[Cite as Facemyer v. Facemyer,
2025-Ohio-205.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
SEVENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
MAHONING COUNTY
GREGORY J. FACEMYER,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
KRISTEN K. FACEMYER nka PATCH,
Defendant-Appellee.
OPINION AND JUDGMENT ENTRY
Case No. 24 MA 0064
Civil Appeal from the
Court of Common Pleas, Domestic Relations Division, of Mahoning County, Ohio
Case No. 2012 DR 00437
BEFORE:
Katelyn Dickey, Cheryl L. Waite, Mark A. Hanni, Judges.
JUDGMENT:
Reversed and Remanded.
Atty. Anthony W. Greco and Atty. Joseph S. Jeziorowski, Greco Law, for Plaintiff-Appellant and
Atty. Louis E. Katz and Atty. Matthew C. Giannini, for Defendant-Appellee.
Dated: January 16, 2025
–2–
DICKEY, J.
{¶1} Appellant, Gregory J. Facemyer, appeals from the June 4, 2024 judgment
entry of the Mahoning County Court of Common Pleas, Domestic Relations Division,
terminating physical parenting time with his 16-year-old daughter and restricting contact
to text messages and emails. On appeal, Appellant asserts the trial court erred in
terminating his visitation rights because it failed to make the required initial finding that
there was clear and convincing evidence of extraordinary circumstances that would justify
such termination. Appellant also contends the court erred in accepting and considering
a recorded statement that purports to set forth the minor child’s concerns regarding
parenting time. For the reasons stated, we reverse and remand.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
{¶2} Appellant and Appellee, Kristen K. Facemyer (nka Patch), were married and
have two children: E.F. (d.o.b. 1/11/2005, emancipated); and M.F. (d.o.b. 5/3/2008)
(“minor child”). The parties divorced on June 19, 2013. They were awarded equal
parenting time pursuant to a shared parenting plan.
{¶3} On September 5, 2019, the trial court terminated the shared parenting plan
and designated Appellee as the children’s residential parent and legal custodian.
However, the court determined it was in the children’s best interest for the parties to be
awarded equal parenting time. Appellee subsequently filed a motion for modification of
parenting time and companionship.
{¶4} A two-day hearing was held on December 15, 2023 and April 5, 2024.
Present for the hearing were Appellant; counsel for Appellant; Appellee; counsel for
Appellee; Attorney Edward Colon, the Guardian Ad Litem (“GAL”); and Attorney Carol
Sopkovich, the duly appointed counsel for the minor child. Attorney Sopkovich was not
present at the hearing on December 15, 2023, because her appointment as counsel for
the minor child occurred after that time. At the hearing on April 5, 2024, the minor child
was less than a month away from celebrating her sixteenth birthday.
{¶5} Throughout these proceedings, it was found by the trial court that Appellant
has a confrontational personality and has maintained an aggressive and adversarial
approach toward the children and Appellee.
Case No. 24 MA 0064
–3–
{¶6} The GAL described the minor child as very bright but very timid, repressed,
and emotionally fragile. The GAL described Appellee as passive aggressive. The GAL
described Appellant as overbearing and persistent. While acknowledging challenges in
the relationship between Appellant and the minor child, the GAL did not believe it was in
the minor child’s best interest for Appellant’s parenting time to be reduced or terminated.
The GAL believed restricting Appellant’s visitation would be detrimental to the minor child.
The GAL said the focus should be on mending the father-daughter relationship. The GAL
recommended counseling for the entire family.
{¶7} The trial court did not accept the GAL’s recommendation for family
counseling indicating that the family had previously been involved in counseling and that
it was unsuccessful. Appellant, however, believes counseling is necessary due to his
observations that the minor child is in distress. Appellee, the parent with medical
decision-making authority, decided not to enroll the minor child in counseling.
{¶8} Appellee believes extreme issues exist between Appellant and the minor
child. Appellee testified her daughter is not happy with the current visitation order and
spends a lot of time in her bedroom by herself. Appellee wished for Appellant’s visitation
to be modified to alternating weekends.
{¶9} The trial court held three separate in camera interviews with the minor child
beginning in September 2022. The minor child said when she is with Appellant at his
house, she spends time alone in her bedroom. When traveling with Appellant in his car,
the minor child sits in the backseat and does not communicate with him. The minor child
complained that when she is at a restaurant with Appellant, he is on his cell phone. The
minor child said that time spent with her father is not positive or rewarding.
{¶10} The parties’ older daughter, E.F., turned 18 years old on January 11, 2023.
Because E.F. does not like how Appellant treats her, she has stopped seeing him. E.F.
also does not like how Appellant treats the minor child. E.F. expressed her concerns
when she would no longer accompany her sister to visits with their father. The trial court
cautioned Appellant that he was placing his relationship with the minor child in jeopardy
if he did not amend his parental manners.
{¶11} Appellant testified the minor child is a straight-A student and involved in
many activities. Appellant said his relationship with the minor child is very good and
Case No. 24 MA 0064
–4–
described his daughter as a normal teenage girl. Appellant does not know why his
parenting time should be limited and claims he is the victim of parental alienation.
Appellant believes that not only should his parenting time continue, but additional
parenting time should be provided. Appellant acknowledged he has experienced parental
problems with the minor child. He said he has gone to a counselor to improve as a parent.
Appellant and his mother, Barbara Facemyer, have attended all of the minor child’s
extracurricular activities. During visits, Appellant said he made efforts to improve his
relationship with his daughter. He asked her about school and her activities. He would
also ask her to do things together such as shop or go to dinner. Appellant believed
counseling was not only feasible, it should be mandatory to maintain a vital relationship
with his daughter.
{¶12} Appellant’s mother testified that for approximately the past one-year period,
despite her longstanding relationship with her granddaughter, the minor child began
giving her only one-word answers to questions and refused to otherwise communicate
with her. She additionally testified that for the past two years, the minor child would
immediately dash to her room after school pickup and indicated her mannerisms and
demeanor changed with Appellant, family, and friends.
{¶13} Following the December 15, 2023 hearing, the trial court found the minor
child expressed sufficient reasoning ability to express her wishes and concerns. The
court found the minor child’s reasons for not wanting to see her father were well thought
out. Based upon the testimony of all parties and the GAL, the trial court ruled at that time
that effective January 1, 2024, parenting time for Appellant should be on a week-on,
week-off basis from 5:00 p.m. Friday to 5:00 p.m. Sunday.
{¶14} At the outset of the April 5, 2024 proceedings, the trial court permitted the
parties to conduct a pretrial with counsel and the GAL. As a result, with the exception of
the pending motions for companionship and parenting time, all other motions were
withdrawn, including for modification of child support.
{¶15} The minor child’s counsel requested that the trial court conduct an in
camera interview with the GAL as to the wishes and the concerns of the minor child. At
the April 5, 2024 last in camera interview, the minor child expressed that she did not want
to visit with Appellant, but that should she be ordered to visit with her father, that overnight
Case No. 24 MA 0064
–5–
visits be terminated. The minor child requested that the trial court and the GAL listen to
an audio recording she made during a visit with Appellant. The recording was
approximately 30 minutes long with Appellant saying to the minor child that he is trying to
be her dad and show her love. The recording also reveals Appellant going on about why
the minor child does not want to spend time with him and blaming Appellee and others
for their relationship.
{¶16} During the afternoon session, Appellant elected to present evidence
relevant to the companionship and parenting of the minor child. The GAL believed the
prior order of the trial court (prior to December 15, 2023) should be re-implemented. The
GAL believed it would be in the minor child’s best interest to have a reunification with
Appellant. The GAL acknowledged, however, that the minor child indicated during the
last in camera interview that she did not want to visit with her father and presented a 30-
minute tape of Appellant’s monologue including his dissertation as to why the parenting
and companionship were not successful. The minor child basically indicated she remains
in her bedroom during visits with her father. The GAL reaffirmed his recommendation
that Appellant’s visits with the minor child should continue.
{¶17} Appellant’s mother opined that the minor child’s attitude changed during the
past year. She did not understand why since Appellant always attempted to provide
proper parenting.
{¶18} Appellant testified he does not understand the wishes and concerns of his
daughters. Appellant continues to believe that he has a loving relationship with the minor
child and that parenting time should be expanded. Appellant believes many of the issues
and problems that have manifested are a result of parental alienation. Regarding the
audio recording, Appellant was unaware that the minor child was taping him, does not
know the date of the taping, and does not know the contents.
{¶19} The trial court indicated it has been involved with this matter for
approximately two years. The court found it necessary to prohibit Appellant from
contacting the minor child’s medical and dental personnel. The court further found it
necessary to modify Appellant’s parental rights and responsibilities by eliminating
holidays and summer vacations, resulting in the current order of every other weekend
from Friday at 5:00 p.m. to Sunday at 5:00 p.m. The court noted that the tape recording
Case No. 24 MA 0064
–6–
presented by the minor child was a 30-minute monologue of Appellant. The minor child
indicated she no longer wishes to have any contact with her father.
{¶20} In its June 4, 2024 judgment entry, the trial court concluded as follows:
In determining whether to grant visitation rights to a parent, the Court
considers the following Ohio Revised Code Section 3109.05[1](D)(1-15):
A. The prior interaction with the person requesting visitation and that
person is not a parent, sibling or relative;
B. The geographical distance between the child’s residence and the nonresidential parent’s or the residence of the person requesting visitation
if not a parent;
C. The child’s and the parent’s available time, including, but not limited to,
the parent’s work schedule, the child’s school schedule, the child’s and
the parent’s holiday and vacation schedule;
D. The age of the child;
E. The child’s adjustment to home, school and community;
F. The child’s wishes;
G. The health and safety of the child;
H. The amount of time the child will have to spend with siblings;
I. The mental and physical health of all parties;
J. Each parent’s willingness to facilitate visitation;
K. Whether the parent or other party requesting visitation has been
convicted or pleaded guilty to child abuse;
L. Whether either parent has established or plans to establish a residence
out of state; and
Case No. 24 MA 0064
–7–
M. Any other factor to the best interest of the child.
(6/4/2024 Judgment Entry, p. 8-9).
{¶21} The trial court further concluded:
The Court has been involved with this case for a period of
approximately two (2) years and has noted the ongoing issues between the
emancipated child . . . and the current minor child . . . . The Court is aware
of the emancipated daughter’s unwillingness to communicate and visit with
the Plaintiff. Further, the Court acknowledges during the course of the
proceedings, the interference by the Plaintiff with dental/orthodontic issues.
During the past approximately twelve (12) months, the Court has conversed
with both counsels of the Plaintiff and has indicated outstanding issues
between the Plaintiff and the minor child. That the Court has advised
Plaintiff’s counsel of the minor child’s struggle in her dealings with the father
and the genuineness of the minor child’s in-camera interviews. This Court,
as all Domestic Relation Courts and Family Courts are motivated by the
best interest of the minor child as set forth in the Ohio Revised Code. The
Court has observed the ongoing issues and the intelligence and
intransigence of the Plaintiff in regard to the Defendant and the minor child
as well as the emancipated child. Based upon the best interest of the minor
child, the Court does hereby issue its decision.
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the
current parenting order of January 5, 2024, in which Plaintiff received
alternating weekends parenting time from Friday at 5:00 p.m. to Sunday at
5:00 p.m. shall hereby be terminated. That the minor child shall not be
required at this time to have any parenting time with the Plaintiff. If it is true
according to Plaintiff’s testimony that he has a “loving” relationship with [the
minor child], a Court imposed visitation schedule may actually diminish the
time [the minor child] would be with Plaintiff. [The minor child] is now 16
years old and her wishes are given greater weight than if she were much
Case No. 24 MA 0064
–8–
younger. Let the “loving” relationship expressed by Plaintiff repeatedly
serve as the source for nurturing the future relationship between [the minor
child] and Plaintiff. The minor child shall unilaterally determine when and
how any parenting time shall occur with the Plaintiff. The Plaintiff may
contact the minor child via text messages and emails in a reasonable
fashion to maintain contact with his daughter. . . .
(Id. at p. 9-10).
{¶22} Appellant filed a timely appeal and raises two assignments of error.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NO. 1
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW TO THE MATERIAL
PREJUDICE OF GREGORY BY TERMINATING GREGORY’S
VISITATION RIGHTS WHERE IT FAILED TO MAKE THE REQUIRED
INITIAL FINDING THAT THERE WAS CLEAR AND CONVINCING
EVIDENCE OF EXTRAORDINARY CIRCUMSTANCES THAT WOULD
JUSTIFY TERMINATING GREGORY’S VISITATION WITH [THE MINOR
CHILD].
{¶23} In his first assignment of error, Appellant argues the trial court erred in
terminating his visitation with the minor child without making an initial finding that there
was clear and convincing evidence of extraordinary circumstances justifying such
termination.
Modification [and termination, see Sirons v. Stewart, 1994 WL 73346
(2nd Dist. March 9, 1994)] of visitation rights is left to the sound discretion
of the trial court. Braatz v. Braatz (1999), 85 Ohio St.3d 40, 45,
706 N.E.2d
1218. . . . [An abuse of discretion occurs when a court exercises its
judgment “in an unwarranted way, in regard to a matter over which it has
discretionary authority.” Johnson v. Abdullah, 2021-Ohio-3304, ¶ 35.]
Case No. 24 MA 0064
–9–
Pursuant to R.C. 3109.051(D), in determining parenting time matters
under R.C. 3109.051, the court shall consider all of the following factors: (1)
the prior interaction and interrelationships of the child with the child’s
parents, siblings and other persons related by consanguinity or affinity; (2)
the geographical location of the residence of each parent and the distance
between those residences; (3) the child’s and parents’ available time,
including, but not limited to, each parent’s employment schedule, the child’s
school schedule, and the child’s and the parents’ holiday and vacation
schedule; (4) the age of the child; (5) the child’s adjustment to home, school,
and community; (6) any wishes and concerns of the child expressed to the
court; (7) the health and safety of the child; (8) the amount of time that will
be available for the child to spend with siblings; (9) the mental and physical
health of all parties; (10) each parent’s willingness to reschedule missed
parenting time and to facilitate the other parent’s parenting time rights; (11)
prior convictions for certain offenses or acts resulting in abuse or neglect;
(12) (applies only when person other than a parent seeks visitation); (13)
whether the residential parent has continuously and willfully denied
parenting time rights; (14) whether either parent has established a
residence or is planning to establish a residence outside this state; (15)
(applies only where person other than parent seeks visitation); (16) any
other factor in the best interest of the child. R.C. 3109.051(D).
Generally, the trial court looks only to the factors enumerated in R.C.
3109.051(D) and determines if modification of visitation is in the best
interest of the child. Braatz v. Braatz (1999), 85 Ohio St.3d 40, 45,
706
N.E.2d 1218. However, in some cases, the foregoing statute does not stand
in isolation. In re Kaiser, 7th Dist. No. 04 CO 9,
2004-Ohio-7208, ¶ 10. It
must be read and interpreted in conjunction with other factors derived from
caselaw to protect against infringement upon an individual’s constitutional
rights. Id.
Case No. 24 MA 0064
– 10 –
This court has specifically held that “[t]he nonresidential parent has
a fundamental and natural right to visitation.” Anderson v. Anderson (2002),
147 Ohio App.3d 513,
2002-Ohio-1156,
771 N.E.2d 303, ¶ 22 (7th Dist.),
citing Johntonny v. Malliski (1990), 67 Ohio App.3d 709,
588 N.E.2d 200,
and Pettry v. Pettry (1984), 20 Ohio App.3d 350,
486 N.E.2d 213. “The child
also has a fundamental right to visitation with the nonresidential parent.” Id.,
citing Porter v. Porter (1971), 25 Ohio St.2d 123,
54 O.O. 260,
267 N.E.2d
299, paragraph three of the syllabus.
Concerning this fundamental right of the nonresidential parent to
visitation with their child, this court has also noted that the right should be
denied only under extraordinary circumstances. Hoppel v. Hoppel, 7th Dist.
No. 03 CO 56,
2004-Ohio-1574, ¶ 44, citing
Pettry, supra, paragraph one of
the syllabus. The burden of proof is on the one contesting visitation to
demonstrate extraordinary circumstances by clear and convincing
evidence. Pettry, 20 Ohio App.3d at 352–353, 486 N.E.2d 213.
Pettry identified two extraordinary circumstances that would qualify:
(1) if the noncustodial parent was unfit; or (2) if visitation would cause harm
to the child. Another court has held that it would be an extraordinary
circumstance if the noncustodial parent were imprisoned for a term of years
for a crime of violence. In re Hall (1989), 65 Ohio App.3d 88, 90,
582 N.E.2d
1055. The examples listed in Pettry and Hall are not meant to provide an
exclusive list of possible extraordinary circumstances. Hoppel, supra
(involving nonresidential parent’s conviction for sexual battery against
subject child’s stepsister). Once the custodial parent proves the existence
of an extraordinary circumstance, the burden shifts back to the noncustodial
parent to prove that any visitation would be in the best interests of the child.
Id.
...
Case No. 24 MA 0064
– 11 –
[W]e find that when a trial court terminates a nonresidential parent’s
right of visitation the court must make a finding in its judgment entry that
there was clear and convincing evidence of extraordinary circumstances
justifying termination of those rights.
Dubec v. Pochiro, 2010-Ohio-1293, ¶ 21-26, 31 (7th Dist.); see also In re T.M.M., 2017-
Ohio-9219, ¶ 44 (7th Dist.), citing Dubec.
{¶24} In this case, in its judgment entry, the trial court terminated Appellant’s
physical parenting time with the minor child, stating:
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the
current parenting order of January 5, 2024, in which Plaintiff received
alternating weekends parenting time from Friday at 5:00 p.m. to Sunday at
5:00 p.m. shall hereby be terminated. That the minor child shall not be
required at this time to have any parenting time with the Plaintiff. . . . The
minor child shall unilaterally determine when and how any parenting time
shall occur with the Plaintiff. The Plaintiff may contact the minor child via
text messages and emails in a reasonable fashion to maintain contact with
his daughter. . . .
(6/4/2024 Judgment Entry, p. 10).
{¶25} The fact that Appellant is only awarded the ability to contact the minor child
via text messages and emails constitutes a termination of visitation. See Dubec, 2010-
Ohio-1293, ¶ 27-29 (7th Dist.). “The Ohio Supreme Court has observed that visitation
means physical, face-to-face visitation.” Id. at ¶ 29, citing Braatz, 85 Ohio St.3d at 44.
{¶26} At the center of all domestic cases involving minors is the best interest of
the child. Appellant wants visitation with his daughter. The minor child does not want to
spend time with her father. The GAL did not believe it was in the minor child’s best interest
for Appellant’s parenting time to be reduced or terminated. Notwithstanding Appellee’s
belief that courts cannot fix broken parent-child relationships, this court will not disregard
the issue before us and ignore the relevant case law.
Case No. 24 MA 0064
– 12 –
{¶27} As addressed, the trial court reviewed the minor child’s best interests under
the factors enumerated in R.C. 3109.051(D) in its judgment entry, and concluded it was
in the minor child’s best interest to terminate Appellant’s visitation. However, the court
did not make the required initial finding that there was clear and convincing evidence of
extraordinary circumstances that would justify terminating Appellant’s visitation rights.
See Dubec, 2010-Ohio-1293, ¶ 26 (7th Dist.). The trial court skipped that step and
instead limited its review to the best interest of the child factors.
{¶28} Although the directive may be procedural rather than substantive, on
remand, should the trial court again decide to terminate Appellant’s visitation rights with
the minor child, before doing so, the trial court, in its judgment entry, shall make the
required initial finding that there is clear and convincing evidence of extraordinary
circumstances that would justify such termination.
{¶29} Appellant’s first assignment of error is with merit.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NO. 2
THE TRIAL COURT VIOLATED R.C. 3109.051(C) AND ERRED AS A
MATTER OF LAW TO THE MATERIAL PREJUDICE OF PLAINTIFF BY
ACCEPTING AND CONSIDERING A RECORDED STATEMENT THAT
PURPORTS TO SET FORTH THE CHILD’S CONCERNS REGARDING
PARENTING TIME.
{¶30} In his second assignment of error, Appellant contends the trial court violated
R.C. 3109.051(C) and erred in accepting and considering a recorded statement that
purports to set forth the minor child’s concerns regarding parenting time, i.e., “particularly
where such recorded statement purports to be an audio recording of a party – undisclosed
to that party – that was neither introduced nor admitted into evidence at trial.” (8/26/2024
Appellant’s Brief, p. 23).
{¶31} R.C. 3109.051(C) permits the trial court, in its discretion, to interview in
chambers a minor child regarding her wishes and concerns with respect to parenting time
or visitation of a noncustodial parent. However, R.C. 3109.051(C) places limits and
restrictions on the trial court’s discretion, including:
Case No. 24 MA 0064
– 13 –
A court, in considering the factors listed in division (D) of this section for
purposes of determining whether to grant any parenting time or visitation
rights, establishing a parenting time or visitation schedule, determining
other parenting time matters under this section . . . or visitation matters
under this section . . . or resolving any issues related to the making of any
determination with respect to parenting time or visitation rights or the
establishment of any specific parenting time or visitation schedule, shall not
accept or consider a written or recorded statement or affidavit that purports
to set forth the child’s wishes or concerns regarding those parenting time or
visitation matters.
(Emphasis added). R.C. 3109.051(C).
{¶32} Thus, R.C. 3109.051(C) bars the trial court from accepting or considering a
recorded statement purporting to set forth not only the minor child’s wishes, but also the
child’s concerns regarding parenting time or visitation.
{¶33} As stated, the trial court in this case accepted and considered a recorded
statement presented by the minor child during the April 5, 2024 last in camera interview
that purported to set forth the child’s concerns regarding parenting time or visitation with
Appellant. The court made factual findings relating to the content of the audio recording
played by the minor child during that in camera interview in its June 4, 2024 judgment
entry:
It was on this last in camera interview that [the minor child] requested that
both the Court and the Guardian Ad Litem listen to a tape recording she
made as a sample of her father’s conduct when she visits him. The tape
recording was approximately 30 minutes long with Mr. Facemyer ranting
and raving why [the minor child] does not want to spend time with him and
blaming Defendant and everyone else for the relationship he has had with
[the minor child]. . . .
...
Case No. 24 MA 0064
– 14 –
The Court noted that the tape recording presented by the minor child was a
30-minute monologue of the Plaintiff. The minor child did not make one
comment during the entire taping. . . .
(6/4/2024 Judgment Entry, p. 4, 8).
{¶34} In camera interviews with children are confidential and not to be disclosed
to the parents. Chapman v. Chapman, 2007-Ohio-2968, ¶ 26 (2nd Dist.). Parents do not
have the right of access to the sealed transcript of the in camera interview between the
children and the trial court. See Lawson v. Lawson,
2013-Ohio-4687, ¶ 57 (5th Dist.).
{¶35} The recorded statement at issue, characterized by the trial court as a 30-
minute monologue of Appellant, was not disclosed to Appellant nor introduced or admitted
into evidence during the hearings. Rather, the minor child requested at the last in camera
interview that the trial court and the GAL listen to the audio recording as support for her
concerns with visiting her father. The trial court considered the recording as evidence of
Appellant’s conduct during a visitation with his daughter.
{¶36} Problematically, the content of the audio recording was controverted by
Appellant as he testified at the April 5, 2024 hearing that he did not know what
conversation was recorded, did not know the date of the recording, and did not even know
what the court was referring to. Appellant was first made aware of the recording’s
existence at this time and had no opportunity to examine it or present any evidence or
argument in his defense. See In re Adoption of C.L.T., 2012-Ohio-5706, ¶ 19 (8th Dist.),
citing Child Care Provider Certification Dept. v. Harris,
2003-Ohio-6500, ¶ 15 (8th Dist.)
(Trial court’s judgment was reversed because it did not afford the party an opportunity to
present a defense to the evidence relied on against her). The GAL found it unusual that
the minor child recorded the conversation and made no comment to her father.
{¶37} While the trial court could consider the minor child’s wishes expressed
during the in camera interview, it could not “accept or consider” the “recorded statement”
presented by the minor child that purports to set forth her concerns regarding parenting
time or visitation with her father based on the facts presented in this case. See R.C.
3109.051(C).
{¶38} Appellant’s second assignment of error is with merit.
Case No. 24 MA 0064
– 15 –
CONCLUSION
{¶39} For the foregoing reasons, Appellant’s assignments of error are well-taken.
The June 4, 2024 judgment entry of the Mahoning County Court of Common Pleas,
Domestic Relations Division, terminating Appellant’s physical parenting time with the
minor child is reversed and the matter remanded for further proceedings according to law
and consistent with this Opinion.
Waite, J., concurs.
Hanni, J., concurs.
Case No. 24 MA 0064
[Cite as Facemyer v. Facemyer, 2025-Ohio-205.]
For the reasons stated in the Opinion rendered herein, the assignments of error
are sustained and it is the final judgment and order of this Court that the judgment of
the Court of Common Pleas, Domestic Relations Division, of Mahoning County, Ohio,
is reversed. We hereby remand this matter to the trial court for further proceedings
according to law and consistent with this Court’s Opinion. Costs to be taxed against
the Appellee.
A certified copy of this opinion and judgment entry shall constitute the mandate
in this case pursuant to Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure. It is ordered that
a certified copy be sent by the clerk to the trial court to carry this judgment into
execution.
NOTICE TO COUNSEL
This document constitutes a final judgment entry.
