[Cite as State v. Eames,
2025-Ohio-2177.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
LUCAS COUNTY
State of Ohio Court of Appeals No. L-24-1162
Appellee Trial Court No. CR 23 1007
v.
Carissa Eames DECISION AND JUDGMENT
Appellant Decided: June 20, 2025
…
Julia R. Bates, Lucas County Prosecuting Attorney, and
Evy M. Jarrett, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee.
Laurel A. Kendall, for appellant.
…
OSOWIK, J.
{¶ 1} This is an appeal from a July 2, 2024 judgment of the Lucas County Court of
Common Pleas, sentencing appellant, Carissa Eames, to a total term of incarceration of
12 to 15 years, following appellant’s negotiated guilty pleas to two counts of complicity
in the commission of felonious assault, in violation of R.C. 2923.03(A)(2) and
2903.11(A)(2), felonies of the second degree, and two counts of complicity in the
commission of kidnapping, in violation of R.C. 2923.03(A)(2) and 2905.01(A)(3), also
felonies of the second degree.
{¶ 2} This case arises from the December 3, 2022 murder of victims K.W. and
K.P., both juvenile males. On December 3, 2022, while K.W. and K.P. were playing
video games in the basement of appellant’s Toledo home, they were assaulted, tied up
with electrical cords, put into the trunk of a motor vehicle, taken to an abandoned home
in North Toledo, and killed, after which the home was burned down, in a failed effort to
conceal the above-described crimes.
{¶ 3} For clarity on the confines of appellant’s role in these events, while appellant
was not involved in the subsequent, off-site murder of the boys, appellant was present in
her home when the victims were initially beaten and tied up, and later put into the trunk
of a waiting vehicle, and driven away.
{¶ 4} Appellant, by her own admission, was aware of what was occurring, heard it
as it was occurring, did not intervene, did not seek assistance for the victims, did not
report the incident, helped clean the blood evidence of the crimes, and later lied to the
investigating law enforcement officers and to the victims’ families regarding what had
occurred.
{¶ 5} Accordingly, appellant’s convictions comprised complicity offenses for the
offenses that occurred in her home, with her knowledge and assistance; namely, assault
and kidnapping. For the reasons set forth below, this court affirms the judgment of the
trial court.
{¶ 6} Appellant, Carrissa Eames, sets forth the following sole assignment of error
on appeal:
“I. The trial court abused its discretion by failing to merge [the complicity to
commit felonious assault and complicity to commit kidnapping offenses] pursuant to
R.C. 2941.25, [as] allied offenses of similar import, [under] the facts and circumstances
of this incident.”
{¶ 7} The following undisputed facts are relevant to this appeal. On December 3,
2022, Corbin Gingrich (“Corbin”), appellant’s fiancé, arranged for an Uber to transport
the victims from a party that they had been attending at Maumee Bay State Park to the
Toledo home shared by appellant and Corbin. Corbin believed that the victims were
involved in the recent theft of one of his firearms. The invitation and transportation of
the victims to appellant’s home was a subterfuge. It facilitated their ambush, and
culminated in their deaths.
{¶ 8} Upon arrival at appellant’s home, the victims went into the basement and
began to play video games. Subsequently, Corbin and Donald Eames (“Donald”),
appellant’s brother, went into the basement and confronted the victims about Corbin’s
missing gun. A struggle ensued, during which the victims were pistol whipped, subdued,
and then tied up with electrical cords. Appellant was aware of what was occurring, and
overheard it as it was occurring.
{¶ 9} At this juncture, Cruz Garcia (“Cruz”) was contacted by the men to arrange
to take the victims out of appellant’s home. Cruz drove to appellant’s home,
accompanied by two other males, with all three men wearing face masks. Upon arrival,
the victims were taken by the masked men from appellant’s home and put into the trunk
of Cruz’s waiting vehicle. The victims were then driven away in the trunk of the vehicle,
while appellant remained at her home. Again, appellant was aware of what was
occurring, and overheard it as it was occurring.
{¶ 10} The victims were taken to several additional locations in the Toledo area,
and then ultimately driven to an abandoned home in North Toledo. The victims were
strangled and beaten to death, after which the vacant home in which their bodies had been
left was burned down.
{¶ 11} On December 14, 2022, 11 days after the victims disappeared, an
anonymous caller reported the involvement of Corbin and Donald in the disappearance of
the victims to law enforcement. The ensuing investigation into this matter led to the
abandoned, burned home in North Toledo. Excavation of the site recovered two sets of
human remains, later positively identified as the missing boys.
{¶ 12} On January 4, 2023, appellant was indicted on two counts of murder, in
violation of R.C. 2903.01, unclassified felonies, two counts of kidnapping, in violation of
R.C. 2905.01, felonies of the first degree, and one count of obstruction of justice, in
violation of R.C. 2921.32, a felony of the third degree. Multiple co-defendants were
likewise indicted in connection to these crimes.
{¶ 13} On June 10, 2024, pursuant to a negotiated plea agreement, and consistent
with the above-discussed confines of her role in these crimes, appellant pled guilty to two
counts of complicity in the commission of kidnapping, in violation of R.C. 2923.03(A)(2)
and R.C. 2905.01(A)(3), felonies of the second degree, and two counts of complicity in
the commission of felonious assault, in violation of R.C. 2923.03(A)(2) and R.C.
2903.11(A)(2), also felonies of the second degree.
{¶ 14} On July 2, 2024, appellant was sentenced to a term of incarceration of six
years to nine years on each of the complicity to commit felonious assault convictions, and
three years to four and one-half years on each of the complicity to commit kidnapping
convictions, with the felonious assault sentences ordered to be served consecutively to
each other, and concurrently with the kidnapping sentences, equaling a total a term of
incarceration of 12 to 15 years. This appeal ensued.
{¶ 15} In the sole assignment of error, appellant argues that the trial court erred in
not merging the complicity to commit felonious assault offenses and the complicity to
commit kidnapping offenses, as R.C. 2941.25 allied offenses of similar import, for
sentencing purposes. We do not concur.
{¶ 16} As this court held in State v. Scott, 2024-Ohio-5849, ¶ 84 (6th Dist.),
R.C. 2941.25 prohibits multiple convictions for allied offenses of similar
import arising from the same conduct. State v. White, 2021-Ohio-335, ¶ 8
(6th Dist.). To determine whether multiple convictions constitute allied
offenses, the court must address three questions: (1) did the offenses
involve either separate victims or separate and identifiable harm, (2) were
the offenses committed separately, and (3) were the offenses committed
with separate animus? Id., quoting State v. Ruff,
2015-Ohio-995, ¶ 25. An
affirmative answer to any of the above will permit separate convictions.
Id., quoting State v. Tellis,
2020-Ohio-6982, ¶ 74 (6th Dist.).
{¶ 17} In conjunction, as this court held in State v. Gilmer, 2024-Ohio-
1178, ¶ 88 (6th Dist.),
The defendant bears the burden of establishing that R.C. 2941.25 prohibits
multiple punishments. State v. Washington, 137 Ohio St.3d 427, 2013-
Ohio-4982, 999 N.E.2d 661, ¶ 18, citing State v. Mughni,
33 Ohio St.3d 65,
67,
514 N.E.2d 870 (1987). An appellate court reviews de novo whether
offenses should be merged as allied offenses under R.C. 2941.25. State v.
Bailey, 171 Ohio St.3d 486,
2022-Ohio-4407,
218 N.E.3d 858, ¶ 5, citing
State v. Williams, 134 Ohio St.3d 482,
2012-Ohio-5699,
983 N.E.2d 1245, ¶
1. Although determining whether R.C. 2941.25 has been properly applied
as a legal question, it necessarily turns on analysis of the facts. Id. at ¶ 11.
{¶ 18} As applied to the instant case, R.C. 2923.03(A)(2), the complicity statute,
establishes in relevant part, “No person shall … aid or abet in committing the offense.”
{¶ 19} In conjunction, R.C. 2903.11(A)(2), the felonious assault statute,
establishes in relevant part, “No person shall knowingly … cause or attempt to cause
physical harm to another or to another’s unborn by means of a deadly weapon or
dangerous ordinance.”
{¶ 20} Lastly, R.C. 2905.01(A)(3), the kidnapping statute, establishes in relevant
part, “No person, by force, threat, or deception … by any means, shall remove another
from the place where the other person is found or restrain the liberty of the other person *
… to terrorize, or to inflict serious physical harm on the victim or another.”
{¶ 21} In principle support of this appeal, appellant argues,
Given that appellant’s crime here was aiding and abetting these crimes by
refusing to contact the police, or the families of the victims, this court should find
that her actions were essentially one prolonged bad act … This court should
find that the injuries to the boys, including their ultimate deaths, were not the
result of any separate actions or inactions by appellant, notwithstanding the
tragedy that unfolded [the murder of both boys].
{¶ 22} The record shows that appellant’s selectively limited characterization of her
actions does not fully reflect the entirety of her conduct, and the corresponding legal
culpability. The record shows that appellant was present in her home, and was, by her
own admission, aware of the actions of Corbin and Donald in physically assaulting K.W.
and K.P. by wrestling them, pistol whipping them, and upon subduing them, tying them
up with electrical cords. In addition, the record shows that appellant ultimately
acknowledged during the course of the investigation that she cleaned the victims’ blood
off of the gun utilized to commit the assault, in an effort to erase the evidence, and
conceal the crimes.
{¶ 23} The record likewise shows that appellant was present in her home, and was,
by her own admission, aware of the actions of Corbin, Donald, and others, in later taking
the tied-up boys from her basement and putting them into the trunk of the vehicle waiting
outside of her residence. In addition, the record shows that appellant ultimately
acknowledged during the course of the investigation that she lied to the investigation
officers and to the victims’ families, concealing her direct knowledge of the kidnapping,
in an effort to cover-up the crimes.
{¶ 24} Thus, the record shows that the entirety of appellant’s participation in these
crimes clearly, materially exceeded appellant’s incomplete characterization of her role
having been limited to, “refusing to contact the police, or the families of the victims.”
{¶ 25} Consistent with the facts manifest in the record of evidence, appellant was
convicted on one set each of complicity to commit felonious assault and complicity to
commit kidnapping, with each set of offenses corresponding to each of the two victims.
{¶ 26} As pertains to the allied offense merger factors set forth in Scott, the record
shows that the assault and kidnapping offenses involved two separate victims, K.W. and
K.P., and therefore, caused separate and identifiable harm, as K.W. and K.P. were
separately, individually wrestled, pistol whipped, tied-up, and later put into the trunk of a
motor vehicle. In addition, the record further shows that the offenses were
chronologically committed separately, sequentially, with the boys first being pistol
whipped and subdued, and thereby assaulted, in the basement of appellant’s home, and
only subsequently, after Cruz was contacted to drive over with a pick-up vehicle, then
taken upstairs out of the basement, taken outside, and put into the trunk of a vehicle, and
thereby kidnapped.
{¶ 27} Accordingly, upon our de novo review, we find that the record shows that
the offenses involved separate victims, with separate harms, and were committed
separately. Therefore, in accord with Scott, Gilmer, and R.C. 2941.25, the trial court
properly found that the crimes were not allied offenses of similar import and did not
merge for sentencing purposes.
{¶ 28} On consideration whereof, the judgment of the Lucas County Court of
Common Pleas is hereby affirmed. Appellant is ordered to pay the costs of this appeal
pursuant to App.R. 24.
Judgment affirmed.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to App.R. 27.
See, also, 6th Dist.Loc.App.R. 4.
Thomas J. Osowik, J.
JUDGE
Christine E. Mayle, J.
JUDGE
Myron C. Duhart, J.
CONCUR. JUDGE
This decision is subject to further editing by the Supreme Court of
Ohio’s Reporter of Decisions. Parties interested in viewing the final reported
version are advised to visit the Ohio Supreme Court’s web site at:
http://www.supremecourt.ohio.gov/ROD/docs/.
