polygraph test in the context of
the trial, we do not find the references to the offer for a polygraph test affected the
outcome of the trial. First, Craft’s steroid use and the resulting effects of the drugs
was central to the State’s theory that Craft was under the influence of high levels of
steroids at the time of the shooting which caused him to experience increased
aggression. Further, a reasonable inference from the testimony detailed above is
that Craft did agree to a polygraph test, but that the State decided not to administer
one. Specifically, Detective Patrick states that Craft is “not hesitant” to take a
polygraph test and that he is willing to take a test that day.
{¶30} Furthermore, given the overwhelming evidence of Craft’s guilt,
including the Facebook messages sent to Karrie immediately prior to the shooting,
Loftis’s testimony regarding her observations of Craft the morning of the shooting
and his subsequent statements to her, and Fargo’s statements regarding Craft’s
admission, we do not find that the reference to the offer of a polygraph examination
constituted plain error.
{¶31} Craft’s first assignment of error is overruled.
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Phone PIN code
{¶32} In his second assignment of error, Craft alleges that the trial court
committed plain error by presenting evidence that Craft did not provide
investigating officers with the PIN to unlock his cell phone.
{¶33} Craft contends that his right to due process was violated when the State
presented evidence that he did not provide law enforcement with the PIN code
allowing law enforcement to access his phone. However, any alleged constitutional
violation is subject to harmless error review. State v. Angus, 2017-Ohio-1100, ¶ 29-
30 (4th Dist.).
{¶34} Here, the State played a recording of Detective Patrick’s jail house
interview with Craft. See State’s Exhibit G-4. However, due to the poor audio
quality of the video, at trial, the State again asked Detective Patrick to summarize
the statements in the short video clip.
[State]: This whole back and forth about his pin code for
the phone, because of [it being] hard to hear, can
you summarize for the jury what [Craft] said in
response to what you said?
[Det. Patrick]: Can you play it back again? It was kind of a little
hard to be able to sum it up.
[State’s Exhibit G-4 played for jury]
[State]: All right. Before we get to the next topic to finish
this audio up, what is going on back and forth
with him and the phone?
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[Det. Patrick]: Basically I’m asking for the pin code because
sometimes when you send it off in order to try to
get into the phone sometimes it can break. We
try to give everybody the opportunity to
cooperate. He didn’t want to do that and when I
told him I didn’t want him to be upset in case the
phone came back broke[n], he said it was a $40
phone from Wal-Mart. He didn’t care about it.
[State]: He wouldn’t give you his pin code, didn’t care if
you broke it?
[Det. Patrick]: Yes.
[State]: You have got to do your job?
[Det. Patrick]: Yes.
(Oct. 19-20 & 23-24, 2023 Tr. at 482-483).
Then, in closing arguments, the State made the following statement:
Ultimately, when you are looking at not just the credibility of
everything else, what does he do to get away with this crime? He
refuses to give them his phone password, which in and of itself you
are allowed to do that, right? But there is nothing in my phone, but
I’m not going to let you look into it. . .
(Oct. 19-20 & 23-24, 2023 Tr. at 616).
{¶35} However, after reviewing the statements in concert with the
overwhelming evidence of Craft’s guilt, we do not find that the statements affected
the outcome of the trial. To the extent that the statements suggest that Craft is
cognizant of incriminating information on the phone, we find that the State
presented additional, stronger evidence to that end. Notably, the State presented
evidence that Craft instructed his mother to perform a factory reset of his phone in
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an effort to erase incriminating information. Furthermore, the State presented
evidence that Craft erased some messages from his phone and on the Facebook
Messenger platform in an effort to conceal potentially incriminating information
from investigators. Accordingly, an error, if any, was harmless beyond a reasonable
doubt.
{¶36} Moreover, as detailed in the discussion of Craft’s arguments relating
to the reference to a potential polygraph examination, in light of the overwhelming
evidence of Craft’s guilt, we do not find that the statements regarding Craft’s refusal
to provide investigators with the passcode to his phone affected the outcome of the
proceeding. Accordingly, we do not find that the inclusion of the evidence at issue
constituted plain error.
{¶37} Craft’s second assignment of error is overruled.
Third Assignment of Error
Cumulative error from the improper evidence that appellant
refused to take a polygraph and refused to provide the police with
access to his phone deprived appellant of a fair trial.
{¶38} In his third assignment of error, Craft argues that he was deprived of
a fair trial due to the cumulative effect of the alleged errors outlined in his first two
assignments of error. We disagree.
{¶39} Under the cumulative-error doctrine, “a conviction will be reversed
when the cumulative effect of errors in a trial deprives a defendant of a fair trial
even though each of the numerous instances of trial court error does not individually
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constitute cause for reversal.” State v. Spencer, 2015-Ohio-52, ¶ 83 (3d Dist.). “To
find cumulative error, a court must first find multiple errors committed at trial and
determine that there is a reasonable probability that the outcome below would have
been different but for the combination of the harmless errors.” In re J.M., 2012-
Ohio-1467, ¶ 36 (3d Dist.). Here, we have not found that the trial court committed
any errors, let alone, multiple harmless errors. Therefore, the cumulative-error
doctrine does not apply. See State v. Jamison,
2016-Ohio-5122, ¶ 40 (9th Dist.),
abrogated on other grounds, State v. Haynes,
2022-Ohio-4473 (“If there [are] not
multiple errors, . . . the cumulative error doctrine does not apply.”); State v.
Carpenter,
2019-Ohio-58, ¶ 104 (3d Dist.), citing State v. Bertuzzi, 2014-Ohio-
5093, ¶ 110 (3d Dist.).
{¶40} Craft’s third assignment of error is overruled.
Fourth Assignment of Error
The trial court erred by refusing to merge felonious assault and
discharging a firearm at or into a habitation.
{¶41} In his fourth assignment of error, Craft argues that the trial court erred
by failing to merge his convictions for felonious assault and discharging a firearm
at or into a habitation. He argues that by failing to merge the convictions, the trial
court misconstrued the statute for discharging a firearm at or into a habitation.
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Allied-Offenses Review
{¶42} We review de novo whether offenses are allied offenses of similar
import. State v. Tall, 2023-Ohio-1853, ¶ 7 (3d Dist.). “De novo review is
independent, without deference to the lower court’s decision.” State v. Hudson,
2013-Ohio-647, ¶ 27 (3d Dist.).
R.C. 2941.25, Ohio’s multiple-count statute, provides:
(A) Where the same conduct by defendant can be construed to
constitute two or more allied offenses of similar import, the
indictment or information may contain counts for all such offenses,
but the defendant may be convicted of only one.
(B) Where the defendant’s conduct constitutes two or more offenses
of dissimilar import, or where his conduct results in two or more
offenses of the same or similar kind committed separately or with a
separate animus as to each, the indictment or information may contain
counts for all such offenses, and the defendant may be convicted of
all of them.
The Supreme Court of Ohio has directed the use of a three-part test to
determine whether a defendant can be convicted of multiple offenses:
As a practical matter, when determining whether offenses are allied
offenses of similar import within the meaning of R.C. 2941.25, courts
must ask three questions when the defendant’s conduct supports
multiple offenses: (1) Were the offenses dissimilar in import or
significance? (2) Were they committed separately? and (3) Were they
committed with separate animus or motivation? An affirmative
answer to any of the above will permit separate convictions. The
conduct, the animus, and the import must all be considered.
State v. Ruff, 2015-Ohio-995, ¶ 31.
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{¶43} “[T]wo or more offenses of dissimilar import exist within the meaning
of R.C. 2941.25(B) when the defendant’s conduct constitutes offenses involving
separate victims or if the harm that results from each offense is separate and
identifiable.” Id. at ¶ 23. “At its heart, the allied-offense analysis is dependent upon
the facts of a case because R.C. 2941.25 focuses on the defendant’s conduct.” Id.
at ¶ 26. “[A] defendant’s conduct that constitutes two or more offenses against a
single victim can support multiple convictions if the harm that results from each
offense is separate and identifiable from the harm of the other offense.” Id.
{¶44} The term “animus” means “purpose or, more properly, immediate
motive.” State v. Logan, 60 Ohio St.2d 126, 131 (1979), abrogation recognized in
Ruff. “Like all mental states, animus is often difficult to prove directly, but must be
inferred from the surrounding circumstances.”
Id. “Thus, the manner in which a
defendant engages in a course of conduct may indicate distinct purposes.” State v.
Whipple,
2012-Ohio-2938, ¶ 38 (1st Dist.). “Courts should consider whether facts
appear in the record that ‘distinguish the circumstances or draw a line of distinction
that enables a trier of fact to reasonably conclude separate and distinct crimes were
committed.’”
Id., quoting State v. Glenn,
2012-Ohio-1530, ¶ 9 (8th Dist.).
Analysis
{¶45} In support of his assignment of error, Craft argues that the trial court
erred by failing to merge his convictions for felonious assault and discharging a
firearm. He argues that, in so doing, the trial court “misconstrues” the statue for
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discharging a firearm into a habitation. He contends that because that statute is
allegedly designed to protect against harm to people who “are likely to be in the
structure, not to protect the structure itself” that “the import of discharging a firearm
at or into a habitation is really no different than felonious assault.” (Appellant’s
Brief at 22). We disagree.
{¶46} Contrary to Craft’s assertion, “[i]t is well-settled that improperly
discharging a firearm into a habitation and an associated assault charge are not allied
offenses of similar import.” State v. Fisher, 2024-Ohio-4484, ¶ 220 (8th Dist.). See
also State v. Grayson,
2017-Ohio-7175, ¶ 24-25 (8th Dist.); State v. Scott, 2018-
Ohio-3791, ¶ 35 (8th Dist.). “This is because the ‘harm caused by improperly
discharging a firearm into a habitation is to the “occupied structure” itself,’ whereas
the harm from a felonious assault is to an individual.”
Id., quoting Grayson at ¶ 24-
25.
{¶47} Irrespective of whether Craft’s intent when firing into the house, and
more specifically, the room where Perry and Harris were sleeping, was to injure the
occupants, the violation of discharging a firearm into a habitation occurred when
Craft fired the gun into the house. Further, although not required for a conviction
for discharging a firearm into a habitation, the shots also endangered Perry, Harris,
and the other occupants of the home. State v. Lambert, 2021-Ohio-17, ¶ 62 (2d
Dist.).
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{¶48} Even if the offenses of felonious assault and discharging a firearm into
a habitation were committed with the same conduct and animus, they involved
separate, identifiable victims, and the harm caused by the improper discharge was
distinct from the harm experienced by the occupants of the home. Id. at ¶ 63.
Accordingly, the trial court did not err by denying Craft’s request to merge his
convictions for improper discharge into a habitation and felonious assault. See
Grayson at ¶ 25.
{¶49} Craft’s fourth assignment of error is overruled.
Conclusion
{¶50} Having found no error prejudicial to the appellant herein in the
particulars assigned and argued, we affirm the judgment of the Crawford County
Court of Common Pleas.
Judgment Affirmed
WALDICK, P.J. and ZIMMERMAN, J., concur.
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JUDGMENT ENTRY
For the reasons stated in the opinion of this Court, the assignments of error
are overruled and it is the judgment and order of this Court that the judgment of the
trial court is affirmed with costs assessed to Appellant for which judgment is hereby
rendered. The cause is hereby remanded to the trial court for execution of the
judgment for costs.
It is further ordered that the Clerk of this Court certify a copy of this Court’s
judgment entry and opinion to the trial court as the mandate prescribed by App.R.
27; and serve a copy of this Court’s judgment entry and opinion on each party to the
proceedings and note the date of service in the docket. See App.R. 30.
Mark C. Miller, Judge
Juergen A. Waldick, Judge
William R. Zimmerman, Judge
DATED:
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